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Abstract 
 
THE METAPHYSICS OF IMPROVISATION 
 
by 
 
Tobyn C. DeMarco 
 
 
 
Adviser:  Professor Nickolas Pappas 
 
 In “The Metaphysics of Improvisation,” I criticize wrongheaded metaphysical views of, 
and theories about, improvisation, and put forward a cogent metaphysical theory of 
improvisation, which includes action theory, an analysis of the relevant genetic and aesthetic 
properties, and ontology (work-hood). 
 The dissertation has two Parts.  Part I is a survey of the history of many improvisational 
practices, and of the concept of improvisation.  Here I delineate, sketch, and sort out the often 
vague boundaries between improvising and non-improvising within many art forms and genres, 
including music, dance, theatre, motion pictures, painting, and literature.  In addition, I discuss 
the concept of non-artistic improvisation in various contexts.  I attempt to portray an accurate 
picture of how improvisation functions, or does not function, in various art forms and genres. 
 Part II addresses metaphysical issues in, and problems and questions of, improvisation in 
the arts.  I argue that that continuum and genus-species models are the most cogent ways to 
understand the action-types of improvising and composing and their relations.  I demonstrate that 
these models are substantiated by an informed investigation and phenomenology of 
improvisational practice, action theory conceptual analysis, cognitive neuroscience studies and 
experiments, cognitive psychology studies and models, and some theories of creativity.  In 
addition, I provide a constraint based taxonomy for classifying improvisations that is compatible 
 v 
with, and supports, the continuum model.  Next, I address epistemological and ontological issues 
involving the genetic properties of improvisations, and the properties “improvisatory,” and “as if 
improvised.”  Finally, I show that arguments against treating, or classifying, improvisations as 
works are weak or erroneous, and by focusing on music, I provide a correct ontological theory of 
work-hood for artistic improvisations. 
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PREFACE 
 
I must admit that I have an attraction to heresies, and that my sympathies naturally tend 
to be with the cranks and doubters and against well-established doctrines.  But this is not 
because I enjoy controversy.  Rather, it is because, like Dewey, I believe that the search 
for knowledge is as often impeded by faulty assumptions and by a limited creative vision 
for alternatives as by a lack of necessary tools for critical evidence.  So I will have 
achieved my intent if, in the process of recounting my thoughts on this mystery, I leave a 
few unquestioned assumptions more questionable, make some counter-intuitive 
alternatives more plausible, and provide a new vantage point from which to reflect upon 
human uniqueness.   
—Terrence W. Deacon, The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of Language and the 
Brain (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1997), 15. 
 
  
Just ten years ago, one would have had to provide a lengthy preface to justify a 
philosophical study of improvisation.  A justification is no longer needed.  Now the 
interdisciplinary study of improvisation is plentiful and of mostly high quality. 
In this dissertation, I provide a cogent metaphysical theory of artistic improvisation.  I 
argue for a continuum model for understanding the distinction between improvising and 
composing (action theory), and attach a taxonomic system for classifying improvisations.  Next, 
I criticize arguments that conclude that improvisations are not works of art.  Lastly, I argue that 
improvisations are works of art, and provide a proper ontological theory of the work for artistic 
improvisations. 
 xi 
EPIGRAPH 
 
 
Now I shall spy on beauty as none has 
Spied on it yet.  Now I shall cry out as 
None has cried out.  Now I shall try what none 
Has tried.  Now I shall do what none has done. 
And speaking of this wonderful machine: 
I’m puzzled by the difference between 
Two methods of composing:  A, the kind 
Which goes on solely in the poet’s mind, 
A testing of performing words, while he 
Is soaping a third time one leg, and B, 
The other kind, much more decorous, when 
He’s in his study writing with a pen. 
 
In method B the hand supports the thought, 
The abstract battle is concretely fought. 
The pen stops in mid-air, then swoops to bar 
A canceled sunset or restore a star, 
And thus it physically guides the phrase 
Toward faint daylight through the inky maze. 
 
But method A is agony!  The brain 
Is soon enclosed in a steel cap of pain. 
A muse in overalls directs the drill 
Which grinds and which no effort of the will 
Can interrupt, while the automaton 
Is taking off what he has just put on 
Or walking briskly to the corner store 
To buy the paper he had read before. 
 
Why is it so?  Is it, perhaps, because 
In penless work there is no pen-poised pause 
And one must use three hands at the same time, 
Having to choose the necessary rhyme, 
Hold the completed line before one’s eyes, 
And keep in mind all the preceding tries? 
Or is the process deeper with no desk 
To prop the false and hoist the poetesque? 
For there are those mysterious moments when 
Too weary to delete, I drop my pen; 
I ambulate--and by some mute command 
The right word flutes and perches on my hand. 
 
—Vladimir Nabokov, Pale Fire, Canto Four, lines 835-872. 
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Part I:  History and Conceptual Landscape 
 
 Part I is an historical and conceptual survey of my first-order subject (improvisation), and 
it outlines some preliminary matters necessary for “doing the philosophy” of Part II:  
Metaphysics.  One of the goals of this part is to disabuse readers of biases and misconceptions 
that they may hold about how and what is classified as improvisation. 
 
 
Improvisation:  The Word(s) 
 
     In 1968 I ran into Steve Lacy on the street in Rome.  I took out my pocket tape 
recorder and asked him to describe in fifteen seconds the difference between 
composition and improvisation.  He answered:  ‘In fifteen seconds the difference 
between composition and improvisation is that in composition you have all the 
time you want  to decide what to say in fifteen seconds, while in improvisation 
you have fifteen seconds.’ 
     His answer lasted fifteen seconds and is still the best formulation of the 
question I know. 
—Frederic Rzewski, “Listen to Lacy,” Wiener Musik Galerie brochure, 1990 
 
 
  The Oxford English Dictionary1 recognizes the following forms of the word:  
improvisate (verb), improvisate (participial adjective--rare), improvisation (noun), improvisatize 
(verb--rare), improvisator (noun), improvisatorial (adjective), improvisatorially (adverb), 
improvisatorize (verb), improvisatory (adjective), improvise (verb), improvising (verbal 
                                                         
1 Oxford English Dictionary, Volume 1 A-O (New York:  Oxford University Press, 1971), 1393; 
original pagination for Volume I:  pp. 119-120.  The epigraph to this section is cited in Derek 
Bailey, Improvisation: Its Nature and Practice in Music (New York: Da Capo, 1992), 141. 
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substantive), improvise (substantive--rare), improvised (participial adjective), improvisedly 
(adverb), improviser (noun).  Here are some definitions: 
 
improvisation - 1. The action of improvising or composing extempore.  2. The 
production or execution of anything off-hand; any work or structure produced on 
the spur of the moment. 
 
improvisatorial - 1. Of, pertaining to, or of the nature of an improviser; relating to 
or having the power of extempore composition or oratory. 
 
improvise - 1. transitive To compose (verse, music, etc.) on the spur of the 
moment; to utter or perform extempore.  2. To bring about or get up on the spur of 
the moment; to provide for the occasion.  3. intransitive To compose, utter, or 
perform verse or music impromptu; to speak extemporaneously; hence, do 
anything on the spur of the moment. 
 
improvised - Composed or uttered off-hand; invented or produced on the spur of 
the moment or for the occasion. 
 
improvisedly - 1. In an improvised or unpremeditated manner; impromptu, 
extempore.  2. Without forethought, impudently, precipitately 
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A few comments are due.  First, one notices that an action is involved:  producing, inventing, 
composing, uttering, or performing.  Second, there is a sense of how the aforementioned actions 
are performed:  off-hand, on the spur of the moment, extempore, impromptu, for the occasion, 
unpremeditated.  The “for the occasion” phrase expresses the strong sense of the action and/or 
the product of the action being temporary, fleeting, ephemeral, but also necessary or needed.  In 
addition, there seems to be an implicit attribution about the agent or the agent’s psychological 
states as evidenced by “unrehearsed, not forethought, unpremeditated, spontaneous.” 
 The etymology of the word implies something temporal, i.e., not being provided for in 
the future, a lack of a plan, as in “unforeseen.”  Thus, John Ayto says:  “[19] Etymologically, if 
you improvise something, it is because it has not been ‘provided’ for in advance.  The word 
come via French improviser from the Italian adjective improvviso ‘extempore,’ a descendent of 
Latin improvisus ‘unforeseen.’  This in turn was formed from the negative prefix in- and the past 
participle of providere ‘foresee’ (source of English provide).  The earliest recorded use of the 
verb in English is by Benjamin Disraeli in Vivian Grey 1826:  ‘He possessed also the singular 
faculty of being able to improvise quotations.’  (The closely related improvident ‘not providing 
for the future’ [16] preserves even more closely the sense of its Latin original.)”2  The first 
recorded appearance of “improvisation” is thought to be in the eighteenth century by Tobias 
George Smollett, who was a Scottish man of letters known especially for his picaresque novels. 
 The Oxford Dictionary of Word Histories indicates that “improvise [early 19th century]  
This comes from French improviser (or its source, Italian improvvisare from improvviso 
                                                         
2
John Ayto, Bloombury Dictionary of Word Origins, Bloombury Reference (London: 
Bloombury, 1990), 296.  The first recorded instance of “improvise” being the nineteenth century 
by Disraeli is confirmed by The Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology, eds. C.T. Onions, 
G.W.S. Friedrichsen, and R.W. Burchfield (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press, 
1966), 466. 
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‘extempore’) from Latin improvisus ‘unforeseen’.  The base is Latin provisus, the past participle 
of providere ‘make preparation for’.”3  Similarly for “impromptu [mid 17th century]  This word 
was first used as an adverb.  It is from French, from Latin in promptu ‘in readiness’, from 
promptus ‘prepared, ready’.”4  In addition, the combination of the Latin “in,” which functions 
like “un” in English, and the verb “provideo,” which means to foresee, to see in advance, 
indicates a strong sense of lack of planning.  Also used in later Latin, was “de” or “ex” 
“improviso” (sometimes without the preposition), which functioned as adverbs meaning 
suddenly or unexpectedly.  For “spontaneous” this dictionary indicates “[mid 17th century]  This 
is based on late Latin spontaneus, from the phrase (sua) sponte ‘of (one’s) own accord’.”5 
 In Europe the term “improvise” seems to have been associated with improvised poetry 
and the like, probably including lyrics to various song forms.  Published in Venice in 1612, the 
Vocabolario degli Accademici della Crusca attempted to retain the purity of the Tuscan dialect, 
in part by citing usage in texts.  Based on a passage from a text dated between 1304 and 1309, 
improvisation is associated with “subito, cioè senza pensare, o premeditare.”6  In 1636, Lorenzo 
Franciosini’s Vocabolario italiano spagnolo7 defines “improvisare” as “comporre versi senza 
                                                         
3 Glynnis Chantrell, ed., The Oxford Dictionary of Word Histories (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2002): 265. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid., 479. 
6 Leslie Korrick, “Improvisation in the Visual Arts:  The View from Sixteenth-Century Italy,” in 
Improvisation in the Arts of the Middle Ages and Renaissance, Early Drama, Art, and Music 
Monograph Series, Volume 30, ed. Timothy J. McGee (Kalamazoo, MI: Medieval Institute 
Publications, Western Michigan University, 2003), 293.  Translation:  “quickly, namely without 
thinking or premediation.” The usage is in Pietro de’ Crescenzio, Trattato dell’ agricoltura, 
Italian translation of his Opus ruralium commodorum. 
7 Lorenzo Franciosini, Vocabolario italiano spagnolo (Geneva: Pietro Marcello, 1636). 
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pensarvi.”8  As noted by Pietropaolo, a bit later the term becomes associated with improvised 
theatre dialogue, especially in the well-known Commedia dell’Arte, which was originally called 
commedia all’improvviso.9  After the Renaissance period to about 1810, various adverbs and 
adverbial phrases were used to indicate forms of improvisation.  Here is a sampling:10 
 
Latin:  ex improviso, ac improvisa, ex tempore, ex sorte, fortuita, repente, ad placitum, ad 
libitum, sine arte, sine meditatione 
 
Italian:  de improviso, all’ improvise, all’ improvistà, all spoveduta, sprovedutamente, 
estemporaneamente, all’ impronto 
 a caso, alla mente, a piacere, ad arbitrio, do fantasia, senza arte 
 
French:  à l’impourvue, à l’improviste, impromptu, sur-le-champ, de tête à plasir, à phantasie, 
sans règle ni dessein 
 
                                                         
8 Cited in Domenico Pietropaolo, “Improvisation in the Arts,” in Improvisation in the Arts of the 
Middle Ages and Renaissance, Early Drama, Art, and Music Monograph Series, Volume 30, ed. 
Timothy J. McGee (Kalamazoo, MI:  Medieval Institute Publications, Western Michigan 
University, 2003),  3. 
9 Ibid., 3.  Pietropaolo also indicates that the first instance of “Commedia dell’Arte” is in Carlo 
Osvaldo Goldoni’s Il Teatro Comico, published in 1750. 
10 This list was culled by Stephen Blum and enhanced by me.  See Stephen Blum, “Recognizing 
Improvisation.”  In In the Course of Performance: Studies in the World of Musical 
Improvisation, Chicago Studies in Ethnomusicology Series, eds. Bruno Nettl and Melinda 
Russell (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 37. 
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German:  unvorsehender Weise, unversehens, auf der Stelle, aus dem Stegereif,11 auf zufällige 
Art, aus dem Kopfe, unbedachtsam 
 
English:  unexpected, on the spur of the moment, by chance, on the sudden, accidently 
 
Some terms emphasize the temporal element; some focus on mental states (or in some cases the 
lack of mental states such as thinking, e.g., “aus dem Kopfe,” “sine meditatione,” and 
“unbedachtsam” literally meaning thoughtless.  Still others suggest randomness and artlessness.   
 It is interesting to note that in Johnson’s Dictionary,12 there is no entry for “improvise” 
or “improvisation.”  However, there are entries for “improvided, improvidence, improvident, 
improvidently, improvision.”  All of these entries are strongly related to the Latin etymology.  
For example, Johnson gives the definition of “improvided” as “Unforeseen; unexpected; 
unprovided against,” and “improvidence” and “improvision” as “Want of forethought.” 
 Stephen Blum usefully summarizes the history of the terms in Europe: 
The development of the European terms for improvisatory practices began with adverbs 
and adverbial phrases …, then continued with verbs and nouns for specific practices or 
genres (e.g., sortisare and sortisatio, ricercare and ricercar), and nouns for agents (e.g., 
Italian improvvisatore).  Only in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have the new verb 
improvise, the noun improvisation, and their cognates in other languages been treated as 
general terms, applicable to a number of practices (though sometimes used as substitutes 
for older terms with a more restricted reference).13 
 
                                                         
11 In contemporary German, the phrase would be “aus dem Stegreif.” 
12 Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language:  In Which the Words Are Deduced 
from Their Originals Explained in Their Different Meanings, and Authorized by the Names of 
Their Writers in Whose Works They Are Found. (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1756, 1994), 
378. 
13 Blum, 36. 
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The French used the phrases jouer de tête (which is similar to the German aus dem Kopfe) and 
préluder as synonyms for improviser.  Jean Jacques Rousseau claims to have introduced the verb 
improviser into French from Italian, but this is wrong because the term appears in the great 
dictionary of Oudin in 1660 and Rousseau’s dictionary appears about a century later.  Rousseau 
defines it as:  “improviser – C’est faire & chanter impromptu des Chansons, Airs & paroles, 
qu’on accompagnecommunément d’une Guitarre ou autre pareil instrument.  Il n’y a rien de plus 
commun en Italie, que de voir deux Masques se rencontrer, se défier, s’attaquer, se riposter ainsi 
par des couplets sur le même air, avec une vivacité de Dialogue, de Chant, d’Accompagnement 
dont il faut avoir été temoin pour la comprendre.  Le mot improvisar est purement Italien:  mais 
comme il se rapporte à la musique, j’ai été constraint de la franciser pour faire entendre ce qu’il 
signifie.”14  In 1821, a dictionary of music has this definition:  “improviser – C’est faire et 
executer impromptu un morceau de musique vocale ou instrumentale.  Il y a d’excellens 
improvisateurs parmi les piansites.  En Italie, on rencontre des chanteurs qui improvisent en 
même temps les paroles et la musique.”15  The composer André Ernest Modeste Grétry uses 
improviser in his manual of 1803.16  Blum points out that in the famous reference work 
Musikalisches Lexikon (1802) of Heinrich Christoph Koch17 the verb improvisieren is given the 
following meaning:  “Improvisieren – die Geschicklichkeit eines Tonsetzers, über ein ihm noch 
unbekanntes Gedicht sogleich aus dem Stegreife eine Komposition zu vertigen unde solche 
zugleich singend unter der Begleitung eines Instrumentes vorzutragen.  Überlegung des Textes 
                                                         
14 Jean Jacques Rousseau, Dictionnaire de musique (Paris: Duchesne, 1768). 
15 Castile-Blaze, Dictionnaire de musique moderne (Paris: Magasin de Musique de la Lyre 
Moderne, 1821). 
16 André Ernest Modeste Grétry, Méthode simple pour apprendre à préluder en peu de tempe 
avec toutes les resources de l’harmonie (Paris: Imprimerie de la République, 1803). 
17 Heinrich Christoph Koch, Musikalisches Lexikon (Frankfurt: Hermann, 1802). 
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geschiet, kann sehr oft für den Tonsetzer ein Mittel warden, die Thätigkeit seines Genies zu 
reitzen, oder sich in denjenigen Zustand zu versetzen, den man die Begeisterung nennet.”18  
Even up to about 1820 Germans would have used the verbs fantasieren or präludieren to 
indicate improvising on a keyboard.19  There is at least one instance of Beethoven using 
fantasieren in his writing, and another use of phantisiren.20  In the nineteenth century, Chopin 
used the Polish term improwizowac. 
 So, did people of a particular culture improvise before the word (or concept) entered their 
language?  Of course they did.  They did not describe their actions with this word, but they 
certainly had available other concepts which communicated similar meanings.  So what did they 
call it?  How did they conceive of what they were doing?  Moreover, when did distinctions 
among generative or productive practices come about?  Next, I shall survey the historical and 
conceptual landscape of improvisation to attempt to answer these and other questions. 
 The history of improvisation has not been as extensively studied as other artistic 
phenomena, but there are sources focusing on various art forms, genres, and time periods.  Of 
course, there are bits and pieces in sources that do not focus on improvisation per se.  Ernst 
Ferand’s Die Improvisation in der Musik21 is the most comprehensive history of improvisation in 
Western art music.  Jeff Pressing has also provided a history, especially for keyboard music, in a 
                                                         
18 Koch, 778. 
19 Blum, 38. 
20 Ibid., 39. 
21 Ernst Ferand, Die Improvisation in der Musik:  Eine Entwicklungsgeschictliche und 
Psychologische Untersuchung (Zurich: Rhein-Verlag, 1938).  This book has not been translated 
into English (as of 2012).  The fact that this book has not been translated into English may reveal 
something about the status of scholarship on improvisation. 
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series of articles.22  Daniel Belgrad’s The Culture of Spontaneity is an excellent source for the 
post war period in the United States.23  A virtue of Belgrad’s book is that he addresses all art 
forms. 
 
 How has improvisation been defined in music?  Here are the remarks of Nicolas 
Slonimsky from his famous Lectionary of Music: 
 
Improvisation.  From the Latin improvisus, “unforeseen,” and ex improviso, “without 
preparation.”  In music, improvisation denotes the art of a completely spontaneous 
performance without a preliminary plan.  Formerly, improvisation was regarded as 
integral to the craft of composition.  Organists in particular were emboldened to 
improvise freely on a given hymn tune.  Among the greatest improvisers on the organ 
were Frescobaldi and Buxtehude.  Bach was a master of organ improvisation in the fugal 
style.  As a child, Mozart included improvisations at his performances at the European 
courts.  Beethoven’s improvisations for his musical friends left an overwhelming 
impression.  At his recitals, Liszt asked musicians in the audience to give him subjects for 
free improvisations and amazed them by the spontaneity of his invention.  Organ 
improvisations have continued to be the stock in trade of organists in the 20th century, 
but public improvisations by pianists gradually fell into disfavor.  Some doubt persists 
whether the supposedly spontaneous improvisations were not in fact prepared in advance.  
One type of talented improviser on the piano, unfortunately extinct, was represented by 
pianists in the silent movies early in the century.  Some of them had a real flair for 
enhancing the visual image on the screen while producing music of considerable validity.  
Jazz players have brought the art of improvisation to a new height of brilliance, 
especially in collective improvisations occurring in jam sessions.
24
 
 
Slonimsky makes unwarranted assumptions in this definition.  For example, the phrase “without 
a preliminary plan” is a common misconception.  In many of the examples I discuss in Part I, we 
shall see that that is false. 
                                                         
22 Jeff Pressing, “A History of Musical Improvisation to 1600,” Keyboard 10, no. 11 (1984): 64-
68; and Jeff Pressing, “A History of Musical Improvisation:  1600-1900,” Keyboard 11, no. 12 
(1984): 59-67. 
23 Daniel Belgrad, The Culture of Spontaneity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998). 
24
 Nicolas Slonimsky, Lectionary of Music: An Entertaining Reference and Reader’s Companion 
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1989), 229. 
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 It is well-known that Bach, Mozart, and Beethoven were excellent improvisers, often 
giving performances for friends and others.25  In contemporary art music, there are many 
examples.  Terry Riley’s In C is a notable case because it gives minimal figures for musicians to 
play as they feel.  Many other contemporary compositions are based upon scores of visual 
material that are to be interpreted by players/performers.  Consequently, many of these works, if 
they can be called works at all, will have indefinitely many instantiations.  Each performance 
can, and usually does, result in a unique sound sequence.  Silent film piano playing was largely 
improvised, as Slonimsky pointed out above.  There is a very strong improvised organ playing 
tradition.  In this part, I will review many of the different forms of improvisation in Western art 
and popular music, and some non-Western musical cultures. 
 Improvisation has had a central role in jazz, classical Persian, and classical Indian music.  
David Demsey, writing in the The Oxford Companion to Jazz says that there at least two major 
misconceptions about improvisation in jazz music.  “One is that it [jazz improvisation] simply 
involves ‘playing whatever comes to mind’ or ‘being spontaneous.’  This idea is naturally drawn 
from dictionary definitions of the term, which commonly contain words such offhand or spur of 
the moment.”26  Clearly, if this view were correct, then jazz musicians would have little need to 
practice, besides for the development of general facility on their instruments.  The “second 
misconception is that jazz improvisation is created by divine intervention.”27  The basic idea here 
is that there is no or little improvisational skill, and perhaps the denial of agency to improvisers.  
                                                         
25 Other famous improvisers in the western art music tradition are Francesco Landini, Paulus 
Hofhaimer, Sweelinck, Frescobaldi, Buxtehude, Handel, Moscheles, Liszt, Franck, and 
Bruckner. 
26 David Demsey, “Jazz Improvisation and Concepts of Virtuosity,” The Oxford Companion to 
Jazz, ed. Bill Kirchner (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 788. 
27 Ibid., 789. 
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Some musicians are just lucky to be the recipients of such divine manna.  This recalls the 
Platonic Ion theory of inspiration and the later romantic theories influenced by it.  There are few 
serious people who hold this view today.  Although, if one has ever been privileged to directly 
experience a master improviser, one recognizes that one begins to have strange thoughts.  Genius 
will do that to sufficiently sensitive and sophisticated people.  We have these thoughts, too, with 
respect to non-improvising performers (Glenn Gould, Jascha Heifetz, Martha Argerich, Maria 
Callas, Pablo Casals comes to mind, but pick your favorites here).28  The fact is that there are 
improvisational skills, many of which are domain specific, jazz performance education (for 
example) is possible, and practicing is crucial for successful jazz improvisers. 
 Another definition:  “Improvisation is the practice of creating a musical composition on 
the spur of the moment, without reference to a pre-existing score, memory, notes or sketches.  
Putting it as simply as possible, it involves ‘making it up as you go along’.”29  Notice this 
definition says that improvisation results in a composition.  In Part II, I shall take up the issue of 
comparing and contrasting composing with improvising, and compositions with improvisations.  
Here is a working definition by neuroscientists who experimented with spontaneous music 
generation:  “Spontaneous musical performance, whether through singing or playing an 
instrument, can be defined as the immediate, on-line improvisation of novel melodic, harmonic, 
and rhythmic musical elements within a relevant musical context.”30  The problems here are that 
                                                         
28 Lewis Thomas says:  “Music is the effort we make to explain to ourselves how our brains 
work.  We listen to Bach transfixed because this is listening to a human mind.”  From Lewis 
Thomas, The Medusa and the Snail:  More Notes of a Biology Watcher, (New York:  Viking, 
1979); quoted in William Calvin, How Brains Think:  Evolving Intelligence, Then and Now, 
Science Masters Series (New York:  Basic Books, 1997), 108. 
29 Brian Levine, liner notes to Jean Guillou, The Art of Improvisation, Dorian Recordings, 1991, 
2. 
30 Charles J. Limb and Allen R. Braun, “Neural Substrates of Spontaneous Musical performance:  
An fMRI Study of Jazz Improvisation,” PLoS ONE 3, no. 2 (February 2008): e1679. 
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the term “improvisation is used in the definition, on-line and novel are vague terms.  I hope to 
clarify some of these matters. 
 
 There are many synonyms and nuanced terms for the practice of improvising, and related 
phenomena (and some not so related, as we shall see).  Here is a list of words and phrases: 
 
improvisation, improvising, improv, ad libbing, ad libitum, off the cuff, soloing, 
spontaneous creation/composition/making, on the spot, making it up as we go 
along, spontaneous composition, real-time composition, blowing, jam, jam 
session, chase, impromptu, ex tempore, extemporize, fill-in, unrehearsed, free 
improvisation, scat and scatting, faking, fabricating, stopgap, makeshift, 
MacGyverize or to MacGyver, MacGyverism, bricoleur, bricolage, adhocism, a 
piacere, ornamentation and embellishment, figured bass (basso continuo, 
thoroughbass, bassus generalis, Generalbass), sortisatio (sortisare), 
Contrappunto alla mente, dechant sur le livre (discantus supra librum), discant 
(descant), cadenza, passacaglia (pasacalle, paseo), ritornellos (riprese), ossia, 
stream of consciousness, commedia dell’arte, fantasia, capriccio (caprice), 
ricercar (ricercare, ricercata, recercada), free association, action painting, 
Tachisme, non-editing and non-revising, free association, cut-up technique, 
nonsense and asemic writing, automatic drawing and writing (Dada, ideomotor 
effect), variation, parody, aleatory (chance music, mobile/open form), taqsim, 
tanan, niraval, tani avartanam, anibaddha, estilar and estillistas, bertsolaritza. 
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Some of these words and phrases are exactly equivalent in meaning and use.  Others capture 
specific nuances.  The different, but related, meanings derive from the fact that many of these 
words are used, more or less, exclusively for one art form or genre, or they are used non-
artistically.  For example, “embellishment” and “ornamentation” are synonyms, and “improv” is 
just a colloquial term used for improvisation mainly by the theatre and comedy community.  Ad 
libbing, ad libitum, ex tempore, and extemporize are all general synonyms for any kind of 
improvising.  “Blowing” is a colloquial term used in jazz for improvisation, especially solo 
improvisation with or without accompaniment.  “Soloing” is a term used in jazz, rock, and some 
popular music for solo improvisation with or without accompaniment.  Jam and jam session are 
primarily used in jazz, rock, and other popular music contexts.  The Oxford Dictionary of 
Popular Music says that jam is “The art of informal collective jazz improvisation.  Hence a jam-
session, when such music-making took place.  Earlier the word was occasionally used as a 
synonym for all jazz.”31  As I mentioned, today the term is used outside of jazz, and may be 
attributed to both informal and more formal performance contexts.  Often, one hears of live jam 
sessions of rock musicians.32  After professional engagements, there are still late night jam 
sessions of especially younger musicians at certain New York City jazz clubs.  Let us investigate 
in more detail several groups of these terms and concepts.  “Scatting” is vocal improvisation by a 
singer or group of singers, often mimicking the sound of musical instruments.  The scatting may 
use meaningful units of discourse or nonsensical (in the literal sense) sounds or some 
                                                         
31 The Oxford Dictionary of Popular Music, ed. Peter Gammond (New York:  Oxford University 
Press, 1991), 288. 
32 The most notable example of this, and perhaps one of the first instances of it being intentional, 
is the Grateful Dead rock group.  In fact an early recording (1968) is classified as “free” 
collective rock improvisation:  Anthem of the Sun.  And this probably accounts for the huge 
bootleg industry of live recording of their concerts (that and the fact that they allowed audience 
members to do so, even allowing some to place microphones on stage). 
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combination of both.  However, not all scatting is improvised.  Scatting sections of tunes may be 
prepared and rehearsed before performances.  Unfortunately, the same term is used of all 
vocalizations of this type.  Louis Armstrong, Ella Fitzgerald, Lamberts Hendricks and Ross, 
Bobby McFerrin, and George Benson are notable examples of improvised scatting. 
 Not all of these terms always refer to a process of improvising in the generative sense.  
By “generative” I mean how some action is performed or executed.  Simply, one may perform an 
action that is improvised, or perform an action in some non-improvised fashion (much more on 
this distinction in Part II).  The same goes for the terms for the products or outcomes of 
activities.  But there is a group of terms that have a relation to improvisation, or in some cases 
have been mistakenly associated with improvisation.  Here is such a group: 
 
one of the main musical meanings of “impromptu,” fantasia, ricercar (ricercata, 
recercada), capriccio (caprice), ossia, Tachisme, cut-up technique, some forms of 
“stream of consciousness” writing, nonsense and asemic writing, variation, 
parody, “aleatory” composition techniques, some “cadenzas,” unrehearsed, some 
forms of “ornamentation” in music, some Beat genre writing 
unconscious/subconscious doings both artistic and non-artistic. 
 
 I shall address the easy ones first.  Improvisation may be a good way of tapping into the 
unconscious or subconscious, if there is such a thing, but clearly not all of the putative products 
of the unconscious are improvisations.  If I am yelling at my friend for something very 
inconsequential, and it turns out that some unconscious state (I am unaware of it), such as 
jealousy, is my motivation for doing so, I am not thereby improvising.  There is a relationship 
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between improvisation and the unconscious or subconscious, and I shall later discuss some of 
them, but one certainly does not want to equate them, or claim that tapping into or using the 
“unconscious” is a necessary condition for improvising.  If by unconscious or subconscious one 
means the kinds of things that are posited and/or discovered by cognitive science, then clearly 
these states are involved, because these unconscious states of mind are involved in all mental and 
motor functioning.  So, that there is a connection between improvisation and unconscious states 
on this understanding of the term is trivial.  However, one often sees the definite article used 
before the term “unconscious.”  In this case, there is usually something else going on.  When the 
term “the unconscious” is used, it comes with a loftier metaphysical commitment than the 
cognitive science or neuroscience sense.  Often, the Freudian sense is used, or the Jungian 
collective unconscious is meant, or even a Hindu version of Atman (universal self) or Brahman 
(the Absolute).  I will take no position on the metaphysics of such entities here, but it is worth 
pointing out that there is a vivid history of making strong connections between improvisation, 
spontaneity, and “the unconscious.”  Daniel Belgrad, in his excellent book The Culture of 
Spontaneity:  Improvisation in the Arts in Postwar America,33 points out that the emergence of 
the “aesthetics of spontaneity” in all of the arts in postwar Unites States had as one of its main 
influences the special access to the unconscious provided by various spontaneous actions.  This 
influence was strong in the development of action art, abstract expressionism, Black Mountain 
Arts and Beat movement, Charles Olson’s composition by field, and Gestalt psychology. The 
Beats could be interpreted as trying to incorporate conscious and unconscious experience; other 
artists and movements attempted linking so-called “primitive” or tribal art to the then 
contemporary art scene.  There is no doubt that these post-war movements were influenced by 
                                                         
33 Daniel, Belgrad, The Culture of Spontaneity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998).  
See my review of this book in The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism (1999): 384-385. 
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the pre-war movements of the Dadaists and surrealists.  Some of the Dadaists and surrealists, 
especially those involved in “automatic writing and painting,” made explicit claims about 
tapping into the unconscious.  It is not completely clear what is meant by such claims, but 
phenomena like automatic writing have now been explained in terms of a well-known and well-
studied phenomenon called “ideomotor-action effect.”  Ideomotor-action effects are supposedly 
unconscious movements (not voluntary), which are usually attributed to some paranormal or 
parapsychological phenomenon by its proponents.  These parapsychological explanations are no 
longer necessary because of our understanding of ideomotor-action effects now.34  Ideomotor 
effects were labeled thus by William James.35  Some traditional examples of automatisms are 
spinning tables and the like in séances, divining rods, Chevreuil’s illusion, and automatic 
writing.36  Automatic writing goes back as far as the nineteenth century; however, the Dadaists 
used this alleged phenomenon for artistic purposes.37  Bargh et alii define automatic ideomotor-
action effect as “merely thinking about a behavior makes it more likely to occur, even if it is 
unintended …”38  These kinds of actions, if framed appropriately, could be used for artistic 
generation (excluding the issue of their aesthetic value), and could be counted as a method of 
improvisation.  But ideomotor-action automaticity is neither sufficient nor necessary for 
                                                         
34 See, for example, John A.Bargh, Mark Chen, and Lara Burrows.  “Automaticity of Social 
Behavior:  Direct Effects of Trait Construct and Stereotype Activation on Action.”  Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology 71, no. 2 (1996): 230-244.  Also see D.M. Wegner, The 
Illusion of Conscious Will (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002). 
35 William James, The Principles of Psychology Volume 2 (New York: Henry Holt, 1890, 1905), 
526. 
36 On automatic writing in general, see Anita M. Muhl, Automatic Writing (Dresden: Theodor 
Steinkopff, 1930). 
37 For an excellent philosophical examination of automatic writing by the Dadaists, see Paisley 
Livingston, Art and Intention: A Philosophical Study (New York: Oxford University Press, 
Clarendon Press, 2005). 
38 Bargh, 232. 
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improvisation.  Thus, I am willing to call some of the Dadaists’ writing improvisational texts.  
The supposed “automaticity” of spontaneous writing and painting may be simply a reflection of 
the fact that these actions are not fully intentional in the ordinary sense. This, however, does not 
mean that the actions are not intentional, the product of an intentional psychology.  One is still 
intending to write or paint spontaneously.39 
 Free association, whatever it is, can be a source or technique of improvisation, and if 
performed in the right context could be a way of improvising.  Perhaps, free association in the 
analyst’s office should also be classified as improvisation, or a form of improvisation.40  I do not 
think there will be deleterious logical consequences for doing so.  And if one accepts traditional 
psychoanalytic theory, one is tapping into the unconscious while free associating.  But even if 
one were not, it could still be a form of improvisation.  Hence, one may want to say that free 
association in any context other than artistic production is simply a form of non-artistic 
improvisation, which may have instrumental value in therapy, or some intrinsic interest if done 
in a proper context (e.g., interview show, part of comedy routine or sketch, et cetera).  This 
thought is substantiated by the fact that much art and music therapy involves the patient or client 
improvising individually and in groups.41 
 “Ossia” is a term borrowed from Italian to indicate alternative versions of a score, or 
parts of a score.  Often, these alternatives were easier to play, but in the case of Beethoven 
                                                         
39 I address these issues in Part II:  Metaphysics, Action Theory, and in the Literary Arts section 
below. 
40 See Philip A. Ringstrom, “Cultivating the Improvisational in Psychoanalytic Treatment,” 
Psychoanalytic Dialogues 11, no. 5 (2001): 727-754. 
41 See Colin Lee, “The Analysis of Therapeutic Improvisatory Music,” in Art and Music Therapy 
and Research, eds. Andrea Gilroy and Colin Lee (New York: Routledge, 1995), 35-50; and 
Leslie Bunt, Music Therapy: An Art Beyond Words (New York: Routledge, 1994).  The locus 
classicus here is Kenneth Bruscia, Improvisational Models in Music Therapy (Springfield, IL: 
Charles C. Thomas, 1987). 
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(among others), his ossia were just as difficult as the originals.  Deciding which version to play 
during a performance is usually determined by a conductor, performer, or teacher beforehand (no 
improvisation); however, in rare cases performers have allowed themselves to choose among 
alternatives while performing.  This is akin to determining how many repeats will be taken while 
performing (or even recording, as long as it is decided while the recording is taking place, not 
before it).  The reasons for this kind of performance practice might have something to do with 
how well or poorly a performance was going, the immediate mood of the performer, the desire to 
add some mild spontaneity to the event, or the result of “reading” the audience.  I am willing to 
count these real-time choices as a very moderate form of improvisation. 
 Being unrehearsed is a more slippery concept than one might think.  Where and what are 
the boundaries for rehearsing?  One day before?  Two?  One year?  All of those years practicing 
scales and arpeggios when a child?  How much of a piece must not be rehearsed?  All of it?  
Some of it?  Obviously, one can perform a previously composed piece of music without 
rehearsing.   This kind of performance may not be excellent, but a good sight reader could do it, 
and perhaps do it fairly well.  This would not be improvisation.  Similarly, it is wrong to think 
(say) that jazz musicians do not rehearse at all.  A jazz musician may have practiced playing over 
a particular set of chord changes hundreds of times; she has practiced scales, modes, riffs, licks, 
famous improvised solos of other musicians, etudes, and exercises.  All of this preparation makes 
possible what we recognize as a paradigm case of improvisation:  the jazz musician solo usually 
with (but can be without) accompaniment (e.g., “rhythm section”).  There are many degrees of 
being rehearsed and not being rehearsed here.  If one uses licks one has practiced hundreds of 
times before a performance, is it improvised?  How much of (say) a jazz solo must be made up 
on the spot?  Is the playing of some mode over a set of changes improvisation?  Does 
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improvisation in jazz just amount to the temporal selection of where the previously prepared 
units (modes, licks, et cetera) are executed?  The answer to the last question is no, but these 
questions raise difficult problems for a theory of improvisation, especially the metaphysics of 
improvisation.  These problems will be addressed in Part II.  For now, I want to say that the 
rehearsed/unrehearsed distinction is not particularly helpful in deciding whether some event has 
been improvised or not.  Certainly, rehearsal and practice play a role in making distinctions, but 
it may turn out that neither of these concepts is necessary nor sufficient in making the distinction 
between improvised and non-improvised. 
 
Improvisation and the Literary Arts 
 
   This endlessly elaborating poem 
   Displays the theory of poetry, 
   As the life of poetry.  A more severe, 
 
   More harassing master would extemporize 
   Subtler, more urgent proof that the theory 
   Of poetry is the theory of life, 
 
   As it is, in the intricate evasions of as, 
   In things seen and unseen, created from nothingness, 
   The Heavens, the hells, the worlds, the longed-for 
    lands. 
  —Wallace Stevens, “An Ordinary Evening in New Haven,” stanza XXVIII 
 
 The role of improvisation in the literary arts is highly contentious.  The contentiousness 
arises from several concerns.  First, the ancient debate about the source of poetic inspiration and 
how it functions in generating poetry and other literary forms involves questions about the 
relationship between improvisation and composition.  Inspiration and related concepts, of course, 
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are thorny issues.  Second, there are specific debates about the sources and conditions of the 
generation of the Homeric poems, which form the basis of Western literature.  Third, a more 
contemporary problem is that of modernist and avant-garde writers explicitly claiming to 
improvise texts and proffer them as finished works of art.  Finally, there is an entrenched view 
that improvisation only occurs, or should only occur, in performing art forms, and literature is 
not a performing art form.  That view is viciously question begging.  Part of what accounts for 
this bias is the general waning away of oral traditions in favor of written texts and all of the 
associated traditions of the written word.  This is still odd because for most of human history 
since writing was invented most humans have been illiterate.  Consequently, people’s access to 
literary forms of entertainment was primarily through oral performances.  Hence, probably the 
source of the bias stems from the minority literate culture.  That this is so today is peculiar 
because the one art form historically associated with the primitive, natural, and spontaneous is 
poetry and various poetic forms (e.g., songs).  In the ancient period this is revealed through the 
inspiration theory of poetic generation,42 and the existence of  improvised, or partly improvised, 
oral literature both before and after the invention of writing. 
 My concern will be to briefly survey the relations between forms of literature and 
improvisation, to understand the nature of improvised literature, and to clarify the nature of some 
related phenomena.  I will address oratory in the section on Plato and Aristotle below.  A 
discussion of improvised literature will yield the following consequences for understanding 
improvisation:  artistic improvisation can occur outside of performances (at least performances in 
the standard sense), immediacy, the generative actions involved in producing an improvisation 
need not be publicly available. 
                                                         
42 See especially Plato, Phaedrus and Ion. 
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 Improvising texts ought not to be surprising since the history of poetry itself, especially 
the various kinds of epic, are intimately connected to a long, ancient tradition of improvising 
bards and troubadours.  Oral poetry, which could take the form of epics, lyrics, songs and the 
like, has been present in many cultures probably since prehistoric times.  Many of these cultures 
still practice forms of this oral tradition, as in the Basque bertisolaro,43 Serbo-Croatian (Balkan), 
Australian pygmy, various Polynesian cultures, and some African cultures.44  There is a huge 
literature on these traditions and comparative studies; below I shall discuss one significant part of 
this scholarship called the Parry-Lord theory.  But one should not conflate oral literary traditions 
with improvisation.  Now there is no doubt that improvisation was and is involved in some oral 
poetry, but it is not always used in transmission.  The stability of content and form of oral poems 
are fixed by the limits of human memory.  But where and when memory fails, improvisation 
often makes up for the gaps.  For example, one important scholar of the cognitive psychology of 
oral traditions, David C. Rubin, lists several properties of oral traditions but notes that none of 
them are necessary or sufficient.  This set of properties does not include improvisation.45  In 
addition, one form of play humans have engaged in involves a kind of improvisation:  “live” 
word games, punning games, and boute-rimés.  Players must create sequences of words on the 
spot within a set of constraints.  This should be considered an artistic enterprise, without 
necessarily being art, and ought to be classified as improvisation. 
                                                         
43 See Gorka Aulestia, Improvisational Poetry from the Basque Country, Basque Series, trans. 
Lisa Corcostegui and Linda White (Las Vegas, NV: University of Nevada Press, 1990, 1995). 
44 See, especially, Ruth Finnegan, Oral Poetry: Its Nature, Significance and Social Context (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1977). 
45 David C, Rubin, Memory in Oral Traditions: The Cognitive Psychology of Epic, Ballads, and 
Counting-out Rhymes (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 8. 
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 Europe also has significant history of improvised literature.  It begins of course with poet 
performers of ancient Greece, which date back to about 1500 BCE to 2000 BCE.46  The tradition 
exploded in Europe again in the sixteenth century with the Italians.  These improvisers were 
often accompanied by musicians, such as a violinist, who also improvised music during the 
improvised poetic recitation.  The Italian improvvisatore and improvviatrice (improvvisatori 
plural) tradition had an influence on the Romantic poets and European culture in general. 
 During the Medieval period to roughly the fifteenth century minstrels performed songs 
that probably were partly improvised.  Texts were memorized but embellishments often occurred 
during performances.  Both the limits of memory and the vagaries of live performance 
contributed to the need and desire for spontaneous changes.  There were ranks of such itinerant 
poets, bards, and singers.  A “scop” was an Anglo-Saxon term for a maker or shaper and a 
professional poet before the Norman Conquest.47  Within the text of Beowulf itself:  “At times 
the scop, a thane of the king, glorying in words, the great old stories, who remembered them all, 
one after other, song upon song, found new words, bound them up truly, began to recite 
Beowulf’s praise, a well-made lay of his glorious deed, skillfully varied his matter and style.”48  
This passage has been interpreted as revealing the authors’ method:  an improvised blending of 
                                                         
46 Bruno Gentili, Poetry and Its Public in Ancient Greece: From Homer to the Fifth Century, 
trans. A. Thomas Cole (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985, 1988).  Also, see 
William V. Harris, Ancient Literacy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989); George 
B. Walsh, The Varieties of Enchantment: Early Greek Views of the Nature and Function of 
Poetry (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1984); and Thomas Cole, The 
Origins of Rhetoric in Ancient Greece (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991). 
47 A.J. Wyatt and R.W. Chambers, eds., “Beowulf” with Finnsburg Fragment (Cambridge:  
Cambridge University Press, 1914), “Glossary,” s.v. “scop.” 
48 Beowulf, lines 867b-874a, translated by Howell D. Chickering, Jr., Beowulf: A Dual-Language 
Edition (New York: Anchor Books, 1977, 2006). 
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old content with some forms (“songs”) with new material.49  Scholarship has revealed that this is 
the standard practice of most oral literature of the past and present, and is geographically 
pervasive.  A “gleemen” was an itinerant poet below a scop.  “Joglars” were performers of 
poetry from memory.  Troubadours were the next group of poetry and song performer who at 
least partly improvised and embellished at the time of performance.  The classical period of the 
troubadours is roughly 1170 CE – 1220 CE, and there is evidence of such performances until 
about 1350 CE.50 
 Improvisation is particularly important in the history of Italian literature.  Some scholars 
date the beginning of this tradition to the thirteenth century; however, the Golden Period of the 
improvvisatori according to Benedetto Croce and others was roughly 1690 CE – 1840 CE.51  
Some scholars believe these improvvisatori influenced commedia dell’arte all’improvviso 
theatre.  It is interesting to note that today one sees the name of this genre as only “commedia 
dell’arte,” omitting the significant “all’improvviso.”  The practice developed over time into solo 
performances with and without music accompaniment, and poetic jousts (like jazz “cutting 
sessions”) in which improvisers competed for public approval.  Topics for the improvised verse 
would be provided by the audience during the performance.  Sometimes a single topic would 
                                                         
49 For example (inter alia), Francis P. Magoun, Jr., “The Oral-Formulaic Character of Anglo-
Saxon Narrative poetry,” in An Anthology of “Beowulf” Criticism, ed. Lewis E. Nicholson 
(Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1963), 189-221; and Chickering, op. cit., in 
his Commentary section entitled “The Improvisation of the DanishScop (867b-874a), 313-314. 
50 See the articles by Domenico Pietropaolo, Timothy J. MCGee, and Clifford Davidson in 
Improvisation in the Arts of the Middle Ages and Renaissance, Early Drama, Art, and Music 
Monograph Series, Volume 30, ed.Timothy J. McGee (Kalamazoo, MI: Medieval Institute 
Publications, Western Michigan University, 2003). 
51 Benedetto Croce, “Gl’improvvisatori,” in La letteratura italiana del Settocento (Bari: Laterza 
and Figli, 1949), 299-311.  Also see Caroline Gonda, "The Rise and Fall of the Improvisatore, 
1753-1845," Romanticism 6 (2000): 208. 
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result in an entire two to three hour performance; other times several topics would taken up to 
generate several improvised poems.  From historical accounts, letters, and novels audiences were 
mesmerized.  By the 1840s – 1850s the phenomenon was finished. 
 One of the earliest improvvisatori was a Neapolitan called Camillo Querno.  Perhaps the 
greatest of the eighteenth century was Bernardino Perfetti (1681 – 1746).  Francesco Gianni was 
an official singer of the victories of Napoleon.  Two of the most famous improvvisatore were 
Pietro Metastasio (1698 – 1782) and Tomasso Sgricci (1789-1836).52  Gabriele Rosetti (1783-
1854) claims in his autobiography of 1850 La vita mia to have improvised after hearing 
Quattromani.  The Italian improvvisatori became mythical figures and were a main attraction in 
Italy.  They travelled around Europe and their influence broadened.  There were Eastern 
European improvisers:  improvvatrice Jadwiga Luszczewski (1834-1908) whose pseudonym was 
Deotyma (1850s), the Pole-Lithuanian Adam Bernard Mickiewicz (1798-1855), considered one 
of the greatest Polish poets, was an improviser but had mixed feelings about improvisation and 
his own skills.  Mickiewicz may have been the model for Alexander Pushkin’s (1799-1837) 
unfinished short story Egyptian Nights (circa 1835).  Scholars have made the case that Pushkin 
was impressed by his improvisations.53  In the story, an Italian improviser is presented partly 
negatively, and shown to be unremarkable as a poet.  Mickiewicz even included his own fictional 
improviser in his drama Forefathers, Part Three (1832), wherein the central scene is called “The 
Improvisation.”  Another Russian story, “The Improvisator,” by Vladimir Fyodorovich 
Odoevsky (1803-1869) published around 1833 presents a somewhat harsh view of improvised 
poetry.  A German improviser, Maximilian Leopold Langenschwarz (1801- c. 1860), wrote a 
                                                         
52 Other famous improvvisatori include:  Corilla Olimpica, Bernardo Sestini, A. Boehringer, 
Bartolomeo Lorenzi. 
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manual for improvisers and impromptu speakers:  Die Arithmetik der Sprache, oder:  Der 
Redner durch sich Selbst (1834).  Unlike many of the theories of poetic improvisation, 
Langenschwarz argues that improvisational skill could be acquired through diligence, hard work, 
and the will.  Because of the myth-like status of both the performers and the performances, 
which were no doubt enhanced through gossip and hyperbole, the source of such a talent became 
mysterious.  Where there is mystery, there is a lot of bunk.  Those with mystical leanings 
attributed the talent to an undefined spiritual source and compared improvvisatori to prophets.  
Balzac’s novel Le Lys dans la vallèe (1835) and Joseph-Marie, comte de Maistre’s (1753-1821) 
Les Soirées de Saint-Petersboug ou Entretiens sur le gouvernement temporel de la Providence 
(1821) pursue this line of thinking.  Others attributed it to divine inspiration. 
 The fascination with the improvvisatori is revealed by the number of protagonists who 
are improvvisatori in novels from the late eighteenth century to mid-nineteenth century:  Anne 
Louise Germaine (Madame) de Staël’s Corinne, ou l’Italie (1807); Francesco Furbo’s Andrew of 
Padua, the Improvisatore (1820); Hans Christian Andersen’s The Improvisatore (1835).  
Andersen himself performed as an improvvisatore cortegiano, and claimed that The Islands of 
Voenue and Gloenue originated in an improvised dinner table speech.54  Then there are the 
attempts at reproducing the spontaneity of the improvvisatori, or faking it, especially by the 
Romantics.  Examples include Alphonse de Lamartine’s (1790-1869) poems “Improvisation sur 
le bateau a rapeur du Rhone,” “Improvisation a Saint Gaudens,” Improvisation a la Grande 
Chartreuse;” Letitia Landon’s (1802-1838) poem “The Improvatrice” (1824); Coleridge’s 
                                                         
54 Carl Fehrman, Poetic Creation: Inspiration or Craft?, trans. Karin Petherick (Minneapolis, 
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“Improvisatore” (1827); Thomas Love Beddoes’ The Improvisatore in Three Fyttes with Other 
Poems (1821); and the general influence on Wordsworth, Shelley, and Byron. 
 The evaluations of both the process of improvisation and its poetic products are mixed, 
even within Italian culture.  There were defenders and detractors of improvisation.  For example, 
Carlo Ludovico Fernow defended extempore art against excessive meditation in his Über die 
Improvisatoren (1806).55  On the other hand, the playwright and librettist Carlo Goldoni (1707-
1793), and playwright Carlo Gozzi (1720-1806) did not attribute much value to improvised verse 
and arts.56  Benedetto Croce opines thusly:  "Intorno agli improvvisatori si e scritto abbastanza e, 
in vertita, di essi non e da dir molto."57  Some scholars speculate that the fame and interest in the 
improvvisatore is not based on the intrinsic merit of their improvisations (the products, the 
poems and verses themselves), but instead the spectacle of the event, the speed and aplomb with 
which they improvised upon topics provided at the time of performance, their ability to please 
audiences, and project a sense of mystery.  The Romantics may be the most significant group to 
be influenced by this misprision.  For the Romantics, spontaneity was associated with sincerity, 
authenticity, the “unity of thought and feeling.”58  Wordsworth describes (good) poetry as “the 
                                                         
55 Carl Ludwig Fernow, Ǖber die Improvisatoren.:  Römische Studien., Volumes 1 and 2, 
(Zürich: Gessner, 1806). 
56 Pietro Giordani, “Dello Sgricci e degl’Improvvisatori in Italia,” in Scritti, ed. Giuseppe 
Chiarini (Firenze: Sansoni, 1961), 133-142.  See also, Adele Vitagliano, Storia della poesia 
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& Figli, 1949).  Translation:  "enough has been written on improvvisatori , and, in fact, there is 
not much to say about them." 
58 See Angela Esterhammer, Spontaneous Overflows and Revivifying Rays:  Romanticism and 
the Discourse of Improvisation (Vancouver: Rondale Press, 2004); and Angela Esterhammer, 
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spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings.”59  It is not clear, however, whether Wordsworth and 
the other Romantics equated spontaneity with improvisation, or perhaps they thought that 
spontaneity was a necessary condition for improvisation.  Moreover, spontaneous and/or 
improvised writing was (and still is) viewed as the raw material from which a more polished text 
can be achieved.  Of course, we even find this view in Aristotle’s Poetics in the passages I shall 
analyze below. 
 Written improvisations raise special difficulties, among them are epistemic questions.  
For example, how would one know that a text was improvised if there are no witnesses?  One 
must rely on the testimony of the writer herself, or if there were witnesses, then the testimony of 
the witnesses.  Should one believe the writer?  There are motives for writers to not lie about such 
things.  Here are some:  the fact that improvised texts may be “rougher” than their non-
improvised texts thereby making the admission a hedge or discount; in order to communicate the 
experimental nature of the texts; and to call attention to their improvisational skill.  Typically, 
since the production of non-performed literary texts is not a public event (there are exceptions, 
e.g., Quick Muse project), there is a matter of trust involved that is not as prominent in 
performing arts improvisation, where the improvised artistic activity is usually public.  However, 
it is possible for a performing artist to engage in deception by performing a pre-planned piece.  
Even the improvvisatori could have “plants” in the audience, who would feed them agreed-upon 
topics.  In addition, given the aesthetic values of particular periods, artists may attempt to either 
conceal or markedly reveal the method of artistic production and generation.  In other words, if 
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improvisation is “in,” then artists want to be known as improvisers; if improvisation is “out,” 
then artists will conceal the improvisation if they continue the practice at all. 
 There is also confusion over the differences between the phenomena of stream-of-
consciousness, nonsense, cut-up, automatic writing, and improvisation.  As in the case of film, 
there are many literary works that give the appearance of spontaneity but are not improvised in 
any sense.  Because it has a longer tradition in literature, and because the canon includes many 
such works by respected writers (such as Laurent Sterne, James Joyce, Virginia Woolf, Gertrude 
Stein, Dorothy Parker, and William Faulkner), stream of consciousness has gained a more or less 
established status as a valid technique of generating, or device of, literary texts, and even has a 
critical base by which one can evaluate such writing.  There are borderline cases, too.  Are some 
of Jack Kerouac’s works stream of consciousness, or improvised, or do they just have the 
appearance of being improvised?  What is the relationship between stream of consciousness 
writing and improvised writing, if any?    In addition, there are other related phenomena that I 
shall discuss briefly:  nonsense poetry, Oulipo writers, aleatory/indeterminacy methods, and cut-
up technique. 
 Cut-up technique was used most notably by William S. Burroughs, Brion Gysin, John 
Cage, and Jackson Mac Low.60  Cut-up involves taking already written or published texts (e.g., 
newspapers, magazines) and adopting a method for extracting sequences of text and placing 
them together, usually adjacent to one another.  The length of the extracted sequences and the 
method of choosing the sequences are decided upon by the artist beforehand.  Sometimes the 
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method of selection was random.  Mac Low developed various methods, some of which were 
deterministic and other chance operations.  For example, when one adopts an algorithmic process 
for selecting text, then as long as the seed text remains constant, the result will always be the 
same.  However, in chance operations (aleatory) the result can only be the same, improbably, by 
“accident.”  The concern for Mac Low was to remove the ego as much as possible from the 
creative process.  Is this generative method a kind of improvisation?  It could be.  These 
generative methods are based on constraints similar to any other conventions with which any 
writer operates, and since artists who use such methods in general do not edit these texts, this 
writing occurs in real-time. 
 Ouvroir de literature potentielle (Oulipo), roughly “the workshop of potential literature,” 
was founded in 1960 by Francois Le Lionnais and Raymond Queneau.61  It included such writers 
as George Perec, Italo Calvino, Oskar Pastior, and Jacques Roubaud.  They were particularly 
influenced by mathematics and science, and were interested in experimental methods of 
generating literary texts.  The Oulipo writers used constraint based methods and self imposed 
rules in writing and developing their texts—poems, novels, plays, et cetera.  For example, 
lipogrammatic texts involved avoiding a particular letter or set of letters in composition.  George 
Perec’s famous novel La Disparition (1969) was written in French without using any word 
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containing the letter “e.”62  The translation into English by Gilbert Adair is an outstanding 
accomplishment.63  I do not believe Oulipo writers improvised.  The use of constraints, in 
particular arbitrary ones, was confused with the constraints improvisers adopt.  Oulipo writers 
edited and revised their texts, and they had no expectation that the final product would be had in 
real-time writing. 
 The following genres are commonly confused with improvised texts:  nonsense verse, 
concrete poetry, abstract poetry.  These genres may contain improvisation but are not of 
themselves defined by improvisational generative practices.  Abstract poetry, purportedly coined 
by Edith Sitwell,64  is verse that primarily depends on its auditory qualities for its meaning.  
Some Beat poetry was of this kind.  Concrete poetry “substitutes for such conventional elements 
of the poem as metre, rhyme, stanzaic form, and even normal syntax, the ultimate elements of 
language:  letter, syllable, word, in such a constellation that the visual effect of the typography  
… is of an importance equal or superior to that of the semantic  and phonetic elements 
involved.”65  Nonsense poetry and writing can be dated to the fourteenth century in Europe, but 
flourished in England in the late nineteenth century.66  Lewis Carrol and Edward Lear.  These 
genres can be combined.  For example, the collectively improvised poems of Jack Kerouac, 
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Allen Ginsburg, and Neal Cassady have calligrammatic, lipogrammatic, abstract, concrete, and 
nonsense elements.67 
 The term “stream of consciousness” was coined by William James in order to describe, 
more or less figuratively, the nature of certain mental processes.68  There seems to be general 
agreement that the first instance of the technique was by Edouard Dujardin in his novel Les 
Lauriers sont coupes, published in 1888.  In literary studies and criticism, at least one theorist 
claims that the subject matter of the novel is the best way to distinguish stream of consciousness 
from other literary forms and devices, rather than such aspects as technique, purpose, or 
themes.69  Robert Humphrey says, “Stream-of-consciousness fiction differs from all other 
psychological fiction precisely in that it is concerned with those levels [of consciousness] that are 
more inchoate than rational verbalization—those levels on the margins of attention.”70  Further, 
he distinguishes between stream of consciousness texts and monologue intérieur.  They are not 
synonyms:  there are kinds of stream of consciousness, such as certain forms of omniscient 
narration and soliloquies, which have little to do with interior monologues.  The use of interior 
monologue is not necessary condition for being stream of consciousness, although some interior 
monologues are stream of consciousness as well (e.g., the last chapter of Ulysses).  
Consequently, some interior monologue passages are not stream of consciousness, and some 
stream of consciousness passages are not interior monologues.  So, according to this definition, 
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Marcel Proust’s A la recherché du temps perdu is not a stream of consciousness novel,71 whereas 
Ulysses, Mrs. Dalloway, To the Lighthouse, and The Sound and the Fury (or parts of them) are 
paradigm examples of it.  At this point one can discern that stream of consciousness writing may 
involve improvising or it may not.  They are logically independent phenomena, but they are 
compatible.  In fact, one source of confusion between improvisation and stream of consciousness 
is that stream of consciousness passages often have an improvisatory feel or quality, but this does 
not entail anything about how the passage was actually written.  The differences between being 
improvised, as a genetic property of works of art, as opposed to sounding or looking or seeming 
improvised, which may be an aesthetic property of a work of art, will be discussed in detail in 
Part II:  Metaphysics 2.2.  Historically, it turns out that improvisation was not used much in 
stream of consciousness novels. 
 What is interesting here is that the fact that stream of consciousness writing has been 
associated with improvisation reveals something about improvisation (and about stream of 
consciousness writing).  Stream of consciousness writing is supposed to mimic thinking, 
sometimes particular kinds of thought, such as self-reflection, introspection, or just ordinary, 
quotidian thinking.  Like the analogy with conversation, improvisation easily can be compared to 
the ordinary thinking process.  This is natural because conversation often reveals, or is a source 
of, unedited thinking—thinking laid bare.  Though not all conversation will do so because of the 
way in which humans edit themselves, pause, false-starts, et cetera. 
 
 
 
                                                         
71 One might say that Proust’s masterpiece is about stream of consciousness without being an 
instance of the literary device or technique. 
  
33 
Written Improvisations 
 
i could use the word “improvisations    ive used it before but ive come to distrust 
what most people think it means    the idea of starting from a blank slate    nobody 
starts from a blank slate    not charlie parker nor homer nor ludwig Wittgenstein 
started from a blank slate    each in his different way going over a considered 
ground    that became a new ground as they considered it again  
—David Antin, I Never Knew What Time It Was, pp. ix-x 
 
 Performance poets, talk poems, and other forms of performance art have been improvised 
(e.g., David Antin, Jackson Mac Low, Spalding Gray).  Improvised writing has a history from 
Dadaist automatic writing to the improvised texts of William Carlos Williams, Jack Kerouac, 
Charles Olson, writers of the Black Mountain Group and Naropa Institute, and A. R. Ammons.  
Recently, the Quick Muse project by Ken Gordon72 has revived improvisation in poetry.  Given 
a theme expressed in a short, quoted passage, two poets have fifteen minutes to compose a poem 
using a computer keyboard.  The poets do not know the subject matter, or the theme, beforehand.  
A computer program records all of the poet’s depressions upon the keyboard in real-time.  
Consequently, one can see the finished product (at the end of fifteen minutes—strictly enforced), 
and view (and re-view) the real-time composition of the poem, which includes by default the 
pauses, amendments, deletions, and alterations of composing.  One might argue that this is not 
improvisation; this is just an arbitrary time limit constraint on composition.  But improvisation 
must occur in time as well—it takes time to improvise.  Someone may choose to improvise for 
thirty minutes.  It is a public event:  an audience views the writing on a computer screen.  The 
written component of Quick Muse is one feature that distinguishes it from the improvvisatori.  It 
is the writing that allows for editing and revision, but since this editing is in the real-time of a 
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performance—a public event—it is part of the “performance.”  People may choose afterwards to 
view only the finished poem, but the recording of the writing process during the fifteen minutes 
is also available.  The availability of editing should not exclude Quick Muse from the 
improvisation classification.  The compression of time of writing, the contest-like format, and the 
performance aspects are sufficient to warrant Quick Muse projects a point near improvisation on 
the continuum line between composition and improvisation. 
 Obviously not all poems, novels, and stories that are classified in the Beat genre were 
improvised.  This is a common misconception.  Some Beat writers did improvise occasionally; 
other times they often wrote as if it was improvised, trying to capture spontaneity, the 
unconscious, et cetera.  One notable case is the mythology surrounding perhaps the most famous 
Beat novel On the Road by Jack Kerouac.  Kerouac did improvise some sections of the novel, 
and he wanted to capture spontaneity and immediacy in his writing, but recent evidence makes 
clear that most of the work on On the Road was seriously edited and revised.73  For example, it 
took three and a half years for Kerouac to write; there were five distinct versions of the novel; 
the notorious scroll manuscript was “the outcome of a fastidious process of outlining, chapter 
drafting, and trimming;”74 and plot lines and journal entries used in the novel have been found in 
the Kerouac archive.  It has been pointed out that the scroll took three weeks for Kerouac to 
compose.  My point is that taking three weeks, or three hours, in and of itself does not provide a 
sufficient reason for classification as improvisation or non-improvisation.  Admittedly, it is rapid 
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composition, but an author may still revise and use notes during that time.  On the other hand, 
very rapid composition—this is going to be vague—in and of itself may be a reason to classify a 
text as improvised.75  The briefer the time period, the less time there is for revision, second-
guessing, and the like.  But why are those properties identified with improvising?  How brief 
does the time of composition have to be in order to qualify as improvising?  However, after On 
the Road was composed/improvised, Kerouac did use what he called “sketching”76 and 
“Spontaneous Prose.”77  Among many other examples, there are texts of poems that were 
collectively improvised by Kerouac, Neil Cassady, and Allen Ginsburg.78 
 How is modernist and contemporary literature improvised?  In the cases in which we 
have confirmation of improvised texts, the generation of the text is spontaneous and either there 
is very limited time allowed for editing and revision, or none at all.  Two very famous, well-
respected poets engaged in improvising poems:  William Carlos Williams and A. R. Ammons.  
William Carlos Williams’ Kora in Hell was (allegedly) spontaneous and he did not edit the texts.  
Some of Jack Kerouac’s texts were generated in a similar fashion, and his most famous texts 
seem to have not been improvised, even though these latter texts may have initially been 
improvised but later significantly edited.  This raises the question of the difference between and 
boundaries of improvised writing and non-improvised writing.  (I will use the term “writing” 
instead of “composition” so as not to confuse it with music.)  In addition, there is a trust issue 
with improvised texts.  One may be inclined to call them “allegedly” improvised.  The author 
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77 See Jack Kerouac, “The Essentials of Spontaneous Prose,” Evergreen Review Volume 2, no. 5 
(Summer 1958); reprinted in The Portable Beat Reader, ed. Ann Charters (New York: Penguin, 
1992), 57-58. 
78 See, inter alia, Kerouac, Scattered Poems, which contains some brilliant, improvised poems 
by Kerouac, Ginsburg, and Cassady. 
  
36 
claims these texts are improvised.  How do we know this is true and how do we know that the 
author has a sound conception of what improvisation means.  In the case of Ammons, the 
evidence for the latter is at least in the text itself.  In Williams’ case, we have his later 
commentaries, which discuss how the texts were produced.  However, sometimes the author’s 
own account cannot be trusted.  In a later autobiographical work Williams claims that he is 
engaging in automatic writing.  Sayre says:  “In I Wanted to Write a Poem, Williams calls both 
Kora and A Novelette examples of ‘automatic writing’ (IWWP, 49); and he must have in mind 
the kind of writing generated by Soupault’s and Breton’s ‘psychic automatism.’”79  But 
Williams’ improvisations do not seem like Breton’s, and thus should not be classified as 
automatic writing.  Here is reminiscence by Williams:  “I wrote some things once called 
Improvisations:  Kora in Hell.  They were wild flights of the imagination.  As I look at them now 
I see how ‘romantic’ they were.  I feel embarrassed.  I was having ‘dreams’ at that time; I was 
having ‘ideas.’”80  Besides displaying a desire to distance himself from Kora, this passage 
confirms that Williams was improvising text and not engaging in automatic writing.  Automatic 
writing is supposed to ignore and eschew “wild flights of the imagination.” 
 It is especially when investigating stream of consciousness and improvisation in literary 
arts that the theories of improvisation that focus on intuition-tapping and conscious-raising seem 
particularly relevant.  The writer is trying to find what she has to say, and the best way to do this 
is to engage directly in the process by which one expresses what one has to say:  writing or 
talking.  So one writes down on the page (or otherwise records) whatever comes to one’s mind 
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attempting not to filter, edit, enhance, or detract as much as one can.  This can be quite difficult 
because the impulse to edit, to filter, to revise is very strong, because that is what we ordinarily 
do in all forms of writing and of course in conversation.  But there is another feature of what we 
ordinarily do in writing and speaking:  create novel expressions.  The novel expressions seem 
improvised.  Seemingly, they come from nowhere, they just pop out of our pens or mouths.  It is 
consciousness, or at least artistic consciousness, laid bare, or thinking or creativity laid bare.  
Roger Gilbert says, “Ammons and Ashberry are thus poets of thinking, rather than poets of truth 
or wisdom.  They are more concerned with rendering the experience of reflection, its rhythms 
and contours, than with delivering completed thoughts that claim the status of truth.”81 
 That writers have motivations and goals for improvising is clear though not always 
obvious.  But there are less clear answers to the following questions.  Why do writers then 
publish such things (i.e., make the texts public)?  And why do we read them?  Why are we 
interested in them?  And, perhaps even more difficult, why do we sometimes evaluate them as 
good or bad or even brilliant?  The fact that many poets and writers themselves have published 
these kinds of works is evidence that these works, and their generative methods, are not 
considered just instrumentally valuable—as merely an exercise for brainstorming or breaking 
writer’s block.82 
 To answer these questions, one needs to describe exactly what is going on when writers 
do this in prose or poetry (in fact, this distinction may be called into question when looking at 
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“improvised” texts).  Let us look at an example.  I have chosen a master poet who has 
improvised texts, A. R. Ammons, but one could easily use William Carlos Williams.  I should 
note that one reason why I have chosen these poets is because of their uncontroversial stature in 
the modernist canon (and post-modernist for Ammons), their almost universal critical acclaim, 
and because some of the best literary critics and scholars of the past fifty years have lauded these 
two poets (e.g., Harold Bloom, Helen Vendler). 
 Tape for the Turn of the Year by A. R. Ammons is an experimental long poem.  It is 
considered experimental because Ammons adopted an almost arbitrary constraint on composing 
the poem.  He used a long roll (approximately one-hundred feet) of adding machine paper 
(width:  approximately three inches) placed in his typewriter to compose in a journal-like way 
his thoughts during the period from December 6, 1963 to January 10, 1964.  Consequently, the 
length and width of the thin, long roll of adding machine paper provided the external limitations 
of Ammons’s composition.  Some line breaks (enjambment) and the ultimate end of the poem 
were left to the physical boundaries of the paper itself.  Ammons’s poem is experimental in two 
ways.  First, it is a literal experiment for the poet to investigate his own writing techniques, 
styles, and thoughts, much like journals function in composition courses and creative writing 
programs.  Second, it is an experimental form, a new technique for composing a literary text.  In 
this second sense, it is less original because writers before Ammons (some Oulipo writers, Jack 
Kerouac) experimented in similar fashion.83  Ammons differs from these experiments because he 
uses physical limitations in addition to conceptual ones.  Here I quote A. R. Ammons’s ending to 
his long poem Tape for the Turn of the Year: 
                                                         
83 It is humorous and interesting to note the putative yet unconfirmed remark by Truman Capote 
about Kerouac’s On the Road:  “that isn’t writing (at all), that’s typing.”  Kerouac sometimes 
used long rolls of teletype paper because his writing was so rapid and continuous that this is the 
only medium that did not break the “flow” of his work. 
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I wrote about these 
days 
the way life gave them: 
 I didn’t know 
 beforehand what I 
 wd write, 
whether I’d meet 
anything new:  I 
showed that I’m sometimes 
blank and abstract, 
sometimes blessed with 
song:  sometimes 
silly, vapid, serious, 
angry, despairing: 
 ideally, I’d 
 be like a short poem: 
 that’s a fine way 
 to be:  a poem at a 
time:  but all day 
life itself is bending, 
weaving, changing, 
adapting, failing, 
 succeeding: 
 
 I’ve given 
you my 
emptiness:  it may 
not be unlike 
 your emptiness: 
 in voyages, there 
 are wide reaches 
 of water 
 with no islands: 
 
I’ve given you the 
interstices:  the 
 space between 
 electrons: 
 I’ve given you 
 the dull days 
when turning & turning 
revealed nothing: 
I’ve given you the 
sky: 
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uninterrupted by moon, 
bird, or cloud: 
 I’ve given 
you long 
uninteresting walks 
so you could experience 
vacancy: 
 
old castles, carnivals, 
ditchbanks, 
   bridges, ponds 
 steel mills, 
 cities:  so many 
interesting tours: 
 
the roll has lifted 
from the floor & 
our journey is done: 
thank you 
for coming:  thank 
you for coming along: 
 
the sun’s bright: 
the wind rocks the 
 naked trees: 
        so long:84 
 
Essentially, these last lines of the long poem recapitulate what happened in the previous pages—
what the poet did.  In doing that, Ammons both criticizes the project and justifies it.  He says 
goodbye to the reader, and thanks the reader for tolerating this experiment.  Interestingly, 
Ammons recognizes the limitations of this kind of odd project, but reconciles it with assigning it 
value.  There is also the view that the whole enterprise was didactic for the poet:  he knows better 
what possibilities of ideas, poetic lines, and tropes come from him, and even what he has to do in 
order to tap into them.  The poem functions simultaneously as failure (though not wholly a 
failure) and inspiration, which is explicitly recognized by Ammons in the lines above (“I / 
                                                         
84 A. R. Ammons, The Tape for the Turn of the Year (New York: W. W. Norton, 1965, 1993), 
203-205. 
  
41 
showed that I’m sometimes / blank and abstract, / sometimes blessed with / song:  sometimes / 
silly, vapid, serious, / angry, despairing: / ideally, I’d / be like a short poem: / that’s a fine way / 
to be:  a poem at a / time:”).  This kind of explicit admission is surprising yet refreshing.  
Ammons uses his poetic lines to criticize the poem he has just written (and still is writing at that 
time).  His justification for the varied quality and interest of different sections of the poem is 
indicated in these lines from above:  “but all day / life itself is bending, / weaving, changing, / 
adapting, failing, / succeeding:.”  The poem itself is a demonstration of, and mirrors, the contours 
of life.  As he talks about his talking about nothing in some sections of the poem, he is of course 
expressing himself beautifully and poetically.  It is a kind of meta-poetry.  Analogously, one can 
discuss ennui without being bored tout court or bored with the discussion of ennui.  Thus, a 
poetic discussion of emptiness is neither empty nor fruitless. 
 Ammons indicates the values of such a poem (improvised, diary- or journal-like. arbitrary 
constraints on writing) by the repetition of “I’ve given you …”  Five different things follow this 
phrase:  1) emptiness, 2) interstices, 3) dull days, 4) sky, 5) long, uninteresting walks.  Even 
though I am not concerned with evaluation and aesthetic value tout court, I am going to 
adumbrate such issues because the values in this case happen to coincide with the reasons, and 
motives of the improvisational writer, and the interests an audience might have for engaging with 
such improvised literature.  And this is necessary if one is going to have a proper aesthetic 
understanding of improvised texts. 
 One value of reading such a poem is that of identification, which is hinted at in the lines 
“I’ve given/ you my/ emptiness:  it may/ not be unlike/ your emptiness.”  Perhaps such 
recognition (through identification), like finding out others are going through similar psychiatric 
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illness, is the whole rationale for support groups, and why some group therapy is therapeutic,85 
and when expressed in art through such identification, there is inspirational value.  Inspirational 
value is the value a work possesses in virtue of its capacity to trigger, spring, and coax readers to 
produce their own art.  The fact that the content of the poem is improvised, and left untouched, 
adds to this kind of value because it gives the poem an authenticity of immediacy of voice and 
inner thoughts to which one may not have access, nor be able to experience, with non-
improvised texts.  Moreover, identification can function in a cathartic way, also akin to group 
psychotherapy, and of course recognized by Aristotle to solve his problem of tragedy (although 
the fact that he has this “solution” almost immediately suggests that this phenomenon was not a 
“problem” to Aristotle).  When one recognizes the emptiness in others, one confirms one’s own 
experience as not unique, thereby attenuating the angst associated with it, and in the case of art, 
the objectification of such a subjective sentiment as emptiness in achieved.  It is there in the 
poem (reification), and the details of how emptiness (say) is communicated, even 
metaphorically, makes it concrete. 
 With “interstices,” Ammons implies that his creativity is laid bare.  One sees the 
creativity as a process in the poem because it is immediate, unmitigated, rough, unedited.  It 
mimics the flow of our own thinking, but not in the stream of consciousness way.  The difference 
is that Ammons is not making claims to an ordinary thinking, his thinking is within the bounds of 
the poetry with a poetic sensibility, nor is it the thinking of some other (or fictional) persona or 
character.  This kind of an effect is best achieved through improvisation.  Again, with “dull 
                                                         
85 See the many editions (up to fifth edition in 2005) of the locus classicus (“bible”) on group 
psychotherapy, which discusses this aspect of group therapy, Irvin D. Yalom, Theory and 
Practice of Group Therapy (New York: Basic Books, 1970, 2005). 
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days,” Ammons reveals that in reading the poem one sees him at his best and worst and 
everything in between (interstices). 
 Sky as a symbol of purity is implied by Ammons saying “uninterrupted by moon, / bird, 
or cloud:”.  Again a reference to the creative process laid bare—pure, raw creativity.  Readers 
are witness to the process of composition. 
 The line “I’ve given you long, uninteresting walks” refers literally to his writing about 
some of the walks he took during the period of writing.  But it also refers back to “emptiness” 
because he writes “so you could experience vacancy.”  Ammons in an essay compared poems to 
walks.  Why is improvised writing better at communicating emptiness and vacancy than non-
improvised writing?  There are many non-improvised poems that do this brilliantly (perhaps 
Eliot’s “J. Alfred Prufrock”). 
 Moreover, there is the value of skill in improvisation.86  Ammons demonstrates that he is 
a virtuoso.  Our interest in diaries, biographies, and autobiographies undergirds in part our 
interest here.  There is voyeurism:  seeing how the poet lives and works.  But could this be done 
by less famous poets or writers?  Would our interest be sustained if these texts were written by 
non-famous, ordinary people?  But when both Williams and Ammons wrote these improvised 
poems both were young and not famous yet.  The aesthetic value of their improvised works has 
perhaps increased with time because of their subsequent fame.  In the case of Ammons, however, 
a good case can be made that his later fame was in part due to such experiments. 
 Consider the following example from a much later poem of Ammons in which he goes 
back to writing on narrow paper—the section is called “Strip” for the strip of paper.  In the 
following, he is being explicit about his motives and method: 
                                                         
86 Whether improvisation is a skill or virtue (or something else) will be discussed in a future 
work on evaluating and valuing improvisation. 
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I know why I write in this method: 
if I don’t write what I’m thinking 
 
right then, it slips my mind:  yep: 
gone for good:  sometimes, the next 
 
day, or several weeks later, I have 
a thought that has an air of 
 
remembrance about it, and I think, 
gee, this may not be déjà vu exactly 
 
but I think I’ve been down this 
street before:  I remember now that 
 
yesterday morning or this morning 
when I was coming back from the 
 
campus store with a mocha chip muffin 
I was thinking of the word cramp and 
 
I was thinking how this tape cramps 
my style:  it breaks down my extended 
 
gestures:  it doesn’t give your 
asshole time to reconfigure after a 
 
dump:87 
 
 What these more or less spontaneous “compositions,” akin to stream of consciousness 
whatever-pops-into-one’s-head, reveal is the pure unadulterated imagination of the author.  The 
only way to understand “unadulterated” is that it means no editing, revision, or only real-time 
composition editing.  One discerns the creative process unadorned at the beginning stage, the 
imaginative connections one makes for seemingly mysterious reasons.  Like free association, we 
learn about the author and the process.  What do we learn about the author?  We learn about the 
                                                         
87 A. R. Ammons, Glare (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1997), 174-175. 
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author’s fundamental concerns, interests, repertory of images, examples, natural talent, and 
devices.  These are laid bare as he exposes the unpolished, unedited improvisations to the 
audience.  The process reveals how imaginative connections between sentences, ideas, and 
images are made—randomly sometimes or through unsuspecting slips, which can all be seen in 
the improvised text.  One may argue that such things can be gleaned from non-improvised texts 
as well.  So, what is the difference?  Because of revising, editing, time for further reflection, et 
cetera, one does not experience the more unmediated creative mind at work.  This is not to say 
that the attributes that can be gleaned from non-improvised texts are less significant.  We can, of 
course, find out about the author through non-improvised texts, and surely natural talent is also 
exposed in ordinary (non-improvised) literary writing.  But what one might want to say here is 
that these are compatible values, but different.  Different interests are answered by improvising 
texts and not improvising them.  Sometimes we learn similar things about the author, and other 
times we learn different things about the author and the author’s process by reading (or listening 
to) improvisations.  In some cases, improvisation is the sole source of evaluating an author’s 
work (e.g., David Antin). 
 
Parry-Lord Theory 
 
 Another piece of evidence for the general prejudice (of some kind) against improvising 
and improvisations is revealed by discussions of the Parry-Lord88 theory of oral-traditional 
literature.  In particular the Parry-Lord theory involved the nature of epic narrative poems and 
                                                         
88 Milman Parry, The Making of Homeric Verse: The Collected Papers of Milman Parry, ed. 
Adam Parry (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987); Albert Bates Lord, Epic Singers and 
Oral Tradition, Myth and Poetics Series (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991); Albert 
Bates Lord, The Singer of Tales, Harvard Studies in Comparative Literature, Volume 24 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960). 
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songs, and ballads.  The theory was motivated by finding out about the Homeric epic poems:  
How were they composed?  What is their source?  and many related questions that classical 
scholars have been investigating and speculating about for centuries.  Milman Parry thought that 
one can find out things about the Iliad and Odyssey by comparing them to a current oral tradition 
of epic poetry and song.  Parry chose Serbo-Croatian oral epic narratives.  For the most part, the 
tradition was oral, not literate or written (for whatever reasons), and has a fairly long history and 
tradition.  Most importantly was the fact that the tradition was still being practiced when Parry 
was researching.  One could have a first-hand experience and account of an oral tradition, which 
Parry initially hypothesized as analogous to Homer and other epics.  So Parry set out to discover 
methods of transmission, content, style, poetics, and composition.  He discovered that the content 
was mostly traditional, based upon a set number of stories or narratives.  The method of 
transmission was from one generation to another through performances of the poems, the 
memories of audience members, and apprenticeship of performers (guslars).  The method of 
composition might be called improvising.  Parry and Lord used the term “oral composition.”  
The guslar would “improvise” lines of poetry, which were constrained by the traditional content, 
and traditional poetics, including style, meter, and even diction, and most importantly for Parry it 
was formulaic.  Tragically, Parry died young, and Albert Bates Lord, his student, carried on his 
work with an emphasis on Serbo-Croatian literature. 
 The idea that the Homeric epics were originally oral was not surprising to most scholars.  
Parry was not the first to recognize this.  Most scholars agree that Flavius Josephus of the first 
century CE was the first to put forward such a thesis.  In the Modern era, Friedrich Wolf made 
similar claims in his Prolegomena to Homer (1795).  And if anyone had been reading Aristotle, 
they would have been able to make the inference fairly easily, since in the Poetics Aristotle 
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mentions twice the improvisatory beginnings of Greek poetry and theatre (this will be discussed 
below).  What scholars did find blasphemous was the idea that the Homeric epics retained this 
improvised character.  The reason given, either explicitly or implicitly, was that texts such as the 
Homeric epics were of such high aesthetic and artistic complexity and value that they could not 
have been improvised or even based upon improvisations.  The assumption making such a claim 
plausible was that improvising cannot give rise to the same properties, or as valuable properties, 
as written, non-improvised texts.  More generally, written texts and traditions (literate cultures) 
have different properties than oral ones.  Now, that may be true, but what was usually implicit or 
tacit is the presupposition that the differences are differences of value or merit, too.  And of 
course the written traditions are found to be more valuable than the oral ones.  Now here is 
where the debate gets tricky, and both sides, it seems to me, are guilty of philosophical 
confusions and mistakes. 
 First, differences in output, results, texts, et cetera do not necessarily entail differences of 
value.  This entailment holds only if there is a lemma somewhere stating that the standards of 
judgment, criticism, and evaluation are the same for both literate and oral traditions or methods 
of composition.  More generally, such a view would hold that belonging to a specific category, 
like genre, art form, et cetera, is irrelevant in making aesthetic judgments.  Such a lemma would 
seem to be either question-begging or would have to function as some sort of self-evident axiom.  
The latter choice is far from obvious, so it is not self-evident.  One would have to provide 
evidence for such a claim.  Counterevidence, however, can be produced.  A view called 
(evaluative) contextualism, or the categorical view, seems to capture many of our intuitions 
about aesthetic and artistic value, and has recently been defended by Noël Carroll in his books 
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The Philosophy of Motion Pictures, On Criticism, and other articles.89  One can find the 
beginnings of the view in Kendall Walton’s now classic “Categories of Art.”90  The basic idea is 
that aesthetic evaluation, and the adjudication of aesthetic disagreement in particular, is a matter 
of categorizing works of art in the correct category, where category is understood broadly to 
include genre, mode of presentation, art form, aspect, et cetera.  There are potential problems 
with this view; nonetheless, this view of aesthetic evaluation gets some things right about 
making aesthetic judgments.  On this view, the standards and criteria of aesthetic and artistic 
merit of improvisations and non-improvisations could be very different. 
 Lord distinguishes between “improvisation” and “composition in performance.”  He 
defines “composition in performance” as the use of “units called ‘formulas’ and ‘themes’ to 
which I have more recently added the highly important concept of ‘blocks of lines.’”91  I accept 
his distinction to a certain extent; however, in my way of viewing things, I would categorize 
Lord’s “composition in performance” as a species of improvisation.  Given my proclivities for a 
very broad continuum of improvisation (as I shall argue for in Part II), this makes sense, 
especially since Lord’s category is similar to other forms and artistic activities we are already 
inclined to label “improvised.” 
 Here is an important, relevant passage, worth the longish quotation: 
The use of the term ‘improvisation’ in referring to the method of composition of the 
South Slavic oral-traditional epic has caused some misunderstandings.  The Oxford 
English Dictionary defines improvising as making up a song or words ‘on the spur of the 
moment,’ ‘extempore.’  It quotes Tobias George Smollett in Travels Through France and 
                                                         
89 Noël Carroll, The Philosophy of Motion Pictures, Foundations of the Philosophy of the Arts 
Series (New York: Blackwell, 2008); and Noël Carroll, On Criticism, Thinking in Action Series 
(New York: Routledge, 2009). 
90 Kendall Walton, “Categories of Art,” Philosophical Review 79, no. 3 (Summer 1970): 334-
367. 
91 Lord, Epic Singers and Oral Tradition, 2-3. 
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Italy, who mentions ‘improvisatori, the greatest curiosities, unique within Italy, 
individuals who have the surprising talent of reciting verses extempore on any subject 
you propose.’  The OED in its discussion also uses the word ‘unpremeditated’ and 
defines improvisation as ‘the production or execution of anything off hand.’  This is a 
very far cry from the technique of composition of oral-traditional epic. 
 My own preferred term for that type of composition is ‘composition by formula 
and theme.’  “Composition in performance’ or possibly ‘recomposition in performance’ 
are satisfactory terms as long as one does not equate them with improvisation, which, to 
my mind, means to make up a new nontraditional song from predominantly 
nontraditional elements. 
 There is a considerable confusion on the difference between improvisation and 
the creation of new songs in an oral tradition of singing narrative songs.  It is a complex 
problem, but this much may be said at present.  New songs in a living tradition of epic are 
forged from traditional formulas and themes and deal with traditional subjects.  A new 
song in this genre has new names, but almost everything else in it has appeared before in 
the tradition in one form or another.  The improvising of shorter topical songs ‘on any 
subject’ ‘on the spur of the moment’ is a very different matter, especially since the 
subjects may be, and usually are, nontraditional, thus requiring a new vocabulary. 
 Milman Parry asked an epic singer in Nevesinje, Hercegovina, if he could 
compose a song about him.  Milovan Vojicic did so, and it has been published in The 
Singer of Tales.  Parry asked a wrong question.  Milovan was not an ‘improvisatore,’ and 
the resulting songwas an anomaly, a tour de force.  Jeff Opland noted when he collected 
praise poems among the Xhosa in South Africa that their praise poems about chiefs used 
many formulas, but when one of them made up—at Opland’s request—a song about an 
automobile accident that Opland had told him about, the song had fewer formulas.  The 
first were traditional praise poems; the second a nontraditional improvisation. 
 The outsider misunderstands, when he is told that singers can make up songs ‘on 
any subject,’ and asks for subjects outside the tradition.  The result is a curiosity that 
proves nothing except that the singer normally does not compose a song extempore about 
‘any subject,’ but only about certain kinds of subjects, for which he has the materials in 
his experience. 
 Ramon Menedez Pidal, in commenting on the The Singer of Tales, expressed 
polite shock that I had, allegedly, said or implied that the Iliad and the Odyssey were 
‘improvised’ by Homer.  I would share his shock, were I to hear anyone say that.  To 
repeat, ‘composition in performance’ does not imply ‘improvisation.’  It can, and in my 
usage it does, mean ‘composition by formula and theme.’92 
 
                                                         
92 Lord, Epic Singers and Oral Tradition, 76-77. 
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The mistake Lord is making here is to confuse a property of improvisation with improvisation 
itself.  The way he sees improvisation already includes originality in a very strong sense.93  This 
is incorrect because improvising itself does not entail originality in the strong sense, and perhaps 
not even in a weaker sense.  Improvising genres may put a premium on originality in its 
generative and appreciative norms, but this is very different from requiring originality for 
generation and production.  Imagine an improviser who legitimately improvises a text but it is 
unoriginal.  This improviser has failed to produce a good improvisation (because it fails to be 
original), but this does not mean that she did not improvise.  Therefore, it is possible to 
improvise unoriginal texts (or other works).  In addition, Lord takes the OED as authoritative.  I 
will admit that if we suppose the OED definition he cites is comprehensively correct, then Lord 
is correct in distinguishing between composition in performance and improvisation.  But as I am 
demonstrating throughout Part I, there is little reason to accept the OED definition as 
comprehensive, and one should not interpret the OED as providing necessary and sufficient 
conditions for improvisation.  I am not committing the denying the antecedent fallacy here.  
Instead I am reconstructing Lord’s argument as a modus ponens structure and challenging the 
argument as unsound.  The conditional premise is true (as indicated above), but the second 
premise asserting the truth of the OED definition is false or questionable at best.  Therefore, the 
argument is valid but unsound. 
 So what is philosophically interesting about the Parry-Lord and critics debate?  The 
critics assume that the written texts we have in manuscripts are the documentations of 
improvisations of bards, troubadours, and singers.  No one is claiming that as far as I know.  
                                                         
93 The relationship between improvisation and originality is discussed in my paper “Originality 
Is Aesthetically Valuable” given at the American Society for Aesthetics, Rocky Mountain 
Division Meeting, July, 1998. 
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Parry-Lord et alii are talking about the genetic properties of these texts:  how they came to be, 
how they were initially generated and transmitted, and the conditions of their transmission.  This 
is not to say that there are no “traces” of oral literature and improvisation in such works as the 
Iliad and Odyssey.  Texts can have evidence of their improvised genetic properties and 
conditions without thereby being documentations of improvisations or improvised performances 
or sessions. 
 Consequently, the Parry-Lord theory, if it is roughly correct, needs a conceptual clean-up.  
Following is how the account would proceed with a sound conceptual scheme.  For centuries, 
both while writing existed and before it, there were performers who used elements of what today 
we call story-telling, monologue, poetry, and song.  The content of the performances over time 
congealed into a tradition of characters, plots, stories, poetic tropes, and grammatical and diction 
formulas, formal and organizational elements.  Probably, the best of these performers, 
determined by popularity and/or the “expert judgment” of the performer community, became 
famous and were consequently copied by others seeking similar fame and success.  This caused 
further compression of literary conventions and content.  The most appropriate analogy here is, I 
think, that of genes/memes and evolution by natural selection.  These performers adopted 
voluntary constraints on their performances in addition to the many non-voluntary constraints.  
No doubt some of these constraints were due to mnemonics and other aids for memory.94  They 
worked within these constraints, but there was still sufficient malleability for each performer to 
make changes and for changes to occur from performance to performance.  Some of these 
changes were due to memory limitations, some caused by audience responses, some by artistic 
choices of the performers.  Even though the performers used various kinds of formulas, there 
                                                         
94 See David C. Rubin, Memory in Oral Traditions:  The Cognitive Psychology of Epic, Ballads, 
and Counting-out Rhymes (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995). 
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was artistic room, so to speak, for the performer to make artistic choices involving content and 
style.  Often these choices were made while performing, while others were planned beforehand 
either by planning or practicing the performances.  This space of artistic choices, especially those 
in real-time, are improvised.  As writing and the technology of writing improved and became 
widespread and available, scribes, who may have been performers themselves, though in no way 
necessarily so, began to write texts of these poems and songs.  While this writing occurred there 
were further opportunities for artistic choices to be made, many during the time of writing.  Here 
there is another level of improvisation.  These would be akin to the literary improvisations of (for 
example) Ammons and Williams.  Over time, these texts became more static, each scribe treating 
his job as copier only.  These more or less fixed texts are distributed more widely and they are 
handed down from generation to generation.  Hence the Iliad and Odyssey.  Improvisation, 
therefore, is part of the history of these great epics.  Does this warrant calling them improvised 
literature?  Yes and no.  These texts did become fixed, and significant portions were originally 
improvised, and those original improvisations were embellished. 
 
Aleatory Music 
 
   aleatory composition and choral improvisation throwback to 
   dinosaur lagoons, the much floating, winged sawbills, 
   bankless, ambient, figurings, dismemberments of breath by 
 
   overhanging fern-spun ramification: 
—A. R. Ammons, Sphere: The Form of a Motion, § 58, p. 36 
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 “Aleatory”95 (sometimes called “chance music” or “mobile/open form”) is a name of a 
technique of composition.  The key to it is that instead of many compositional elements of a 
piece being determined by the composer, whether based on some principle, preference, et cetera, 
these elements are selected randomly.  The random procedures vary widely.  Consequently, the 
composer does choose to use a random process, and she chooses which random process will be 
executed.  Grove usefully defines “aleatory” as follows:  “A term applied to music whose 
composition and/or performance is, to a greater or lesser extent, undetermined by the composer 
… the term is usually restricted to music in which the composer has made a deliberate 
withdrawal of control …”96 
 Paul Griffiths distinguishes between three kinds of aleatory music.97  First, there is the 
use of random procedures to generate a more or less fixed composition.  Here the compositional 
process itself is randomized—thus attempting to eliminate or reduce authorial intention.  Since 
often the goal is to generate a fixed composition, it is not improvisation, although the process 
will reveal something salient about composing and agency, which shall be discussed in Part II.  
Examples of random procedures that have been used are throwing dice, flipping coins, using 
templates drawn from the constellations, and using the Chinese I Ching.   
                                                         
95 It is believed that Werner Meyer-Eppler coined this term in the early 1950s from the Latin root 
alea meaning “a die.”  However, it was Pierre Boulez who popularized the term, especially due 
to his important article “Alea,” Nouvelle revue francaise 59 (November 1957); reprinted in 
Pierre Boulez, Relevés d’apprenti, ed. Paule Thévenin (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1966), 41-45; 
English translation:  Pierre Boulez, "Alea," in Notes of an Apprenticeship, ed. Paule Thévenin, 
trans. Herbert Weinstock (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968), 35-51; a new English translation:  
Pierre Boulez, "Alea," in Stocktakings from an Apprenticeship, ed. Paule Thévenin, trans. 
Stephen Walsh, intro. Robert Piencikowski (New York: Oxford University Press, Clarendon 
Press, 1991), 26-38. 
96 Paul Griffiths, “Aleatory,” Grove Music Online ed. L. Macy,  <http://www.grovemusic.com> 
(accessed July 17, 2007). 
97 Ibid. 
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 The second kind of aleatory music is the use of performers’ discretion in choosing 
between options during performance (sometimes beforehand in rehearsal), and these options are 
presented by the composer in the score.  If the options are selected by the performer during real-
time performance, then this practice may count as a minimal form of improvisation.  If the 
selections are prepared and chosen before performance, then this practice should probably not be 
classified as improvisation but as interpretation.  From this case, one can discern that the 
potential for a fuzzy line between improvisation and interpretation exists.  Stanley Cavell notes 
in his famous article “Music Discomposed” that “I do not, however, hesitate, having reminded 
myself of what the notion of improvisation suggests, to say that what is called for in a piece such 
as Stockhausen’s Pianostücke Elf (where nineteen fragments are to be selected from, in varying 
orders, depending upon certain decisions of the performer) is not improvisation.  To call it 
improvisation is to substitute for the real satisfactions of improvisation a dream of spontaneity—
to match the dream of organization it is meant to complement …”98  My reply to his rejection of 
this kind of action as a minimal form of improvisation is that although his reason for rejecting it 
is insightful, it simply does not recognize that there are, and ought to be, different degrees of 
improvisation.  Those degrees can be determined by many kinds of properties (e.g., amount of 
time to select, placement or location of selection, discretion, contingencies of performance).  
When improvisation is more broadly construed, which is one of the points this Part I is trying to 
show and exemplify, lots of practices and actions will be admitted into the set.  Hence, I 
recognize that the real-time selection incorporated into this piece (I am supposing that it is real-
time selection, not planned) shares few features with (say) standard bebop jazz solos, but the 
                                                         
98 Stanley Cavell, “Music Discomposed,” in Must We Mean What We Say? (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1976), 204.  The piece Cavell refers to is Karlheinz Stockhausen, 
Pianostücke Elf (Piano Piece XI), which is approximately fourteen minutes in duration, and was 
“composed” in 1956. 
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selection still involves some features in common—enough, I would argue, to warrant classifying 
them under the same term.  One such feature is real-time discretionary decisions, which lead to 
actions, made by a performer during performance.  Of course, the vagueness of this particular 
feature is obvious; however, this vagueness does not stop one from analyzing hard cases on a 
case by case basis, instead of trying to rely on a detached general principle.  One reason not to 
formulate the general principles first, i.e., divorced from the artistic practices, is that this seems 
to reverse the process that is most desirable when doing philosophy in a field such as aesthetics 
(some would say in all areas of philosophy).  There would be no need to do, or interest in, 
aesthetics at all if it were not for the first-order phenomena about which aesthetics is concerned 
and tries to theorize about, and that subject matter is art itself:  individual works, art forms, 
genres, et cetera.  In part, the strategy I am employing here is taking the historical and conceptual 
facts of music history and art history as a starting point, instead of defining improvisation 
beforehand and excluding and including based upon a potentially fabricated definition.  
Sometimes those facts imply clear boundaries for improvisation, other times less clarity.  We 
need arche, as Aristotle would say, and I think it is reasonable to describe the phenomena, at 
least at first, and start from there.  However, one risks begging the question.  The way one avoids 
a vicious circle is to treat the initial descriptions of artistic practices as sonly a starting point for 
serious conceptual analysis. 
 In addition, part of the justification for the premise that the Stockhausen selection process 
in the above piece shares some features with more standard cases of improvisation is that this 
selection process is very much like some of the established improvisational practices from the 
late Medieval, Renaissance, and Baroque periods described in this section.  In discussing the 
concept of improvisation, Cavell mentions cadenzas, ornamentation, and figured bass, but says 
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“In such uses, the concept [improvisation] has little explanatory power, but seems merely to 
name events which one knows, as matters of historical fact (that is, as facts independent of 
anything a critic would have to discover by an analysis or interpretation of the musical material 
as an aesthetic phenomenon), not to have been composed.”99  But why should we want the 
concept of improvisation to be explanatory in any other way than classifying or giving 
instructions?  Certainly, the concept can have explanatory power, especially when used more or 
less—“metaphorically” is the word that immediately comes to mind, but it does not precisely 
capture how Cavell is using it in his essay—as an as-if property.  In other words, a sound 
sequence can sound as if it were improvised, which has little to do with how it was actually 
generated.  This reading is substantiated by Cavell’s next sentences:  “My use of the concept 
[improvisation] is far more general.  I mean it to refer to certain qualities of music generally.”100  
But this conception does not exhaust its use; in particular, its classificatory sense is a valid use of 
the concept of improvisation, viz., what is and is not improvised as a descriptive property of an 
event’s generative conditions, which is my concern here. 
 Third, there is underdetermined notation, which reduces the control the composer has 
over the realized sound sequence in performance.  Once again, how these underdetermined 
notations are realized may be varied:  they may be prepared beforehand by performers or left to 
the whim of the performer in real-time performance.  Underdetermined notation dates back to the 
origins of Western music notation itself.  Various chant notations and contemporary use of 
proportional notations are examples.  Lucas Foss’s UCLA Improvisation Chamber Ensemble of 
the 1950s performed using charts with only sketches of musical ideas and instructions.  William 
Duckworth’s Pitch City (1969) is one example of the graphic score, wherein musicians are 
                                                         
99 Cavell, 200. 
100 Ibid. 
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expected to interpret graphic marks of various kinds and execute sounds and other sonic 
properties.  The performances of such pieces will be different unless a set of musicians is able 
(and have a desire) to reproduce a previously realized sound sequence.  If one is to count such 
practices and musical phenomena as figured bass, cadenza, ricercar, Eingang, and faburden 
(among others) in the Western art music tradition as a form of improvisation, then this latter case 
of varied notational realization during performance should count as well.  But if this 
underdetermined notation is prepared before performance, then there can be a presumption of no 
improvisation, although, again, this kind of case raises serious questions about being able to 
distinguish clearly between composing, improvising, rehearsing, and interpreting (see Part II).  
Note that there is a difference between the terms “undetermined” and “underdetermined,” 
although they are related.  Undetermined here indicates an epistemic state of not knowing before 
the performance what sound sequence will be realized.  Underdetermined refers to a notation that 
does not provide explicit, complete instructions for the performer to realize it in sound any time a 
player is reading the score.  The logical relationship between these two concepts is that 
underdetermined notation results in undetermined music; however, it is not the case that 
undetermined music is due to underdetermined notation.  If one is asked to freely improvise for 
two minutes during the performance of a piece, the result will be undetermined prior to 
performance but not because of an underdetermined notation.  In this case, the notation is 
prescribing exactly what is desired by the composer.  If the simple instruction is insufficient, 
then the composer could prescribe further instructions, such as improvise for two minutes in the 
style (say) of Keith Jarrett. 
 Charles Ives is considered to be the first composer to use aleatory components to his 
compositions.  Henry Cowell, Pierre Boulez, John Cage, Karlheinz Stockhausen, and Iannis 
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Xenakis are among the foremost composers who used aleatory techniques.  The three kinds of 
aleatory musical techniques can be combined, too.  For example, John Cage’s Winter Music 
(1957) is a combination of one and two above.  The aleatory post-war revolution is often 
interpreted as a way of giving up “compositional fascism,” thereby giving more freedom to the 
performers, giving up control of the composer (and sometimes players too), and introducing 
choice.  Two of Cage’s pieces may be read as the culmination of these aesthetic forces.  
Imaginary Landscape no. 4 (1951) is a set of instructions of when and how to turn on and off 
twelve radio tuners.  Control is lost by both composer and performers because the sounds 
produced are totally dependent upon the broadcasts that happen to be received at the time of 
performance.  The very famous, and philosophically interesting, 4’ 33’’ (1952) also gives up 
control except for the eponymous duration of the piece.  Since no one knows what ambient 
sounds will be produced during the framed time, neither the composer nor performer determines 
the sonic properties. 
 
 
Some Notes on Motion Pictures 
 
 Aleatory methods have also been used in filmmaking.  Most examples in film involve the 
screening process, which interestingly would be akin to the emphasis on performance by aleatory 
music composers.  Coin flipping is used in Fred Camper’s film SN (1984) to determine which of 
eighteen reels are screened, and the order of the screening of the eighteen film reels.  Another 
example is from Barry Salt in which a die is used by the projectionist to determine which of six 
reels are screened. 
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 Improvisation in film raises some thorny problems in the metaphysics of improvisation.  
If a scene is improvised by actors and recorded on film, it seems that the film itself would be a 
documentation of an improvisation.  The film itself would not be an improvisation.  But what 
does it mean to say that “The film itself would not be an improvisation?”  Taken literally, 
celluloid or video tape would have to be a proper bearer of the ascription “improvised.”  There 
are only two ways in which this can be the case.  First, the manipulation of the medium by 
directors, cinematographers, and editors could involve improvisation.  Second, an improvisation 
is documented on celluloid or video tape.101  Both of these make sense.  To accept the second 
option is not to assume that film is merely documentation or mechanical reproduction.  
Obviously, one can document with film visual images of objects and events.  That claim has 
been used by some theorists to deny film and filmmaking as a legitimate art form.102  This debate 
is well beyond the scope of my project here, but suffice it to say that I, like most other 
aestheticians today, believe it is false.  All of the major arguments denying film the status of art 
have been thoroughly refuted.103  If a scene is improvised in rehearsal in order to generate a more 
or less fixed script (of dialogue and action), then this also seems to warrant a non-improvisation 
classification.  What would it take for a film itself to be improvised?  Perhaps improvisation in 
filmmaking itself has more to do with the director, cinema-photographer, and other members of 
the crew.  For example, imagine a case in which the director and photographer make decisions 
                                                         
101 The term “improvography” has been suggested for such cases, i.e., cases of recorded 
improvisations.  I am not sure such a term helps:  a neologism does not itself constitute an 
ontology.  See Alan R. Slotkin, “Improvography: A Contradiction in Terms,” American Speech 
68, no. 4 (Winter 1993): 437-438. 
102 See the analytic philosophy locus classicus on this issue, Roger Scruton, “Photography and 
Representation,” Critical Inquiry 7 (1981): 577-603. 
103 For a through, excellent review of these arguments and their refutations see Noël Carroll, The 
Philosophy of Motion Pictures, Chapter 1. 
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on camera placement and movement at the time of recording.  Is this improvisation?  Suppose 
one left a film camera (or video) aimed at a walkway in Washington Square Park for three hours.  
Suppose further that the three hour segment was chosen randomly or at the spur of the moment.  
The camera would record whatever actions took place in front of it.  Would that be an example 
of improvisation in film?  My inclination is to classify both cases as film improvisation.  An art 
form or medium should not be excluded from classification as improvisation merely on the 
grounds of the manner in which the medium works.  The assumption here is that improvisation 
may exist in any art form or medium.  The denial of this view would be to say that certain art 
forms or media ought to be excluded from improvisation because improvisation is either 
impossible or unworkable.  This would be a kind of medium specificity thesis:  certain contents, 
forms, artistic practices, or properties are better suited in particular media.  Medium specificity 
ideas go back to Plato and Aristotle and reached a peak in the work of Lessing and 
Winckelmann,104 and it is currently a hot topic in the philosophy of film.  Since it is outside the 
scope of this project, I shall not take a general position on any medium specificity thesis; 
however, I will say that I do not believe it to be relevant to improvisation because of what I will 
show in Part II with respect to the relationship between composition (generally conceived, not 
just musical) and improvisation.  A brief preview:  if the distinction between composition and 
improvisation is a continuum, then there will be many cases where a solid distinction cannot be 
made.  Composition and improvisation are modes of generative practices or creation.  Art 
requires creation in a medium.  Denial of this claim would be absurd.  Consequently, 
composition cannot be used as a factor for medium specificity (of any media or art form) because 
                                                         
104 See Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Laocoon or On the Limits of Painting and Poetry (1766); 
Johann Joachim Winckelmann, Thoughts on the Imitation of the Painting and Sculpture of the 
Greeks (1755). 
  
61 
it is a precondition of the art form itself existing.  This is a kind of transcendental argument.  If 
composition cannot be used as a factor for medium specificity, then improvisation cannot be 
used as a factor since distinctions between them are vague. 
 Because of past practice in the history of cinema, we may want to classify 
documentations of improvisations as improvised filmmaking as well.  Why?  Because 
mainstream past practice of filmmaking uses scripts and story-boarding (or the like) for the most 
part, deviations from these norms may warrant a separate classification to distinguish at least two 
ways in which films are brought into existence.  Decisions made well in advance of the recording 
process itself, which can include comprehensive prescriptions for the real-time performance of 
actors, is a reason to classify the traditional filmmaking process as akin to composition in music, 
literature, painting, and choreography.  This is not to say that there are not mixtures of 
composition and improvisation in many traditional (Hollywood style) films.  However, the 
improvisatory parts in these cases are probably quite minimal.  Consequently, one could classify 
some significant parts of Michelangelo Antonioni’s films as improvisation, but not sections of 
the films of Mike Leigh and John Cassavetes.  It is important to note that there are parts of 
Antonioni’s films that are like Leigh and Cassavetes, and there are parts of Leigh’s and 
Caasavetes’s films that are like Antonioni.  What is the difference?  Antonioni has said in 
interviews, documentaries, and writings that he improvised complete scenes during the recording 
process or made off the cuff decisions just before recording (without planning).105  Leigh and 
Cassavetes are well-known for their use of improvisational rehearsals and very sketchy scripts.  
The directions for a scene were very minimal, if anything at all, requiring that the actors, and 
often the crew, to improvise dialogue and actions.  These rehearsal improvisations in turn 
                                                         
105 Michelangelo Antonioni, Antonioni:  Documents and Testimonials, directed by Gianfranco 
Mingozzi, included on Disc 2 of L’Avventura, Criterion Collection, Criterion Films, 2001. 
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generated the “script” to be followed during the recording process, although further 
improvisation was often done and encouraged during the recording process as well.  Homay 
King notes that “Cassavetes’ method of improvisation does not involve ad-libbed dialogue or 
scenes invented on the fly (with some exceptions, of course, …).  On the contrary, his method 
involves sustained reworking and polishing of the script.  …  Thus improvisation for Cassavetes 
does not mean jettisoning the script, but rather producing a script collectively through multiple 
drafts.”106  So, in some cases Leigh and Cassavetes are farther away from improvisation than 
Antonioni and vice versa.  Of course, in many of Antonioni’s films, most parts were more or less 
completely scripted and planned. 
 
 The relationship between paradigm cases of improvisation and the concept of 
“impromptu” in Western art music is also problematic.  For example, here is Nicolas 
Slonimsky’s entry on “impromptu:” 
Impromptu.  From the Latin locution in promptu esse, “to be at hand,” “to be ready.”  
The term, which suggests improvisation, was applied to interludes in theatrical plays in 
the 17th century, as in Moliere’s L’Impromptu de Versailles.  As a form of character 
pieces, the impromptu became popular in the 19th century.  Schubert wrote a number of 
impromptus for piano.  These pieces are indeed “in promptu,” for they are built in a 
symmetric form in which each main section is subdivided into three subsections, and 
each subsection is subdivided into three subaltern segments, which in turn are split into 
brief musical phrases in three-part form.  The title Impromptu was not original with 
Schubert; it was appended to the music by his publisher.  Chopin’s impromptus for piano 
are particularly remarkable in their perfect symmetrical design.
107
 
 
So, in western classical art music “impromptu” does not describe the genetic property of being 
improvised.  Instead, it uses improvisation as a baseline concept:  the pieces sound as if they 
                                                         
106 Homay King, “Free Indirect Affect in Cassavetes’ Opening Night and Faces,” Camera 
Obscura 56, Volume 19, no. 2 (2004): 108. 
107 Nicolas Slonimsky, Lectionary of Music: An Entertaining Reference and Reader’s 
Companion (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1989), 229. 
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were improvised or could be improvised.108  It also seems to refer to the “somewhat casual origin 
in the composer’s mind.”109  The New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians says the term 
‘impromptu’ “probably derives from the casual way in which the inspiration for such a piece 
came to the composer.”110  Notice the association of improvisation with being “casual.”  One can 
infer what these reference works mean to some extent, but it still puzzles me:  casual as opposed 
to what?  Formal?  Are there two kinds of inspiration:  formal and casual?  Perhaps it is like this:  
if one were really trying to compose and edit, then it is “formal;” if it just popped into one’s head 
without the context of composing, then it is “casual.”  This kind of theme about improvisation 
and related terms will come up again and again.  Although I do not think it is necessarily the 
case, the use of “casual” can seem somewhat derogatory or negative.  One can imagine someone 
saying:  “Well, it is only an ‘impromptu,’ you know.”  But we may learn something from cases 
in which composers use “improvisation” in the title or description of a work that was not 
improvised at all nor derived from improvisations.  Arnold Whittal speculates that “Here the 
implication is not simply that the character of the music has something of the unconstrained 
quality of ‘real’ improvising, but that the composer’s thoughts themselves have an improvisatory 
character, seeking to replace the logical and rational with something more spontaneous and 
freely associative.”111  Once again, notice the potentially derogatory connotation here:  the 
                                                         
108 The Oxford Companion to Music says:  “An instrumental composition, not necessarily 
(despite its name) of an improvisatory character.”  Arnold Whittal, “Improvisation,” The Oxford 
Companion to Music, ed. Alison Latham (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 604. 
109 Willi Apel, The Harvard Dictionary of Music, Second Edition (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, Belknap Press, 1972), 404. 
110 The New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians, Volume 9, ed. Stanley Sadie (New York: 
Macmillan, 1980), 31. 
111 Arnold Whittal, “Improvisation,” The Oxford Companion to Music, ed. Alison Latham (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 605. 
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improvisatory character of thoughts and actions are opposed to rationality and logicality.  Is 
improvisation irrational and illogical, then?  Using any conception of “rationality” and “logical” 
with respect to the arts, and bracketing the inherent difficulty of making sense of these concepts 
in artistic composition, clearly this is wrong.  Not all improvisations lack rationality and logic.  
Numerous studies and analyses have shown that some of the best improvisers in jazz, for 
example, create even large-scale formal and expressive properties in their improvisations.112  
Consider what a very famous, accomplished organist (in the French organ improvisation 
tradition) says about this:  “According to [Jean] Guillou, although improvisation ‘can project and 
express the most innate impulses of the psyche, it also demands the intervention of intellect, 
which endeavors to organize these impulses, submitting them to method and to the mental 
discipline essential to any work of art ... improvisation must be as self-aware and controlled as 
minutely as a composition developed over a long time’.”113  That is a very strong statement 
coming from an expert practitioner.  Other music theorists have also viewed much of 
improvisation as problem-solving.  This model suggests that the harmonic structure (and 
sometimes melodic structure) of a tune presents a “problem” for the improviser to overcome.  In 
other words, the improviser is forced to find ways of connecting harmonic units, cadences, 
placing relevant scales and modes to form a coherent, musical, aesthetically pleasing 
performance—all, of course, in real time.  Another error here is that improvisation is being 
                                                         
112 The notable examples here are Sonny Rollins, Charlie Parker, Louis Armstrong, Miles Davis, 
Bill Evans, John Coltrane, Lee Konitz, Jimmy Giuffre, Paul Desmond, among many others.  One 
of the first music theorists (and also a musician, teacher, and composer) to discuss this seriously 
was Gunther Schuller.  See Gunther Schuller, “Sonny Rollins and the Challenge of Thematic 
Improvisation,” Musings:  The Musical Worlds of Gunther Schuller: A Collection of His 
Writings (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 86-97.  This article was originally 
published in the Jazz Review (November 1958). 
113 Brian Levine, liner notes to Jean Guillou, The Art of Improvisation, Dorian Recordings, 1991, 
3. 
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equated, or at least strongly correlated to, “free association.”  But as I remarked above, this is but 
one kind of improvisation, e.g., free jazz improvisation (and even in this genre this method is not 
always used). 
 A similar case to impromptus is “fantasias.”  According to the Harvard Dictionary of 
Music at least five groups of fantasias have been recognized.  Two of these recall improvisation 
directly.  The first one is:  “Pieces of a markedly improvisory [sic] character; written records, as 
it were, of the improvisation technique of the various masters.”114  Secondly, we have:  “Operatic 
potpourris of a free and somewhat improvisory treatment, as if written in remembrance of a 
performance.”115  From both of these definitions one can infer that a fantasia was a sort of post 
facto document of a previously improvised performance, whether imagined or actual, or a 
document of an improvisatory style of a former master.  A “ricercar” was an “instrumental piece 
common during the 16th and 17th centuries.  The earliest were improvisatory in style, often for 
solo instruments such as the bass viol or lute …”116  One of the main characteristics of these 
pieces is that they were virtuosic, featuring lots of embellishment and scalar, flowing passages—
just as one might hear in an improvisation by virtuosic master.  Consequently, one can say that 
many impromptus, fantasias, and ricercars are trying to exhibit the property of as if 
improvised.117  “Capriccio” had several uses depending on the period.  In the nineteenth century, 
the term was used similarly to impromptu and fantasia for short piano pieces.  In the seventeenth 
century, capriccio was one of the four pre-fugal forms (ricercar, canzona, fantasia), and was 
                                                         
114 Apel, 307.  Examples cited are:  J.S. Bach’s Chromatic Fantasia, Fantasia in A minor for 
Harpsichord; W.A. Mozart’s Fantasia in D minor for Piano; Beethoven’s Fantasia opus 77; and 
the many Fantasien by K.P. E. Bach. 
115 Apel, 308.  Example cited:  Liszt’s Réminiscences de “Don Juan.” 
116 Denis Arnold, “Ricercar,” The Oxford Companion to Music, 1060.  There are other meanings 
of “ricercar” as well. 
117 A fuller discussion of this property is in Part II:  Metaphysics. 
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“looser” than the others.  None of these pieces were improvised, although their ultimate source 
may have been the improvisations of the composers.  Once again, the meaning suggests that the 
pieces sound as if improvised. 
 “Tachisme” comes from the French noun tache, which means blot or spot.  Its original 
use was derogatory toward the Impressionists, but it took on a new meaning with the French 
critic Michel Tapie,118 who used it of non-geometric abstract painters, but it could have an 
application to American action painters such as Jackson Pollock.119  The idea was that this kind 
of painting looked spontaneously created.  A related term is gestural painting.  The Oxford 
Dictionary of Art defines it as:  “Gestural Painting - A term near synonymous with Action 
painting, but used more broadly and not envisaging a specific school of American painting.  It 
carries an implication not only that a picture is the record of the artist’s actions in the process of 
painting it, but that the recorded actions express the artist’s emotions and personality, just as in 
other walks of life gestures express a person’s feelings.  The name ‘gestural’ is applied 
particularly to painting in which the visible sweep and manner of applying pigment has been 
deliberately emphasized.  It has sometimes been used as a synonym for Art Informel or 
Tachisme.”120  So, the painting is a physical object that documents a process of painting.  Of 
course, all paintings, no matter how they were made, are documents of the processes used to 
produce them; however, here the idea is that there is a document of a spontaneous process, and 
the process of painting is not to be concealed but rather celebrated.  In what sense can painting or 
drawing or sculpture be improvised?  Was there improvisation involved in this kind of painting?  
                                                         
118 Michel Tapie, Un art autre (Paris: Gabriel-Gireaud, 1952). 
119 Grove Dictionary of Art, s.v. “Tachsime.” 
120 Ian Chilvers, Harold Osborne, and Dennis Farr, The Oxford Dictionary of Art (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1982), 197-198. 
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Probably, some improvisation was involved, but there was also a background aesthetic that 
prescribed producing art that looked as if it was improvised.  Traces of spontaneity were 
intended and viewed as desirable in the post-war period of the twentieth century.  Whereas in the 
past history of music and the plastic arts, with some exceptions noted herein, spontaneity was 
eschewed in most contexts, and there was a desire for concealment, the twentieth century valued 
the transparency of spontaneity—no concealment—and has been called the “culture of 
spontaneity.”121  The immediate precursors of this post-war aesthetic were Wassily Kandinsky 
and the Dadaists and Surrealists.  Kandinsky began a series entitled Improvisations in 1909.  
However, one ought to make a distinction between spontaneity of feeling and spontaneous 
action.  It is unclear exactly how Kandinsky painted these works.  His own words do not give us 
a precise verdict.  In his famous Über das Geistige in der Kunst,122 Kandinsky identifies three 
sources of inspiration.  The two that concern us here are:  “(2) A largely unconscious, 
spontaneous expression of inner character … This I call an ‘Improvisation.’  (3) An expression 
of a slowly formed inner feeling, which comes to utterance only after long maturing.  This I call 
a ‘Composition.’”123  It is not clear what he means by sources of inspiration, but he distinguishes 
between improvisation and composition, which I classify as two generative processes or 
practices.  Note that timing seems to be significant:  “spontaneous” versus “slowly formed.”  In 
addition, Kandisnky, like many others, associates improvisation with the unconscious.  If 
“spontaneous expression” means painting more or less deliberately but to some  degree 
                                                         
121 See Belgrad, The Culture of Spontaneity. 
122 Wassily Kandinsky, Concerning the Spiritual in Art, trans. M. T. H. Sadler (New York: 
Dover, 1977).  Also see Gail Levin and Marianne Lorenz, Theme and Improvisation: Kandinsky 
and the American Avant-Garde, 1912-1950 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, Bulfinch Press 
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unplanned, letting skilled whim on the spur of the moment take its course, and not contriving to 
make a painting look as if it was improvised, which would require more time, editing and 
revision, then Kandinsky’s Improvisations ought to be classified as improvised painting. 
 The evidence for improvisation in post-war abstract expressionist painting mainly lies in 
the documentation of Jackson Pollock’s working methods.  Hans Namuth published in 1951 
photographs of Pollock painting in his East Hampton studio in 1950.  A year later Namuth and 
Paul Falkenburg produced a short, color film of Pollock working,124 which was first screened at 
the Museum of Modern of Art in June of 1951.  Both the still and moving photography of 
Pollock in action contributed to idea that Pollock was improvising while painting.  The 
Modernist definition of improvisation in the plastic arts seems to be “characterized in the belief 
in the simultaneous conception and manifestation of a given work which is rendered quickly, 
impulsively, and with concomitant freedom of expression.”125  Notice the emphasis on lack of 
planning before the creative act itself, the making of the art, and the adverbial attributes of speed, 
lack of reflective deliberation, and lastly an idea about content:  this method, generative process 
is about immediate self-expression.  A process of painting in which the painter makes at least 
some decisions while in the process of painting may qualify as improvised painting.  However, 
there are always decisions made by painters while painting, even when most of the subject and 
theme of the painting have been planned and sketched out.  But of course we cannot say that 
improvised painting cannot be planned at all.  We have already reviewed to some degree how 
improvisation works in music, and one result was that improvisation does not entail no 
preparation or no planning.  It is nearly impossible to do something intentionally without 
                                                         
124 In fact, there were two films produced:  one black and white and one color.  But Namuth 
thought the only the color film did Pollock justice. 
125 Korrick, 289. 
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preparation and planning, even if it is minimal.  One must have skills, and have some ideas about 
what one is going to do before improvisation can begin.  So it must be with painting and 
sculpture.  Problem is that it is more difficult to discern what things may be planned and 
prepared beforehand, or to what degree they may be accomplished beforehand, or 
 The practice of improvising drawings is documented as far back as Michelangelo and the 
Cinquecento.  Improvisation appears in the famous treatise of Giovanni Battista Armenini, De’ 
veri precetti della pittura (1586).126  His remarks about improvisation are divided.  On the one 
hand, improvised schizzi or bozze are prescribed as instrumental only in helping the invenzione 
of the artist.  On the other hand, there is much praise for those, like Michelangelo, who could 
improvise excellent drawings.  Armenini recalls being a witness to Mchelangelo’s improvisatory 
skill.  When asked to render a drawing of Hercules on the spot, Armenini says, “era un stupor 
grande  a quelli  che cio avevano veduto fare in cosi poco tempo, che altri vi averebbe giudicato 
dentro la fatica di un mese.”127  The key phrase here is “cosi poco tempi” for evidence of 
improvisation.  Moreover, the quality of the drawing is compared to the finito of what others 
would judge to take a month or more.  The additional time implies no improvisation.  Vasari 
mentions Leonardo’s skill at improvising on the lyre (lira da braccio)128 and in recitation of 
poems,129 but Vasari mentions nothing about Leonardo’s improvising in visual art media.130  
                                                         
126 Giovanni  Battista Armenini, De’ veri precetti  della pittura (Ravenna, 1586); translation:   
On the True Precepts of the Art of Painting, ed. and trans. Edward J. Olszewski (New York: Burt 
Franklin, 1977). 
127 Armenini, 93. 
128 On Leonardo and music, see Emanuel Winternitz, Leonardo da Vinci as a Musician (New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982) 
129 Giorgio Vasari, Le vite de’ piu eccellenti pittori scultori ed architettori nelle redazioni del 
1550 e 1568 (Florence, 1550, revised and expanded 1568); translated:   Lives of the Painters, 
Sculptors, and Architects, trans. by Gaston du C. de Vere (New York: Knopf, 1996). 
130 Korrick, 290-291. 
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Similar to what I said above with respect to literature, the speed with which one makes 
renderings may itself qualify a painting or drawing as improvised.  This coheres with what both 
Vasari and Armenini describe as improvised, too.  For example, as Leslie Korrick notes, in his 
treatise Armenini uses all’ improvviso as a synonym for working rapidly and contrasts it with 
con tempo, which means “over time” or “slowly.”131  In addition, Armenini seems to equate 
improvisation with prestezza, velocemente (swiftly), and in breve tempo (in a short time).132 
 My hypothesis is that because there a fixed material object in standard cases of the plastic 
arts, the duration, and possibly context, of execution becomes the point of focus for 
distinguishing between improvisation and non-improvisation (or composition).  This also seems 
to be the case for the literary arts. 
 
Some Specific Kinds of Improvisation 
 
 Here are some terms for specific kinds of improvisation: 
 
cadenza, ornamentation and embellishment, figured bass (basso continuo, 
thoroughbass, bassus generalis, Generalbass), ad libitum, sortisatio, a piacere, 
discant, discantus supra librum (déchant sur le livre), faburden, fauxbourdon 
(faberdon), passacaglia (pasacalle, paseo), ritornello (riprese), Eingang (lead-in), 
chase, taqsim, tanan, niraval, tani avartanam, anibaddha, estilar and estillistas, 
bertsolaritza. 
 
                                                         
131 Korrick, 293. 
132 Korick, 297. 
  
71 
 Most dictionaries of music take ornamentation and embellishment to be semantic 
equivalents.  Depending upon the period of music history, there were different practices, 
locations of, and instructions for ornamentation and embellishment.  The essential attribute of 
embellishment, whether improvised or notated, is that it is decorative rather than structural.  
Ornaments are categorized into two kinds:  simple (graces) and compound.  Many scholars 
believe that ornamentation may have arisen because of the limits of orthodox notation.  This 
view is not incompatible with another historical view:  at least in the improvised cases, 
performers were allowed more freedom.  The performer’s aesthetic inclinations and goals had an 
opportunity for realization in conjunction with that of the composer’s and conductor’s 
prescriptions.  Embellishments can be notated or at least prepared beforehand, as many 
performers do, or they can be improvised with the constraints indicated in notation, and by 
custom and style.  Manuals on how to embellish and play figured bass have been numerous since 
the fifteenth century.  So, one is not told exactly what to play, but options and loose rules are 
presented, and in some cases even what would be inappropriate.  Moreover, just because 
something in a composition is left up to the performer’s discretion, or gives the performer some 
latitude in execution, does not necessarily mean that it is improvised.  What would make the 
difference?  Suppose the ornament was in fact improvised while the player was rehearsing the 
piece.  When she performs it later, is it improvised or not?  A performer can figure out, and 
almost always does, her interpretation of the work, which includes making decisions on the 
aspects and sections that call for performer’s discretion.  I do not classify these performances as 
improvisations.  In this case, improvisation occurred during rehearsal but not during public 
performance. 
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 “Division” may refer to either a compositional or improvisational practice.  The latter 
was a primarily seventeenth century technique in which a player would divide the notes of a 
melody into shorter ones to create a variation effect, or counter melody.  Similar practices 
include diminution (diminuire), diferencia (Spanish), and “breaking.”  Divisions were written 
down for two purposes.  First, they provided exercises for those players learning how to 
improvise in this style and within these constraints.  Second, they were meant to be compositions 
that had the flair of spontaneity. 
 The Latin phrase “ad libitum” has two meanings.  First, the phrase can be used to indicate 
any kind of improvising in any art form.  Second, in Western art music scores, the phrase affords 
performers a certain amount of discretion and freedom.  Three specific senses have been 
isolated:  (1) discretion for changes to tempo; (2) the discretion to add or delete a part of a voice 
or instrument; and (3) as an indication for the performer to include a cadenza.  All three of these 
senses do not guarantee improvisation.  The discretion afforded the performer or conductor can 
be exercised before performance and rehearsed.  A cadenza may be written out completely 
beforehand.  However, in cases where the discretion is exercised more or less at the time of 
performance, there is a small degree of improvisation.  An exercise of freedom from fidelity to 
score or what has been planned beforehand, does not itself entail improvisation; the relevant 
timing (and often space) of the exercise of such freedom is necessary. 
 Sortisatio is “A 16th-century term for improvised counterpoint, as opposed to compositio, 
written out counterpoint.”133  A piacere, an Italian phrase, is used to indicate that the performer 
may use her discretion with regard to tempo and rhythm.134  Cadenzas are passages or sections 
                                                         
133 Willi Apel, Harvard Dictionary of Music, Second Edition (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, Belknap Press, 1944, 1972), 796. 
134 Ibid., 42. 
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of a composition (usually a concerto in Western classical art music) that were left by the 
composer unwritten, allowing the performer to improvise for varying lengths of time.  Often the 
duration was at the discretion of the performer or conductor.  During specific periods, the 
cadenzas were not without some rules.  For example, in the eighteenth century it was customary 
to play the cadenza in the style of the composer, and to end by trilling on the dominant chord.  In 
the nineteenth century more liberal standards were accepted and the cadenzas reflected the lush 
harmonies of the Romantic period even while playing compositions of Mozart, Haydn, and 
Beethoven.  Some composers wrote the cadenza, which shows that one cannot automatically 
assume that “cadenza” means improvised or that one should improvise it.  Beethoven, 
Schumann, and Brahms sometimes wrote out cadenzas.  In some cases, there might have been a 
distrust of performers.  The odd and paradoxical history of the cadenza is that while originally its 
purpose was as an outlet for the performer, to indulge one’s virtuosic skills and improvisational 
skill, the nineteenth century brought the cadenza into a writing exercise.  Often the attempt 
would be to write it as if it were improvised—much like a fantasia, impromptu (especially for 
piano), or ricercar.135  Today, most performers choose an already written cadenza or model their 
own on an already written one; whatever the case, most of the time they are prepared 
beforehand—that is prepared and practiced before the performance.  Consequently, there is no 
improvisation.  There are exceptions, such as Robert Levin who improvises the cadenzas to 
Mozart piano concertos.  In fact, Levin says, “... an audience that knows (and anticipates) every 
note of the authentic cadenzas as well as the concerto proper is deprived of the critical element of 
uncertainty that is the very raison d’être of the cadenza.”136 
                                                         
135 The property “as if improvised” will be discussed in Part II:  Metaphysics. 
136 Robert Levin, “A Note on Performance and Improvisation,” liner notes in Wolfgang 
Amadeus Mozart, Piano Concertos No. 17 K.453 and No. 20 K.466, Robert Levin fortepiano 
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 Figured bass was originally a stenographic system from the Baroque period for 
accompaniment, to provide the bass lines, and to provide counterpoint.  These were played most 
commonly by organs, harpsichord, cello, or viola da gamba.  There were strict rules for this 
practice (in most cases), but it still left room for the performer’s discretion and improvisation.  
Contrappunto alla mente was a High Renaissance term for improvisation—literally it means 
mental or unwritten counterpoint.  Also used was déchant sur le livre (English descant).
137
  
“Discant” was a term mainly used between the twelfth and fifteenth centuries to describe an 
often improvised line against the plainchant.  “Faburden” was a term used in the fifteenth century 
to describe an improvised harmony under a fixed melody.138  Although there is some scholarly 
controversy on what “fauxbourdon” refers to exactly, one can say with some confidence that it 
was a fifteenth century French practice in which a vocal composition contained a middle part 
that was supposed to be improvised (within strict rules) by a singer.  Some scholars believe that 
this middle part was simply a doubling of the melody (superius) by a lower fourth. 
 “Eingang” literally means “entrance” in German.  This term is used now, and has been 
used since the Baroque period, to indicate a “short improvisatory passage that leads into a 
statement of thematic material.”139  Composers of all periods of Western art music have used 
Eingänge in all genres in two ways:  some were written out by the composer, others were left for 
the performer to improvise.  The latter was usually indicated with a fermata or a note in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
and conducted by Christopher Hogwood, The Academy of Ancient Music, L’Oiseau-Lyre 455-
607-2-OH, 1997, 7. 
137
 Listed in Paul Henry Lang, “Ornamentation and Improvisation,” Musicology and 
Performance, eds. Alfred Mann and George J. Buelow (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
1997), 225. 
138 There are other meanings of “faburden” as well. 
139 April Nash Greenan, “Eingang,” Grove Music Online, ed. L. May, 
<http://www.grovemusic.com> (accessed July 17, 2007). 
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score.  Eingänge are shorter than cadenzas, and the same performing practice has developed as in 
cadenzas:  most performers today prepare the Eingänge beforehand.  When they are prepared 
and practiced by a performer beforehand, or written out by the composer, I would not classify 
them as improvisations. 
 A “chase,” which is used mainly in jazz, describes an improvisatory competition.  The 
competition is usually two players or soloists, but may be more.  The goal of a chase is for the 
improvising soloists to be influenced by what the previous soloist played, and each musician 
tries to outplay the other.  In live contexts, sometimes the “winner” is indicated by audience 
reaction and applause.140  The soloists can “trade” any amount of musical units, i.e., the 
musicians take turns in improvising over four, eight, or sixteen bars of the tune or harmonic 
structure.  Thus the common jazz terms:  “trading fours,” “trading eights,” et cetera.  Sometimes 
the traded unit is an entire chorus of the base-tune over which the musicians play.  In some 
famous examples, the unit has been reduced to phrases or even half phrases, wherein the soloists 
may attempt to “finish” each other’s lines, licks, or musical thoughts.141  So, there may be a 
progressive decrease in the musical units over time, which often results in some musical climax. 
 Many world music traditions have a stronger presence of improvisation, as in the 
classical art music of India and Persia.  There are many world music and art terms that refer to 
some form of improvisation.  In some cases these terms are used exclusively to describe music 
improvisation, in other cases the term is more general.  “Taqsim” is a term that refers to 
                                                         
140 There is a presentation of a “cutting” session or chase in Robert Altman’s film Kansas City. 
141 Famous live, non-recorded chases have been recalled and discussed in jazz histories, 
interviews, and memoirs.  However, there are many live or studio recorded chases.  Some 
notable examples are:  Dexter Gordon and Gene Ammons, Gordon and Wardell Gray, Ammons 
and Sonny Stitt, Sonny Rollins and others. 
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improvisation sections in Arab and Turkish music.142  Karnatak music, which is the art music of 
south India, is a genre in which improvisation plays a large role.  In Karnatak, there are several 
terms for improvisation:  tanan, niraval, tani avartanam, anibaddha.  Tanam is pulsed rhythmic 
improvisation; niraval is improvised variation on a composed melodic line; tani avartanam is a 
solo percussion improvisation; and anibaddha is the improvised elaboration of a raga melody.143  
In classical Persian music (radif), both before and after the Islamic influence, melodic and 
rhythmic aspects of the music are improvised within a frame of reference.  It is interesting to 
note that beginning with some of the Westernization of Persian music, improvisation has been 
downplayed.144  Estilar, literally “styling,” is the term for melodic improvisation in fado music 
of Portugal.145  Esillistas are those men and women who are famous for their creative 
                                                         
142 Ali Jihad Racy, “The Many Faces of Improvisation: the Arab Taqasim as a Musical Symbol,” 
Ethnomusicology 44, no. 2 (Spring-Summer 2000): 302-320; Bruno Nettl and Ronald Riddle, 
“Taqsim Nahawand Revisited:  The Musicianship of Jihad Racy,” in In the Course of 
Performance: Studies in the World of Musical Improvisation, Chicago Studies in 
Ethnomusicology Series, eds. Bruno Nettl and Melinda Russell (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1998), 369-394. 
143Thom Lipiezky, “Tihai Formulas and the Fusion of ‘Composition’ and ‘Improvisation’ in 
North Indian Music,” The Musical Quarterly 71, no. 2 (1985): 157-171; John Napler, “Novelty 
That Must Be Subtle: Continuity, Innovation, and ‘Improvisation’ in North Indian Music,” 
Critical Studies in Improvisation/Études critiques en improvisation, vol. 1, no. 3 (2006): 1-17; 
Bonnie Wade, “Chiz and Khyal: The Traditional Composition in the Improvised Performance,” 
Ethnomusicology 17, no. 3 (September 1973): 443-459; and Ludwig Pesch, ed., The Illustrated 
Companion to South Indian Classical Music (Delhi: Oxford University Press,1999). 
144 Bruno Nettl, “On Learning the Radif and Improvisation in Iran,” in Musical Improvisation:  
Art, Education, and Society, eds. Gabriel Solis and Bruno Nettl (Urbana, IL: University of 
Illinois Press, 2009), 185-199; Hormoz Farhat, The Dastgah Concept in Persian Music (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Jean During, The Art of Persian Music (Washington: 
Mage Publishers, 1991); and Ella Zona, Classical Persian Music: An Introduction (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1973). 
145 Salwa El-Shawan Castelo-Branco, “Fado,” Grove Dictionary of Music (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), s.v. “fado;” Samuel G. Armistead, “Improvised Oral Poetry in the 
Hispanic Tradition,” Voicing the Moment:  Improvised Oral Poetry and Basque Tradition, eds. 
Samuel G. Armistead and Joseba Zulaika (Reno, Nevada: University of Nevada, Reno Center for 
Basque Studies, 2005), 29-44. 
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improvisations.  Bertsolaritza is a “Basque genre of oral improvised poetry created by folk poets 
for an audience.”146 
 
Some Notes on the Dance 
 
 Improvisation occurs in both the classical and popular dance traditions of Europe, India, 
Africa, and parts of Asia.  In the European tradition, one may trace improvisation in the dance to 
the frenzied, orgiastic bacchanal dances of ancient Greece and Rome.  (In modernity, perhaps the 
duende sections of flamenco serve as the best analogues to these ancient bacchanal dances.)  
Much of the later classical ballet tradition involved fixed, choreographed movements.  No doubt 
because of the lack of a standard and good notation system for choreography (even still today, 
but there are developments), even dance works intended to be fixed had more fluidity over 
individual performances and over periods of time.  As Curtis Carter notes, there are essentially 
three areas in which improvisation occurs in the dance:  “the embellishments left to the 
individual artists where a set choreography persists; improvisation as a process of spontaneous 
free movement to invent original movement intended for use in set choreography; and 
improvisation for its own sake that is brought to a high level of performance.”147  The first is 
directly analogous to ornamentation in Western classical art music.  The second is what I call 
instrumental improvisation; in the way described by Carter, it is directly akin to the use of 
improvisation by Leigh and Cassavetes during rehearsals for films.  In addition, it shares the 
                                                         
146 Aulestia, Improvisational Poetry from the Basque Country, 21; and see Samuel G. Armistead 
and Joseba Zulaika, eds., Voicing the Moment:  Improvised Oral Poetry and Basque Tradition 
(Reno, Nevada: University of Nevada Center, Reno for Basque Studies, 2005). 
147 Curtis Carter, “Improvisation in Dance,” Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 58, no. 2 
(Spring 2000): 182. 
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instrumentality of the use of improvisation for training actors and speech makers.148  The third 
domain is improvisation during public performance as in jazz and theatre improvisation, and also 
includes the various “private” improvisations in some contact improvisation and therapeutic 
movement and verbal techniques, such as Feldenkrais, Awareness-Through-Movement method, 
Moreno, DanceAbility,149 and psychoanalysis. 
 In the South Indian classical dance called Bharatanatyam, improvisation of expressive 
movements is essential to a section, called padam, of the traditional seven-part recital.  The 
female dancer is expected to use a “vocabulary” of mudras (codified hand gestures) and 
abhinaya (mimetic expressive movements) to communicate expressive and thematic elements of 
the melodic, sung text.  During the padam, percussionists and other musicians join the dancer for 
artistic, collaborative improvisation.  So they are improvising simultaneously by collective 
interaction with respect to tala (rhythm), bhava (emotive, expressive), and raga (melody) aspects 
of the performance.150 
 Spanish flamenco music and dance (cante jondo/grande) share similar properties to the 
South Asian classical dance.  There are “codes” to be learned in flamenco—brazeo—and are 
used by the dancers in solos (as in jazz music).  Important criteria of evaluation of flamenco 
include virtuosity of rhythm and movement and “authenticity,” which amounts to 
improvisational skill.  Fully choreographed flamenco performances are not considered authentic; 
there is an expectation for improvisation especially in a duende section, but in other sections as 
                                                         
148 As in theatre, drama, acting pedagogy, there are a plethora of how-to books on dance 
improvisation. 
149 This is a kind of art therapy using dance, although some are offended by that categorization.  
Others view it as simply art making and performing (like “outsider” art phenomena).  
DanceAbility puts together able-bodied and disabled dancers with no hierarchies. 
150 See Avanthi Meduri, “Multiple Pleasures: Improvisation in Bharatanatyam,” in Taken by 
Surprise: A Dance Improvisation Reader, eds. Ann Cooper Albright and David Gere 
(Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 2003), 141-150. 
  
79 
well.  Both the dancer(s) and the musicians improvise.  At certain points of the flamenco 
performance palmas sordas (rhythms that are handclapped or played on a small percussion 
instrument) are improvised as well, much like tala are improvised by tabla players in South 
Asian classical music. 
 Contemporary dance works (postmodern), like contemporary musical works, often use 
some degree of improvisation or random techniques during a performance (and composition).  
Many of Merce Cunningham’s dance works, like his often close colleague John Cage, involved 
aleatory techniques, some of which were executed before performance during the compositional 
act, and other aleatory techniques would be executed during the performance.151  These are not 
instances of improvisation because the chance devices Cunningham and Cage used generated 
fixed, set choreography or scores.  Although Cunningham and Cage often disparaged 
improvisation, there were mild improvisational elements to some of their works—real-time 
performer discretionary decisions.  They were skeptical of improvisation because they thought 
that improvising performers would tend to gravitate to things the performers’ already or had 
already done; whereas, aleatory and chance methods precluded this problem and opened up more 
territory, expanded the artistic possibilities.152  This indictment of improvisation only makes 
sense against the background of Cage’s and Cunningham’s alleged artistic goals:  novelty (at any 
cost—even the cost of meaning), originality, exploration.  Many experimental dance companies 
and “choreographers” of the 1960s and 1970s have focused on improvisation in dance:  Yvonne 
                                                         
151 Richard Kostelanetz, ed., Merce Cunningham:  Dancing in Space and Time (New York: Da 
Capo Press, 1992, 1998). 
152 See, for example, Remy Charlip, “A Symposium with Earle Brown, Remy Charlip, Marianne 
Preger Simon, David Vaughan:  The Forming of an Esthetic: Merce Cunningham and John 
Cage,” [edited transcript of a panel discussion at a Dance Critics Association Conference at The 
Kitchen in New York, June 16, 1984] in Merce Cunningham:  Dancing in Space and Time, 53. 
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Rainer (especially Continuous Dance—Altered Daily), Anna Halprin, Simone Forti, Dianne 
McIntyre, and Judson Dance Theater concerts.  Many postmodern dance works incorporate 
improvised sections and give much leeway to the dancer(s).  This kind of postmodern dance is 
called open choreography, or indeterminate choreography (although this label may be confused 
with Cunningham’s projects), or situation-response composition.153 
 Contact improvisation is probably the best known genre of improvised dance.154  Contact 
improvisation involves the movement of two dancers with each other.  The movements are not 
planned beforehand; there is no script, no choreography.  The dancers react in movement to one 
another in real-time.  Contact improvisation is interesting because it reveals something that I 
think is largely unique to improvised art making, viz., although one may watch contact 
improvisation being performed (if one can even call it that) and experience aesthetic pleasure and 
attribute aesthetic merit to it, another purpose, perhaps its main goal, is the aesthetic pleasure of 
the dancers themselves.  I do think this pleasure is aesthetic, although it may be experienced with 
other kinds of pleasures as well.  Therefore, the aesthetic focus of this practice, for example, is 
twofold:  audience and agents (dancers). 
 Not a dance tout court, but a martial art, capoeira is similar to contact improvisation.  
Capoeira is an Afro-Brazilian phenomenon that consists of musical and dance elements.  Some 
classify capoeira as a separate art form or hybrid art form; however, there is now a recognized 
                                                         
153 Sally Banes, “Spontaneous Combustion:  Notes on Dance Improvisation from the Sixties to 
the Nineties,” in Taken by Surprise, 77-88.  See also her excellent books:  Terpsichore in 
Sneakers: Post-modern Dance; Democracy’s Body: Judson Dance Theater, 1962-1964; 
Greenwich Village 1963:  Avant-Garde Performance and the Effervescent Body; Subversive 
Expectations:  Performance Art and Paratheater in New York, 1976-1985. 
154 See the excellent books by Cynthia J. Novack, Sharing the Dance: Contact Improvisation and 
American Culture, New Directions in Anthropological Writing: History, Poetics, Cultural 
Criticism Series (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1990); and Thomas 
Kaltenbrunner, Contact Improvisation: Moving, Dancing, Interaction, Meyer and Meyer Sports 
Series (Lansing, MI: Meyer and Meyer, 1998); and articles by Steve Paxton. 
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genre of music called capoeira.  The debate over its status is in part due to the vague and 
incomplete accounts of its origins.  Nonetheless, much of what capoeira participants do may be 
classified as improvisation.  Within a circle of participants, members gravitate to the center either 
playing a musical instrument, or singing, or sparring with a partner.  The sparring in particular is 
what makes capoeira very interesting.  The sparring consists of acrobatic movements, superficial 
hitting and slapping, feinting movements, kicking, and other interactions that resemble Asian 
martial arts and boxing.  I have seen this executed by two males without a circle or audience and 
without music.  When the participants are good, it is quite beautiful and reminds me of good 
contact improvisation.155 
 Improvisation is integral to many popular or folk dance genres, many genres being 
analogous to their musical counterparts.  For example, tap dance challenges between two or more 
dancers are akin to “chases” in jazz.156  Ordinary, social dancing should not be excluded.  The 
various genres of dance that people engage in at parties, clubs, rituals, and other social settings 
involves moderately to completely unplanned movements, especially since one of the goals is to 
react to one’s partner and the particular of the context.  Anyone who has danced without a set 
choreography has improvised. 
 
 
 
 
                                                         
155 I thank Jennifer Balkan, a sociologist at the University of Texas at Austin, for enlightening 
me about capoeira. 
156 Constance Valis Hill, “Stepping, Stealing, Sharing, and Daring: Improvisation and the Tap 
Dance Challenge,” in Taken by Surprise: A Dance Improvisation Reader, 89-102. 
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Examples from Theater, Drama, Broadcast 
 
 Improvisation in theatre and drama is ancient.  Impromptu performances by bards and 
troubadours, usually involving the playing of an instrument such as the lyre, were common.  
Medieval theatre also had it.  Commedia dell’arte all’improvviso of the Renaissance period is 
probably the most well-known.  Improvisation was also a part of British, French, and American 
nineteenth century genres such as the extravaganza, which was similar to burlesque, Pantomime, 
and hippodrama, which was a theatrical genre started in the late eighteenth century involving 
circus-like horsemanship with melodramatic scripts.  In the twentieth century, experimental 
theater groups:  Chicago Compass Group,157 Second City, Keith Johnstone’s theatre group,158 
Roberto Ciulli’s Theater an der Ruhr,159 and early Mike Leigh theatre works.  As the name of the 
famous comedy club in New York “The Improv” indicates, stand-up comedy, either individual 
or group, usually contains elements of improvisation.  A “bit” or joke is never performed the 
same way, and the differences consist in improvisation of content, style, dynamics, et cetera.  
The comedy sketches of Elaine May and Mike Nichols were largely improvised from a bare 
script, which contained general descriptions of the context and characters. 
 Various television and radio programs, such as television and radio sketch comedy, live 
shows, radio plays, teleplays, and “talk” radio shows.  Often these broadcasts have some 
scripting, but the scripts allow for, in fact encourage, improvisation by the actors.  Broadcast 
                                                         
157 See Janet Coleman, The Compass: The Improvisational Theatre that Revolutionized American 
Comedy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1990; reprint edition, Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1991.). 
158 See Keith Johnstone, Impro: Improvisation and the Theatre, Theatre Arts Book Series (New 
York: Routledge and Methuen, 1979). 
159 Bartula, Malgorzata and Stefan Schroer, eds., On Improvisation: Nine Conversations with 
Roberto Ciulli, Dramaturgies: Texts, Cultures and Performances Series, Volume 12, trans. 
Geoffrey Davis (New York: Peter Lang, 2003).  
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television shows, such as “Whose Line Is It Anyway?,”and a new show “Thank God You’re 
Here,” involve a set of performers who are given props, scene descriptions, or other forms of 
prompts for the purpose of individually or collectively generating an improvised performance.  
One may even count food/cooking shows that require chefs to construct and prepare a menu 
based on ingredients not revealed to the chefs before the taping of the show.  The chefs do not 
know beforehand what restrictions and requirements they will be subject to during the “contest” 
broadcast.  Notice the comparison with ancient Greek performance contests, rap contests, and 
music showdowns.  The ingredients, and sometimes style and cuisine, are unknown.  Sometimes 
there are other restrictions.  The Chicago chef Charlie Trotter has been influenced by jazz in his 
approach to cooking in both his restaurant and television shows.160 
 Improvisation is common in the filming of television shows.  Actors on these shows 
improvise to keep things fresh, elicit a particular response from fellow actors during filming, to 
generate material for writers, to test material from writers.  It is instructive to watch “blooper,” 
out-takes, or gag reels and deleted scenes of high quality shows, which are now generally 
available on the DVD recordings of television shows by season.  For example, in one scene from 
the The Office, Steve Carell’s character (Michael Scott) is supposed to (I inferred this from 
watching many alternatives of the scene) utter an erroneous surname of an Indian colleague to 
co-actor Jenna Fischer (Pam).  The Hindi name is difficult to say and remember, but is 
particularly so for the bumbling idiot character of Michael Scott.  There are several versions of 
the scene on a “blooper” reel in which Carell utters a different sequence of nonsensical but funny 
sounds, which are supposed to sound like the Hindi surname.  Each version of the scene contains 
a different sequence of uttered sounds.  It is obvious from watching that Carell is improvising the 
                                                         
160 See Charlie Trotter, Workin’: More Kitchen Sessions with Charlie Trotter (Berkeley, CA: Ten 
Speed Press, 2004). 
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sounds each time.  Perhaps it was written in the script as “ad lib erroneous surname.”  Whether it 
is planned improvisation or not, Carell’s improvising is brilliant because each concoction of the 
name is funny and sometimes onomatopoetic, and it achieves the likely goal of acting like 
someone who is coming up with the name on the spot.  In other words, Carell must improvise 
each time the scene is shot in order to reveal authentic improvisation of the character.  This is an 
interesting use of improvisation.  Improvised acting can be the conduit to unexpected outcomes, 
whether called for or not, and improvisation is a method to portray a character who is supposed 
to behave off the cuff or on the spur of the moment.  The desirable authenticity of such behavior 
may not be conveyed by non-improvised movements and verbal behavior. 
 Acting pedagogy has a long history of recognizing the value of improvisation in order to 
develop acting skills.  The main purpose here is to make students better general actors (for both 
theatre and film), although it can obviously have the effect of helping students become better 
improvisers.  It is one of the main components of what is now called “method acting,” and is 
associated with the Actor’s Studio in New York.  There are a plethora of improvisation manuals 
for the theatre and acting. 
 
Related Terms and Non-Artistic Improvisation 
 
 Here are some terms related to improvisation, some referring to exclusively non-artistic 
improvisation: 
 
stream of consciousness, free association (in psychotherapy, especially 
pscyhoanalysis), bricolage, bricoleur, parody, variation, makeshift, provisional, 
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substitute, temporary, adhocism (coined by Charles Jencks in 1968),161 stopgap 
(“improvised to fill a need temporarily”)
162
, MacGyverize or to MacGyver, 
MacGyverism. 
 
 I have already addressed stream-of-consciousness and free association.  The Oxford 
Thesaurus163 gives these synonyms for the verb “improvise:” ad-lib, extemporize, Colloq play 
(it) by ear, fake it, wing it; invent, concoct, devise, contrive, jury-rig, make do.  And for 
Makeshift:  temporary, stopgap, expedient, emergency, temporary, jury-rigged,164 improvised, 
tentative, standby, slapdash, substitute. 
 The Oxford Thesaurus gives these synonyms for “spontaneous:”  unannounced, 
unpremeditated, unplanned, impromptu, extemporaneous, extempore, unprepared, unrehearsed, 
offhand, ad-lib, spur-of-the-moment, off the cuff.  Second set:  natural, unforced, unbidden, 
instinctive, instinctual, unconscious, reflex, automatic, mechanical, immediate, offhand, 
unguarded, unthinking, unwitting, involuntary, impetuous, impulsive, knee-jerk.  And for 
“extemporaneous” the following are added:  unstudied, extemporary, unscripted.  And for 
“unpremeditated” the following are added:  unarranged, uncontrived, coincidental, last-minute, 
casual.165 
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 Parody, variation, and improvisation are sometimes related and confused with one 
another.  Nelson Goodman and Catherine Elgin comment on this: 
 
4. Improvisation and Parody 
Among concepts closely related to variation, improvisation is presumably subject to 
somewhat looser formal restrictions than is variation.  Otherwise, improvisation upon—
that is, referring to—other music differs little from variation.  A completely “free” 
improvisation referring to no other music is simply a spontaneous creation invention 
having nothing to do with variation. 
     A parody of work ordinarily meets the formal requirements for a variation.  But while 
a variation is always upon a theme or work, a parody may be upon (or of) a style or a 
whole corpus of works; and features exemplified and those contrastively exemplified are 
features common to works in the corpus.  Of course the point of a parody is quite 
different from that of the usual variation.  This may remind us that I have not so far 
discussed the why of variations--what they do, how they are used, what artistic roles they 
play.  But I shall postpone that subject a little longer until after we have considered 
variation in arts other than music.166 
 
Obviously one may improvise a parody or variation, but being a parody or variation does not 
entail that it was improvised.  Parody involves the treatment of a trivial or ludicrous subject in a 
obviously deliberate imitated style of notable artists and works.  Related terms are caricature, 
burlesque, and travesty.  Travesty involves an imitation (thus derivative) that is grotesquely 
incongruous in style (extravagant), treatment, or subject matter.167  Thus, a travesty may have 
derivative subject matter, which remains the same, but is absurd in style.  Burlesques are of two 
types:  (1) usually a literary or dramatic work that seeks to ridicule by means of grotesque 
exaggeration or comic imitation (e.g., mockery of a serious or lofty subject by frivolous 
treatment); (2) “theatrical entertainment of a broadly humorous often earthy character consisting 
                                                         
166 Nelson Goodman and Catherine Elgin, Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and 
Sciences (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1988), 73. 
167 Merriam-Webster Dictionary, s.v. “travesty.” 
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of short turns, comic skits, and sometimes striptease acts.”168  Caricature involves exaggeration 
by means of ludicrous distortion of parts or characteristics;169 caricature is usually visual but may 
be literary or even musical.  Probably, confusions between these works and improvisation arose 
because travesties, burlesques, parodies, and caricatures often tried to convey a sense of whimsy 
and spontaneity in achieving their ends. 
 There are practices in Western art music, world folk music, and popular music in which 
musicians perform a variation on a common tune or theme.  Some of these are improvised and 
some prepared before the performance.  Goodman is correct to point out that most of the time 
improvisation and variation have little to do with one another.  Furthermore, improvisation that 
uses a referent, as in modern jazz, should not be considered variation.  This is true even of the 
interpretations of jazz standards.  This may be just a semantic point, i.e., one may call it whatever 
one wants, but given that there is a technical meaning of “variation” one should eschew 
extending its application.  In addition, jazz musicians do not describe their “versions” or 
interpretations of standards as “variations.”  In the arts, parody requires imitation of a style (of an 
individual work or entire oeuvre), genre, or other well-defined category for the purpose of 
ridicule or comedy.  Parodies may be improvised, but obviously not all parodies are improvised.  
Much of sketch comedy qualifies as parodies, but these are often scripted before performance.  
Comment on parody and variation. 
 From these lists, one can see that it is quite natural to think of non-artistic improvising.  
Consider the terms makeshift, stopgap, jury-rig, which are mostly associated with non-artistic 
actions.  Bruno Nettl has expressed skepticism about the relationship between artistic and non-
artistic improvisation:  “The art of improvisation, as the concept is ordinarily used in Western 
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discourse about music, appears to be quite different from the improvisatory processes that are 
necessary in ordinary speech, or from improvisation as a way of dealing with emergencies.”170  
But I think this is false.  There must be some shared core of meaning in order for the same terms 
to be used, and more importantly for the concept to be applied, albeit sometimes stretched too 
thinly, to both artistic and non-artistic contexts, even if it is being used metaphorically in non-
artistic cases.  First, as I shall discuss in Part II, there is now neuroscientific evidence that 
ordinary speech production and musical improvisation share similar brain activation in neuro-
imaging studies.171  This probably shows that that there is some underlying computational 
process, and neuroanatomy, that both speech generation and (at least) musical improvisation 
share.  Second, there are very plausible accounts of the origins of improvisation from non-artistic 
matters to artistic generation.172 
 Without stepping too far athwart, I want to say that the motivation for improvisation in 
the arts, to a certain extent, stems from the presence of (non-artistic) improvisation in everyday 
life (non-artistic improvisation).  Many theorists have linked significant portions of intelligence 
(as cognitive ability) of both humans and non-human organisms to the capability for 
improvisation and the degree of it executed.  The fact that human behavior is highly regularized 
and rule governed is a fact that hardly exhausts our behavior.  Much more needs to be added to 
                                                         
170 Bruno Nettl, “Introduction: An Art Neglected in Scholarship,” in In the Course of 
Performance: Studies in the World of Musical Improvisation, Chicago Studies in 
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172 See my paper “The Evolution of Art Behaviors and Improvisation,” given at the American 
Philosophical Association, Pacific Division, Annual Meeting and Conference, April, 2012 (panel 
with Stephen Davies and Noël Carroll). 
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an explanation of human behavior, and that element is going to involve reference to creativity (in 
the plain, broad sense) and improvisation.  As Arthur Koestler has noted, humans need to 
improvise because of the contingencies presented to them by the environment.173  This, too, is 
probably a vestige of natural selection—improvisational skill (whatever that may be) is a trait 
that increases survival.  Improvisation that occurs in everyday tasks, so my thesis goes, transfers 
quite easily to entertainment, and becomes a way to satisfy the desire to express oneself—
consider the improvisational nature of much tribal art:  music-making, dancing, oral poetry and 
the like, et cetera.  Conversation itself is entertainment.  The evolution and development of 
language involves the uttering of novel strings of meaningful discourse.  Novel strings are 
prompted by novel stimuli, and novel strings trigger more new ones. 
 Moreover, the role of play in humans and other animal species has been studied 
extensively, and may be a significant part of the explanation of the origin of improvisation.174  
Consequently, anthropology, primatology, and ethology can turn out to have a role in 
explanations of improvisatory behavior in humans.  Perhaps not obvious at first, there seems to 
be a strong connection between play and improvisation.  On the other hand, this should not be 
too surprising because there is a long history of connecting play with art and aesthetics.175  It has 
been said that one major source of the origin of human artistic practices is play.  Much has been 
written about the subject, and the locus classicus is Homo Ludens by Johann Huizinger.176  None 
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of this excludes other illuminating approaches that may enhance biological or evolutionary 
theories of improvisation.  Presently, since no clear evolutionary theory of art in general 
(including music) stands out, improvisation may have to wait for a plausible theory.  Although 
there is no dearth of such theories, many seem plausible; some conflict with each other; for some 
it is difficult to determine whether they could be empirically verified.177 
Rhetorical analyses may be fruitful because of the concept of inventio in rhetoric, and the 
use of figures and tropes is relevant for memory devices,178 oral-formulaic improvisation (or 
formulas in general), and historically there has been a strong relationship between rhetoric and 
music.179  In addition, socio-economic and political analyses can explain contextual features of 
various forms of improvisation and potentially why they arise and why they are valued or not.180 
 
 The use of the concept of improvisation in non-artistic contexts goes back to at least 
Thucydides.  At Histories 1.138.3.10, Thucydides uses the verb au0tosxedia&zein181 which post-
Homer was used, more or less, for improvisation: 
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kai_  to_  cu&mpan  ei0pei~n  fu&sewj  me_n  duna&mei, mele&thj  de_  braxu&thti  kra&tistoj 
dh_  ou3toj  au0tosxedia&zein  ta_  de&onta  e)ge&neto. 
 
From this passage, it is clear that the ability to improvise is viewed positively.  Speaking of 
Themistocles’ genius, Thucydides cites his natural ability to judge in crises in which there is 
little or no time to deliberate, and that his ability to intuitively handle an emergency was 
extraordinary.  Here, Themistocles is being lauded for being an excellent, non-artistic 
improviser.182  However, a scholia remark for au0tosxedia&zein in the above passage indicates “ 
e3toimoj le&gein.”183  Consequently, this suggests that Thucydides was pointing out 
Themistocles’ ability “to speak readily.”  Nonetheless, this passage is an example of a non-
artistic conception of improvisation, which is the case for Plato’s use of au0tosxedia&zein as well 
(see below). 
 Contemporary philosophical sources also discuss non-artistic improvisation.  For 
example, Stanley Cavell recognizes not only the use of non-artistic improvisation, but its 
necessity in human life.  In an unlikely place (if that truly can be the case for Cavell’s writings), 
while discussing virtue in the Platonic and Aristotelian sense, Cavell comments: 
 
Courage and temperance are virtues because human actions move precariously from 
desire and intention in to the world, and one’s course of action will meet dangers or 
distractions which, apart from courage and temperance, will thwart their realization.  A 
world in which you could get what you want merely by wishing would not only contain 
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no beggars, but no human activity.  The success of an action is threatened in other 
familiar ways:  by the lack of preparation or foresight; by the failure of the most 
convenient resources, natural or social, for implementing the action (a weapon, a bridge, 
a shelter, an extra pair of hands); and by a lack of knowledge about the best course to 
take, or way to proceed.  To survive the former threats will require ingenuity and 
resourcefulness, the capacity for improvisation; to overcome the last will demand the 
willingness and capacity to take and to seize chances.184 
 
Notice the connection Cavell makes between improvisation and “the willingness and capacity to 
take and to seize chances.”  The latter is recognition of a common theme in discussions of artistic 
and non-artistic improvisation:  risk.185  Improvisation seems to require taking risks of various 
sorts.  This risk is entailed by the very nature of improvisation itself:  since improvisation always 
goes beyond the planned, the known, et cetera, and may occur in circumstances in which one’s 
usual choices, decisions, or courses of action have been exhausted or do not even seem 
applicable, uncertainty of outcome is always present.  Uncertainty is an epistemic state of an 
agent, whilst risk involves executing an action with uncertain results under uncertain 
circumstances.  The uncertainty is important to human agents because the outcomes may be 
positive or negative for us, and those outcomes will depend on what we do, how we improvise.  
The importance of the skill (or virtue?) of improvisation for a successful life in general, not only 
in emergency or crisis situations, is also noted in the work of Martha Nussbaum, Pierre 
Bourdieu, and a growing number of psychologists.186  What is interesting in the Cavell quotation 
above, is that he suggests that improvisation enters the scene from a failure of an action (“The 
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success of an action is threatened in other familiar ways:  by the lack of preparation or foresight; 
by the failure of the most convenient resources, natural or social, for implementing the action (a 
weapon, a bridge, a shelter, an extra pair of hands); and by a lack of knowledge about the best 
course to take, or way to proceed.”).  In other words, it may be the case that “the lack of 
preparation or foresight” requires a skill that fills in the gap, which skill is itself associated with 
no or little preparation and foresight.  Being prepared for when one is unprepared means the 
development of a particular kind of skill—improvisation.  This is the paradoxical nature of non-
artistic improvisation.  It is hoped that I have already presented some evidence refuting this view 
of all improvisation, i.e., improvisation often involves much planning, forethought, et cetera; 
however, this fact does not entail that improvisation involves exhaustive plans, forethought, and 
rehearsal.  If one’s plans, outlines, and forethought are exhaustive, then simply there is no 
improvisation and there is no need for it. 
 Sorting through the uses of the concept of improvisation in philosophy is tricky because it 
is often unclear whether a philosopher is using artistic improvisation as an analogy for 
understanding a particular phenomenon, or she is referring to a species of non-artistic 
improvisation.  This difference is important for making the case of whether we should recognize 
non-artistic improvisation at all.  If these uses are all analogies to artistic improvisation, then 
there really is no non-artistic improvisation, but just phenomena that are like, similar to 
improvisation as it occurs in the arts. 
 In one of Gilbert Ryle’s last articles before his death entitled “Improvisation,” he seems 
to be suggesting that a large portion of thinking, and perhaps behavior, is improvisation.  His 
main concern is the way in which thoughts impinge on us, that is, they just come to us, without 
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any conscious preparation or deliberation, nor any verifiable stages of thought.  Ryle describes 
the phenomenon aptly: 
 
I shall soon be reminding you of some of the familiar and unaugust sorts of 
improvisations which, just qua thinking beings, we all essay every day of the week, 
indeed in every hour of the waking day. 
… 
My interest is in the notions of imagination, invention, adventure, improvisation, 
initiative, etc., derives from an interest in the general notion or notions of thinking; i.e. in 
what it is that Le Penseur is now doing which is beyond an infant, reptile, or a clock.  …  
That impromptu but well-timed joke, that swift, pertinent, and unrehearsed reply to a 
question, that on-the-spur-of-the-moment twist of the steering wheel—certainly we had 
been awake and had just used out wits; certainly we accept blame or praise, applause or 
jeers, for the doing or saying of it, since it has been intentional and not a slip, an 
automatism, or a seizure; certainly we had been thinking what we were saying or doing, 
and minding how we said or did it.  But to the request for a chronicle of its component 
steps we have nothing to say, except “Oh, it just came to me’, as if some thinking, 
including some adequate or even bright thinking, is, after all, not a state-after-stage 
progression; or as if there could be the thinking-up of a wanted something without the 
execution of any successive pieces of thinking-out or thinking-over, however condensed 
or swift.187 
 
Recently, Galen Strawson has written on this, providing us with a brilliant phenomenology of 
thinking.188  Strawson’s concern, however, is whether thinking, or much of it, should count as 
action.  Are we agents while thinking?189  We must not fall into the trap that because we cannot 
give a full account of something, or make it wholly intelligible to ourselves, where that involves, 
as Ryle points out, a step-by-step process, a recipe if you will, then agency must be questioned.  
A similar concern is presented by Anthony Palmer:  “Understanding the creativity of a piece of 
work presents the dilemma that if the account we give is successful it will have the effect of 
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denying that creativity is involved.”190  I am not sure that that paradox exists.  That may rely on 
an overly Romantic notion of creativity.  What this shows, perhaps, is that we are up against the 
limits of our understanding, at least presently. 
 J. David Velleman’s recent work on practical reasoning191 seems to involve non-artistic 
improvisation.  In Velleman’s work, there are several ways in which improvisation is invoked.  
First, Velleman introduces and explains improvisational theatre and acting.  Clearly, this is 
artistic improvisation.  The second level is more difficult to interpret.  He extends the discussion 
of actors improvising theatre to human action, in particular acting for reasons.  It is unclear 
whether he is using improvisation as a model for understanding human behavior, or that he is 
suggesting that humans are improvising in their ordinary (non-artistic) behavior, or both.  Here is 
a sentence that suggests improvisation is a model and analogy:  “On the one hand, the rational 
agent does not attend to the mechanics of self-enactment, any more than the improvisational 
actor attends to the mechanics of improvisation.”192  But here is another that suggests that acting 
for reasons is a form of non-artistic improvisation:  “I believe that process of improvisational 
self-enactment constitutes practical reasoning, the process of choosing an action on the basis of 
reasons.”193  Velleman, I believe, is using artistic improvisation as a model and analogy for 
practical reasoning, and simultaneously claiming that humans engage in non-artistic 
improvisation frequently.  Nussbaum has a similar view. 
 Martha Nussbaum has also used the concept of improvisation.  In her article “The 
Discernment of Perception:  An Aristotelian Conception of Private and Public Rationality,” 
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included in Love’s Knowledge, section VII is entitled “Improvising When to Improvise.”194  
Before this section she remarks:  “Good deliberation is like theatrical or musical improvisation, 
where what counts is flexibility, responsiveness, and openness to the external; to rely on an 
algorithm here is not only insufficient, it is a sign of immaturity and weakness.”  Nussbaum uses 
literary examples, especially Henry James, to interpret Aristotle’s notion of practical wisdom 
(phronesis) and the role of perception of particulars in phronesis.  She takes the following well-
known passage from Aristotle as her stepping stone:  “Practical wisdom is not concerned with 
universals only; it must also recognize particulars” (1141b4 – 16).195  The following longish 
passage displays well how Nussbaum moves from using improvisation as a metaphor and 
analogy to suggesting that human moral behavior is and often ought to be improvised (non-
artistic).  She moves between artistic and non-artistic improvisation, recognizing the role artistic 
improvisation plays in our understanding of non-artistic improvisation: 
 
We can begin by returning to the metaphor of theatrical improvisation, which is a 
favorite Jamesian as well as Aristotelian image for the activity of practical wisdom.  
Maggie Verver is an actress who has prepared and practiced, and now discovers that she 
must ‘quite heroically,’ ‘from moment to moment,’ improvise her role.  Does she, in 
learning to improvise, adopt a way of choosing, in which there are no principles and 
everything is ad hoc? (Perhaps: in which everything is permitted)?  The image of the 
actress suggests how inaccurate such an inference would be.  The salient difference 
between acting from a script and improvising is that one has to be not less but far more 
keenly attentive to what is given by the other actors and by the situation.  You cannot get 
away with doing anything by rote; you must be actively aware and responsive at every 
moment, ready for surprises, so as not to let the others down.  An improvising actress, if 
she is improvising well, does not feel that she can say just anything at all.  She must suit 
her choice to the evolving story, which has its own form and continuity.  Above all, she 
must preserve the commitments of her character to the other characters (of herself as 
actress to the other actors).  More, not less, attentive fidelity is required. 
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Consider the analogous contrast between a symphony player and a jazz musician.  
For the former, commitments and continuities are external, coming from the score and 
the conductor.  Her job is to interpret those signals.  The jazz player, actively forging 
continuity, must choose in full awareness of and responsibility to the historical traditions 
of the form, and actively honor at every moment her commitments to her fellow 
musicians, whom she had better know as well as possible as unique individuals.  She will 
be more responsible than the score-reader, not less, to the unfolding continuities and 
structures of the work.  (We can also say that as the classical player ascends the scale of 
musical excellence, so to speak, becoming not simply a rote reader of the score but active 
thinking interpreter who freshly realizes the work at each performance, she resembles 
more and more the jazz musician in the nature of her attention.) 
 These two cases indicate to us, then, that the perceiver who improvises morally is 
doubly responsible: responsible to the history of commitment and to the ongoing 
structures that go to constitute her context; and especially responsible to these, in that her 
commitments are forged freshly on each occasion, in an active and intelligent 
confrontation between her own history and the requirements of the occasion.196 
 
 Cora Diamond, in commenting on Nussbaum, has picked up on this theme.  She 
emphasizes the relationship between improvisation and possibility:  “There is a contrast between 
two notions of what possibility is in moral life:  are the possibilities open to an agent in a 
particular situation fixed, with his responsibility being only to choose between them, or is what is 
possible dependent on creative response to the elements of the situation?”197  Does being limited 
to two or three choices of courses of action exclude improvisation, or the need for improvisation?  
I do not think so.  Could not making a choice on the spur of the moment, even when that choice 
was fixed beforehand, constitute improvisation in acting and choosing?  As I argued above in the 
section on aleatory music, the exercise of discretion, even when the discretion is limited and the 
choices have been pre-set, can be a form of improvisation.  This is the case because making 
choices at the time of acting (these processes often seem simultaneous) is spontaneous, and lacks 
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comprehensive planning and rehearsal.  Again, improvisation admits of degrees.  Improvisation, 
then, opens us to possibilities, leaving the fixity of situations and their descriptions.  I think what 
is most important for Diamond is the leaving room for improvisation.  In other words, a choice, 
or at least recognition, must be made beforehand that one will not limit oneself to a narrow set of 
choices, and that one may want and need to improvise.  This choice, however, is a kind of meta-
choice. 
 In fact, there are sources from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that tried to foster 
such connections between morality and virtue and improvisation.  In Alexandre-Guillaume 
Mouslier de Moissy’s Les Jeux de la petite Thalie, ou petis drames, dialogues sur des proverbs 
(1769), shorts dramatic pieces are presented for moral instruction through their performance by 
young people and sometimes older adults.  The use of such proverbe dramatique was common 
for the wealthy classes during the eighteenth century.  As Penny Brown notes, Moissy’s 
innovation was including elements of improvisation.198  This source provides some historical 
ground for both Vellemen and Nussbaum.  Typically, young actors were chosen for roles to 
which they had some resemblance.  They were explicitly being asked to act and improvise their 
own characters, to consider themselves as characters.  The similarities to Velleman’s theory are 
apparent.  Moreover, the inclusion of impromptu passages seems to both recognize and foster the 
presence of improvisation in life, in particular on our moral thinking.  Although, there was 
always a “moral script,” akin to universal moral principles, virtues, the improvisation component 
functioned as practice for applying such moral principles, and having the ability to adjust them 
accordingly to the vagaries and particularities of individual situations. 
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 Viewing the improvisations of others is instructive to us.  This is part of the training to 
become a competent improviser in life and art.  Nussbaum asks rhetorically:  “It is possible to 
play a jazz solo from a score, making minor alterations for the particular nature of one’s 
instrument.  The question is, who would do this, and why?”199  What Nussbaum misses here is 
that this is a common, and many would argue necessary, practice for improvisers in training, 
especially in the jazz tradition.  Transcription courses, usually more than one semester, are a 
standard component of jazz curricula in universities.  We spend a great deal of time transcribing 
the improvised solos of Charlie Parker, John Coltrane, and Miles Davis.  Then we play them 
over and over again.  We are presented with the possibilities of improvisation; we discern how 
these great improvisers solved problems (how did they make that strange and difficult harmonic 
transition in bars 13 through 18?); and our fingers develop that most important “muscle 
memory;” facility and dexterity are enhanced through habituation.  The practice of scales and 
modes is limited here; listening repeatedly is also insufficient.  One needs to reproduce others’ 
improvisations.  Moreover, it is a way of becoming artistically intimate with the history and 
tradition of one’s chosen genre.  There is another reason for such a practice:  quotation.  Jazz 
musicians quote famous improvised sequences from others (sometime even their own in order to 
be funny or self-deprecating) in jazz solo improvisations.  The most famous example is that of 
the pianist Red Garland quoting a trumpet solo of Miles Davis played on a Charlie Parker 
recording when Miles was about nineteen years of age.  This occurred on a Miles Davis record 
on a different tune.  Garland block chorded the trumpet solo (and transposed it) but otherwise 
played the exact sound sequence.  This was a novel, musically interesting part of Garland’s solo, 
but also functioned as an homage to Miles Davis. 
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 Here is my diagnosis of the ambiguity and ambivalence of the use of improvisation as 
model for some human behavior and claiming that behavior is improvisation tout court.  The 
reason for the use of artistic improvisation as an analogy for understanding certain non-artistic 
human behavior is that we do not have a strong sense of what it means to say that humans 
improvise in their ordinary behavior.  If non-artistic improvisation is as pervasive as many think, 
then our natural state is one of improvising.  We improvise in conversation, in our general 
interactions with others, in movement in walking, running, and sports, and in making decisions.  
We are too close to it, too intimately involved in it, to have the intellectual distance to consider it 
and analyze it.  Consequently, analogies must be made to artistic improvisation, a phenomenon 
to which most us have more distance from a quotidian perspective, and because artistic 
improvisation is recognizable to us—we have watched it, listened to it.  We understand it 
because it has been portrayed for us in the artistic context.  In addition, as Alexander Nehamas 
has interpreted and emphasized in Nietzsche,200 there are ways in which our lives are like works 
of art, and we act like artistic agents in the ordinary course of human action. 
 Kant and other modern philosophers used the concept of spontaneity.  Kant uses a few 
German terms that we translate as “spontaneous” and “spontaneity.”  Most of the time, Kant uses 
“spontan.”  These primarily occur in the Critique of Practical Reason, and a few in the Critique 
of Pure Reason.  Thomas Mautner addresses how “spontaneity” was addressed in modern 
philosophy:  “spontaneous adj.  In everyday usage, a synonym of unreflective, but classical 
philosophers (e.g. Leibniz, Kant) use it in a different sense closer to the etymology of the word:  
a spontaneous action is one which originates with the agent; freedom, in contrast to 
                                                         
200 Alexander Nehamas, Nietzsche: Life as Literature (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1985).  
  
101 
determination by external forces, is the spontaneity of an intelligent being.”201  Kant used 
“spontan” for a process of the mind.  His use has little to do with improvisation (either artistic or 
non-artistic). 
 
 The neuroscientist and philosopher William Calvin cites Jean Piaget as saying, “I like 
Jean Piaget’s emphasis, that intelligence is what you use when you don’t know what to do.  This 
captures the element of novelty, the coping and groping ability needed when there is no “right 
answer,” when business as usual isn’t likely to suffice.  Intelligent improvising.  Think of jazz 
improvisation rather than a highly polished finished project, such as a Mozart or Bach concerto.  
Intelligence is about the process of improvising and polishing on the time scale of thought and 
action.”202  Later Calvin says “Intelligence is all about improvising, creating a wide repertoire of 
behaviors, ‘good moves’ for various situations.”203  Calvin seems to be using “intelligence” in its 
descriptive sense, not honorific sense.  Hence, according to this conception of intelligence non-
artistic improvisation (and thereby artistic improvisation, too) is at the core of organisms with 
high cognitive abilities.  Perhaps, one of the defining features of being human is the ability to 
improvise.  When viewed in this light, it is certainly baffling how improvisation has been largely, 
not completely, ignored in our intellectual history.  Obviously, this scholarly situation has 
recently changed. 
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 In addition, Philip Ringstrom, in discussing two approaches to psychoanalytic therapy 
(conventional theatre and improvisational theatre), says that in the improvisational theatre model 
for the therapist “the emphasis has little to do with ‘what one knows,’ as it is all about what one 
does with what one does not know.”204  In fact, recently, there has been an explosion of the use 
of the concept of improvisation in non-artistic contexts.  Searches of academic databases list 
hundreds of articles on improvisation in business, management theory, engineering, medicine 
(emergency and other), and even conflict theory.  Many of these articles and books focus on a 
phenomenon called “situational uncertainty,” which is similar to Piaget’s conception of 
intelligence noted above.  Obviously, these kinds of events can happen in any domain.  As an 
example, consider one of Robin Wagner-Pacifici’s theories of standoffs (“Standoffs are 
situations of mutual and symmetrical threat, wherein the central parties face each other, literally 
and figuratively, across some key divide.”205): 
 
Rules and spontaneity that work together at a deep level pull coherence out of an 
evolving and unpredictable situation.  In terms of locating improvisation in a sociological 
theory, I argue that improvisation is a sort of halfway house between the Meadian ‘I’ with 
its playful and idiosyncratic experience of self and the Meadian ‘Me’ with its learned 
taking of the role of the generalized other.  This involves the temporal looping of the past 
through the present, as memory and creativity join forces. 
 This coordination of memory and creativity is most explicit in theatrical 
improvisation and in musical genres such as jazz and rap where knowledge of dramatic 
genres, traditional plots, musical variations, and so forth clearly provide the 
epistemological ground for the improvisation.  Thus, improvisations both carry out and 
reconfigure our aesthetic and narrative expectations.  But improvisation is found as well 
outside of the world of theater and music.206 
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This quotation shows that improvisation is a useful, sustainable concept outside of artistic 
contexts.  Theorists outside of the arts invoke non-artistic improvisation regularly and naturally.  
In these cases, there is an attempt to systematize the “asystematicity” of improvisation. 
 When perusing other examples non-artistic improvisation, often jazz is used as the model 
and analogy.  I have found that there is a lot of misunderstanding of both jazz and improvisation 
in many of these cases.  Occasionally, these writers have enough of a grasp of jazz to make some 
point.  The general point of these articles and books seems to be that improvisation has a place in 
various domains, usually when other components and rules fail, or when confronted with 
“situational uncertainty,” and, probably more importantly, that tools can be taught, or training is 
possible, to develop some improvisational skill within the relevant domain.  This adumbrates the 
interesting of question of whether improvisation is a skill, and if it is, whether it is domain 
specific, and how it can be taught, and what is the nature of the training needed for its 
development.  So, there are tools for improvisation in emergency medicine, in business 
management, emergency management, and so on.  Perhaps this literature is useful; nonetheless, 
it seems it can be summed up in the way Piaget did:  knowing what to do when one does not 
know what to do.  This paradox is meaningful because it hints at a putatively acquired (and 
natural) skill of making do when preparations are not drawn up, or fall short in the situation at 
hand. 
 In addition, another major way in which non-artistic improvisation is used is in social 
theory.  For example, Pierre Bourdieu’s famous conception of social practices as “regulated 
improvisations” directly appeals to the concept.207  Edward Schieffelin notes that “Social 
practices, emerging in what Bourdieu has called ‘regulated improvisations’ arising from the 
                                                         
207 Michel de Certeau is another example of a social theorist using a similar concept. 
  
104 
socially structured dispositions of ordinary persons (the habitus), assert their own forms of 
intelligibility and organization in human activity.”208  In discussing how to theorize about social 
practices, Bourdieu rejects the typical models that are mechanical or rely too much (according to 
him) on the use of the rule-governed approach.  And it may actually be that the best 
understanding of most artistic improvisation, especially in jazz, is Bourdieu’s concept of 
habitus,209 field, and more generally genetic sociology.  Without going to far athwart, it is useful 
to give a brief exposition of this theory.  Although Bourdieu has explicitly addressed the arts, 
primarily found in The Field of Cultural Production and Distinction, my interest here is in the 
social theory.  Bourdieu aimed at avoiding two dichotomous approaches to social practices in 
general, and here in artistic production in particular.  On the one hand, there is the Romantic, 
idealistic, charismatic view of the artist, free from all structure and creating structure.  On the 
other hand, there are the deterministic models, either the historical materialism of Marxists, or 
those theorists who rely heavily on the external circumstances, environment, and social and 
artistic structures—all outside, more or less, of the agent’s control.  Bourdieu’s theory combines 
the supposed truths of both theories.  The agent is important (atomism, cognitivism) and the 
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externalities are important (holism).  Consequently, Bourdieu introduces the concepts of habitus 
and field, among others.  Habitus may be defined as: 
 
The habitus is sometimes described as a ‘feel for the game,’ a ‘practical sense’ (sens 
pratique) that inclines agents to act and react in specific situations in a manner that is not 
always calculated and that is not simply a question of conscious obedience to rules.  
Rather, it is a set of dispositions which generates practices and perceptions.  The habitus 
is the result of a long process of inculcation, beginning in early childhood, which 
becomes a ‘second sense’ or second nature.  According to Bourdieu’s definition, the 
dispositions represented by the habitus are ‘durable,’ in that they last throughout a 
lifetime.  They are transposable in that they may generate practices in multiple and 
diverse field of activity, and they are ‘structured structures’ in that they inevitably 
incorporate the objective social conditions of their inculcation.210 
 
Bourdieu is not satisfied with rational choice theory, or wholly problem-solving approaches, or 
mechanistic rule-governed explanations of behavior (historical materialism, behaviorism).  The 
poverty of those approaches is among his reasons for rejecting them.  This is not the place to go 
into the details, but suffice it to say that Bourdieu finds them explanatorily impotent with respect 
to many social phenomena, not sufficiently fecund to generate the behaviors we observe. 
 “Field” (champ) for Bourdieu is the social structure of objective social relations and 
concrete social situations in which agents act.211  Field is determined by the positions the agents 
occupy, and their relations, in a particular domain:  political field, cultural field, economic field, 
athletic field, et cetera.  Fields have their autonomous rules etc., but there is also an hierarchy of 
fields.  Hence, some fields are subordinate to others.  The economic and political fields often 
dominate other social spheres. 
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 The combination of habitus and field, then, creates the total structure in which humans 
find themselves, and is the key, for Bourdieu, to explaining and understanding human behavior.  
So what of these “regulated improvisations?”  Bourdieu uses this term no less than four times in 
his Outline of a Theory of Practice.212  In Bourdieu’s work, I have discerned two related uses.  
First, regulated improvisation delineates that social space of action where the habitus and field 
fail to determine completely or exhaust the motivations and reasons for an action, while 
simultaneously recognizing that the behavior does not occur in a vacuum.  Where these 
unforeseen or non-deliberated situations arise, one must improvise.  Second, the dispositions of 
one’s habitus and constraints of the relevant fields do not dictate the full range of actions 
available to agents that are compatible with the socially acceptable norms.  Regulated 
improvisations fill in this gap.  Since Bourdieu does not want to be mechanistic about human 
action and thought, his habitus-field is not a model from which one can predict what people will 
do given any context or any set of contingencies.  The agent always has access to improvisation 
while still in the framework of habitus and field, thus “regulated improvisation.”  Humans 
improvise in everyday life because of the various contingencies with which we are confronted, 
because of our fluid whim, our intelligence and natural talents, and habitus. 
 To use habitus in the jazz context, the jazz musician as an agent of cultural production 
has been “inculcated” into a system of rules, constraints, a language, a shared knowledge of 
background information.  Listening to jazz recordings, lifting lines and licks, transcribing others’ 
solos, practicing scales, modes, arpeggios, copying favorite players, going to jazz clubs, taking 
lessons, reading histories and biographies—all of these form the micro-habitus, if you will, of 
jazz musicians.  I can say from personal experience, one who inhabited that micro-habitus for a 
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long time, that one can tell very quickly whether a new person on the scene “knows the 
language,” as Jackie McLean would say.213  McLean embraced the ambiguity of the phrase 
“know the language,” meaning both the large array of musical conventions in jazz, and the 
natural language vocabulary (slang, jargon) used by the jazz community.  Habitus accounts for 
the internalization of the stock from which jazz musicians draw to improvise in specific contexts 
(settings, tunes, genres, harmonic structures, et cetera). 
 The sentence from the early work of Bourdieu that invites his theory’s application to jazz 
in particular is this:  “Because the habitus is an endless capacity to engender products—thoughts, 
perceptions, expressions, actions—whose limits are set by the historically and socially situated 
conditions of its production, the conditioned and conditional freedom it secures is as remote from 
a creation of unpredictable novelty as it is from a simple mechanical reproduction of the initial 
conditionings.”214  The last part of that sentence accurately describes much of standard jazz 
improvisation (as well as other genres in other art forms).  The Romantic conception, as I shall 
call it, of potentially infinite creativity with complete freedom, unpredictable novelty, and 
originality is an erroneous model for jazz improvisation (among other genres).  The Baroque 
conception of very limited freedom within a narrow domain under strict rules and a small set of 
possibilities, with the goal of concealing spontaneity is erroneous as well.  Standard jazz 
improvisation is neither completely free (and novel) nor is it mechanistic reproduction of 
memorized phrases or the instantiation of some internalized rules.  The jazz musician operates 
under various constraints, both internally and externally imposed, both factual and prescriptive, 
but within these constraints there is much room for freedom and originality.  (The taxonomy I 
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shall provide in Part II will elaborate on this.)  In fact, breaking barriers and pushing novelty is a 
premium value within jazz.215  Consequently, Bourdieu’s habitus-field model provides an 
excellent framework for understanding improvisation in the jazz genre.  In fact, Jon Elster, 
another social theorist (and philosopher, economist, et cetera), has introduced a constraint based 
theory of creativity in the arts,216 and Elster has discussed jazz improvisation explicitly.217 
 An even more unlikely place to find improvisation is in design, planning, and 
architecture.218  In these areas, both the artistic and non-artistic senses of improvisation have 
been used.  In planning and design, the concern has been situational uncertainty as above, but 
also the open-mindedness required to face the contingencies of localism.  “Adhocism,” coined by 
Charles Jencks and Nathan Silver in the early 1970s, draws upon the bricolage concept of Claude 
Levi-Strauss, which will be discussed below.  Seeking to integrate more fully the notions of 
community, democracy, and people’s everyday lives with architecture, planning, and design, 
Jencks and Silver advocate adhocism.  But in this sense adhocism has little to do with 
improvisation. 
 Given all the ways in which improvisation is used, or can be used, in non-artistic 
contexts, one can discern two other domains in which improvisation may be essential:  ordinary 
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conversation in natural languages and play.  There is a large literature on both of these,219 and 
improvisation is often explicitly cited as both an analogy for what goes on in conversation and 
play, and straightforwardly in ascribing much (or even all) conversation and play as 
improvisation.  Some even think one can learn something about artistic improvisation by 
studying conversation and play.  In fact, one might say that theatre and comic improvisation just 
are improvisation in the ordinary sense of conversation and play and persiflage.  Pedagogically, 
this putative fact is often stressed.220 
 Not all instances of the use of the concept of improvisation in non-artistic contexts are 
metaphorical; some of these uses are genuine, legitimate cases of improvisation.  The evidence 
for saying this is simply that it follows from the general definitions one finds for “improvise” and 
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“improvisation,” and these cases connect up cozily to the etymology of the terms and concept (as 
we shall see below, especially the ancient Greek etymology and concept).  While recognizing 
that “Metaphors are notoriously tricky tools of instruction,”221 John Kao uses the concepts of 
improvisation, jazz, and jam sessions to foster and manage creativity in business firms.  
However, being creative is one thing, improvising is another.  This conflation occurs frequently, 
which is akin to the conflation of improvisation with inspiration, too.  What compounds the 
problem is that the term “creative” can be honorific or merely descriptive.  Using the honorific 
sense, one can improvise without being creative.  Obviously, not all creating is improvising (but 
I shall investigate this issue in Part II).  So, although I do not object to Kao using jazz as a 
metaphor to manage creativity in business contexts, I would warn against extending the 
metaphor too far, especially since there is a predilection among many of these theorists to 
misunderstand the nature of improvisation and jazz.  For example, in one case improvisation is 
product marketing is explicated as “strategy of emergent learning.”222  This sounds like Piaget’s 
idea again, but it is difficult to equate improvisation with any kind of learning.  A certain amount 
of learning and training may be necessary for improvisation, and improvising itself may give rise 
to new experiences, but beyond that things become hopelessly vague. 
 One can also discern why various movements of psychotherapy and personal growth 
have been impressed by spontaneity of action and decision, supposedly getting people to come to 
terms with some sort of instinctual, basic psychic phenomena.  In fact, Malcolm Gladwell’s book 
Blink is a recent best seller which discusses (and sometime advocates) using intuition and 
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spontaneous “gut” reactions.223  Moreover, there is a very long history of valuing some form of 
spontaneity in eastern philosophy, especially Daoism and Zen Buddhism.224  In Daoism, the very 
important concept of wu-wei often has been interpreted by scholars to be a form of spontaneous 
action or yielding.225  In many of these traditions, spontaneity supposedly taps into, or is one of 
the best methods to mine, the sub-conscious mind.  Obviously, these views are supposing that the 
efforts and products of the sub-conscious mind are valuable. 
 In addition to free association and other techniques in psychoanalysis, Dr. J.L Moreno 
developed a system of psychotherapeutic treatment involving spontaneity and a kind of 
improvisational theatre, which also functions as a kind of training and a method of sociological 
research.226  The three components to his system are sociometry, sociodrama, and psychodrama.  
The two relevant for my concerns are sociodrama and psychodrama.  Sociodrama is a kind of 
group psychotherapy with the goal of not only the mental health of individuals, but a means to a 
more integrated and healthy society, too.  Psychodrama was a kind of individual (solo) 
improvisational theatre of role playing with therapeutic aims.  Where does spontaneity fit in?  
Moreno believed spontaneity was important for two main reasons.  First, spontaneous action, 
talking, and thinking in the context of one these “dramas” is apt to loosen the person’s limited set 
of behaviors and inflexible cognition, which putatively give rise to mental and behavioral 
                                                         
223 Gladwell, Blink.  But an unfortunately ignored pre-cursor to Gladwell is Guy Claxton, who 
was on to this before Gladwell popularized the research and movement.  See Guy Claxton, Hare 
Brain Tortoise Mind: How Intelligence Increases When You Think Less (Hopewell, NJ: Ecco 
Press, 1997). 
224 See Belgrad, Claxton, and Joel J. Kupperman, Learning from Asian Philosophy (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1999), 84-89. 
225 There are several different interpretations of what  wu-wei means in the classic Daoist texts of 
Laozi and Zuangzi.  For a good (and clear) survey, see David Loy, Nonduality: A Study in 
Comparative Philosophy (Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 1988), 96-132. 
226 See J. L Moreno, The Essential Moreno: Writings on Psychodrama, Group Method, and 
Spontaneity by J.L. Moreno, M.D., ed. Jonathan Fox (New York: Springer, 1987). 
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dysfunction.  Spontaneity here allows a self-enlightenment of new possibilities and variations, 
which increase flexibility in thinking and acting.  Second, the technique of psychodrama allowed 
the patient to “try on” new (social) roles in order to not be confined by one’s own past roles, both 
those that have outlived their usefulness and those that were constraining to the patient 
unjustifiably.  Importantly, Moreno was also one of the few who thought action, cognition, and 
rest could be spontaneous.  Limiting spontaneity to just exaggerated actions and the like is a 
caricature of human spontaneity.  As Galen Strawson points out,227 human thinking is 
spontaneous, and rest itself, not just its time and location, can be spontaneous.  In addition, the 
benefits of spontaneity were supposed to be realized both in the psychotherapeutic context and in 
real life.  The spontaneity fostered and coaxed from patients in the psychodrama was supposed to 
be a model for ordinary behavior outside of the psychotherapeutic context.  Hence, by making 
people act out roles off the cuff, they experience catharsis (Moreno meant it in the Aristotelian 
sense), and thus liberation from emotional disequilibria and the constraints of dysfunctional 
thinking and behavior. 
 Bricolage, a term originally used by Claude Levi-Strauss in his theory of myth,228 is used 
in artistic and non-artistic contexts.  In literary theory and cultural criticism, bricolage is used to 
describe “an improvisatory activity performed by a kind of intellectual jack-of-all-trades with 
whatever happens to be available … contemporary theorists … view the practice of theorizing as 
itself a form of bricolage performed with concepts and ideas retrieved from the grand theories of 
the past.”229  In general, a bricoleur is a person who can make do with whatever is available.  
                                                         
227 Strawson, “Mental Ballistics.” 
228 Claude Levi-Strauss, La Pensée Sauvage (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1962).  
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Hence, the terms stopgap, jury-rig, makeshift, and provisional are all especially associated with a 
bricoleur’s practice.  Implied here is a kind of skill, or perhaps virtue, which disposes a person to 
be able to think on the spot, have sound and useful intuitions, create under material or resource 
deprivation and time pressure, and make the best of it.  In short, this is a person who can 
improvise well.  From the television show MacGyver, which was broadcast from 1985 to 1991 
(and has a cult following), the eponymous main character is such a bricoleur.  As a result of this 
show, two terms have entered the language.  “To MacGyver” (verb) is to improvise quickly 
needed things from a lacking hodgepodge; a “MacGyverism” (noun) is a spontaneous invention 
or the use of ordinary household items to jury-rig devices.230  This is consistent with engineering 
improvisation, which requires this kind of insight and skill in the face of emergencies, 
obsolescence, embargo, lack of funding, and loss of product support.  In education theory, 
Seymour Papert, who was a collaborator of Jean Piaget, distinguished between two types of 
problem-solving:  analytical and bricolage.231  The latter is a way to learn and solve problems by 
trying, testing, playing around, experimenting, et cetera.  Notice the connection to Piaget’s 
definition of intelligence.  In these cases, far from having a negative connotation, the concept of 
improvising is seen as a skill, virtue, necessity even, and a major component of person’s mental 
and physical resources. 
 In artistic contexts, bricolage refers not to improvising but styles of fashion, art, and 
music.  The bricolage here may involve some improvisation, but that is not its defining 
characteristic.  Essentially, bricolage is a hodgepodge of materials and styles, genres put together 
                                                         
230 It has also given rise to lots of parody, especially a set of sketches (“Mac Gruber”) on 
Saturday Night Live inspired by the show.  (Recently, it became feature length film.)  The 
parodies take advantage of the hyperbolic (and ridiculous) ability to make anything from 
anything. 
231 See the work of Seymour Papert and Idit Harel Caperton on the theory of “Constructionism.” 
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to create something eclectic and novel, thereby giving rise to a new style or genre.  For example, 
in music bricolage may consist in putting together different instrumentation, conventions, and 
styles, which may include even non-musical aspects, such as a certain style of fashion.  Some of 
these styles have been described a “guerilla semiotic warfare.”232 
 And now philosophically speaking: has improvisation been used in doing philosophy?  I 
do not mean philosophical analysis and theorizing about improvisation as I am doing here, nor 
do I mean the use of improvising as an example (e.g., for action theory or aesthetics); I mean 
improvising philosophical content itself, and the use of the concept of improvisation to 
understand philosophy (or philosophical texts).  The Socratic elenchus may be interpreted as 
improvising philosophy because in impromptu conversations, which Plato and others seem to 
suggest were the nature of Socrates’ interactions, one cannot plan beforehand all of the questions 
and argumentative moves.  If the conversation is in fact impromptu, then one does not know 
what the topic will be.  Obviously, Plato’s dialogues are representations of this kind of 
conversation; however, I am not suggesting that the dialogues themselves are improvisations. 
 Stanley Cavell in his famous opening paragraphs to his magnum opus, The Claim of 
Reason, hints at such a use.  In the fourth opening paragraph, which is completely parenthetical, 
Cavell self-reflexively refers to an earlier article (which I will use extensively in Part II) he wrote 
entitled “Music Discomposed.”233  The term “improvisation” is used and recalled here: 
 
(If one asks:  When must a work, or task, be written, or permanently marked?, one may 
start thinking what makes a work, or task, memorable.  And of course the answer to this 
alone should not distinguish philosophy from, say, music or poetry or early astronomy or 
ruler and compass proofs in geometry (or, I wish I knew, what level of logic?).  Poetry 
                                                         
232 Roy Shuker, Key Concepts in Popular Music (New York: Routledge, 1998), 34. 
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(some poetry) need not be written; novels must be.  It seems to me a thought I once 
expressed concerning the development of music relates to this.  I said (“Music 
Discomposed,” pp. 200, 201) that at some point in Beethoven’s work you can no longer 
relate what you hear to a process of improvisation.  Here I should like to add the thought 
that at that point music, such music, must be written.  If one may speculate that at such a 
stage a musical work of art requires parts that are unpredictable from one another (though 
after the fact, upon analysis, you may say how one is derivable from the other), then one 
may speculate further that Beethoven’s sketches were necessary both because not all 
ideas are ready for use upon their appearance (because not ready ever but in the right 
company), and as it were, grow outside the womb.  What must be sketched must be 
written.  If what is in a sketch book is jotted just for saving, just to await its company, 
with which it is then juxtaposed as it stands, you may say the juxtaposition, or 
composition, is that of the lyric.  If it is sketched knowing that it must be, and gets in 
time, transformed in order to take its place, you may say that its juxtaposition, or 
composition, is essentially stratified and partitioned; that of the drama; the drama of the 
metaphysical, , or of the sonata.  Here are different tasks for criticism, or tasks for 
different criticisms.)234 
 
Stephen Mulhall has commented in detail on this parenthetical paragraph.235  He sees the 
significance of this paragraph as establishing two theses:  the nature of modernism and a 
prescription for how to read, interpret, for example, his work and Wittgenstein’s Philosophical 
Investigations.  When we focus on the form of some works of philosophy, the most significant 
property of their form is the fact that they were written.  In making his analogy, Cavell mentions 
that novels must be written, not all poetry needs to be written, and that at a certain point in 
Western art music history it becomes necessary that it is written, which for Cavell means that the 
music cannot be construed as being improvised (or derived from improvisations), or better, 
cannot be attributed the property as-if improvised.  Now this is an interesting thesis per se; 
however, here I limit myself to discussing the point Cavell is trying to make about philosophy 
itself, or the form philosophy takes (e.g., philosophical texts).  There is an ambiguity here.  The 
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supposed requirement of writing may be due to the especially complex content of the ideas and 
arguments, or the availability of writing (and recording, later) itself changes the way 
philosophers (and artists) conceive of their task, thereby causing the content of philosophy (and 
art) to change.  Both interpretations seem plausible, and I do not choose between them.  What is 
the significance of a philosophical text being written?  Mulhall interprets Cavell as saying that 
given certain conditions of our modernist culture, the content of the written text would be 
forgotten, thereby not available for commentary.  So, there are ideas that circulate naturally, 
without necessarily needing inscribed transmission (today in evolutionary theory, we might call 
them “memes”236).  On the other hand, there are ideas that would be impermanent, fleeting if not 
written down.  Their transmission occurs only when the text survives.  So one of the main 
conditions of modernism for Cavell is the necessity of being written, whether novels, music, or 
philosophy.  Mulhall says “Its parts or elements can no longer be re-enactments or memorials of 
insights originally discovered by improvisation.”  So, are there pre-modern philosophical texts 
that do not seem improvisatory, even in a metaphorical sense?  Are all modern philosophical 
texts writerly?  Is the relevant distinction here that between oral and written?  As I have pointed 
out already, it is a mistake to equate “oral” with being improvised.  I am wary of the opposition, 
presumably assumed by both Cavell and Mulhall, of what is written and (or versus?) what is 
improvised.  However, in another sense Cavell’s thesis seemingly has nothing to do with the 
development of writing and its technology.    Historical point:  Modernism in philosophy does 
not seem to demand any more memorialization than ancient philosophy.  But does the content of 
the philosophy itself require writing for its articulation, or is the matter that it could have been 
improvised but cannot be memorized.  Cavell and Mulhall seem to be suggesting the former.  
                                                         
236 “Meme” was first used by Richard Dawkins. 
  
117 
Hence, for Cavell philosophy has moved away from its memorable origins (could be improvised) 
to a state in which its memorability is questionable and thus must be written.  Improvisation is a 
model for both a historical claim, and a ways of doing philosophy.  But Cavell does not seem to 
be talking about actually improvising philosophy, that is, improvise while doing philosophy; 
although he does not exclude this option. 
 
 The earliest uses of the concept of improvisation in Western philosophy are in Plato and 
Aristotle.  Plato uses the verb au0tosxedia&zw in Apology 20d 1, Euthyphro 5a 7, 16a 2, 
Menexenus 235c 7-9 and 235d 2, Euthydemus 278e 1-2, Phaedrus 236d 5, and Cratylus 413d 3-
5. 
 
le&ge  ou]n  h9mi~n  ti&  e0stin, i[na  mh_  h9mei~j  peri_  sou~ au0tosxedia&zwmen   
Apology 20c 8 - 20d 1; part of direct discourse sentence) 
 
kai_  nu~n  e0peidh&  me  e0kei~nos  au0tosxedia&zonta&  fhsi  kai_  kainotomou~nta  peri_  
tw~n  qei&wn  e0camarta&nein  (Euthyphro 5a 7-8) 
 
SW.  Oi[a  poiei~j, w}  e9taire.  a0p’  e0lpi&doj  me  katabalw_n  mela&lhj   
a)pe&rxh|  h3n  ei{xon,  w(j  para_  sou~  maqw_n  ta&  te  o#sia  kai_  mh_  kai_  th~j   
pro_j  Me&lhton  grafh~j  a)palla&comai. e)ndeica&menoj,  e)kei&nw|  o#ti  sofo_j   
h2dh  gar’  Eu)qu&fronoj  ta_  qei~a  ge&gona  kai_  o#ti  ou)ke&ti  u(p’  a)gnoi&aj   
au)tosxedia&zw  ou)de_  kainotomw~  peri_  au)ta&, kai_  dh_  kai_  to_v  a@llon  Bi&on   
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o#ti  a!meinon  Biwsoi&mhn.  (Euthyphro 15e 7 - 16a 2)237 
 
MEN.  0Aei_  su_  prospai&zeij,  w}  Sw&krathej,  tou_j  r9h&toraj.  nu~n  me&ntoi   
oi}mai  e0gw_  to_n  ai9reqe&nta  ou0  pa&nu  eu0porh&sein:  e0c  u(pogu&ou  ga_r   
panta&pasin  h4  ai3resij  ge&gonen,  w#ste  i2swj  a0nagkasqh&setai  o(  le&gwn   
w#sper  au0tosxedia&zein.  (Menexenus 235c 6-9)238 
 
SW.  Po&qen,  w0gaqe&;  ei0si_n  e9ka&stij tou&twn  lo&goi  pareskeuasme&noi,  kai_ a3ma  
ou0de_  au0tosxedia&zein  ta&  ge  toiau~ta  xalepo&n.  (Menexenus 235d 1-2) 
 
e0a_n  ou}n  do&cw  u9mi~n  i0diwtikw~j  te kai_  geloi&wj  au)to_  poiei~n,  mh&  mou   
katagela~te:  u9po_  proqumi&aj  ga_r  tou~  a)kou~sai  th~j  u9mete&raj  sofi&as   
tolmh&sw  a)pautosxedia&sai  e0nanti&on  u9mw~n.  (Euthydemus 278d 6 - 278e 2) 
 
SW.  0All’,  w@ maka&rie  Fai~dre,  geloi~j  e2somai  par’  a)gaqo_n  poihth_n  i0dw&thj  
au0tosxedia&zwn  peri_  tw~n  au0tw~n.  (5) 
 FAI.  Oi]sq’  w(j  e2xei;  pau~sai  pro&j  me  kallwpzo&menoj:  sxedo_n  ga_r  e2xw  o3  
ei0pw_n  a)nagka&sw  se  le&gein.  (Phaedrus 236d 5-7) 
 
EPM.  Fai&nh|  moi, w}  Sw&krathj, tau~ta  me_n  a)khkoe&nai  tou  kai_   
                                                         
237
 Greek text for Apology and Euthyphro taken from John Burnet, ed., Plato’s Euthyphro, 
Apology of Socrates, and Crito (New York: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press, 1924). 
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ou)k  au)tosxedia&zein. 
SW.  Ti&  de_  ta}lla;  (Cratylus 413d 3-5) 
 
John Burnet comments on the word at Euthyphro 5a 7 and Apology 20d 1: 
 
au0tosxedia&zonta, ‘judging rashly’, from au0to&sxedon, ‘on the spot’, a strengthened 
form of sxedo&n found in this sense in Apollonius Rhodius alone, but implied by e0c 
au0tosxedi&hj peirw&menoj in the Homeric Hymn to Hermes 55.  It is used in the neutral 
sense of ‘to improvise’, but it often means to speak, think, or act in an ‘off hand’ or 
‘temerarious’ manner.  Cf. Ap. 20d 1.
239
 
 
i3na  mh_  ...  au0tosxedia9zwmen, ‘that we may not form a rash judgment’.  Cf. Euth. 5a 7 
n. and 16a 2.
240
 
 
Burnet assumes Plato intended a negative sense here (which probably derives from the verb’s 
Homeric/Ionic roots), even though he recognizes the neutral sense of “to improvise.”  Temerity 
means foolish boldness or rashness.  Context seems to make the difference in whether this term 
in interpreted in its neutral sense or has the negative connotation of being rash, rude, or acting or 
speaking with temerity.  I think we find both senses in Plato. 
 Burnet cites the Homeric Hymn to Hermes line 55.  This Homeric Hymn was probably 
composed in the late sixth century BCE, much time before Plato’s writings.241  Here it seems 
definite that au0tosxedi&hj means improvisation in a neutral sense.  Here is the text: 
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 John Burnet, ed., Plato’s Euthyphro, Apology of Socrates, and Crito (New York: Oxford 
University Press, Clarendon Press, 1924), 109. 
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  qeo_j  d'  u9po_  kalo_n a2eiden 
                      e0c  au0tosxedi&hj  peirw&menoj, h0u&te kou~roi 
                      h9bhtai_  qali&hsi  paraibo&la kertome&ousin,242 
 
The word occurs in the context of the description of how Hermes invented the seven-string lyre.  
Michael Crudden translates this as “exerting himself [Hermes] impromptu.”  Another translation 
by Jules Cashford has “The god then, improvising, trying his skill, sang out sweet snatches of 
song ...”243  In a note about this line Nicholas Richardson comments that the improvisation may 
refer “to the practice of improvisation of comic or abusive songs, sung alternately as a form of 
contest at feasts or symposia.”244  But does the h0u&te refer to the improvising of Hermes, or the 
singing of bits of songs?  Of course the passage means that Hermes was improvising the singing, 
but I think the clause is ambiguous as to what is like the taunting of boys at festivals—that they 
improvised these taunts or sang “sweet snatches of song.”  Nonetheless, the context here 
certainly warrants a neutral sense of improvisation. 
 The Euthyphro passages are trickier than they seem.  At 5a 7, Socrates is referring to 
Meletus’ charges against him.  Lane Cooper translates this passage as “put forward my own 
notions and inventions.”245  Grube translates thus:  “improvising and innovating about the 
                                                         
242 Greek text from Thomas W. Allen and E.E. Sikes, eds., The Homeric Hymns (London: 
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gods.”246  At 3b 6 Euthyphro tells Socrates of his understanding of the charges.  He uses the verb 
kainotome&w, which is used metaphorically to mean innovating, being original, et cetera.247  
Before this, at 3b 1-2 Socrates says that he is viewed as a poihth_n ei}nai qew~n, kai_ w(j kainou_j 
poiou~nta qeou_j.  The fact that Plato uses poihth_n here is probably ironic because of the three 
accusers against Socrates, Meletus brings the indictment on behalf of the poets.248  Thus, 
Socrates waxes poetically about the gods!  The evidence for this kind of irony is that Plato is 
often “playing” with figures and language in this way.  Probably, it would have struck the 
ancient audience as very humorous much in the same way that Shakespeare’s figures were to 
Elizabethan audiences.  For example, there is already paronomasia (play on words, puns) at 2d 2 
with the use of the verb epimelhqh~nai, in which part of it rhymes with Meletus.  Plato does this 
with the same verb (but a different form) and Meletus’ name again at Apology 26b 1-2 (Melh&tw| 
… e)me&lhsev).249  So Euthyphro’s phrase is a reference to Socrates’ characterization of the 
charges against him:  a maker of gods, a maker of strange gods and not believing in the old gods.  
The commentator John Hare thinks that the use of au0tosxedia&zonta& at 5a 7 refers back to 
Euthyphro’s words at 3b 2-6.250  Hence, he suggests “innovations” as a translation for it.  But I 
think this is confused.  Euthyphro uses kainotome&w with respect to the indictment against 
Socrates.  Socrates, as just noted above, uses poiei~n.  Socrates is probably referring to what he 
                                                         
246 G. M. A. Grube translation in Plato: Complete Works, eds. John M. Cooper and D.S. 
Hutchinson (Indianapolis, IN:  Hackett, 1997), 4. 
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has said before, not what Euthyphro said.  Moreover, the use of au)tosxedia&zw at 16a 2 is again 
by Socrates.  Therefore, if Socrates’ use of poiei~n is playful and ironic, and later at 5a 7 he is 
referring to the same set of charges in the indictment, then  au0tosxedia&zonta& is best thought of 
as improvising about the gods and religious matters, just as the poets and singing bards 
improvise.  This may be the closest use of au)tosxedia&zw to artistic production in Plato. 
 In the Apology, Socrates uses the term in indirect discourse, in which he anticipates what 
the judges are thinking or would say.  Tredennick translates this neutrally:  “Tell us the 
explanation, if you do not want us to invent it for ourselves.”251  Grube, though, follows Burnet:  
“Tell us what it is, that we may not speak inadvisedly about you.”252  I do not think a negative 
connotation is warranted here.  The gist here is that Socrates is suggesting that he should account 
for his time and occupation at this time (while he is speaking) so that the judges are not left with 
an omission in which they could think up anything according to their inclinations, including, but 
not necessarily, negative things. 
 The Menexenus passages seem to use au)tosxedia&zw neutrally as well, but something is 
revealed about extempore speech-making.  There is a discussion at the beginning of the dialogue 
between Menexenus and Socrates about a forthcoming public funeral for the war-dead.  In this 
context au)tosxedia&zw is used of orators.  The implication here is that the professional orators 
are trained to be able to improvise speeches (and to be able to debate).  At 234c 3 Socrates says 
that dead veterans are honored by having eulogies given by “experts” (a)ndrw~n sofw~n), who 
have tediously prepared these eulogies beforehand.  I think the clear implication here is that it is 
more honorable to have prepared eulogies, with elaborate verbal embellishments, than to have an 
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orator give an extempore eulogy.  In fact Paul Ryan translates this passage as “Even if he dies a 
pauper, a man gets a really magnificent funeral, and even if he was of little account, he gets a 
eulogy too from the lips of experts, who speak not extempore but in speeches worked up long 
beforehand.”253  The term au)tosxedia&zw is not present at 234 c3, but the context strongly 
suggests a comparison between well-prepared eulogies and eulogies that are not thus.  This 
opposition is best interpreted as being between well-prepared speeches and off the cuff speaking.  
Thus, here improvisation is not necessarily of negative value but inferior to composition.  After 
this at 235c 9 and 235d 2, au)tosxedia&zw seems to be used in a neutral sense.  Menexenus says 
that since the selection of the orator for the eulogies will be made at the last minute, he will be 
put in a position in which improvisation is required and this is not an easy thing to do.  Socrates 
replies that professional orators have ready-made speeches for all occasions, but even in the 
event that improvisation is required, orators can do this without difficulty.  Hence, there is 
recognition here that orators did have improvisational skill, and their training provided them with 
tools to be able to speak extempore. 
 The passage from the Phaedrus is similar to the Menexenus:  the context is about orators 
and speaking.  Phaedrus is attempting to get Socrates to speak on the topic of love.  This is 
prompted by Socrates’ criticism of Lysisas’ speech on the subject.  Once again, Socrates has 
negative things to say about orators and oratory.  Socrates seems to be trying to avoid talking 
about the subject in this way.  Socrates says, probably with typical Socratic irony, that “I’ll be 
ridiculous—a mere dilettante, improvising on the same topics as a seasoned professional.”254  So, 
au)tosxedia&zw is once again being used about making speeches.  There is an implication here 
                                                         
253 Paul Ryan translation in Cooper and Hutchinson, 951. 
254 Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff, trans., Plato: Phaedrus (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 
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that is slightly different from the Menexenus passage:  the “professionals” are prepared, and 
compared to them, one cannot compete in debating and speaking about a topic off the cuff.  Here 
the comparison that is implied in Socrates’ statement is either between the superior skills of the 
orators in improvising versus the ordinary person’s improvising, or between the ordinary 
person’s improvising versus the orator’s prepared speech.  Neither interpretation necessarily 
reveals a negative evaluation of improvisation in speck-making. 
 In the Cratylus, Hermogenes uses au)tosxedia&zw to indicate that he thinks Socrates is 
not improvising what he is saying, rather Socrates must have heard these ideas before from 
someone.  At 411b 3-4, Socrates says that these ideas about etymology “popped into his head.”  
Hermogenes disputes this claim later (413d 4).  The implication is that the content of what 
Socrates is saying is too worked out for him to have made it up just at that moment. Since, again, 
this involves speech, I do not think there is a clear sense of value being attached to 
improvisation.  There may be a questionable attitude toward improvisation in the background, in 
terms of what can be accomplished, but this is quite natural when it comes to speaking. 
 I include the Euthydemus passage even though the term used is a)pautosxedia&zw.  
Burnet’s Oxford text has it as a)paautosxedia&sai at 278d 7, but two other manuscripts (or sets 
of manuscripts) indicate two other possibilities (readings), as Burnet indicates in his Apparatus 
Criticus.  Codex Bodleianus, MS. E.D. Clarke 39 (= Bekkeri U) [B] reads a)p’ au)to_  
sxedia&sai; and Codex Venetus Append. Class. 4, cod. 1 (= Bekkeri t) [T] reads 
au)tosxedia&sai.  Burnet seems correct to dismiss B because it makes little sense in the sentence 
(accepting Codex Vindobonensis 54 supplement phil. Gr. 7 (= Stallbaumii Vind. I) [W]).  I 
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prefer the T reading against Burnet because text searches255 and Liddel and Scott show only this 
one instance of a)paautosxedia&sai.256  Of course, it is possible that a term may appear only 
once in the extant Greek manuscripts and texts we possess, and that there may have been more 
instances in lost manuscripts.  But the reading I suggest here is at least plausible given what we 
know now.  Edwin Hamilton Gifford, whose revised text was published after Burnet’s Oxford 
editions, notes the uniqueness of a)paautosxedia&sai, but seems to accept it.257  (Gifford reports 
in his Preface that he introduced only two original emendations, neither of which occurs at 278d, 
otherwise he mostly accepts Burnet’s textual readings.)  However, in his introduction on the text, 
Gifford claims that in general he has preferred the readings of manuscript B:  “In choosing 
between various readings I have preferred those of Cod. B as being by far the oldest and best 
authority, except where they are evidently corrupt or fail to give any adequate meaning to the 
passage.”258  In his note to 278d 7, Gifford says:  “a)paautosxedia&sai V, a)p’ au)to_ sxedia&sai 
B, au)tosxedia&sai T.  The verb au)tosxedia&zw is found both in earlier dialogues, Euthyphro 
5A, 16A, Apol. 20, and in later Crat. 413D, Phaedr. 236D, as well as in Thucydides, Xenophon, 
and Aristotle.  The compound with a)po& may be compared with a)pamqadizo&menoj Apol. 37A, 
                                                         
255 I used Greek electronic text databases for the search: Thesaurae Linguae Graecae and 
Perseus. 
256 Another verb used in Plato is close to what we have here:  a)pauqadi&zomai. This meant “to 
speak or act boldly,”  according to An Intermediate Greek-English Lexicon Founded upon the 
Seventh Edition of Liddell and Scott’s Greek-English Lexicon, eds. H. G. Liddell and R. Scott 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press, 1889), 90. 
257 Edwin Hamilton Gifford, ed., The “Euthydemus” of Plato with Revised Text, Introduction, 
Notes, and Indices (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1905; reprint ed., New York: Arno Press, 1973), 
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a)panaisxunth~sai ibid. 31B, a)potolma&w Pol. 503B.”259  The comparisons Gifford makes at 
the end of his note reinforces, I think, a preference for the T manuscript reading. 
 W. R. M. Lamb’s translation of this Euthydemus phrase is “treating it in a crude and 
ridiculous manner.”260  Rouse translates this more neutrally as “to make a rough sketch,”261 
Sprague uses “improvise,”262 and Waterfield uses the neutral term “impromptu.”263  In this 
context au)tosxedia&zw is more or less neutral, but there is a hint of potential shame because of 
the warning not to laugh or ridicule and that the presentation might be unprofessional or 
ridiculous because Euthydemus is going to improvise.  But this may be due to the fact that 
Euthydemus is not trained in such speech making, as sophists are, instead of the warning being 
elicited from any intrinsic limitation of improvising itself. 
 Let me now summarize what we have learned about improvisation in Plato.  In the 
Menexenus, Euthydemus, and the Phaedrus, the concept of improvisation is used of the orators 
and sophists, and about rhetoric.  The concept is used differently in the Apology, Euthyphro, and 
Cratylus.  In these passages, au)tosxedia&zw is used in the sense of making things up, with some 
implication of not being prepared, well-thought out, and perhaps even recklessness.  If, however, 
my reading of Euthyphro 5a 7 is correct, then Plato uses au)tosxedia&zw for the making up of 
ideas, albeit not in an “on the spot” way, but in a negative sense.  Nonetheless, all of the Plato 
                                                         
259 Ibid., 20. 
260 W. R. M. Lamb’s translation of Euthydemus in Plato: “Laches,” “Protagoras,” “Meno,” 
“Euthydemus,” Loeb Classical Library Series Volume 165 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1924). 
261 W. H. D. Rouse’s translation of Euthydemus in Huntington and Cairns, 392. 
262 Rosamond Kent Sprague’s translation of Euthydemus in Cooper and Hutchinson, 715. 
263 Robin Waterfield, trans. of Eythydemus in Plato: Early Socratic Dialogues, ed. Trevor J. 
Saunders (New York: Penguin, 1987), 327. 
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passages share this:  improvisation is used with respect to speaking, talking.  In Plato, there are 
no straightforward uses of the concept of improvisation with respect to artistic production. 
 au)tosxe&don and its cognates appear in Homer:  nine uses in the Iliad (7.273, 12.192, 
13.496, 13.526, 15.510, 15.386, 15.708, 16.319, 17.294), and one in the Odyssey (11.536).  An 
Homeric Dictionary264 contains these entries: 
 
au)tosxeda& = au)tosxedo&n 
 
au)tosxedi&h (sxedo&n):  close combat; adv., au)tosxedi&hn, ‘at close quarters.’ 
 
au)tosxedo&n:  hand to hand,  ma&xesqai, etc. 
 
It is interesting to see how the word evolved from close combat to acting or speaking off-hand, 
or improvising.  Liddell and Scott265 give the following entries: 
 
au)tosxedia&zw, f. a&so, to act or speak off-hand, Xen.  2. c. acc. to devise off-hand, 
extemporize, Thuc., Xen.  II. in bad sense, to act, speak, or think unadvisedly, try rash 
experiments, Plat.; and 
au)tosxedi&asma, atoj, to_ an impromptu, Arist.; and 
au)tosxediasth&j, ou~, o(, one who acts or speaks off-hand:  a raw hand, bungler, Lat. tiro, 
Xen.  From 
au)tosxe&dioj, a, on, and oj, on, hand to hand,  au)tosxedi&h| (sc. ma&xh|) in close fight, in 
the fray, Il.:  au)tosxedi&hn as Adv., = au)tosxedo&n, Hom.  II. off-hand, of an 
improvisatore, h. Hom. 
 
                                                         
264 George Autenrieth, A Homeric Dictionary for Schools and Colleges, trans. Robert P. Keep, 
rev. Isaac Flagg (Norman, OK:  University of Oklahoma Press, 1876, 1901, 1958), 55. 
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 Liddell and Scott, 135, 786. 
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sxedia&zw, f. a&sw, (sxe&dioj)to do a thing off-hand, Plat. 
sxedih&n, Ep. Adv.  ...  , of Place, near, close at hand, Lat. cominus, Il.  II. of Time, 
straightway, at once, Babr. 
sxe&dioj, a, on, (sxedo&n):  I. of Place, hand to hand, in or for close combat, Aesch.  II. of 
Time, on the spur of the moment, off-hand, Anth. 
 
 A Greek etymological dictionary has the following entry for au)tosxedia&zw: 
 
...  ec —ihj ‘unüberlegt, aus dem Stegreif’ (h. Merc.); Adj. —ioj ‘unvorbereitet, 
improvisiert’ (Arist., hell. u. sp.).  -  Davon die Verba:  1. sxedi&azw, auch m. apo— 
u.a., ‘improvisieren, aus dem Stegreif tun, machen, unbesonnen handeln’ (hell. u. sp.) mit 
–asma, asmoj, astikwj (hell. u. sp.; zur Bed. Koller Glotta 40, 183ff.).  2. 
au)tosxedia&zw  ‘ds.’  (att.) mit —asthj (X.), —asma, —asmoj, —astoj, —astikoj 
(Pl. Kom., Arist. u.a.).266 
 
In later writing in ancient Greek, Philo (third to second century BCE) uses the verb 
a)pautomati&zw for “producing or occurring spontaneously” (1.36, 2.182,1.571).267  The same 
verb is used by Plutarch (first century BCE and CE) for “doing something oneself” (2.717b).  In 
addition, there is a dubious reading of the adverb a)pauti&ka, “on the spot,” in the second to third 
century CE historian Dio Cassius (40.15). 
                                                         
266 Hjalmar Frisk, Griechisches Etymologisches Wörterbuch, Band II, Indogermanische 
Bibliothek II.Reihe--Wörterbücher (Heidelberg:  Carl Winter Universitätsverlag, 1973): 837. 
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 In Aristotle, there are two key uses in the Poetics at 1448b 23 and 1449a 9-10.268  
(Aristotle also uses the term in Politics 1326b 19.)  Both occur in a section on the origins and 
anthropology of poetry (and art in general).  Here are the passages: 
 
kata_  fu&sin  de_  o@ntoj  h(mi~n  tou~  mimei~qai  kai_  th~j  a(rmoni&as  kai_  tou~  r(uqmou~  
(ta_  ga_r  me&tra  o#ti  mo&ria  tw~n  r(uqmw~n  e)sti  fanero_n) e)c  a)rxh~j  oi(  pefuko&tej  
pro_j  au)ta_  ma&lista  kata_  mikro_n  proa&gontej  e)ge&nnhsan  th_n  poi&hsin  e)k  
tw~n  au)tosxediasma&twn.  (1448b 20-23) 
 
genome&nh  d’  ou}n  a)p’  a)rxh~j  au)tosxediastikh~j — kai_  au)th_  kai_  h(  kwmw|di&a,  
kai_  h(  me_n  a)po_  tw~n  e)carxo&ntwn  to_n  diqu&rambon  …  (1449a 9-10)
269
 
 
 Aristotle here gives us a speculative, or armchair, anthropology on the origins of different 
kinds of poetry.  I say armchair anthropology because it is doubtful that Aristotle had access to 
any empirical evidence for this claim; in fact, it is not even clear what would count as evidence 
for such a claim:  thus the controversy over the Parry-Lord theory of Homer.270  Gerald Else 
claims:  “… but it does not mean that this point of origin for poetry was not suggested to 
                                                         
268 Stephen Blum makes a minor error in identifying the passages as 1448b7 and 1449a14 in his 
article in In the Course of Performance, op.cit. 
269
 The Greek text taken from  Rudolph Kassell, Aristoteli: De Arte Poetica Liber, Oxford 
Classical Texts (New York: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press, 1965), which is the 
definitive Greek text, because it takes into account all four of the extant ancient manuscripts.  
Also see S.H. Butcher, Aristotle’s Theory of Poetry and Fine Art with a Critical Text and 
Translation of The Poetics, Fourth Edition (New York:  St. Martin’s Press, 1894; reprint edition, 
New York:  Dover, 1951): 14-15, 18. 
270 The Parry-Lord theory was discussed in the section on literature above.  Parry and Lord used 
twentieth century Balkan oral epic and its traditions to infer claims about other epic traditions 
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Aristotle by research but by reason, by its probability.”271  So the story goes like this.  Aristotle 
thinks that humans have a natural inclination to and for imitation, and at least some humans have 
a natural talent for melody and rhythm (and other prosodic elements).  When combined, poetic 
improvisations result—oral renderings, sketches.  From the text, it is also clear that Aristotle 
thought this occurred before Homer, before the Homeric poems were circulating.  Now since a 
clear connotation of au)tosxedia&zw was not established before Aristotle, as seen above by the 
Plato passages, Aristotle’s moderate disdain for the primitive beginning of poetry cannot reside 
wholly in the use of  au)tosxedia&zw.  In other words, I do not think Aristotle viewed 
improvisation itself as bad or rough; rather, these passages reveal Aristotle’s limited conception 
of what improvisation was and could be.  In addition, Aristotle was writing in the third century 
BCE, wherein textuality and writing became dominant.  This would be true of anyone of this 
historical period, and this shortsightedness might not have been able to be overcome at this point 
in history.  The improvisations available to Aristotle might not have been very good.  Although I 
say that, I am slightly skeptical because the improvising bards and troubadours of the ancient 
world had exceptional skill as noted by other authors of the period, and this skill seems to have 
been valued.  In addition, there is the strong tradition of the orators and sophists, who valued 
improvisation, improvised speeches, and trained for improvising.  Nonetheless, by Aristotle’s 
time, this type of performance had waned a bit.  However, there had to be a period of confusion 
(as some of Plato’s passages above illustrate with respect to rhetoric and oratory) over the nature 
of poetic performances.  Even when texts become dominant, their use was either not practical or 
frowned upon, causing performers to memorize passages.  Thus, the distinction between the 
earlier form of oral composition—that is, composing in real-time during performance—and the 
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recitation of already composed passages becomes blurry.  This confusion was enhanced by the 
fact that oral composers often composed orally in private first, then more or less memorized 
these compositions and performed them for audiences at some later time.272  Because of the well-
established textual tradition by the time of Aristotle, a prejudice probably developed because the 
texts seemed superior to the improvisations, not because the texts were in fact better than 
improvisations, rather because te&xnh becomes valued more.  Should te&xnh  and improvisation 
be divorced?  They should not be divorced but Aristotle could not see it that way.  Aristotle 
defines te&xnh at Nicomachean Ethics VI, 1140a as an art, or skill, or applied science.  
Improvisation was often associated with tu&xh (chance) and/or fu&sij (natural talent).  This point 
was appreciated by Quintilian about three centuries later, and I think it helps us understand 
Aristotle’s attitude.  In his Institutio Oratoria, Quintilian distinguishes between two kinds of 
improvisation in oratory:  artful and artless.  Artful improvisation was a product of much 
training, education, and practice in his program for oratory.  Artless improvisation relied on 
ingenium, the natural ability that some people possess, and he repeatedly describes it as “mere 
ranting or fumbling through.”273  These two categories are labeled with value-laden terms.  
“Artless” is obviously pejorative.  Quintilian even forbade extemporaneous speeches by younger 
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men in training.274  Improvised speeches should only be attempted after much learning and 
training, and significantly Quintilian thinks that artful improvisation was the goal of his program 
and probably of oratory and rhetoric itself.  Obviously, for Aristotle, if the improvisations arise 
from chance, then there is no agency and thus cannot be lauded.275  If the improvisations are the 
result of a natural talent, then the requirements of knowledge generated by generalizing from 
previous experiences, and being in accordance with logos are not present.  The reason for the 
seemingly dismissive attitude toward improvisations lies in the fact that Aristotle is a 
developmental evolutionist with respect to artistic and intellectual matters (obviously not in 
biology). 
 D.W. Lucas comments on the first appearance of au)tosxedia&zw at 1448b 23: 
 
au)tosxediasma&twn, ‘improvisations,’ came first; men gradually developed them 
(proa&gontej) until they reached a stage when they became fit to be described as 
belonging to an art.  Though there is no reference to it, this is not incompatible with the 
view attributed to Democritus that mousikh& is the product of superfluity … The slowness 
of development might well be due to lack of leisure in a struggling community.276 
 
Lucas correctly places an emphasis on the gradual and developmental implications of Aristotle’s 
passage.  Ingram Bywater comments on 1448b 23 as follows: 
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au)tosxediasma&twn.  On the verb au)tosxedia&zein = ‘to speak off-hand, without 
premeditation or previous study’ see Ernesti, Lex. techn. gr. s.v.  The fact is described in 
the Homeric Hymn to Hermes 54 qeo_j  d'  u9po_  kalo_n a2eiden  e0c  au0tosxedi&hj  
peirw&menoj, h0u&te kou~roi  h9bhtai_  qali&hsi  paraibo&la kertome&ousin, a)mfi_  Di&a  
Kroni&dhn  kai_  Maia&da  kallipe&dilon.  A similar view of the origin of poetry is 
implied in Quintilian 9.4, 114 poema nemo dubitaverit imperio quodam initio fusum et 
aurium mensura et similiter decurrentium spatiorum observatione esse generatum, mox 
in eo reportos pedes.—Maximus Tyr. 37.4    )Aqhnai&oij  de_  h(  me_n  palaia_  mou~sa  
xopoi_  pai&dwn  h}san  kai_  a)ndrw~n, gh~j  e)rga&tai  kata_  dh&mouj  i(sta&menoi … 
a@|smata  a@|dontej  au)tosxe&dia (comp. on 4, 1449a 9, and Bentley, Wks. I p. 250 
Dyce).  The phallic-song, in which Aristotle finds the germ of Comedy, was sometimes 
described as an w)|dh_  au)tosxe&dioj (see on 4, 1449a 12).277 
 
The Quintilian passage cited—initio fusum et aurium mensura—does not necessarily agree with 
Aristotle’s au)tosxediasma&twn.  These phrases would simply agree with Aristotle’s account of 
the human motivation to make poetry (imitation, natural inclinations for rhythm et cetera).  
Bywater also mentions the Homeric Hymn to Hermes passage, as Burnet noted with respect to a 
Plato passage above.  Here is Bywater’s comment on 1449a 10: 
 
genome&nhj  d’  ou}n  a)p’  a)rxh~j  au)tosxediastikh~j = genome&nh  d’  ou}n  a)p’  a)rxh~j  
au)tosxediastikh~.  Having begun with   genome&nhj … au)tosxediastikh~j, scil. th~j 
tragw|di&aj, Aristotle sees that the same is true of Comedy, and adds a parenthesis to 
show that; after which he says in a13 hu)ch&qh, just as though genome&nh … 
au)tosxediastikh had begun the clause.  For another instance of a gen, abs. in lieu of a 
nominative see 17, 1455b 3 (comp. Bon. Ind. 149b 26 and Kühner, Gr. Gr.3 2.2 p. 110).  
A parenthetical addition of very similar form is found in 5, 1449b 12, and also (with 
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Christ’s punctuation) in Metaph. Q 10, 1051b 11.  a)p’  a)rxh~j is used adverbially 
(comp. Pol. 7.16, 1334b 29, and Plat. Criti. 112e) in the same sense as e)c a)rxh~j.  Several 
of the recent editors and translators, however, accepting the reading genome&nh of certain 
apographs, take a)rxh~j and au)tosxediastikh~j together as meaning an ‘improvisational 
beginning’.  This certainly simplifies matters, but it may be doubted whether a)rxh_  
au)tosxediastikh& would naturally bear that meaning.”278 
 
Bywater expresses some skepticism about the reading of a)rxh_  au)tosxediastikh&; however, he 
does not supply an alternative, which would be interesting to compare.  No one since Bywater 
has raised a flag about whether a)rxh_  au)tosxediastikh& is the correct reading of the text, nor 
provided any other potential meanings of the phrase.279  I have none to offer here, but I am 
curious. 
 The history of translation of these words is interesting, and perhaps revealing of the 
various attitudes toward improvisation through Western aesthetic theory and criticism.  Whether 
these different translations reflect the Zeitgeist or new scholarship is difficult to discern.  The 
early Italian translators and commentators used a variety of phrases from the straightforward 
improvisation to extemporize, the latter probably coming from various Latin translations of the 
Poetics and early Latin scholia and commentaries.  The 1789 translation of Twining gives “rude 
and extemporaneous attempts” and “originated in a rude and unpremeditated manner.”  
Buckley’s nineteenth-century translation gives “extemporaneous efforts” for both 
occurrences.280  Cooper (1913, rev. 1947) translates the first occurrence as “naive 
                                                         
278 Bywater, 133-134. 
279 More precisely, I should say in my research I have not come across any flags since Bywater. 
280
 Thomas Twining, Treatise on Poetry, Translated with Notes on the Translation and on the 
Original and Two Dissertations on Poetical and Musical Imitation (London: Payne and Son, 
  
135 
improvisation” and the second as just the neutral “improvisation.”281  Butcher (1895) contains 
“rude improvisations” and “mere improvisation.”282  Whence does Butcher get “rude” and 
Cooper “naive”?  Either they are attaching the Homeric sense or Platonic sense to the translation 
as it occurs in Aristotle, or expressing the prejudice of the times.  But to say that it is only a 
prejudice of the times would be wrong.  For in these passages one may discern Aristotle’s slight 
disparagement of improvisation whilst still recognizing the process as the origin of the valuable 
things to be discussed in the Poetics.  Here is Stephen Halliwell and Kenneth Telford 
commenting on the passages: 
 
It should not, however, be thought that Ar.’s argument in this passage excludes emotion 
and spontaneity from the origins of poetry.  Indeed, a kind of spontaneity, in the form of 
improvisation and experiment, seems to be presupposed as a motive force at various 
experimental stages in the evolution of poetry.  But the scope for purely natural 
improvisation in Ar.’s scheme diminishes as poetic activity is gradually channeled into 
generic types, which are regarded as embodying the regular (and so repeatable) principles 
of ‘art,’ without which Ar.’s whole notion of a poetic treatise would be unthinkable.  
Whereas a Romantic might regard the freshness of primitive spontaneity as a kind of 
mythical ideal of artistic expression, for Ar. it is a necessary step, but also a first step, in 
the cultural process which culminates in the much more sophisticated achievements of 
regular artistry.
283
 
 
Furthermore, the cause of tragedy’s specific properties is found, not in the innate 
tendencies of men, nor in their acquired dispositions, but in the appropriateness of those 
properties to a function or form which rises only improvisationally [sic] and more by 
fortune than by art.
284
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Even Halliwell seems to agree that improvisation gives rise to epic and tragedy, but spontaneous 
creation itself is a stepping stone to better things, “more sophisticated achievements.”  Another 
way to interpret what Aristotle says in these passages is that improvisations of poetry and song in 
the initial stages of the development of these art forms was valuable at that time; however, when 
writing and oral tradition became solidified improvisations became less valuable. 
 Most contemporary translations use the neutral “improvisation(s).”  Out of twelve 
translations surveyed,285 eleven use the term “improvisation.”  Grube uses “random 
utterances.”286  This seems wrong at least conceptually because, as I shall demonstrate and 
hinted at above already, to improvise or act off-hand does not entail randomness, especially if we 
use a precise, computing theory definition of random.  Randomness implies a lack of 
intentionality, and improvisation is intentional action.  On the other hand, if one is assuming the 
inspiration theory put forward in Plato (especially in the Ion) and a few other ancient sources, the 
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Murray (New York: Oxford University Press, 21920); Gerald F. Else, trans., Aristotle: 
“Poetics,” Ann Arbor Paperbacks Series (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1967, 
1970); Preston H. Epps, trans., “The Poetics” of Aristotle (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1942, 1970); Leon Golden, Aristotle’s “Poetics:” A Translation and 
Commentary for Students of Literature, commentary by O. B. Hardison (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice-Hall, 1968); Stephen Halliwell, Aristotle: Poetics, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1995); Malcolm Heath, trans., Aristotle: “Poetics” (New York: 
Penguin Books, 1996); James Hutton, trans., Aristotle’s “Poetics,” preface by Gordon M. 
Kirkwood (New York: W. W. Norton, 1982); Richard Janko, trans., Aristotle: “Poetics I” with 
the “Tractatus Coislinianus,” A Hypothetical Reconstruction of “Poetics II,” the Fragments of 
the “On Poets” (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett,1987); Kenneth McLeish, Aristotle: Poetics, Dramatic 
Contexts Series (New York: Theatre Communications Group, 1998); George Whalley, trans., 
Aristotle’s “Poetics,” eds. John Baxter and Patrick Atherton (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 1997). 
286 G. M. A. Grube, trans., Aristotle on Poetry and Style. The Library of Liberal Arts Series, No. 
68 (New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1958). 
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human body can be viewed as a mere vessel for regurgitating the combined and garbled ideas of 
the Muses or gods.  
 
 Can one provide necessary and sufficient conditions for improvising?  Is there a family 
resemblance relation among the reviewed practices and concepts?  I will address these questions 
in Part II.  For now, here are some important features of improvising derived from some 
prototypical practices and from some of the definitions.  The notion of producing something, 
creating, composing, and making is important.  The idea that the producing does not involve 
planning, or not planning completely, not working from a recipe, specific design, having little if 
any forethought; to some extent unrehearsed; to some extent unpremeditated, and not completely 
thought out; all of these seem to be significant to a conception of improvisation.  In addition, the 
properties of being spontaneous, off-hand, off the cuff, in the moment, may be added.  Given 
these features we can already rule out some of the above listed practices.  So, let us sort some of 
this out.  Random processes may be excluded, but some aleatory works and methods may be 
deemed to be a method of achieving the above features. 
 To some extent, I have shown what to include and exclude and what is in between or the 
“it depends” phenomena.  In music, there are many specific kinds of improvisation, and some 
genres are at least partly defined by the presence of kinds of improvisation.  Some aleatory music 
contains improvisation, some does not.  It is possible for film to document improvisation and be 
improvised.  Literature may be improvised, but certain techniques of composition are not 
themselves improvising but may be used in the process of improvising:  cut-up, nonsense, stream 
of consciousness, constraint based composition (e.g., Oulipo).  Some oral poetry, oratory, and 
performance arts are improvised.  Dance has many genres that involve improvisation, including 
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aleatory pieces.  Improvisation is central to many genres of theatre, drama, broadcast, including 
in pedagogical contexts. 
 Improvisation seems to pick out both a process, activity, kind of conduct, and a product.  
In Part II:  Metaphysics I attempt to make sense of improvising as an activity, and the results of 
that activity—improvisations as products. 
 
Explanations, Accounts, Methods 
 
 The psychologist Philip Johnson-Laird has said that “The problem of free will and the 
problem of creativity are, in some respects, one and the same.  They can both be solved 
together.”287  With some minor reservations, I agree.  In addition, the core, and most 
fundamental, questions about improvisation integrally involve the problem of creativity.   And 
the problem of creativity is at bottom about aspects of free will, or at least what we now take to 
be free will.  Consequently, an explanation of the origin of improvisation, both artistic and non-
artistic, and its fundamental nature involves the explanation of  the origin of language, 
intentional behavior and motor activity, the solving (or dissolution) of the problem of free will, 
and the path out of the morass of the presumed mystery of creativity.  No small task, to put it 
mildly.  Questions like these have prompted very smart people to classify some of these 
questions as mysteries beyond the cognitive capacity and ability of humans.288  The answers to 
these questions and their concomitant theories are cognitively closed to humans.  I will not have 
                                                         
287 Philip Johnson-Laird, “Freedom and Constraint in Creativity,” in The Nature of Creativity, 
ed. Robert Sternberg (New York: Cambridge University press, 1988), 204. 
288 See, inter alia, Noam Chomsky, Language and Problems of Knowledge: The Managua 
Lectures (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988); and Colin McGinn, Problems in Philosophy: the 
Limits of Inquiry (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 1993).  Also see Gilbert Harmon, “Reflection 
on Knowledge and Its Limits,” The Philosophical Review 111 (2002): 417-28. 
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to worry about solving these problems here, nor taking a comprehensive view about cognitive 
closure, because my aims are much more modest.  I have no doubt, however, that answers to 
these fundamental and general questions, if possible for humans, will have consequences for a 
philosophical theory of improvisation (or any other philosophical theory for that matter).    That 
intuition probably derives from my “scientistic” inclinations—a term much abused of late.  By 
“scientism” I mean an approach to the hard and interesting questions about the world, viz., a 
presumption for the scientific method and scientific explanations, an assumption of a robust 
version of physicalism, and a background belief that explanations of social and psychological 
phenomena will be helped by, if not reduced to, the natural sciences.  But I believe that we do 
not have to wait for those answers in order to do some theorizing about improvisation.  First, we 
may be closer to some of those answers than many believe.  Obviously, these are controversial, 
and opinions vary greatly on their epistemic status and scientific merit.  Nonetheless, there has 
been a lot of progress—research has been conducted and some hypotheses have been confirmed 
or disconfirmed or burden shifting has been warranted.  Those putative hypotheses are readily 
available and can be used now.  Second, an aesthetic theory of improvisation does not have to 
solve these colossal questions in some of its elements, and similarly, answers to those colossal 
questions may be irrelevant for other aspects of such a theory.  This may rattle the more 
empirically-minded philosopher, but I count myself among them even though I also accept some 
autonomy for philosophy.  There is no a priori reason why one cannot believe both 
simultaneously—autonomy and a large chunk of scientism (in my sense).  A strong example of 
what I mean is the following.  I cannot see how any advances in any of the sciences (including 
psychology), nor new piece of knowledge from them, could help us with the metaphysical 
question of what a musical (or work of art more generally) work is, or whether they even exist.  
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Perhaps I am being naïve in the same way that the neuroscientists and empirical social scientists 
claim the moral philosophers are with respect to ethics.  The scientists say289 there will be a time 
when philosophical ethics will dissolve.  For example, there cannot be a virtue theory if character 
and dispositions do not exist.290  Cooperation is merely reciprocal altruism, the result of 
evolution by natural selection.291  The hold-outs (or dead-enders) counter claim that there will 
always be a need for conceptual analysis, and although not restricted to philosophers, conceptual 
analysis is in particular the domain of philosophy.  I do not believe that all epistemology is 
psychology (naturalistic), nor all argument rhetoric, nor all reasoning computational, nor all 
social phenomena reducible to micro-physics (even though much of it may be reducible).  All of 
these fields will eventually explain a lot, but I think there will be room for, and perhaps 
necessarily so, conceptual analysis at minimum.  This entails that there are some problems, 
issues, or questions that are intrinsically philosophical, thus at least some of the autonomy of 
philosophy is preserved. 
                                                         
289 For example, see E. O. Wilson, Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1998). 
290 Among the first philosophers to use social psychological data to question the existence and/or 
significance of human character are Gilbert Harmon and John M. Doris.  Gilbert Harmon, “The 
Nonexistence of Character Traits,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (1999-2000): 
223-226; Gilbert Harmon, “Skepticism about Character Traits,” Journal of Ethics 13 (2009): 
235-242; Gilbert Harmon, “No Character or Personality,” Business Ethics Quarterly 13 (2003): 
87-94; Gilbert Harmon, “Moral Philosophy Meets Social Psychology: Virtue Ethics and the 
Fundamental Attribution Error,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (1998-99): 315-331; 
Gilbert Harmon, “Virtue Ethics without Character Traits,” in Fact and Value: Essays on Ethics 
and Metaphysics for Judith Jarvis Thomson, eds. Alex Byrne, Robert Stalnaker, and Ralph 
Wedgewood (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), 117-27; Maria Merritt, Gilbert Harmon, and 
John Doris, “Character,” in The Moral Psychology Handbook, ed. John Doris (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2010), 354-400; and John Doris, Lack of Character: Personality and 
Moral Behavior (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
291 For example, see Robert Trivers, “The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism,” The Quarterly 
Review of Biology 46, no. 1 (March 1971): 35-57; and Elliot Sober and David Sloane Wilson, 
Unto Others: The Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behavior (Cambridge, MA; Harvard 
University Press, 1998). 
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Part II:  Metaphysics 
 
 The second part of this dissertation addresses metaphysical issues in, and problems and 
questions of improvisation in the arts.  I argue that that continuum and genus-species models are 
the most cogent ways to understand the action-types of improvising and composing and their 
relations, and I provide a constraint based taxonomy for classifying improvisations. Next, I 
address the epistemological and ontological issues of the genetic properties of improvisations, 
and the properties “improvisatory,” and “as if improvised.”  Finally, in 2.3, I show that 
arguments against treating improvisations as works are wrongheaded, and I provide a correct 
ontological theory of work-hood for improvisations.  Following are the sections contained in Part 
II. 
 
2.1 Action Theory 
 2.1.1 Thought Experiments and Data 
 2.1.2 Cognitive Neuroscience and Cognitive Models 
 2.1.3 Taxonomy 
 2.1.4 Philosophical Models 
 
2.2 Properties 
 
2.3 Works of Art 
 2.3.1 A General Critique of “Musical Work” and a Defense 
 2.3.2 General Challenges to Improvisations as Works 
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 2.3.3 Burden-Shifting:  Levinson’s Theory and Improvisations 
 2.3.4 The Proper Theory for Improvisations as WOAs 
 
 
 A few brief notes about terminology are necessary.  There are (at least) two kinds of 
events:  actions and happenings.  Actions are the doings of agency, whereas, happenings lack 
agency.  Consequently, by definition, I take “actions” to be events that are distinct from 
happenings.  My concern here is not with vague cases, even though I recognize that there are 
cases that are vague and those kinds of cases may question the distinction between actions and 
happenings.1  In fact, there are elements of improvisation that may be classified as vague.  I use 
“action-type” to indicate events of agency that fall under the same category as determined by 
certain mental states, such as intentions, desires, and other relevant cognitive processes that are 
necessary for the execution and discrimination of the action, and the bodily movements involved 
in executing the action (if any).  For example, my improvising on the guitar last night at 7:00 pm 
is an action and event-token; whereas, improvising itself is an action-type.  The individuation of 
action-types can be problematic; however, I am interested in only composing, improvising, and 
performing. 
 I use the term “work of art” (WOA) or just “work” to indicate the thing or object, abstract 
or otherwise, that is produced through artistic action-types, through art making and doing.  
                                                         
1 There are many cases and examples used in the philosophy of law and ethics.  For example, 
when investigating the differences in legal and/or moral culpability (fully intentional, 
premeditated, reckless, negligent, et cetera), certain cases raise problems for such levels of 
culpability while simultaneously illustrating the need for such distinctions.  Here are some cases 
(which involve counterfactual reasoning as well):  the epileptic with his finger on a gun trigger; 
injury from the lawn of knives which includes a “No Trespassing” sign; damage, morbidity, and 
morality of Hurricane Katrina and the influence of human induced climate change; damage, 
morbidity, and morality earthquakes and building codes. 
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Consequently, there can be musical works, dance works, literary works, et cetera.  “Art form” 
refers to a particular set of artistic actions-types and their products, presumably works of art.  In 
addition, art forms are typically individuated by the primary sensory modalities for which those 
WOAs were intended.  So, music is putatively a sonic art form, while dance, literature, motion 
pictures, photography, plastic arts (painting and sculpture), and theatre and drama are all in part 
visual art forms inter alia.2  Sounds are physical events (in space-time, with specific temporal 
and location coordinates) in which air is caused to vibrate by some apparatus, including natural 
and artificial/synthetic sources.3  A “sound occurrence” is an event in which sounds happen or 
are produced through agency.  A “sound sequence” is a physical instantiation or realization of a 
“sound structure.”  A “sound structure” is an abstract object; it is a set of ordered n-tuples that 
represent properties of sounds.  Although there is some debate among philosophers about which 
properties a sound-structure may represent and possess, in general pitch, duration, rhythm, and 
meter are accepted.  I will argue later that a sound-structure may include timbre and dynamics as 
well. 
 Although I concentrate on music in what follows, and mostly use musical examples, the 
theories provided herein are meant to cover all art forms in which improvisation occurs.  When it 
is useful or important, I do use examples from other art forms.  I try not to “cherry-pick” the art 
form examples to make the theories see better than they are; instead, I move sometimes from one 
                                                         
2 Of course, many philosophers and theorists have questioned some of these boundaries and the 
usefulness of referring to “art forms” any longer.  For example, many literary critics (and Peter 
Kivy to an extent in The Performance of Reading: An Essay in the Philosophy of Literature, 
New Directions in Aesthetics Series (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009)) have made 
arguments that literature is a performance art form, and Dom Lopes has recently tried to make 
the case that music is not only essentially sonic but visual as well, see Dom McIver Lopes and 
Vincent Bergeron, “Hearing and Seeing Musical Expression,” Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 78 (2009): 1-16. 
3 See Casey O’Callaghan, Sounds (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007) on the ontology of 
sound, which has been a neglected domain in metaphysics. 
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art form to another because a different practice may be problematic or interesting for what I am 
proposing and I want to account for it appropriately. 
 
2.1 Action Theory 
 
that a human being thinks on the one hand and wills on the other, and that he has thought 
in one pocket and volition in the other … [Thought and will] are not two separate 
faculties; on the contrary, the will is a particular way of thinking—thinking as translating 
itself into existence, thinking as the drive to give itself existence.4 
— G.W.F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, Section 4, 35. 
 
 Movements (object motion) are a sub-set of events.  Actions are a sub-set of movements 
and events.  Not all actions are movements (e.g., if thinking counts as an action, then this is true 
because thinking does not essentially involve bodily movement, assuming we exclude the 
electro-chemical activity which occurs in the brain while thinking).  Conduct is a set of human 
action-types (and actions).  Improvised conduct is a sub-set of conducts, and so is composition.  
For my purposes here, there are three relevant action-types:  composing, improvising, and 
performing.  There are, furthermore, two types of improvised conduct:  the mundane (or non-
artistic; it does not take place in an artistic context nor wholly for artistic or aesthetic purposes, 
though it might contribute to aesthetic experience and have aesthetic features), and artistic.  
Moreover, artistic improvised conduct may occur in two general categories of art forms:  the 
performing arts (e.g., music, dance, theatre/drama, some broadcast (especially live radio and 
television), and performance or multi-media art) and non-performing arts (e.g., literature, 
painting, sculpture, architecture, photography, and perhaps most film and video). 
                                                         
4 G.W.F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, ed. Allen Wood, trans. H.B. Nisbet (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), Section 4, 35.  Quoted in Richard Eldridge, An 
Introduction to the Philosophy of Art (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 131. 
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 This section addresses the distinctions between composing or creating or generating 
artworks (non-improvised), improvising, and performing non-improvised artworks.  For 
example, in music, a composer creates some type of instructions for producing a sound sequence 
(usually called a score), while an improviser creates and produces a sound sequence while 
performing, and a performer uses the previously determined score that was already notated to 
instantiate or realize a sound structure by producing a sound sequence.  In literature, a writer 
composes over a period of time, which includes revision, editing, alteration, deletion, 
amendment, and the text is then released or published for audience appreciation; while an 
improviser would compose more or less spontaneously without, or with very little, revision, 
editing, et cetera; and a performer might read aloud a poem or story from a text that was 
previously composed or improvised (if the improvisation was recorded or notated).  In the above 
examples, I have purposely chosen a performing art form (music), and a (putatively) non-
performing art form (literature), although some theorists challenge this distinction.5  So, the 
question for this section is:  What are the differences between composing and improvising, if 
                                                         
5 The field called “performance studies” often does not distinguish between performing arts and 
non-performing arts, or even between art and non-art.  Some in this movement seek to collapse 
such distinctions, and categorize a many social activities as performance.  See for example, Elin 
Diamond, ed., Performance and Cultural Politics (New York: Routledge, 1996); Carol 
Laderman, and Marina Roseman, eds.  The Performance of Healing (New York: Routledge, 
1996).  For a more conservative and illuminating view, see Richard Poirier, Trying It Out in 
America: Literary and Other Performances (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1999); 
Robert P Crease, The Play of Nature: Experimentation as Performance, Indiana Series in the 
Philosophy of Technology (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1993); and K. Anders 
Ericsson, ed., The  Road to Excellence: The Acquisition of Expert Performance in the Arts and 
Sciences, Sports and Games (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence  Erlbaum Associates, 1996).  It should be 
noted also that the sociologist Erving Goffman used the term performance in the 1950s to 
characterize his analysis of social interaction.  See Erving Goffman, Interaction Ritual: Essays 
on Face-to-Face Behavior (New York: Anchor  Books, 1967; reprint edition, New York: 
Pantheon, 1982); Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (New York: Anchor 
Books,  Doubleday, 1959); Philip Manning, Erving Goffman and Modern Sociology, Key 
Contemporary Thinkers Series (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992); Charles Lemert, 
and Ann Branaman, eds., The Goffman Reader (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1997).  Also see n. 2 
above on Peter Kivy’s view on literature. 
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any?  Following are some of the suggested differences between composing and improvising:  the 
availability of revising and editing, making/creating while performing, temporal dimensions of 
planning (how long and when), the content of planning, temporal dimensions of artistic 
decisions, and intentions about prescription and performance means.  I shall consider these and 
others, and attempt to construct an adequate action theory of artistic composition and 
improvisation. 
 First, it is illuminating to understand whether and why the distinction between composing 
and improvising is important.  Whenever concepts pick out ways in which artistic products are 
generated, our interests are varied.  There are pedagogical, evaluative, metaphysical, and 
practical concerns.  The practical and pedagogical interests concern how to continue artistic 
practices, how to teach, develop, and foster them for the future.  This assumes that we want them 
to continue.  This desire may or may not be motivated by evaluative concerns.  The desire may 
result from low level interests in aesthetic play and variety and novelty.  The evaluative concerns 
derive from the ancient period, when with the rise of writing and notation systems generative 
practices changed, and concomitantly their products.  In the case of music, it makes a significant 
difference whether a useful notation system was at hand or not.  Furthermore, the limits of 
human memory play a role especially before writing and notational technology.  There are, of 
course, other reasons accounting for certain changes to artistic practices, such as purely aesthetic 
interests, but we cannot deny that technology, broadly understood, has had (and will have) a 
significant influence on artistic practices.  Knowing whether an agent composed or improvised, 
or did something involving both,  tells us things about the agent, the product (a composition or 
improvisation), the limitations and constraints under which the agent operated—all of which may 
be relevant to aesthetic understanding and appreciation, which in turn is necessary for proper 
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evaluation.  The fact that these distinctions were fuzzy or concealed in the past is not a reason for 
thinking that the distinction between composing and improvising is not important.  Rather, 
fuzziness and concealment reveal reasons why the distinction has significance and merit in many 
cases, both to the audience and to artists. 
 Some of the results of this section on action theory (2.1) will have consequences that are 
relevant to the work of art discussion in 2.3.  Unless one defines a priori composition as the 
action-type that gives rise to works, then the fact that composition and improvisation are two 
different species will not hinder the conclusion that both of these generative processes can give 
rise to works of art (in fact, it may help establish that conclusion).  In other words, this in and of 
itself will not show that works are necessarily produced or not produced through these action-
types.  Whatever the account of the action-types, an independent argument must be given to 
show whether works are produced through composing and improvising.  In addition, there may 
be instantiations of the action-type “composing” that do not give rise to works, and there may be 
instantiations of the action-type “improvising” that do not give rise to works.  For example, 
suppose a composer created a score with instructions that were impossible to follow.  Such a 
case may be counted as an instance of composing without the generation of a WOA.6  In the case 
of improvising, suppose a person “doodles” on her piano for two minutes.  The action-type 
improvising was instantiated but it may be implausible to categorize the doodling as a WOA.7  
Cases like these and others, however, will be classified according to the account of WOAs (or 
musical works) one adopts.  Furthermore, I can discern no a priori reason for thinking that 
composition (action-type) must be defined as the generative process that gives rise to works, 
                                                         
6 I note that in a clever way one may interpret the instructions for the impossible as a conceptual 
WOA. 
7 Once again, one can imagine a John Cage piece giving such instructions. 
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either exclusively or not.  Additionally, it would be question begging to just assert that 
improvisation (action-type) is the (or an) artistic practice that does not generate WOAs.  Most 
importantly, even if one did define composition in this way, it would still not entail that there 
was no other way (an action-type) for works to be generated.8  These issues will be taken up in 
detail in 2.3. 
 My conclusion is that composing and improvising are two species under the same genus, 
but that a continuum or spectrum model is the most useful way of understanding the distinction 
between the two action-types.  Recall the genus-species relationship and method of definition.9  
The most important properties both composing and improvising share is that of selection and 
selection realization.  What accounts for their differences will generate two action-types that are 
subsumed under one genus (or kind).10  Although I recognize below that a different model 
accounts best for the action theory, that model, the continuum model, would result in an 
indeterminate ontology for WOAs.  My goal here is to have the action theory and ontology fit 
well together.  Since I will later argue (2.3) that improvisations are works, in my account both 
composing and improvising give rise to works of art (WOAs), and in the case of music, musical 
works (MWs). 
 I will present three philosophical models for understanding the agency of, and 
individuation of, the action-types of composing and improvising.  These models differ in 
function and breadth from the cognitive psychological models that have been developed (which I 
review below).  The main purpose of these philosophical models is twofold.  The models are 
                                                         
8 I am using the neutral word “generate” instead of “create” in order to not beg the question of 
what creation is. 
9 Sometimes this method of definition is called pyramid or tree, which usually produces visual 
representations of semantic and/or grammatical relationships. 
10 Some philosophers distinguish between kinds and types.  Kinds are more general than types. 
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analyses and representations of the action-types, which help explain these artistic practices.  In 
some cases, the models serve as the explanans of features of the action-types, and in others the 
model serves as a device to help explain the action-types.  In short, the models here operate in 
the same way that models function in the natural and social sciences.  The models are the linear 
(LM), continuum (CM), and species-genus models (S-G).  In order to discuss these and other 
issues (e.g., ontology of works), it will be useful to have a few cases, examples, and thought 
experiments in mind.  These will serve as the data for the theories, and sometimes they will help 
support the arguments.  I want a metaphysical theory that not only helps to explain and 
understand the history of improvisations and improvising, but will handle future developments.  
(including the possibility of non-human cases).  Thought experiments help one accomplish that. 
 
2.1.1 Thought Experiments and Data 
 
 (SCI) The Standard Case of Improvisation.  This case involves a jazz improviser playing 
some musical instrument or vocalizing with a reference point:  the harmonic changes, melodic 
and other elements of the background tune, sociological, and other possible constraints as 
discussed in taxonomy section of Part I.  Some bits of the realized sound sequence will be 
recalled exactly from memory.  Other bits will be executed and thought of for the first time.  
Some movements will be from "muscle memory” alone (from lots of practicing of scales, modes, 
licks, arpeggios, et cetera), and other movements will be (partly) novel.  The result is a publicly 
available, realized sound sequence. 
 Moreover, it is important to notice that in (SCI) there is much more improvisation going 
on than one might think (jazz musicians know this).  In (SCI), all of the musicians are 
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improvising to different degrees, and all are under various constraints, some of them have the 
same constraints as the soloist.  A standard rhythm section in small jazz ensembles since the 
1940s has a drummer, bassist, and pianist (or guitar).  The “walking” bass lines of jazz are 
constrained by the general harmonic structure of the tune, but most of what the bassist is playing 
is improvised (except in sections of tunes where the chart or lead sheet include a fully notated 
bass line).  The drummer is constrained by meter and tempo, for example, but she is improvising 
the general “keeping of time.”  But even the basic constraints may be changed by the rhythm 
section.  They might do this in response to what the soloist is playing, or they might do it for the 
sheer aesthetic pleasure such moves provide to performers (and, I would argue, the informed 
audience as well).  For example, the bassist and drummer might change a 4/4 meter and feel for a 
double-time or a stop-time in two.  The pianist is accompanying the soloist and is responsible 
for, along with the bassist, keeping the harmonic structure of the tune in place.  This is called 
“comping.”  Comping is a form of improvisation within the constraints of the harmonic structure, 
tempo, and other rhythms.  A pianist is expected to be creative in her comping.  One of the best 
examples of making comping an “art” itself is Herbie Hancock, especially his years with the 
Miles Davis Quintet.11  Some compers are known for their unique chord voicings (McCoy 
Tyner, Bill Evans), chord substitutions, novel rhythms (Tyner, Red Garland, Paul Bley), and fill-
ins (Hancock). 
 (SCI) demonstrates that standard improvisation involves performance.  The manner in 
which content is selected is more or less spontaneously, i.e., occurs in real time during the time 
of the performance.  In the standard case, some of the content is planned and much of it is not 
                                                         
11 The Miles Davis Quintet of the 1960s (sometimes called the “Second Quintet”), roughly 1963 
to 1968, whose members were Miles Davis (trumpet), Wayne Shorter (tenor and soprano 
saxophones), Herbie Hancock (piano), Ron Carter (double bass), Anthony Williams (drums). 
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planned.  The quantity of content that is planned or outlined before the performance is vague.  It 
is vague in two ways.  First, the duration of content (or how much of the content generated) that 
is spontaneously produced in real time—not planned—is indeterminate with respect to what is 
necessary for categorizing the performance as improvised.  I am assuming that we can know and 
do know which content is planned and which is spontaneous.  Practically, this is difficult, 
perhaps impossible, because it would require a kind of objective mind-reading; but for the sake 
of obtaining an accurate metaphysical theory of improvisation, one needs to make this 
assumption.  Second, the determination itself of whether a part of the performance is planned or 
spontaneous is problematic.  For a single melodic phrase (say), there may be aspects of it that are 
planned and other aspects that are not planned.  This problem is part of what will be discussed in 
this section.  In addition, there are other problems of vagueness for each element of the 
performance as discussed in Part I.  Some parts have been rehearsed, some parts have been partly 
rehearsed, others have been outlined but no specific content has been specified, et cetera.  
Neither revision nor editing is possible because the intended final product, the telos of this 
process, is the real time performance. 
 (SCC) The Standard Case of Composition.  This case involves using an inscription 
device, such as a writing instrument (pencil or pen), on manuscript paper with perhaps a piano or 
other instrument nearby.  The composer inscribes using a particular notational system to specify 
and represent sounds, sonic properties, performance means (instrumentation), et cetera.  The 
composer may at any time before the score is “published” revise and edit anything in it.  The 
result of (SCC) is a publicly available score.  Editing may alter, delete, or amend anything 
already notated.  In fact, the results of the previous (say) day’s work may be deleted completely.  
The composer may use, at her leisure, reference items and books, and discuss ideas with others.  
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The “compositional act” is typically not unitary.  Composers compose in fits and starts, just in 
the way writers do.  A composer may be working on several pieces simultaneously, composing 
each during different times of the day, or different days, or even going back and forth between 
pieces during s single compositional session.  The point is that the temporal and spatial 
boundaries of the compositional act are not definite and continuous.  This even includes finishing 
a composition.  Ludwig van Beethoven is a famous case.  Beethoven changed compositions 
many times immediately before a performance.  He changed compositions sometimes year later 
after supposedly finishing them.  There are several different published versions of his piano 
concerti.  It seems Beethoven never accepted any of his compositions are finished.  The famous 
musicologist Joseph Kerman comments on Beethoven and the concerto form: 
 
Those powers [speaking of Beethoven’s improvisational skills] were exercised most 
spectacularly, of course, in cadenzas, the concerto’s moments of sanctioned carnival.  
Extended formal cadenzas come near the ends of many movements, while numerous 
other short ones, ‘run’ins’ (Eingänge), and fermatas, or pauses, are scattered throughout.  
In addition, improvisation of a different kind continued throughout the score, 
improvisation carried out against a background of harmony, phrasing, and so on laid 
down by the orchestra, with the surface spun out extempore by the solo.  Indeed the 
young Beethoven never wrote out--never really ‘composed’--concerto piano parts until he 
had to, because publication was in the offing.  When the B-flat Concerto reached the 
printer in 1801, the orchestra part, too, was still in flux, subject to the composer’s last-
minute tinkering. 
     At this point the long-bubbling soup of the B-flat Concerto became a text and the 
composer could put it behind him.  Concertos were performing vehicles; they would not 
be published until they were no longer needed, when they had worn out their welcome 
with the public and a new one was ready.  The autograph of the C-minor Concerto, No. 3, 
of 1803, about which Plantinga tells us more than we probably want to know, also started 
life as a ‘performance autograph.’  That is, it contained the orchestral music with, at 
many places, no more than piano cues to guide Beethoven’s improvisation.  The piano 
part was only fixed conclusively when it had to be, in this case for a performance in the 
next year by another pianist.12 
                                                         
12 Joseph Kerman, review of Beethoven’s Concertos:  History, Style, Performance, by Leon 
Plantinga, and Beethoven:  Piano Concerto Nos. 1-5 and Choral Fantasy, Robert Levin, 
fortepiano, The New York Review of Books 46, no. 11 (June 24, 1999): 27. 
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The “myth” of composition and the compositional act are undermined instructively here.  It is 
especially telling because it involves Beethoven, who regularly ranks in the top three of the 
“Canon” (along with Bach and Mozart, both fierce improvisers, too).  One can discern the clear 
lines of improvisation and composition blurring.  However, musicians today perform using those 
seemingly always unfinished scores of Beethoven.  They are not improvising, and Beethoven’s 
legacy includes these fixed scores. 
 (SCC) demonstrates that composing often involves a notation and notational devices.  
The purpose is to provide a set of instructions for later execution by performers. 
 Let us compare and contrast (SCI) and (SCC).  Typically, the conditions under which 
these creative tasks occur are different.  Typically, composing is not public; it may occur in any 
convenient location; one does not need musical production tools or instruments; one needs 
notation technology; and it is prescriptive.  Again emphasize typically.  Typically, improvisation 
is public, usually occurs in a meaningful environment (concert hall, jazz club or venue, et 
cetera); one must have musical production tools and/or instruments; notation technology is 
optional; it is usually not prescriptive.  Both composing and improvising are goal-oriented or 
goal-directed behaviors, which goals are usually artistic (e.g., expressive, contentful, aesthetic, et 
cetera). 
  (IND-1) Indiscernibles Case One.  There are two performances, for example, of solo alto 
saxophone musicians, one after the other at (say) Carnegie Hall.  Each performance is by a 
different musician.  The first musician comes out and plays for exactly ten minutes.  The other 
musician comes out and plays for exactly ten minutes.  Now the catch:  the second performance 
is (qualitatively) identical to the first except for the following feature.  The first musician 
performed a composition, that is, she rehearsed, practiced, learned, and studied the score of this 
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solo saxophone piece; whereas the second musician improvised the sound sequence played at the 
time of performance, for the most part not knowing precisely what she was going to play before 
the actual performance.  Both performances’ sonic properties are identical, including pitches, 
durations, timbres, and expressive properties.  Now the improviser did of course practice and 
prepare and warmed up and so forth, but she did not perform a piece of music that was composed 
beforehand.  There was no score from which the improviser was playing.  Suppose further that 
the improviser never heard the other musician’s piece, and the first player never the heard the 
improvisation.  It seems that these features entail that the two performers must be two different 
persons; otherwise, one would be familiar with what had gone on before, thereby undermining 
the idea of improvising the piece.  If the player-performer had heard the improvisation prior to 
her performance, then possibly her performance could be considered a performance instantiation 
of the improvised sound sequence.  This is a thought experiment; however, it is certainly 
possible, though highly improbable, that this event could occur.  The probability of such an event 
decreases with the duration of the sound sequence increasing.  So, it is far more likely that a 
three second sound sequence could be the subject of (IND) than a one hour sound sequence.  But 
this is irrelevant for the (IND) thought experiment to work. 
 (IND) demonstrates that composing and improvising cannot be individuated on the basis 
of content.  However, I do not pretend that especially sophisticated music and art consumers do 
not have intuitions based on their perceptions of what sounds like a composition and 
improvisation.  Probabilities of composition versus improvisation status could be assigned on the 
basis of inductive inferences from people’s knowledge about art and music history, 
musicianship, what is possible for musicians to do, et cetera.  It may be the case that such 
probabilities would be fairly accurate.  Nonetheless, an accurate metaphysical theory must take 
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(IND) cases seriously.  I say this while also recognizing the importance of actual, artistic 
practice. 
 (IND) is important because it is a way of testing some of our thoughts about what we 
think is relevant to categorizing and evaluating WOAs, and in determining the differences and 
similarities between the action-types composing and improvising.  It has the potential to reveal 
what is ordinarily hidden from even our sophisticated, introspective selves.  It is similar to what 
Daniel Dennett is attempting to elicit in constructing the following case: 
 
To see how crucial this excess baggage of ours is, imagine that musicologists unearthed a 
heretofore unknown Bach cantata, definitely by the great man, but hidden in a desk and 
probably never yet heard even by the composer himself.  Everyone would be aching to 
hear it, to experience for the first time the "qualia" that the Leipzigers would have known, 
had they only heard it, but this turns out to be impossible, for the main theme of the 
cantata, by an ugly coincidence, is the first seven notes of "Rudolph the Red-nosed 
Reindeer"!  We who are burdened with that tune would never be able to hear Bach's 
version as he intended it or as the Leipzigers would have received it.13 
 
There are many interesting aspects of this case:  about how we hear, whether it is possible to 
have authentic performances, whether it is possible to retrieve initial or original reception 
circumstances, and the indiscernibility.  The knowledge of “Rudolph” and its “baggage,” 
hopelessly biases our twenty-first century perception.  (IND) forces one to consider what the 
background knowledge of generative processes given in the case does to our thinking about the 
same sound structure and sound sequence. 
 Brain imaging studies have demonstrated that different areas of the brain are activated 
and deactivated during playing from memory as opposed to improvising.14  There are also shared 
                                                         
13 Daniel C. Dennett, Consciousness Explained (Boston: Little Brown, 1991), 388. 
14 Aaron L. Berkowitz and Daniel Ansari, “Expertise-related Deactivation of the Right 
Temporoparietal Junction during Musical Improvisation,” NeuroImage 49 (2010): 712; Aaron L. 
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activations, especially in motor areas of the brain.  Neuroscientists have inferred that there are 
different neural substrates underlying the two cases even when the content is the same. 
 (IND-2)  Indiscernibles Case Two.  In this thought experiment, everything is the same as 
above except that the two players are the same person.  Suppose that there are two parallel 
universes, which are exactly the same in every respect except that in Comp World the musician 
plays the sound sequence from a score, and in Imp World the same musician improvises the 
sound sequence.  These events occur at exactly the same time, which is possible because the two 
universes share temporal parts, but not spatial coordinates. 
 Considering such a case is useful for determining exactly which cognitive, motor, and 
neural processes are different in each case.  The fact that the same person both plays from a score 
and improvises would rule out any differences that may obtain because of differences that exist 
among different individuals.  In fact one brain scan study has attempted to replicate such a case 
by comparing scans of musicians under three conditions:  improvise a sound sequence with the 
caveat that one will have to reproduce it as best as one can later; play from memory the 
previously improvised sound sequence; and improvise a sound sequence freely without 
memorization and reproduction.15 
 (IND-3)  Indiscernibles Case Three.  Everything is the same as in (IND-1) except that the 
improviser, after the performance, decides to score and notate the improvisation.  Consequently, 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Berkowitz and Daniel Ansari, “Generation of Novel Motor Sequences: The Neural Correlates of 
Musical Improvisation,” NeuroImage, (2008): 535-543; Charles J. Limb and Allen R. Braun, 
“Neural Substrates of Spontaneous Musical Performance: An fMRI Study of Jazz 
Improvisation,” PLoS ONE 3, no. 2 (February 2008). 
15 Sara L Bengtsson, Mihaly Csikszentmihályi, and Fredrik Ullén, “Cortical Regions Involved in 
the Generation of Musical Structures during Improvisation in Pianists,” Journal of Cognitive 
Neuroscience 19, no. 5 (2007): 830-842. 
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a notated score, capturing the salient features of the sound sequence and performance, now exists 
in addition, to the “composed” score used by the non-improvising musician. 
 (IND-3) demonstrates that an improvisation, a sound sequences that was initially 
generated by improvisation, may be prescriptive.  The notated score serves as a set of 
instructions for future reproduction.  Of course, the accuracy of the score depends on the 
memory and other skills of the improviser.  These contingencies can be eliminated by having the 
improvisation recorded, thereby allowing someone to transcribe it later, or the use of some other 
device that would in real-time notate the improvised sounds.  (See “The Notional Device” 
below.)  It does not matter whether the improviser intended the improvisation to be prescriptive 
or not.  The decision to “publish” the score (or even the recording) may be made after the 
completed performance. 
 (MusPen) The Musical Pen Case.  Suppose there is a pen device such that when applied 
to music manuscript paper, the pen not only inscribed the paper with notation but also produced 
the sound and sonic properties of the notation as well.16  There are computer MIDI devices that 
are very close to this imaginary example in this thought experiment.  There can be two sub-cases 
here:  (1) an audience is present while a person uses the Musical Pen; (2) there is no audience 
present.  Would this be composing or improvising?  Would the presence of an audience matter? 
 (MusPen) demonstrates that a typical compositional act, that of notating a score, could be 
performing and producing sounds much in the same way someone improvises.  It is a 
contingency of technology and history that people.  Would editing be possible?  If real-time 
editing occurred, then the edits would produce sounds in the way the original scoring did.  
                                                         
16 The first noted case of a similar device was the one invented and used by Pietro Mascagni.  It 
is said that his pianoforte included a device that would notate what he played.  I do not know if 
this has ever been confirmed.  See Philip Heseltine, “A Note on the Mind’s Ear,” Musical Times 
(February 1, 1922). 
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Erasures would delete notational inscriptions but would not be able to delete already produced 
sounds.  Consequently, editing would give rise to a different realized sound sequence, even 
though there may be only one score published. 
 (NotDev) The Notational Device.  The Notational Device is the opposite of the 
(MusPen).  This technology exists.  As one plays an instrument or sings, a computer 
simultaneously records and notates the sound sequence.  Many composers of popular songs use 
this technology. 
 This case, like (MusPen), raises problems for distinctions between performing and 
composing, especially if the playing that is being notated occurs in a public venue.  Additionally, 
this case raises questions about composition being connected to prescription or giving 
instructions for future performance.  This device would permit a person to simultaneously 
perform, score/notate thereby providing instructions for future performance.  Of course, we need 
to assume that the person would not edit the notated score from the performance.   
 (Pure)  The Strangely Pure Improvisation Case.  Imagine a piano keyboard-like 
instrument in a sound-proof room.  Depressing the “keys” generates sounds.  The person 
depressing the keys cannot hear the sounds generated, and the depression of the keys makes no 
sound.  In addition, all of the keys are uniform, i.e., no black keys, they are all white; and there 
are 132 keys instead of the standard 88 keys on a piano in order to distinguish this instrument 
from a piano.  The depression of a key could generate a sound of any pitch, duration, timbre, 
rhythm, In other words, the sounds generated are unknown beforehand to the musician/performer 
and are random.  There is a complete disconnection between the agent depressing the keys and 
the sounds generated.  The agent only knows that she is depressing keys and that there may or 
may not be sounds generated.  Consequently, the agent make no connections, cannot establish 
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any patterns or relationships between the sounds, and this cannot be accomplished by tactile 
relationships because the sound generated is divorced from the intensity used to depress the key, 
the rhythm of depression, and the fact that two depressions seriatim will not necessarily generate 
the sound.  One movement could be in response to another, and relations could be made between 
(say) fingerings, but this would not correlate in any way to the sounds produced.  (Humans have 
a tendency to construct imagined relationships between movements when they do not know the 
actual products of such movements.)  Therefore, one sound event has no relation to the one 
before and after it, save that the same agent depressed some keys to generate the random sounds. 
 An experiment like this one is not far from actual practices musicians have used to 
conjure up ideas and elicit discovery, and eschew tired and well-worn practices.  For example, 
Richard Taruskin recalls this anecdote:  “One musician whom I particularly admire, a lutenist, 
once told me that when he began to experiment with improvisatory practices to accompany 
medieval song, he deliberately mistuned his instrument so that his fingers would not be able to 
run along familiar paths.”17  John Cage has used many methods to generate scores, and his pieces 
for prepared piano introduce an element of surprise as one plays the score, especially if one 
cannot exactly reproduce the piano preparations each time one performs the piece.18 
 (Pure) raises questions about agency.  In (Pure) the agent is responsible for the “doing,” 
which here amounts to selecting which keys to depress and how, and the selection realization 
(motor sequence).  However, the agent has no idea what is being produced by these selections 
and movements.  Is the agent responsible for the sound sequence produced and/or notated in 
(Pure)?  Some extreme critics of improvisation have raised similar doubts about improvisers:  
                                                         
17 Richard Taruskin, Text and Act: Essays on Music and Performance (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1995), 78. 
18 See the list of John Cage’s compositions and recordings in Rob Haskins, John Cage, Critical 
Lives Series (Reaktion Books, 2012), 177-178. 
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they are not truly and significantly responsible for their improvisations, so credit (and I guess, 
blame) cannot be given to the improviser.  If an improviser happens to produce a pleasant and 
interesting sound sequence (say), then this has not been achieved, but arrived at by more or less 
accident.  But, as I have shown Part I, this view rests on assumptions about improvisation that 
are false, and should have never been taken seriously.  A simple experiment could have 
disabused those holding such a view:  try it yourself, that is, if one has (say) musical training, 
spend some time improvising. 
 (PP)  Perfect Pair Case.  This thought experiment comes from Lee Brown.  Brown set it 
up this way:  “Suppose that an improvisation by Cormac Hackins (H1) just happens to be 
perceptually indistinguishable from the famous “Body and Soul” solo by Coleman Hawkins 
(H2).  Unlike the pair I described in the previous section, this pair not only parallel each other 
perceptually, but they are equally spontaneous.  I shall call such a pair a perfect pair.”19  This 
case is similar to (IND), except that both sound sequences are spontaneous (improvised).  This is 
improbably but possible.  I think we need to also suppose that Cormac and Coleman have had no 
contact and do not know of each other’s improvisation.  So, neither one has influenced the other.  
(PP) demonstrates that at least two spontaneous performances may result in the same sound 
sequence (content), and that perhaps improvisations should be individuated based on agent and 
time of performance.  Putatively, the two sound sequences in (PP) possess different artistic 
properties:  one may influenced by Louis Armstrong, the other not; one may be “retro,” the other 
revolutionary. 
 Some of the elicited intuitions and salient features that arise from these cases will make 
some of the basic data for the models and theories developed herein. 
                                                         
19 Lee B. Brown, “Musical Works, Improvisation, and the Principle of Continuity,” Journal of 
Aesthetics and Art Criticism 54, no. 4 (Fall 1996): 353-369. 
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2.1.2   Cognitive Neuroscience and Cognitive Models 
 
Creativity is like murder—both depend on motive, means, and opportunity.20 
—Philip Johnson-Laird, “Freedom and Constraint in Creativity” 
 
 The cognitive models of improvising posit selection as the fundamental process or 
function of improvising.  Notice that this function could be the same for composing.  What is the 
difference?  When one improvises or composes one essentially selects something from a set of 
possibilities.  The set of possibilities is tacitly or explicitly recognized during the selection 
process. 
 My purpose in giving an exposition of cognitive models of improvising is two-fold.  
First, the models are intrinsically illuminating about the nature of improvising and creation itself.  
Second, the models give evidence for a key premise in my argument that composing and 
improvising fundamentally share the same cognitive mechanism.  All of the models begin with 
selection.  The models however do not address precisely what selection is.  I will fill in this gap.  
In addition, in terms of giving an account of creativity, the models show how, after the creative 
process begins, choices (selection) are made by artistic agents.  The significant omission is how 
the process starts—the first creative selection.  Often, this starting choice is explained away by 
referring to some inane heuristic rule (as in the case of artificial intelligence programs for 
improvising, and in others it is explained by a random generator given certain parameters.  For 
my purpose here, I do not have to solve the problem of creativity, even though it would be nice 
                                                         
20 Philip N. Johnson-Laird, “Freedom and Constraint in Creativity,” The Nature of Creativity, ed. 
Robert Sternberg, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 208. 
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to have such an explanation.  I do not believe that these models take away the value of art, nor 
genius, nor the “mystery” of creation. 
 Many methods have been used to study improvisation:  sociological, economic, 
phenomenological, computational, cognitive science, and neuroscience.  Many models of 
improvisation are nested within models of creativity more generally.21  This fact itself is 
illuminating, and I think provides some presumptive support for my claim that creation/selection 
is the basic state underlying both composition and improvisation.  Four main models have been 
proffered.  Many theories of creativity use musical improvisation as their test case for the theory, 
and as one of the best examples of creative behavior.  I will review Philip Johnson-Laird’s 
computational model, Jeff Pressing’s cognitive model, Csikszentmihalyi and Rich’s systems-
based model, and Eric Clarke’s three-stage cognitive model.22  Pressing says:  “The central core 
of this model is the generation of a new set of array components for Ei+1 from those preceding 
it.”23  Johnson-Laird says:  “The principles that I have described amount to a theory of creativity 
at the computational level—a theory of what has to be computed, namely, nondeterministic 
choices among options characterized by a set of criteria.  A theory at the algorithmic level must 
                                                         
21 This is the case for Johnson-Laird, and Csikszentmihalyi and Rich (see below n. 22). 
22 Philip N. Johnson-Laird, “Freedom and Constraint in Creativity,” The Nature of Creativity, ed. 
Robert Sternberg, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 202-219; Jeff Pressing, 
“Improvisation: Methods and Models,” in Generative Processes in Music: The Psychology of 
Performance, Improvisation, and Composition, ed. John A. Sloboda (New York: Oxford 
University Press, Clarendon Press, 1988), 129-178; Eric Clarke, “Generative Principles in Music 
Performance,” in Generative Processes in Music: The Psychology of Performance, 
Improvisation, and Composition, ed. John A. Sloboda (New York: Oxford University Press, 
Clarendon Press, 1988), 1-26; Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi and GrantRich, “Musical Improvisation: 
A Systems Approach,” in Creativity in Performance, ed. R. Keith Sawyer (Greenwich, CT: 
Ablex Publishing, 1997), 43-66; Barry J. Kenny and Martin Gellrich, “Improvisation,” in The 
Science and Psychology of Music Performance: Creative Strategies for teaching and Learning, 
eds. Richard Parncutt and Gary E. McPherson (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 117-
134. 
23 Pressing, 162. 
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specify how the choices are made.”24  The models admirably handle the selection process from 
one selected sound-sequence to the next; however, where all of them show difficulty is how the 
process gets started.  In other words, how does that first sound, the first string get chosen.  
Essentially, this is the problem of creativity.  Johnson-Laird says that the starting point for 
getting the process going can just be arbitrary selection within the constraints of the particular 
context in which the improviser is improvising.  Once the process gets going, the models have 
explanatory power, and are illuminating. 
 Selection can occur by an agent simply cognizing:  that is, in one’s mental ear, or mind’s 
eye, et cetera.  I use the term “virtual sounding” for the willed mental production of a sound 
sequence in the mind’s ear.  Auditory hallucinations and phenomena such as tinnitus are not 
virtual soundings.  When composing, the selection may occur in the form of notation by writing 
with some utensil on some medium, or even by memory by actually producing the sound-
occurrence.  In improvising one mainly produces the sound-occurrence simultaneously with the 
selection.  In order not be dualistic about this process, one must understand that cognitive models 
are rational reconstructions, which include the specification of sub-conscious mental states and 
computation, and are not intended to mimic or reflect the phenomenology of the actual practice.  
Thus, when selection is posited as the fundamental state of creation, one is not committed to the 
idea that the agent recognizes such a state as selection, nor is it meant to be interpreted as an 
actual, separate state in thinking or action.  Selection can occur in something we think or do.  
These are all standard ways of understanding cognitive science and the models to which it gives 
rise. 
                                                         
24 Johnson-Laird, 209. 
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 There are no brain studies comparing imaging of the brain during improvisation and 
composition.  I conjecture that one reason for this is because the compositional act is vague, 
nebulous, and temporally ordered in a way that is inconvenient for imaging studies.  
Improvisation, on the other hand, can be more realistically reconstructed in laboratory 
conditions.  In other words, the improvising that occurs during brain imaging in a laboratory is 
sufficiently similar to improvisation that occurs in normal settings.  Compositional tasks, 
however, could be reconstructed in the laboratory setting.  The reconstruction of the tasks would 
have to sufficiently match what occurs in real composing.  Surely, there will be artificiality to the 
tasks, but it may not matter much for imaging studies.  Of course, asserting that these differences 
do not matter begs the question, but all studies have this problem to some degree.  Another 
problem is the varied nature of how composers compose.  Some compose on an instrument, 
some without an instrument, some hum to themselves; many combine several different methods 
at different times and locations.  Consequently, the motor component can be different and this 
would have to be held constant for an imaging study to be valid.  This could create more 
artificiality.  In improvising studies, the subjects always play and improvise on the same 
instrument in order to keep the motor components constant. 
 Improvised playing of instruments (usually piano) has been compared to non-improvised 
playing, such as reading from a score.  In addition, some studies change the degree to which the 
subjects have familiarity with the score material.  Subjects memorize some sequences, sight read 
some, et cetera.  In one major study from 2008,25 imaging analysis revealed that improvisation 
involves the dorsal premotor cortex (dPMC), inferior frontal gyrus/ventral premotor cortex 
(IFG/vPMC), and the anterior cingulated cortex (ACC).  Berkowitz and Ansari report that 
                                                         
25 Berkowitz and Ansari, (2008). 
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improvisational processes seem to be subserved by these areas of the brain.  They define 
improvisation as “Improvisation involves the generation of possible musical phrases, selection 
among these at any given moment, and execution of the decided-upon motor output.”26  The 
dPMC is implicated in motor tasks.  The ACC is implicated in voluntary selection, internally 
selected action as compared to externally stimulated actions, conflict monitoring, decision 
making, unrehearsed movements, and willed action.  The IFG/vPMC is part of Broca’s area, and 
has been implicated in language production and processing, sequence processing, selection and 
retrieval, and maintenance of rules and task selection. 
 The most notable finding in another 2008 study by Limb and Braun27 is focal activation 
of the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC).  Associations have been found between MPFC activity 
and autobiographical narrative.  Limb and Braun find this germane because “one could argue 
that improvisation is a way of expressing one’s own musical voice or story.  In this sense, 
activity of the MPFC during improvisation is also consistent with an emerging view that the 
region plays a role in the neural instantiation of self, organizing internally motivated, self-
generated, and stimulus-independent behaviors.”28  This is very interesting and coheres well with 
some phenomenology of improvising.  Many first-hand phenomenological accounts of expert 
improvisers reveal that especially in extended improvisations players “go into their own isolated 
worlds,” and improvisers sense they are telling stories (but not necessarily propositionally).  For 
                                                         
26 Berkowitz and Ansari, (2008): 541. 
27 Charles J. Limb and Allen R. Braun, “Neural Substrates of Spontaneous Musical Performance: 
An fMRI Study of Jazz Improvisation,” PLoS ONE 3, no. 2 (February 2008). 
28 Limb and Braun, e1678-e1679. 
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some improvisers the sounds that they are generating and selecting have no non-sonic mental 
image associations.29  In other words, the selection of sounds is purely sonic. 
 Limb and Braun summarize their findings as follows:  “Our data indicate that 
spontaneous improvisation, independent of the degree of musical complexity, is characterized by 
widespread deactivation of lateral portions of the prefrontal cortex together with focal activation 
of medial prefrontal cortex.  This unique pattern may offer insights into the cognitive 
dissociations that may be intrinsic to the creative process:  the innovative, internally motivated 
production of novel material (at once rule-based and highly structured) that can apparently occur 
outside of conscious awareness and beyond volitional control.”30  The last part of the sentence is 
significant.  One aspect of “outside of conscious awareness and beyond volitional control” is that 
self-monitoring is decreased during improvisation.  Self monitoring has been shown to “inhibit 
spontaneity and impair performance.”31  This is further confirmed in a studies that correlate high 
creativity and general disinhibition, sensation-seeking, and shamelessness.32  These traits have 
been found specifically in jazz musicians.33  Disinhibition requires less self-monitoring.  It is 
unclear whether increased spontaneous creative behavior causes increased general disinhibition 
(this would be strange) or vice versa. 
                                                         
29 On this, and similar phenomena, see David Sudnow, Ways of the Hand: The Organization of 
Improvised Conduct (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978), and David Sudnow, 
Ways of the Hand: A Rewritten Account, foreword by Hubert L. Dreyfus (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 2001). 
30 Limb and Braun, e1679. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Asunción Gonzalez Pinto, Verónica Sanmartin, Virginia Guillén, Carlota Las Hayas, and José 
Guimón, “Shamelessness and Creativity,” Advances in Mental Health 2, no. 3 (November 2005). 
33 Geoffrey I. Wills, “Forty Lives in the Bebop Business: Mental Health in a Group of Eminent 
Jazz Musicians,” British Journal of Psychiatry 183 (2003): 255-259. 
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 Johnson-Laird also includes an element that is outside of conscious awareness in his 
computational model of creative behavior and improvisation.  He says, “In the same way, the 
tacit criteria for generating ideas are not available to conscious critical processes.  Because 
critical criteria are easy to communicate to other people but insufficient for creation, whereas 
generative abilities are unconscious and ineffable, critical judgment tends to be considerably in 
advance of the ability to create works of the imagination.  The paradox of creativity therefore 
leads ineluctably to the view that there are many criteria on which the creator must rely and that 
by no means all of them are available to overt inspection.”34  Here he addresses the issue more 
specifically to improvisation: 
 
What is common to most forms of improvisation is a reliance on two quite separate 
mental components: first, a long-term memory for a set of basic structures, such as the 
chord sequences of modern jazz or the ragas (scalic patters) of Indian music; second, a set 
of tacit principles that underlie the improvisatory skill.  We know that these two 
components exist because the basic structures are accessible to consciousness, and 
musicians can talk about them, write them down in a suitable notation, and teach them to 
neophytes.  But, this explicit knowledge is not sufficient to enable a musician to 
improvise.  Hence, there is a second component, which is relatively inaccessible to 
consciousness.  Some musicians are aware of a few of its principles, but no one has 
complete access to them.  Musicians learn to improvise by imitating other virtuosos and 
by experimenting with various possibilities.  They learn to improvise by improvising, and 
they thereby develop their own particular styles within a genre.35 
 
In addition, this coheres well with important typology in action theory.  Creative actions, 
especially improvising, are often like actions that have been called “half-intentional.”  Myles 
Brand identified two kinds of actions:  “intentional actions” and “actions simpliciter.”36  Randall 
                                                         
34 Johnson-Laird, 209. 
35 Johnson-Laird, 210. 
36 Myles Brand, Intending and Acting: Toward a Naturalized Action, Bradford Books 
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Dipert has re-named these “fully intentional” actions and “half-intentional” actions.37  Dipert 
defines half-intentional actions as, 
 
A half-intentional action is typically one in which conscious deliberation and decision 
may not be the immediate cause of this behavior but for which I may nevertheless in 
some sense be “responsible.”  An example of a fully intentional action might be my 
writing an essay on artifacts.   An example of half-intentional actions might be many of 
my word choices, the keys I am striking when typing, and so on.  These are activities of 
which I am not fully conscious at the time of the activity and have not immediately prior 
deliberated about. Roughly speaking, a half-intentional action, to be an action at all, must 
be a habit that has arisen (1) from the repetition of prior, fully intentional actions; (2) is a 
revocable habit; and (3) is activated by a current fully conscious intention.  Most of our 
actions are half-intentional: our motor behavior, driving on the right-hand side of the 
road, and so on.  Some few of our actions now, the “big choices” we make and occasional 
intervention in normally habitual activities, are fully intentional.  …  Beethoven’s basic 
musical style, described within broad parameters, was not something Beethoven in 
middle age and later had to contemplate each time he sat down to compose.  Although 
highly complex, certainly, it became a habit or style of composition that need not always 
have been consciously contemplated with the creation of each work.38 
 
For musicians who have achieved excellence, improvising, at least in certain genres with a 
particular set of constraints, becomes partly, in some cases mostly, habitual.  Habitual behavior 
involves agency, but not in the full volitional sense.  Habituation is achieved through training, 
practice, experience, and imitating.  The level of volitional control in improvising is vague.  
Notice that Dipert gives the example of composing as half-intentional.  This is surely correct, 
and further substantiates my view that the fundamentally composition and improvisation share 
the same cognitive state—selection—and that their distinction will be one of degree, not always 
kind (a continuum or spectrum). 
                                                         
37Randall R. Dipert, Artifacts, Art Works, and Agency, The Arts and Their Philosophies Series 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1993), 50. 
38Ibid. 
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 Another Berkowitz and Ansari study compared expert players with non-musicians.  They 
infer from an analysis of the imaging that trained musicians (experts) improvise in a more top-
down fashion than non-musicians.  Non-musician improvised playing is more stimulus driven 
response to what they are playing.  Hence, trained musicians are able to inhibit attentional shifts 
to irrelevant stimuli thereby allowing a “more goal-directed performance state that aids in 
creative thought.”39  They also have evidence that confirms that musical training changes 
structures within the brain. 
 The lack of brain studies comparing the two relevant action-types here can be 
ameliorated by considering brain studies of similar tasks to composition, or at least tasks that can 
be relevantly compared and contrasted to improvisational tasks. 
 All of the brain studies of improvisation establish that areas of the brain that are 
implicated in “free response selection” or “free generation of responses” are integrally involved.  
Thus, improvisation fundamentally involves selection.  Externally motivated motor tasks include 
playing music from a score.  Creative acts involve internally motivated selection and motor 
execution of the selection.  In performing without creating, one is not selecting.  Spontaneous 
and non-spontaneous creation involves internally motivated selection at its heart. 
 Jeff Pressing’s cognitive model of improvisation is the most complex and comprehensive.  
This cognitive model is supposed to be a description of the process of improvising.  
Improvisations may be partitioned into sequences of over-lapping sections.  Each section 
contains a quantity of musical events, which Pressing calls event clusters (Ei).  Thus, a single 
improvisation I = {E1, E2, E3, …, En}.  The sub-numerals refer to time points, which may be 
                                                         
39 Aaron L. Berkowitz and Daniel Ansari, “Expertise-related Deactivation of the Right 
Temporoparietal Junction during Musical Improvisation,” NeuroImage 49 (2010): 712; also see 
their “Generation of Novel Motor Sequences: The Neural Correlates of Musical Improvisation,” 
NeuroImage, (2008): 535-543. 
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interpreted as the point at which an agent’s decided action begins to be executed.  Thus, E0 is 
silence, viz., the time point before the improvisation begins.  Next, event clusters must be 
explained and described.  An event cluster generation for a solo improvisation is ( {E}, R, G, M 
)i → Ei+1, where R is a referent, G are current goals of the agent, and M is the long time memory 
of the agent.  An event cluster E has the following aspects:  acoustic, musical, movement, visual, 
emotional, and perhaps others.  Each aspect A has two states:  intended and actual.  Since 
intentions and goals are not always realized or executed properly there may be a disparity 
between an intended aspect and the actual aspect that is executed.  Thus, the aspects are all 
correct descriptions of Ei and are redundant.  When an event cluster Ei occurs, Ei is triggered and 
executed by the agent, and each aspect of Ei can be decomposed into three types of analytical 
representations, which are representations of Ei from different perspectives.  These 
representations constitute a sufficient amount of information for the agent’s decision-making, 
which I call selection.    The object representation O is a unified perceptual or cognitive entity 
(e.g., chords, bodily movements, a sound).  “’Features’ are parameters that describe shared 
properties of objects, and ‘processes’ are descriptions of changes of objects or processes over 
time.”40  Each analytical representation is further decomposed into arrays, which possess values 
and cognitive strengths.  Cognitive strength tracks attentional loading and indicates the 
importance of a particular value in the agent’s internal representations.  So, these will be 
different given different agents.  The selection of Ei+1 is the next event cluster. 
                                                         
40 Jeff Pressing, “Improvisation: Methods and Models,” in Generative Processes in Music: The 
Psychology of Performance, Improvisation, and Composition, ed. John A. Sloboda (New York: 
Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press, 1988), 154. 
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 The production of Ei is based upon “long-term factors (R, G, stylistic norms, and ongoing 
processes), and by the evaluation of the effects and possibilities of Ei.”41  My account fills in 
what these possibilities are, and my taxonomy (below) provides a partial explanation of stylistic 
norms. 
 Once the process begins there are two methods by which an agent continues, i.e., 
produces Ei+1.  Associative generation is selection based on a previous Ei.  Interrupt generation is 
locally novel selection.  The only thing left to explain is the choice between associative or 
interrupt generation.  Pressing accounts for this formally with a time-dependent tolerance level 
for repetition.  Let L(t) be the agent’s time-dependent toleration level for repetition, and let Z(t) 
be the current level of repetition.  If Z(t) ≥ L(t) then the agent institutes an interrupt generation, 
otherwise the agent continues with associative generation.  There may be other reasons why an 
agent chooses one kind of generation over another, but Pressing is correct to assume that 
repetition toleration is a significant factor in deciding whether to associate or interrupt.  
Additionally, Pressing omits the fact that an agent’s L(t) may change over time, both external to 
the time of one improvisation I to another, and even within (internal) a single I.  The internal 
change in L(t) may be influenced by the previous event clusters.  Cognitive and motor sub-
programmes generate a specific action design.  The remaining event clusters are generated by 
iteration from the above components until the agent is done with the improvisation. 
 Pressing’s model incorporates all of the important elements of improvising from the 
agent’s point of view.  Improvisers do in fact make decisions about what to do next based upon 
what they just did.  Improvisers focus their attention on different aspects of the artistic content 
(and sometimes non-artistic, such as amount of fatigue, motor patterns), and given specific 
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conditions and contexts, their attention will shift.  Now of course an improviser is not thinking of 
her decisions consciously as associative or interruptive.  Consequently, the phenomenology of 
the improvisational process does not necessarily include the agent being aware of such states; 
however, the explanatory fecundity of cognitive models is to at least cohere well with the 
phenomenology, being consistent with the agent’s output, and those generative principles of 
which the agent is consciously aware. 
 Eric Clarke’s three stage cognitive model takes as its object performing music, of which 
improvisation is a species.42  Once again, fundamentally, the model uses selection.  For 
improvised performances, Clarke identifies three principles of improvised musical phrase 
generation:  hierarchical, associative, and repertory-based. 
 
The various representations underlying an improvised performance can be brought 
together by considering the abstract representation of an improvised performance in its 
very earliest states ... All that exists is a low-level musical unit, characterized here as a 
small-scale, hierarchically organized event.  A complete performance will consist of a 
large collection of such events, organized in different ways, and related to this first event 
according to three possible principles: 
(1)     The first event may be part of a hierarchical structure, to some extent worked out in 
advance, and to some extent constructed in the course of the improvisation. … 
(2)     The first event may be part of an associative chain of events, each new event 
derived from the previous sequence by the forward transfer of information.  … 
(3)     The first event may be selected from a number of events contained within the 
performer’s repertoire, the rest of the improvisation consisting of further selections from 
this same repertoire, with a varying degree of relatedness between selections.  …43 
 
 Johnson-Laird’s (J-L) model is computational.  He thinks that there are three possible 
procedures for creative tasks:  creation within a framework or genre in real time, creation 
                                                         
42 Eric Clarke, “Generative Principles in Music Performance,” in Generative Processes in Music: 
The Psychology of Performance, Improvisation, and Composition, ed. John A. Sloboda (New 
York: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press, 1988), 1-26. 
43 Ibid., 8-9. 
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intended to produce a new framework, and creation based on whether or not there is an 
opportunity to revise the creative product (creation within a framework in stages).  Most 
improvisations are going to be classified into the real time framework and new framework 
categories, and composition seems to fit into revisable creativity.  Frameworks may be 
interpreted to be artistic genres and the like.  Johnson-Laird builds a model of creation within a 
framework in real-time—improvisation.  There are two separate mental components for 
generating extemporaneous performances:  long-term memory for a set of basic structures, and 
tacit principles that underlie improvisational skill.  He says, “We know that these two 
components exist because the basic structures are accessible to consciousness, and musicians can 
talk about them, write them down in a suitable notation, and teach them to neophytes.”44  J-L is 
assuming that there is such thing as improvisational skill.  Does skill necessarily imply that it is 
something that can be taught?  No.  There can be skills that cannot be taught directly, typically 
those involving non-exhaustive rule-based judgment or discretion.  One can nudge someone in 
the right direction.  In a case like (SCI), there are inputs and outputs.  The inputs can be 
described as what Pressing (above) represents as ( {E}, R, G, M )i → Ei+1, where R is a referent, 
G are current goals of the agent, and M is the long time memory of the agent.  The referent in a 
case like (SCI) will be the tune, which includes a harmonic structure, melodic pattern, tempo, 
and a wide range of stylistic options.  As Johnson-Laird notes, an improviser learns to improvise 
by improvising.45  He says that musical improvisation is syntactic organization of sounds into 
patterns without being concerned with what they represent.  So, “[t]he computational problem in 
improvisation is therefore to produce in real time an acceptable melody that fits the chord 
                                                         
44 Philip Johnson-Laird, “Freedom and Constraint in Creativity,” in The Nature of Creativity: 
Contemporary Psychological Perspectives, ed. Robert J. Sternberg (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988), 210. 
45 Ibid. 
  
174 
sequence, and the tempi of modern jazz call for melodies to be extemporized at an extremely 
rapid rate (e.g., 10 to 12 notes per second).”46  In addition, creating in real-time like 
improvisation requires low computational power, because intermediate internal representations 
are not necessary.  Johnson-Laird substantiates this by giving an existence proof.  He constructs 
a model and uses other models that have produced computer programs that produce passable 
melodic and jazz bass line improvisations.  On the other hand, he says that “if there is time to 
revise or to reject the products of a generative process, then the ultimate results are likely to rely 
on a high degree of computational power.  That is, they can be produced making considerable 
use of a memory for intermediate results.”47 
 Now the key is that even in the computational model selection is at the foundation.  J-L 
says:  “The tacit skills have to run efficiently in real time.  They govern the choice of notes to fit 
the harmonic implications of the chord structure and to make a good melody.”48  Notice his use 
of the term “choice.”  In another place he says, “Freedom of choice occurs par excellence in acts 
of creation.  …  When a musician improvises a melody, at each point there are several possible 
notes that could be played.”49  The goal of a computational theory of creation includes specifying 
what has to be computed, which J-L describes as “nondeterministic choices among options 
characterized by a set of criteria.”50  Choices among options are sometimes determined by the 
tacit and sometimes explicit principles and rules musicians learn, practice, and internalize; 
sometimes the choices are arbitrary.  If there was not an arbitrary element, then the undesirable 
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48 Ibid., 210. 
49 Ibid., 207. 
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and false result would inevitability.  An arbitrary choice here and there in a sound sequences 
allows for different principles to be invoked and influence the future choices the improviser 
makes.  Importantly, J-L points out that the human mind does contain a mechanism for making 
arbitrary choices. 
 The principles used for making many of the selections are computable because they are 
programmable.  Computer programs generate novel sound sequences given a set of inputs.  The 
program contains some random generators thus allowing for different sound sequences to be 
produced given the same inputs.  Recently, David J. Mendoça and William Al Wallace have both 
reviewed artificial intelligence programs of improvisation and constructed their own.51  Now 
there is also some empirical data that provides support for the idea that improvisers use a set of 
basic principles to generate novel sequences.  In one neuro-scientific experiment a template of a 
melodic pattern was given to trained musician subjects as a source for improvisation.  A 
qualitative analysis of the improvised sound sequences produced revealed that all of the 
modifications made by the musicians to the melodic template could be classified in eleven 
categories:  “(i) insertion of a fast group of one or more grace notes before a template note; (ii) 
substitution of a template note for another note; (iii) figuration, that is, expansion of the original 
template into melodic figures; (iv) insertion of a trill on a template note; (v) filling in, that is,  
insertion of chromatic or diatonic scales between template notes; (vi) repetitions of template 
notes; (vii) elimination of template notes; (viii) insertion of figures giving a broken two-part 
polyphony; (ix) rhythmization of the template; (x) insertion of tremolo, that is, a trill-like figure 
between two notes with a larger interval than a second; (xi) switching of tonality from major to 
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Emergency Management,” IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics 37, No. 4 (July 
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minor.”52  This is empirical evidence that humans use rules, to a large degree, to produce 
improvised novel sequences based on an input referent.  The timing of the rule applications 
varies, and the exact content of the rule application is contingent.  For example, two improvisers 
may choose to modify by grace note insertion but insert different grace notes. 
 In free improvisation,53 that is, when there is no referent such a melodic or harmonic 
template provided, the improviser will usually establish a referent or set of referents early in the 
playing.  These can be brief figures or phrases, or the improviser imagines following a harmonic 
structure.  In fact, one interesting exercise in ear training and jazz transcriptions courses is to 
listen to a master improviser play alone, solo.  The task is to determine what the “changes” are.  
In other words, the listener must determine the implicit harmonic structure the improviser is 
following and using as a referent for the melodic improvisation.  Some structures are easy to 
detect for trained musicians:  rhythm changes, twelve and sixteen bar blues structures, and 
certain fecund jazz standard changes (e.g., “All the Things You Are,” “Autumn Leaves,” Classic 
tunes by Miles Davis, Thelonious Monk, Wayne Shorter).  In the genre known as “free jazz,” the 
musicians will often have a loose or vague idea beforehand with which to work.  It might as 
vague as a tempo, or chord, or an abstract, non-musical idea.  In the latter case, the improvisers 
are expected to improvise according to their own self-expression aroused by the idea.  Once the 
performance gets going, then associative principles are used based upon triggers the improviser 
hears the other improvisers playing.54 
                                                         
52 Sara L Bengtsson, Mihaly Csikszentmihályi, and Fredrik Ullén, “Cortical Regions Involved in 
the Generation of Musical Structures during Improvisation in Pianists,” Journal of Cognitive 
Neuroscience 19, no. 5 (2007): 834. 
53 Some call this “motivic improvisation.” 
54 See Ekkehard. Jost, Free Jazz, The Roots of Jazz Series (Graz: Universal Edition A.G. Wien, 
1974; reprint edition, New York: Da Capo Press, 1994); Todd S. Jenkins, ed., Free Jazz and 
Free Improvisation: An Encyclopedia: Volume 1: A-J (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2004); 
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 In what some call formulaic improvisation, as in the Parry-Lord interpretation of epic 
poetry, the basic generative rules will be simpler and possibly fewer in number.  The content will 
be drawn from the improvisers repertory stored in long-term memory.  Nonetheless, it is not very 
different from referent-based improvisation. 
 Now Johnson-Laird thinks that composition and improvisation must have different 
underlying processes because there are “composers who cannot improvise and improvisers who 
cannot compose.”55  Suppose that this is true (which I am not willing to assert without further 
clarification).  Beethoven was a great improviser by all accounts,56 though there is evidence that 
he composed with great difficulty.  But what was the source of such difficulty?   I think there are 
a plethora of other explanations for such a case, and most of it will be speculation with respect to 
composers like Beethoven and Mozart.  The speculation, however, does have some foundation in 
historical documents:  first-hand and second-hand accounts of Mozart and Beethoven 
improvising, performing, and composing, and the personal accounts, such as Mozart’s letters.57  
Perhaps studies can be done on present day composers.  One need not be constrained by 
historical cases.  We do not know for certain that Beethoven found composing difficult.  We also 
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do not know whether Mozart and Beethoven experienced a creative blocks that inhibited both 
their composing and improvising.  If there were cases of creative block in composing and not in 
improvising, then this can be explained by the fact that each task operates under a different set of 
constraints and goals.  One can be blocked under one set of circumstances and not blocked in 
another, even when the underlying processes are the same.  One can make sports analogies here.  
For example, professional runners perform differently in the Boston marathon versus the New 
York marathon even though both are the same distance and involve long distance running. 
 Another explanation is that Beethoven could have been more easily satisfied while 
improvising, i.e., the sound sequences he generated were more acceptable to him because of the 
difficult constraints that exist when improvising.  Composition involves open time, perhaps a lot 
of it, and there are possibilities of editing and revision at every turn.  Open time and many 
choices create paralysis.  This is substantiated by studies of choices in consumption.  
Psychologist Barry Schwarz has shown that when consumers (choosers, deciders) are given 
longer periods of time to make choices and many choices, they become paralyzed (do not 
choose) or resort to random choosing but only after much agonizing.58  We become paralyzed.  
Given that Schwarz used many different examples in many different domains makes it plausible 
that there are general psychological tendencies and strategies that humans employ, and these are 
relevant to art-making and artistic selection.  Therefore, the above examples do not give much 
evidence for different underlying processes.  Even if the underlying process is the same, the 
manner in which it is executed along with the concomitant constraints may be sufficient to 
account for those who can compose but not improvise and vice versa.  In addition, when one 
considers the most significant improvisers in the history of jazz (e.g., Louis Armstrong, Coleman 
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Hawkins, Charlie Parker, John Coltrane, Bill Evans, Miles Davis), one finds that all of them 
composed, even though the compositional output of each varies.  In some cases the compositions 
were melodic and harmonic structures—tunes—that served as springboards for improving.  To 
substantiate Johnson-Laird’s point, the inquiry that would provide better evidence is to determine 
whether good composers are also good improvisers.  In the history of Western art music, we 
have three extraordinary examples (Bach, Mozart, Beethoven) wherein the answer is an emphatic 
yes.  The difficulty they might have experienced in composition can be accounted for by 
differences between the two contexts of improvisation and composition, especially those that 
existed and were conventional in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.  Is that enough 
evidence to undermine J-L’s hypothesis?  I do not think J-L provides sufficient evidence for the 
hypothesis that composition and improvisation have different underlying processes.  In addition, 
it is unclear why J-L does not consider selection itself to be the underlying process of all (at 
least) artistic creativity, doing, and making. 
 The systems model looks to personal, social, and cultural factors in determining 
creativity.  The systems model differs most from the cognitive and computational in that it places 
an emphasis on the external environment, rather than the internal states, of the agent.  
Csikszentmihalyi and Rich identify two components of the environment:  domain and field.  
Creativity is a certain set of interactions between individual, domains, and fields.  Of course, 
they address the agent as well.  “At the micro level, the systems model suggests that the creative 
process involves a person’s ability to innovate while interacting mentally with the rules or 
practices of a domain, and while keeping in mind the judgments and practices of the field.”59  
The systems model is compatible with computational and cognitive models because these latter 
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models can be viewed as providing the details at the micro-level of the agent’s internal states, 
and the systems model provides the details of the context in which the agent operates. 
 In summary, all of the models either posit, or assume, or otherwise use selection as a 
fundamental unit of the rational reconstruction of creative acts, of which many theorists see 
improvisation as the example par excellence (that is why many of them use improvisation as 
their test case for their theory or model).  Part of my contribution to understanding the nature of 
the basic rules the agent uses and has available for use is provided in the next section on 
taxonomy.  I attempt to achieve two goals.  First, provide an economical and precise way of 
classifying all of the variegated behaviors, practices, and genres involved in improvisation.  
Second, provide a way understanding the basic rules improvisers use and the constraints that 
determine and are constitutive of those rules. 
 
2.1.3 Taxonomy 
 
The only one of the imaginative arts in which I had from childhood taken great pleasure, 
was music; the best effect of which (and in this it surpasses perhaps every other art) 
consists in exciting enthusiasm; in winding up to a high pitch those feelings of an 
elevated kind which are already in the character, but to which this excitement gives a 
glow and a fervour, which though transitory at its utmost height, is precious for 
sustaining them at other times.  This effect of music I had often experienced; but, like all 
my pleasurable susceptibilities, it was suspended during the gloomy period.  I had sought 
relief again and again from this quarter, but found none.  After the tide had turned, and I 
was in process of recovery, I had been helped forward by music, but in a much less 
elevated manner.  I at this time first became acquainted with Weber’s Oberon, and the 
extreme pleasure which I drew from its delicious melodies did me good, by shewing me a 
source of pleasure to which I was as susceptible as ever.  The good however was much 
impaired by the thought, that the pleasure of music (as is quite true of such pleasure as 
this was, that of mere tune) fades with familiarity, and requires either to be revived by 
intermittence, or fed by continual novelty.  And it is very characteristic both of my then 
state, and of the general tone of my mind at this period of my life, that I was seriously 
tormented by the thought of the exhaustibility of musical combinations.  The octave 
consists only of five tones and two semitones, which can be put together in only a limited 
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number of ways, of which but a small proportion are beautiful:  most of these, it seemed 
to me, must have been already discovered, and there could not be room for a long 
succession of Mozarts and Webers, to strike out as these had done, entirely new and 
surpassingly rich veins of musical beauty.  This source of anxiety may perhaps be 
thought to resemble that of philosophers of Laputa, who feared lest the sun should be 
burnt out.  It was, however, connected with the best feature in my very unromantic and in 
no way honorable distress.  For though my dejection, honestly looked at, could not be 
called other than egotistical, produced by the ruin, as I thought, of my fabric of 
happiness, yet the destiny of mankind in general was ever in my thoughts, and could not 
be separated from my own.60 
—John Stuart Mill, Autobiography, Chapter V 
 
 John Stuart Mill was tormented by the thought that humans may exhaust all of the 
possible musical compositions, at least interesting and beautiful ones, thereby effectively 
bringing an end to music as a growing art form.  Mill explicitly indicates in the above quotation 
that this problem, if it be one, was generated by thinking mathematically or ideally about 
Western music.  To be more precise than Mill, there are a finite number of permutations of 
pitches with durational, rhythmic, and dynamic dimensions combinations.  This is the case only 
when one (arbitrarily) caps the duration of time the permutations are notated or played.  The 
number is enormous, perhaps inconceivable.  The number is obtained by an algorithm involving 
exponents and factorials.  Even if we cap the duration at thirty minutes, the number is so 
enormous that Mill’s worry is rendered moot.  Even if Mill’s concern is with good or pleasant 
sounding sequences only, the number is very large and listening to these possible sequences of 
sounds would practically take many human lifetimes.  Nonetheless, I wish to use Mill’s 
fundamental intuition as an impetus for the taxonomy of improvisation. 
 There are many ways of categorizing things, and metaphysics has made an industry of 
such tasks.  Very often, a categorization is based upon its purpose.  The idea that truth should be 
                                                         
60 John Stuart Mill, Autobiography and Other Writings, Riverside Editions, ed. Jack Stillinger 
(New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1969), chapter V, 87-88. 
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the purpose of all taxonomies and categorizations makes sense to me, especially when doing 
natural science, but then we also have to admit that there can be several truths here, especially 
when the objects of taxonomy are social phenomena and artifacts.  So, what one wants is a 
taxonomy that is true to the ways things are in the world but also answers to our interests in 
doing the classification in the first place, which often goes beyond merely describing the world. 
This is not to say that “answering to our interests” is going to conflict with truth.  Simply, it 
means that there can be many different categorizations, all of which are true, and each giving us 
different foci. 
 Below I construct a very general taxonomy with a high level of abstraction.  Doing this 
will achieve my purpose in providing a taxonomy that fits all art forms, genres, aesthetic tastes, 
et cetera.  This taxonomy will be compatible with other classifications whose interests will be 
more specific.  Moreover, this taxonomy serves as a logical geography of improvisation.  It helps 
one to understand and classify activities (or practices) and improvised works.  Even though it is 
meant to cover all art forms, I will focus on music as my example.  Furthermore, this taxonomy 
of improvisation is not just about classifying already documented and executed improvisations; 
although, as a byproduct, recordings (or other documentations) of improvisations may be 
classified according to this taxonomy.  The purpose here is to give a highly general classification 
system of the possibilities open to individuals who improvise.61 
 I think the best way to achieve this is by a constraint-based system.  By “constraints,” I 
mean restrictions on what can be done, should be done, and can be employed by the artists 
                                                         
61 Here I do not yet take a position on whether there can be non-human improvisers, such as non-
human animals and robots.  As mentioned above, there are computer programs that “improvise.”  
See David J. Mendoça and William Al Wallace, “A Cognitive Model of Improvisation in 
Emergency Management,” IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics 37, no. 4 (July 
2007): 547-561. 
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themselves within an environment, particular institution, and tradition.  Constraints may be 
expressed in the form of rules.  I do not call it a rule-governed (or a rule-based) system because 
of the unwelcome commitments that term would bring.  Thus, for an actor to improvise any 
number of constraints are and can be placed upon her in improvising.  These could restrict what 
she says and what she does, how she moves and the like.  A musician could be constrained by 
the physical limitations of the chosen instrument.  Once the logical possibilities of constraints are 
set out, any number of these may be combined to form particular classifications.  Of course, very 
generally, there are also the constraints on human beings in terms of shared physical and 
cognitive limitations, individual physical and cognitive limitations, spatio-temporal limitations, 
technological limitations, the materials available to the artists, et cetera.  Artificial Intelligence 
(AI) experiments with improvisation have had some success.  What counts as success here?  The 
computer with the improvisation program generates a score or sounds that “sound like” 
moderately skilled human improvisations.  One can take as inputs musical sounds or scores (or 
even other representations of sound-occurrences) and compose computer programs that would 
analyze these inputs.  One kind of analysis is based on constructing rules that explain why the 
input is the way it is.  These rules can then be used in the other direction:  to generate novel 
outputs of scores or musical sounds.  In other words, the only way a programmer would be able 
to invent computer programs that generate novel musical sequences is to analyze musical 
patterns that have already been composed or improvised by humans.  The rules must be highly 
abstract and general in order to be able to be performed on a wide variety of new inputs.  The 
inputs may be an inventory of notes based upon key, style, et cetera.  (Pressing’s cognitive model 
calls this the “referent.”)  My taxonomy is a way of making those inputs clear. 
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 Since improvisation (and composition) is fundamentally cognitive and motor selection, 
then this presupposes a set of things from which to select.  One can only select if there are 
options, choices.  Now, it seems that whether a person (agent) is aware (conscious or cognizant 
of the options (all or even some)), one may always post facto reconstruct the set of choices which 
were available or present to the agent at the time of selection.  By this I mean the set of choices 
that were available to the agent from an objective point of view.  This set has little to do with the 
actual, individual conscious states of the agent; however, it does involve many specific 
conditions of the agent and the agent’s environment.  For example, a musician S may say that “it 
never occurred to me to play that B-flat after the A,” even though objectively that choice was 
available to S.  Sometimes, however, we describe others, and even ourselves, as just doing 
something—no other options presented themselves to consciousness.  So, “selection” may seem 
like an inappropriate term or concept for what is going on in improvisation.  It may, however, 
seem more accurate in composition.  When humans perform actions in quick succession, 
consciously it does not seem like a choice or decision is being made for each separate action.  In 
fact, in some cases it may be difficult to individuate the rapid succession of actions into discrete 
units.  It seems to be a unitary flow of movements.  These are half-intentional actions.  Beside 
the (SCI) case, examples of this kind of phenomenon are playing sports, talking, and just 
mundane actions like walking to the market.  From a phenomenological perspective, in some 
moments the choice or decision aspect can be discerned, while other moments “feel” automatic.  
Consequently, it is in these seemingly automatic moments that selection may be an erroneous 
description.  But there are several pieces of evidence that suggest that in both cases similar or the 
same processes are realized.  First, it would be impossible to account for talent and skill if some 
sense of choice or selection or decision was not involved.  Indeed, psychologists and others 
  
185 
indicate that some people are better than others (usually in some specific domain of behavior) in 
their speed of thinking, choosing, and moving in situations that require rapidity.62  In other 
words, if we cannot attribute responsibility to selection or choice, even in an attenuated sense, 
training and effort would be diminished or demolished.  Why would one train if one could not 
control the automatic thinking or moving?  What would be our understanding of talent and 
expertise?  Second, there is reductio ad absurdam argument that can be given here, analogous to 
the one Thomas Nagel presents in the classic “Moral Luck” article.63  One could argue that 
artistic agents are never responsible for anything they do; they have no agency because all novel 
thoughts impinge.  Humans do not cause their thoughts and selection.  My only response is that 
creativity is still a mystery, and we are not yet epistemically entitled to run this argument to the 
point of absurdity.  Furthermore, cognitive science has informed us that even in these moments 
sub-conscious motor and kinetic programs or mechanisms are running.  Some of these were 
delineated for improvisation above.  This is one reason why a phenomenology needs to be 
appended to cognitive models and the like.  One should also be interested in what is present to 
the consciousness of the agent, and what is consciously occurring while playing (if anything), not 
only the underlying processes posited by a cognitive theory, nor what could be going on as 
argued for in a philosophical theory. 
 David Sudnow is perhaps the best example of a phenomenological approach to 
improvising.64  By introspecting on his improvised piano playing and his learning how to play 
                                                         
62 For example, see Sian Beilock, Choke: What the Secrets of the Brain Reveal about Getting It 
Right When You Have To (New York: Free Press, 2010). 
63 Thomas Nagel, “Moral Luck” in Mortal Questions, Canto Classics Series (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1979), 24-38. 
64 David Sudnow, Ways of the Hand: The Organization of Improvised Conduct (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1978), and David Sudnow, Ways of the Hand: A Rewritten 
Account, foreword by Hubert L. Dreyfus (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001). 
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paino and improvise, Sudnow gives excellent descriptions of the process and actions.  One of the 
most important insights he gives is that selection in jazz piano improvisation is in large part 
about fingering and the way one’s hands and fingers move across the keys.  I can attest that the 
same is true for stringed instruments, like guitar.  Often, when I improvise, my attention is on 
finger patterns that I know work (with embellishments) over certain “changes.” 
 How strongly the phenomenology of playing an instrument comes to play in thinking 
about creativity and improvisation in particular comes to the fore in this extraordinary account of 
a conversation with the famous, brilliant pianist Bill Evans. 
 
... I [Gene Lees] kidded him [Bill Evans] about his rocking a finger on a key on a long 
note at the end of a phrase.  After all, the hammer has already left the string:  one has no 
further physical contact with the sound.  ‘Don’t you know the piano has no vibrato?’ I 
said. 
     ‘Yes,’ Bill responded, ‘but trying for it affects what comes before it in the phrase.’65 
 
Evans reveals that there are motor selections that do not enter into the perceivable product (in 
this case sounds) but yet affect properties of that product.  Not all selections will be perceivable 
in the final product (e.g., performance, recording). 
 One should also be aware that selection may be coerced in both a literal and metaphorical 
sense.  External factors such as authorities may constrain what artists do, thereby eliminating or 
reducing choices.  I may only have the resources to learn one instrument.  If I only know how to 
play saxophone, I am not going to pick up a trumpet. 
 At any given time t, the agent (improviser, player, performer) has twelve pitches 
available in the range physically determined by the instrument.66  This range is vague because 
                                                         
65 Gene Lees, “The Poet Bill Evans,” in Reading Jazz: A Gathering of Autobiography, 
Reportage, and Criticism from 1919 to Now, ed. Robert, Gottlieb (New York: Pantheon, 1996), 
424. 
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given certain techniques, which some musicians are able to do and others not, and physical 
enhancements to instruments, the range can be extended, both to the top and bottom of the 
frequency or pitch range.  But it would wrong to suppose that this complete selection options set 
is fully available every time, in every context to an improviser.  What decreases the possibilities 
of the selection options group are the constraints that are given and/or accepted by the player, the 
genre, context, et cetera.  Now, the agent may at any point deviate from these constraints 
(intentionally or otherwise), but she may not deviate from the complete selection options group, 
unless she changes instrument or technique. 
 The idealized selection options group is coextensive with the set of all physically 
realizable pitches and all possible durations.  This set may be expressed in many ways.  For 
instance, one could simply give the Hertz (Hz) cycles (frequency) of the pitch indexed to a timed 
duration, such as eight seconds or two seconds.  Obviously, this is an infinite set, because the 
duration of a produced pitch could be infinitely long, and the sound waves, although severely 
limited by human audibility capacity (even non-human animal audibility) could be infinitely low 
or high, although there are frequencies which we cease to call sounds.  Practically, in Western 
music theory, the accepted range of pitches is the human audition range (called audio or sonic), 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
66 I am assuming the agent is using the Western Equal Temperament (ET) tempered system.  On 
the drawbacks of the exclusive use of the ET system that was more or less codified in the 
eighteenth century, see Ross W. Duffin, How Equal Temperament Ruined Harmony (and Why 
You Should Care) (New York: W. W. Norton, 2007).  Scholars have identified at least 150 
different temperament tuning systems in Western art music.  Of course, ET does not apply to 
many non-Western music systems.  The locus classicus is J. Murray Barbour, Tuning and 
Temperament: A Historical Survey, Dover Books on Music Series (n.d., n.p., 1951; reprint ed., 
New York: Dover, 2004). 
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which is approximately from 20 - 50 Hz (the lowest pipe organ sounds) to 20,000 - 30,000 Hz; 
while the accepted range of durations caps out at 128th notes.67 
 Selection is the process of choosing an output.  The output may be physically realized or 
produced sound, or a notation for a realizable sound, or both.  A single selection is actually an 
array of various factors as explicated in Pressing’s cognitive model.  In using the term 
“choosing,” or “choice,” again I make no commitment to a theory of free will.  This theory and 
taxonomy may remain neutral.  If free will is false, then the selection process will be a product of 
some set of causal laws.  Those causal laws will still have to operate within the taxonomy.  
Moreover, ideally a selection may be viewed as a choice of each discrete unit with relevant 
arrays, even though phenomenologically one may not be aware of all of the arrays.  A musical 
phrase or lick may be played wherein the agent chose to play the lick as a whole.  The entire 
phrase, then, which may consist of several pitches of different durations, dynamics, rhythms, and 
attacks, is the unit of selection—not each discrete pitch et cetera. 
 Following are the selection options sets for musical sound generation (although I include 
a few examples from other art forms). 
 
 Music is a subset of sound.  Musicians produce sounds.  Thus, the constraints will 
involve the production of sound and its properties.  The fundamental properties of sound are 
pitch (frequency), timbre, duration, rhythm, volume.  Properties of music which supervene on 
those of sound are harmony, melody, counterpoint, phrase, theme, large-scale 
structural/organizational properties (such as AABA forms), expressive properties, dynamics, 
time signature, beat, key, and mode. 
                                                         
67 Obviously, the actual time length of a 128th note will depend upon the meter and metronome 
or tempo marking. 
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Master Set (MS):  the idealized selection options group of all possible sound frequencies, all 
possible durations, all possible timbres, et cetera.  This set is infinite because it is not constrained 
by what is physically possible at a given location, time, and context.  The infinity mainly derives 
from the duration function.  Ideally, a pitch may be generated for an infinite amount of time.68 
 
 Agent centered constraints divide into constraints that are externally imposed and not 
chosen by the agent, and those that are internally imposed.  The latter may be deliberate or not.  
Agents are not always explicitly aware of these constraints.  To repeat:  this is an idealization. 
 
Human Master Set (HMS):  the set of selection options group of all sounds, timbres, and 
durations that humans are physically capable of auditing (including prosthetic hearing devices) 
and physically producing with or without devices.   It might be desirable to remove the audition 
qualification here because (say) a dog whistle could be included in a composition.  In such a 
case, for example, humans could “view” the sound on an oscilloscope.  (HMS) includes human 
species-wide physical limitations.  The human body has many kinds of limitations.  Perceptual 
systems are limited, our facility, dexterity, et cetera are limited by anatomy and motor 
functions/capacity.  Specifically, this results in the limits of hearing and seeing, singing and 
playing, and moving.  Other physical limitations obtain because of environments.  For example, 
gravity limits motion, weather and atmosphere limit sound production and perception. 
 
                                                         
68 The only physical assumption being made here is that the temporal dimension of the universe 
is infinite. 
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Occurrent Set (OS):  the set of the selection options available to the agent indexed to the 
instrument, abilities, time, place, genre, and all other constraints accepted by the agent at the time 
of production.  These include individual physical limitations.  Some humans have physical 
limitations not shared by the species as a whole.  For example, some humans cannot walk, or 
talk, or see colors.  For those that possess such limitations, their (OS) will be restricted and 
constrained accordingly. Some of the limitations of the OS will be deliberately chosen by the 
agent, and others will not.  Some of the constraints are merely a product of contingencies over 
which humans have no, or very little, control, such as some aspects of location, natural talents, 
some elements of social and cultural exposure, and the like.  
 
(MS), (HMS), and (OS) are always overarching.  They constrain and limit any other constraints 
and limitations that might be present.  These selection options sets are representations of 
possibilities. 
 Next are the (more or less) internally imposed constraints that agents adopt.  There are 
Macro- and Micro-level. 
 
Large-Scale (Macro) Form Constraints 
 Examples include composing a sonnet, haiku, sonata form, rondo, samba, bossa nova, 
Afro-Cuban, AABA, not using any words that contain the letter ‘e’.  All of these have structural 
or formal constraints, and some have content constraints. 
 
Micro-level:  Genre and Sub-Genre Constraints 
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 Genres and sub-genres have conventions.  Often, these conventions define the genre.  If 
one wants and intends to create an individual work that is a member of a genre kind, then one 
must obey constraints and conventions.  Examples include Film Noire, comedy, tragedy, opera 
buffo, blues, bebop, epic, pastoral, concerto, symphony, chamber music. 
   
Micro-form Constraints within constraint sets above: 
 Examples include being in the key of C, the meter of 3/4, using the Dorian mode, playing 
happy sounds only, and playing without expression.  Some examples of rules are as follows: 
 
play loudly 
play only c’ of any duration any rhythm you want 
play only eighth notes 
play in 3/4 waltz style 
play in the dorian mode 
play sounds expressive of sadness 
play in key of A Major 
hold any note for one minute 
play in a syncopated way 
play variations on X (melody) 
ornament the following basic theme T 
 
 Some of these are very vague, and I am not suggesting that these would be actual rules 
adopted (although the second one is close to Terry Riley’s famous piece In C).  It is not clear 
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what would count as success in keeping under the constraint.  But this is in part what criticism is 
about:  showing us how why an artist is successful or not given the constraints.  The critic will 
also make us aware of the constraints, though not using this taxonomy language. 
 Any number of these may be combined.  For example, a bebop jazz player playing a 
“standard” would be under the following constraints  (who and why these constraints are not 
important here):  harmonic constraints given by the chord changes and progression of the tune, 
tempo and meter constraint established by the musicians performing and kept by the rhythm 
section of the ensemble, key and scales, and modes associated with the harmonic structure, to 
some extent playing only certain rhythms and syncopations, and then something we may call the 
vocabulary of bebop or straight-ahead jazz. 
 Finally, operating under the above constraints, the final product—an improvisation—
results in the: 
 
Realized Set (RS):  the set of media with arrays actually chosen/selected by the agent and 
realized in a medium or notated in a medium (including an intentional mental states of 
remembering the selections). 
 
 There is a relationship between the selection group, the set of pitches, durations et cetera 
that  are produced thereby chosen or selected by the agent, and the various sets of selection 
options groups.  Rules may be formulated to represent these sets’ relations.  Here is an example 
of a rule: 
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Rule:  the physically realized selection group must always be smaller in number of selections 
than the number of elements in any of the selection options groups.  If a selection options set is 
infinite, then this rule is necessarily true because humans cannot carry out any action for an 
infinite amount of time (if infinite time is even intelligible).  If a selection options set is finite, 
then the only way it is possible for this rule to be false is if the physically realized selection 
group is equivalent to the idealized selection options set.  There would be a one-to-one 
correspondence between the selected sounds in the realized group and the idealized selection 
options set, but not necessarily in any particular order since these are sets and not ordered n-
tuples.  Here are examples of theorems upon which rules are derived: 
 
Theorem:  (HMS) is a subset of (MS); 
Theorem:  (OS) is a subset of (HMS) and of (MS); 
Theorem:  (RS) must always be a subset of all of the selection options groups (sets) (MS, HMS,  
  and OS); 
Theorem:  (RS) will always be a set of ordered n-tuples because it is a sound-sequence (and  
  abstractly, a sound-structure). 
 
The subset relation is determined by constraints.  For example, (HMS) is a subset of (MS) 
because there are things that humans cannot do. 
 What are the philosophical consequences of such a taxonomy?  First, this constraint 
based taxonomy provides additional evidence of the inherent vagueness of the boundaries 
between composition and improvising.  This is the case because composition operates under 
similar constraints.  Second, this taxonomy provides a fairly finely-grained system by which 
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improvisations can be classified.  Improvisations are classified according to a specification of the 
constraints under which.  This can be represented as structures, each element of the structure 
mapping onto idealized options sets and lower level constraint sets. 
 Now the important point for composing versus improvising is that these selection options 
sets are exactly the same for the composer in (SCC) and the improviser in (SCI).  The OS for 
composers will be in general broader than for an improviser because in composition one is not 
limited to an instrument one is playing.  But I would submit that composition is like make-
believedly69 being in a situation in which one is playing the instrument one is composing for at 
that specific time.  The (MusPen) case establishes that in principle there is no difference between 
playing the sound, as in (SCI), and inscribing it, as in (SCC).  Furthermore, from a 
phenomenological point of view, composers often experience their composing for various 
instruments in this way, although this is not always possible because composers usually cannot 
play (at least competently) all of the instruments for which they compose.  Even if the composer 
cannot play a particular instrument, the composer’s familiarity with the way the instrument 
sounds would allow the composer to “hear” the composed lines in the composer’s mind’s ear.  
The fact that ideally both action-types have available to them the same resources is another piece 
of evidence in favor of a shared fundamental state.  This fundamental state is best interpreted as 
selection because that is essentially what one does when one composes or improvises. 
 Both composing and improvising involve the same fundamental cognitive and motor 
states:  selection.  The motor components will be different depending on the instrument, notation 
device, et cetera.  Selection gives rise to both action-types; selection is a necessary condition for 
both action-types.  In music, the composer and improviser select pitches, durations, rhythms, 
                                                         
69 I borrow this term from Kendall Walton, Mimesis and Make-Believe: On the Foundations of 
the Representational Arts (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993). 
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timbres et cetera under constraints (as those discussed in the taxonomy section) from a set of 
possible options (which are also formed by constraints).  One cannot imagine cases of 
composition or improvisation that do not involve some form of selection.  On the other hand, 
selection is also involved in many action-types (and their tokens).  One might say that all 
deliberative actions involve selection in the sense that the agent decides, chooses, that is, selects 
an appropriate action from a set of possibilities.  Artistic selection differs from the selection that 
occurs in other action-types by its goals (aesthetic) and vehicle or media (paint, marble, words), 
and motor components (e.g., depressing keys on a keyboard). 
 
 
2.1.4 Philosophical Models 
 
 Nicholas Wolterstorff has argued for a strong and categorical distinction between 
composing and improvising.  This distinction results from his formidable account of what 
constitutes a musical work.  Wolterstorff says, 
 
A corollary to this understanding of the nature of composing is that to improvise is not to 
compose.  That corollary is clearly correct.  Suppose that someone has improvised on the 
organ.  And suppose that he then goes home and scores a work of such a sort that his 
improvisation, judged by the requirements for correctness specified in the score, is at all 
points correct.  In spite of that, the composer did not compose his work in performing his 
improvisation.  In all likelihood, he did not even compose it while improvising.  For in all 
likelihood, he did not, during his improvising, finish selecting that particular set of 
requirements for correctness of occurrence to be found in the score.  Suppose, for 
example, that at a certain point in his improvisation he introduced a bit of rubato, with 
full consciousness of doing so.  In so doing he has not yet decided whether to select 
rubato at that point as required for correctness of occurrence.  One cannot uniquely 
extract a work from a performance.70 
                                                         
70 Nicholas Wolterstorff, Works and Worlds of Art, Clarendon Library of Logic and Philosophy 
(New York: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press, 1980), 64. 
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Wolterstorff here reveals that a necessary condition for composing is that the composer must 
select “that particular set of requirements for correctness of occurrence to be found in the score.”  
There are two, not mutually exclusive, meanings possible here.  First, it could mean the 
implausible condition that something is composed only when written down, or inscribed 
somewhere.  I derive this from the “score” part of the phrase.  There is no a priori reason to 
exclude scoring without inscription from the process of composing.  The way scores are written 
is an historical accident; the process could have been quite different (as I shall point out in 2.3 
below).  In short, composing by writing physical inscriptions of notation on manuscript paper is 
a historically contingent practice.  People can “score” mentally, so to speak, it is in their heads, 
and they remember it.  In addition, there are new computer technologies that score and 
orchestrate from inputs from various devices and instruments as in (MusPen) and (NotDev).  
This meaning should be rejected. 
 Second, Wolterstorff makes selecting features central to composing.  I take “selecting” 
and “selection” to be a form of choosing and deciding.  So, the composer makes decisions about 
what features shall be included (and sometimes excluded too); and in making decisions, the 
composer decides, sometimes by considering a set of alternatives, sometimes a bit more 
impetuously by just accepting what has impinged his mind as agreeable enough not to warrant 
considerations of other alternatives.  But even if the composer did not consciously select from a 
set of alternatives (half-intentional), this is the best logical and cognitive reconstruction of what 
occurs (as shown above), and as was indicated the process can be below conscious awareness.  
For example, if I sit down in the seat to the left, I could have sit in the seat to the right, even if I 
never considered it.  The fact that there are two alternatives makes this the case.  Deciding is a 
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part of deliberating, and decisions, because logically tied to deciding, are deliberate.  Now, to 
recall J. L. Austin,71 just because some act was spontaneous does not mean that the act was not 
deliberate.  Austin says, “If I acted not even on impulse, but quite spontaneously (rather, tricky, 
this), and so even more evidently not deliberately, it is at least plausible to say that I still acted 
intentionally (cf. Sir Walter Raleigh).  Again, a man put unto agony of mind and fearful 
indecision by some crisis may adopt some course such as running back into the blaze.  No doubt 
he runs back into the blaze intentionally enough; he even (perhaps) decides to run back—though 
of course this is not necessary for him to do so ‘intentionally.’  But I think it might well be 
agreed he did not do so deliberately.”72  This does not mean that all spontaneous actions are 
deliberate; spontaneous actions, including improvisations, can be deliberate.  Therefore, because 
Wolterstorff makes selecting a necessary condition for composing, and makes this a basis for 
distinguishing between composing and improvising, either (1) selecting in his sense is not a 
necessary condition for composing; or (2) selecting is not the condition which distinguishes 
composing from improvising; or (3), more radically, if Wolterstorff’s account of composing is 
correct, then there is no categorical difference between composing and improvising (or it is a 
matter of subtle degree, not categorical).  Unfortunately, in his brief consideration of 
improvising, Wolterstorff does not discuss any other differences which might distinguish the two 
action-types. 
 If one counts the aleatory works, as discussed in Part I, as compositions and composing, 
then selection must be interpreted more loosely than how Wolterstorff uses it here.  The selection 
                                                         
71 John Austin, “Three Ways of Spilling Ink,” in Philosophical Papers, Third Edition, eds. J. O. 
Urmson and G. J. Warnock (New York: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press, 1961, 1970, 
1979), 277. 
72 Ibid., 277. 
  
198 
in aleatory compositions is not setting down requirements for correctness because in many cases 
there is no repeatable “correct” instantiation of the instructions.  Moreover, the selection itself 
sets up the conditions for the performed work, but radically underdetermines what will be 
instantiated.  I am inclined to say that (1) is false because a broader conception of selection is 
needed.  A broader conception of selection is a necessary condition for composing.  Consider 
Yasunao Tone as an example.  I think there is selection but it is not in the way Wolterstorff 
intends.  The compositional process used by Tone is as follows (for the relevant works that 
concern me here, which are Solo for Wounded CD and Musica Iconologos).  Tone converts 
photographic images of Chinese/Japanese characters into sound files via a software program.  
Essentially this amounts to digitally encoding the images (if they are not already in digital 
format) and then converting that encoding into digital sound encoding.  One could do this by 
making the image information map onto random bytes to form a sound file73, or use some 
algorithmic process, which would map image encoding to some sound encoding.  Now, the 
software used for this conversion could be programmed such that tonal sound sequences would 
result, but Tone does not do that.  He lets stand whatever results from the encoding.  Then Tone 
burns this digital encoding onto a CD-R or the like.  The compact disc is then “prepared” to 
override the error correction function on a CD player.  The result is more or less random bursts 
of sound—noise.  This playback is then recorded on another medium (could be another CD-R).  
So, the final recording is a documentation of the “wounded” CD playback.  If this is done 
repeatedly, the result of the playback will never be the same because the error correction override 
                                                         
73 Notwithstanding that, one would have to specify whether it was 8 bit or 16 bit, and the 
sampling rate, et cetera. 
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will almost always produce a different noise burst.74  These playbacks may be considered 
performance tokens of the compositional process.  So, what is the work?  The work may reside 
in the instructions of the generative procedures that give rise to the sound sequences.  But there is 
no selection of “that particular set of requirements for correctness of occurrence to be found in 
the score.” 
 Furthermore, one can extract a unique work from a performance.  Consider (MusPen) in 
which a performance takes place, and a notated composition.  Granted (MusPen) is far from 
(SCC), but what matters for a theory of composing and improvising are not just standard cases 
but logical possibilities.  We do not want a theory to be limited by historical contingencies.  
Also, Wolterstorff here begs the question because he is already assuming that performances 
themselves cannot be works.  Later I will argue that performances can be works.  If 
performances are sometimes works or can be works, then why not allow performances 
themselves be the compositional process?  One can decide that no changes will be made to what 
the performance specified.  Of course (MusPen) can have the following consequence.  Why not 
allow revision and editing in the (MusPen) case.  This would be part of the performance, but this 
would not be allowed because the inscription process would not halt and then it would take 
additional notation to indicate whether the parts that are putative edits and revisions should not 
become part of the work proper, meaning that they would not be requirements for correctness for 
future performances or instantiations.  From what Wolterstorff says here, he would be most 
concerned in the (Ind-1) case with the different intentional states in performing the (composed) 
sound sequence, improvising the sound sequence, and composing the sound-sequence.  The one 
that would matter here is between the composer’s intentional states and the improviser’s 
                                                         
74 In addition, if the conversion program contained a random element, the image to sound 
encoding could also be different every time a new conversion takes place. 
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intentional states.  The composer intends to set down requirements for correctness, whereas the 
improviser does not.  It should be noted that although it is not standard, improvisers can intend 
by their improvising to set down requirements for correctness—this is logically possible and 
there are actual cases of this. 
 In addition, Wolterstorff does not give us any reason to rule out the following possibility.  
Suppose our improvising organist decided before his performance to accept whatever features 
and notes et cetera that he happens to perform (and decide on) as the particular set of 
requirements for correctness of occurrence for his later scoring (inscribing) of his “composition.”  
Here the performer has made a selection of criteria, albeit a general one, and thereby meets 
Wolterstorff’s condition.  In fact, there have been many compositions “composed” in this 
manner.  Although what our improvising organist does may be indicative of compositional 
practice for the most part, calling this kind of activity “pre-composition” is begging the question.  
Often, such improvisation may be function as pre-composition, but such improvisation can be, 
and in some cases is, composition tout court. 
 An objection to my account of selecting here is that there are two (putatively different) 
intentional states, and thus possibly two different actions (or action-types) taking place.  One is 
selecting with a score or “composition” in mind, which will be used for subsequent performances 
of the “work,” while the other admittedly qualifies as selecting but is not directed toward 
composition or subsequent performances or whatever.  But this just shows that Austin is right:  
for the difference here is that there is selecting in both cases but in each case the purposes of 
selecting are different, but both are in fact deliberate and on purpose, or purposeful.  Wolterstorff 
does not say much about purpose explicitly, but implicitly the notion of requirement for 
correctness which he does use in some sense entails future instantiations.  But one can have 
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criteria (requirements) of correctness of occurrence without there ever being an occurrence.  
What does this mean for my objection to Wolterstorff?  
 The answer, I think, is that (2) and (3) are correct, because the difference between the 
selection of composition and improvisation is a matter of degree.  With regard to (2), for 
example, one might say that selecting occurs in both composing (obviously) and improvising, 
but more features are typically selected for prescription in composing than in improvising.  This 
continuum between composing and improvising is what needs to be reflected in a philosophical 
understanding of the relationship between the two action-types.  Consequently, we need an 
accurate philosophical model. 
 Next, I consider some alternatives for such models.  Each model has its advantages and 
disadvantages.  My evaluation of the models is based upon intuitions we have when considering 
the cases and thought experiments above (and others), the cognitive models, and our ordinary, 
informed understanding of composition and improvisation.  I say “informed” understanding 
because many people’s conceptions of these action-types derives from what I call mythical 
anecdotes and stories of these processes, and the fact that many people have no direct experience 
of either composing or improvising in the formal sense.75  However, one of my contentions is 
that a lot of what people do and have done in particular circumstances should count as 
composition and improvisation.  Doodling is improvisation.  Playing around on a piano more or 
less randomly is a form of improvisation.  Writing an essay or poem is composition; making up a 
simple tune for a child to play during music lessons is composition.  Which model or theory is 
correct? 
                                                         
75 Without intending to be arrogant or condescending, I want to point out that many 
characterizations of performing, composing, and especially improvising in the philosophical 
aesthetics literature are naïve, and consequently inaccurate.  Aestheticians with backgrounds in 
music performance (not just musicology and history) tend to have more accurate descriptions. 
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 Now I will introduce the linear model.  Following is a diagram of (LM). 
 
                                                                     ------------------- 
                  t0                                           tn      
 
The line should be interpreted geometrically, and represents the flow of time or temporal 
coordinates.  Reading from left to right, improvising is the first, solid part of the line, and the 
dotted continuation line represents composing.  The linear model captures the notion that all 
artistic production (creation as selection) begins as improvisation.  The difference between 
moving from the solid to the dotted part of the line is a function of time.  The element that causes 
a different description of the action in time is when the agent decides to revise or edit what has 
been selected at previous points of the line.  So there will be changes from solid to dotted lines 
throughout the process.  It makes no difference whether the process is interrupted or not; 
although, significant amounts of interrupted time will favor composition because it is odd to 
think of an improvisation that would go on hiatus too many times, or is interrupted for long 
periods of time.  The individuation of different action-tokens of a single action-type event may 
be determined by a chunk of time, as in duration, specific date and time, or by product.  So the 
length of a jam session or concert, or the Beethoven’s Third Symphony could be ways of 
individuating action-tokens.  (LM) may be interpreted as being a sub-diagram of a more general 
radial model.  Thus: 
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The linear model line is a representation of each line “radiating” from the central bubble.  Lines 
represent an action.  Some lines will be improvising, and some will be composing.  The central 
bubble is a representation of the fundamental property composing and improvising share. 
 Even though I did not conceive of this model from these sources, the Continuum Model 
(CM) has been hinted at, albeit non-philosophically, by musicologists.  For example, Arnold 
Whittal says, “As is often the case with categorizations in music, however, absolute distinctions 
between improvisation and non-improvisatory activities cannot be sustained.”76  Bruno Nettl, 
one of the few scholars (an ethnomusicologist) to study improvisation seriously before the 1990s, 
comes close to expressing the (CM) model in this passage: 
 
Improvisation and composition are frequently regarded as completely separate processes, 
but they may also be viewed as two forms of the same kind of thing (Nettl 1974b).  The 
                                                         
76 Arnold Whittal, The Oxford Companion to Music, 604. 
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phenomenally quick though by no means careless composition of a sonata by Schubert 
may well be related to the rapid combination and rearrangement of materials in an Indian 
improvisation, and the fact that Schubert used paper and pencil may in some respects be 
incidental.  On the other hand, the gigantic labor involved in the careful composition of a 
symphony, with the use of sketches and planning diagrams, has just a bit in common with 
the technique of the Yahoi Indian composer who, within the strictest possible limits, 
nevertheless finds a large number of ways of relating to each other two short phrases that 
make up a song.  For that matter, the many readings of a Beethoven sonata by a Horowitz 
are comparable to the twenty different ways in which an Arabic musician may render 
maqam in the taqsim form in the period of a year, or of his life.  It may be rewarding to 
consider improvisation and composition in essence, if not in specific nature, as aspects of 
the same process.  The extreme forms of both appear at opposite ends of a continuum.  
The one relies on speed, quick decision-making, and risk-taking in public, in front of an 
audience that wants to see the musician deal with his issues immediately.  The other is 
characterized by laborious processes and the careful, thoughtful solution of complex 
problems.77 
 
In addition, D. Gary Miller in a section called “Improvised/Non-improvised:  Typology of Oral 
Poetry,” develops a continuum model for oral epic poetry:  “The above examples suggest a 
continuum of relative fluidity ranging from completely fixed to completely free, with most oral 
traditions somewhere in between [sic], the degree being contingent primarily on social 
assumptions and the function/content of the text …”78  Miller then says that the distinction in the 
oral/written debates of ancient epic poetry, especially Homer, is not really about whether the 
texts were oral first then written down, but about the improvised/non-improvised distinction.  
Miller’s “typology” is drawn thus: 
 
   non-improvised    improvised 
  Stable |--------------------|-----------------|  Fluid 
 
                                                         
77 Bruno Nettl, The Study of Ethnomusicology: Twenty-nine Issues and Concepts (Urbana, IL: 
University of Illinois Press, 1983), 28-29. 
78 D. Gary Miller, Improvisation, Typology, Culture, and ‘The New Orthodoxy:’ How ‘Oral’ is 
Homer? (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1982), 14. 
  
205 
The Continuum Model says that composing and improvising are actions that inhabit a point or 
points on a continuum or spectrum.  So a finite, geometric line with an infinite number of points 
between two set end points will represent this model.  The upshot here is that there will be (or 
are) cases in which it will be difficult or impossible to determine whether an activity should 
count as composing or improvising.  This may turn out to be a desirable consequence because 
given what we know about human action there may be no fact of the matter with respect to 
classification in a conceptual scheme that assumes these distinctions.  There will be middle, grey 
area; but the location of a particular selection action being nearer one end point (either 
composing or improvising) could be used for classification purposes (with a “more or less” 
attached).  For example, if an action is not at the end point of composition, but near it, it would 
count as composition and less as improvisation (and vice versa).  The advantage of (CM) is that 
there seems to be cases where it is legitimately difficult to determine whether the artistic agent is 
purely improvising or purely composing (assuming we know what that means).  Furthermore, 
even when considering (SCI) and (SCC), there are ambiguities.  For example, one cannot rely 
solely on produced content to determine whether something was improvised or composed, as 
(IND-1) demonstrates.  Imagine an audience being present while Bach or Beethoven was 
“composing.”  One can easily imagine a case of a musician improvising (even with an audience) 
in order to create a prescriptive work.  This method may seem unorthodox but it is not too far 
from what we know about Bach and other composers.  In the case of Bach we definitely know 
certain works were directly derived from performed improvisations.79  David Schulenberg 
writes, “What Bach and other keyboard players of his day actually did in fulfilling their 
professional obligations involved a great deal of improvisation:  the realization of figured-bass 
                                                         
79 For example, the three part ricercar from the Musical Offering by Bach we know originated in 
an improvisation. 
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accompaniments, the performance of preludes during a church service, and so forth.  Written-out 
solo pieces were employed principally for teaching and study …”80  Improvisation was central to 
ordinary musical practices during Bach’s time period, and this practice grounded what we now 
call composition.  Peter Kivy writes, “We know, furthermore, both from anecdote and from 
fairly trivial inference, that a lot of the composer-performer’s musical compositions must contain 
material that had its origin in improvisational performance, thus, of course, further collapsing the 
composer-performer distinction.”81  Here Kivy does not go far enough.  It should also be a trivial 
inference upon reflection of what composition is that improvisation is often the first stage of 
composing:  new musical thoughts and expressions arise from somewhere, but in the same way 
as they do when improvising.  The problem here is that Kivy, like so many others, necessarily 
associates improvisation with performance.  Performing is in front of an audience.  If one is 
sitting in front of the piano with manuscript paper and pencil, and trying things out on piano and 
writing down the ones that sound good, one is improvising and them writing down.  Why restrict 
improvisation in such a narrow way?  Simply, it is inaccurate to think improvisation necessarily 
involves an audience and performing.  Therefore, Kivy is correct is correct that the composer-
performer distinction collapses, but the composer-improviser distinction also collapses. 
 The current classical music culture does not appreciate this history, or if it does, then it 
rejects it.  Classical performance music practice has reified these distinctions as if they were 
historically always the case.  Reasons for this phenomenon, although beyond the scope of this 
project, should be investigated.  Some have speculated about it.  Some lament this situation.  
Presently, Robert Levin, an extraordinary pianist, improvises.  Levin expresses his wish in liner 
                                                         
80 David Schulenberg, “Composition and Improvisation in the School of J.S. Bach,” in Bach 
Perspectives, Volume 1 (Lincoln, NB: University of Nebraska Press, 1995), 2. 
81 Peter Kivy, Authenticities: Philosophical Reflections on Musical Performance (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1995), 164-165. 
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notes to his own recording of Mozart piano concertos:  “When improvisation regains its former 
position at the center of Classical music-making, perhaps the gap between composer and 
performer, between old and new music, between vernacular and art music, and between Classical 
performer and audience will narrow.”82 
Improvisations may become, or part of, a composition.  But compositions can be parts of 
improvisations in only limited fashion.  For example, in an (SCI) case, playing a quotation from 
a famous composition should count as improvised because the particular placement in the 
temporal order of playing, in addition to the harmonic implications (inter alia) are creative and 
novel.  In addition, its placement in the temporal order of the sound sequence would not be 
prepared beforehand.  Hence we have a slippery slope.  Suppose the musician planned when to 
play the composition quotation before the putative improvised performance.  This, then, would 
not be improvised.  Both the content of the placement and the temporal ordering would be 
planned—that is too much planning to be categorized as improvised.  In addition, I rule out cases 
in which a performer plays a previously improvised sound sequence.  This case demonstrates 
that improvisations may be prescriptive, but the reproducing of the sound sequence is not an 
improvisation.  Initially, the sound sequence was improvised; thereafter, it is the performance of 
an improvisational work (sound structure). 
 (CM) handles some difficult cases very well, but it also does not capture some 
fundamental intuitions we have about composing and improvising.  (CM) seems to be correct for 
the Quick Muse case (mentioned in Part I).  Quick Muse is an online poetry “competition” in 
which two poets are given a quotation as a theme to compose (read:  write) a poem.  This is the 
                                                         
82 Robert Levin, “A Note on Performance and Improvisation,” liner notes to Wolfgang Amadeus 
Mozart, Piano Concertos No. 17 K.453 and No. 20 K.466, Robert Levin fortepiano and 
conducted by Christopher Hogwood, The Academy of Ancient Music (L’Oiseau-Lyre 455-607-
2-OH, 1997), 7. 
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only constraint imposed on them, except the time limit and the actual time of the competition.  
Thus, the poets may write in any poetic form they choose:  sonnet, rhyme or no rhyme, free 
verse, meter et cetera.  The poets have fifteen minutes to write the poem, and every action of the 
keyboard is “recorded” in real-time.  Consequently, one may view the composition process itself:  
deletions, amendments, delays, et cetera.  There are many things to discuss about this kind of 
case, but here I want to address the issue of whether the poets are improvising or not.  It certainly 
is not the standard case of writing (or creating) a poem.  It seems that this case has elements of 
composing and improvising.  The poets may revise and edit within the time limit, but this 
constraint forces poets to write more spontaneously, to extemporize.  What is one to do with such 
a case?  Having a continuum allows one to locate such a case on the line in the grey area, and 
with changing constraints one can move the point more or less towards one end point of the line. 
 On the other hand, (CM) does not capture some features of improvising we might think 
are necessary.  For example, that improvising must be a performance event (token) distinguishes 
(SCI) from (SCC).  On (CM), this kind of necessary condition would be available only for the 
end point “improvisation;” the grey area section of the line could not make a categorical 
distinction in this way.  Here the salient features of composing and improvising are slippery, 
which is desirable with respect to temporal dimensions of the creative act or acts, the amount and 
nature of preparation and planning, and the amount of editing and revision. 
 The linear model captures the initial stages of composition and improvisation as the 
same, viz., selection, but has the unfortunate consequence of calling all initial selection 
improvisation.  (CM) captures the vagueness of composing versus improvising, but does not 
indicate the fundamental property both actions share.  This is the case because an action located 
at either end point, definitely composing or definitely improvising, would not reflect sameness of 
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process in the initial stages.  This is undesirable, as I will show when I discuss the third model:  
Genus-Species. 
 The genus may be called creation or selection.  There are two ways to create art (I am 
eschewing the term “work of art” for the time being).  Creating art is essentially a process in 
which an agent makes choices with respect to materials and how to put together or manipulate 
those materials.  One creates relationships between elements of the materials.  In painting, 
sculpture, and other plastic arts, this is obvious.  In music, the material is sound production 
devices, sounds, and sonic properties. 
 Typically, the genus-species relation would look like this: 
 
 
 
However, the genus-species relationship between composition and improvisation may need to be 
modified.  This modification reflects the claim that in a fundamental sense improvisation is prior 
to composition.  The diagram then needs to reflect that improvisation is the first step in 
composition in the sense of the production of original ideas, or the initial production of an idea, 
Genus
Creation/Selection
Species
Composition
Species
Improvisation
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but that composition also involves non-improvised determination or selection.  An example of 
the latter would the case of an agent (artist, composer) who after marking down initial “ideas,” 
proceeds to change them or put them together.  Here the basic artistic content is present already, 
not created in the initial sense, but is rearranged.  This still counts as composition and does is 
best not considered editing or revising because editing/revision requires at least an intermediary 
finished sequence of manipulation, which is then altered, deleted, or amended.  I define editing 
and revision as the altering, deletion, or amendment of content or form.  That feature is an 
important phase of composition.  As a result, the proper diagram might look like this: 
 
 
 
Consequently, the creation-improvisation-composition relationship is not a strict genus-species 
relation (at least not in the traditional sense).  The advantage of this model is that it reflects some 
historical facts about the relation between improvisation and composition (as distinct activities) 
in the Western musical tradition.  From the late eighteenth century onwards, composition, like 
writing, has been privileged.  This results in seeing improvisation as parasitic on composition.  
Creation/Selection
Improvisation
Composition
Improvisation
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Roger Scruton, for example, says that “The jazz performer is, in a sense, also a composer, or one 
part of a corporate composer.  But to describe free improvisation in that way is to assume that 
composition is the paradigm case, and improvisation secondary.  It would be truer to the history 
of music, and truer to our deeper musical instincts, to see things the other way round:  to see 
composition as born from the writing-down of music, and from the subsequent transformation of 
the scribe from recorder to creator of the thing he writes.  Jacques Derrida has famously 
criticized Western civilization as ‘logocentric’—privileging speech over writing, as the purveyor 
of human intention.  The criticism is the opposite of the truth:  writing has been so privileged by 
our civilization, in religion, law, and politics, as well as in art and literature, that we tend to lose 
sight of the fact that written signs owe their life to the thing which is written down.”83  Now I 
think Scruton is being too simplistic about the relationship between speaking and writing and the 
contents that either can generate, but the point is that there had to be musical ideas 
communicated first otherwise there would be nothing to record, notate, and write down.  It is 
also important to note two different questions here.  First, there is an historical or anthropological 
question about which generative practice came first.  Scruton seems to be addressing that 
question.  Second, there is a theoretical question about the two action-types and their relation. 
 The reason why the above model of (G-S) is problematic is that it seems to equate 
creativity with improvisation.  But we already have a state that accounts for the productive 
capacity of the creative process, and that is selection.  So, we should let selection do its work and 
reject this enhanced (G-S) model. 
 The correct elements of (G-S) and (CM) need to be combined.  Thus, the selection 
mechanism, which underlies both composing and improvising, needs to be understood as having 
                                                         
83 Roger Scruton, The Aesthetics of Music (New York: Oxford University Press, Clarendon 
Press, 1997), 439.  Footnote deleted from quotation. 
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a potential infinite number of dotted lines emanating from basic selection to a point in the 
continuum line lying between the two end points—composing at one end point, improvisation on 
the other.  Thus: 
 
improvising |----------------------------------------------------------------------| composing 
 
 
 In one common definition of improvisation, that it is “composing in the course of 
performance,”84 there is a potential implication that improvising is a species of composing.  
Philip Alperson seems to champion this view.  But this idea is faulty because it fails to see that 
the way in which improvising is like composing is in the fact that both action-types share the 
same process but do so in a different manner, which Lee Brown calls “modal” considerations.85  
According to my account, the issue of whether composing is a species of improvisation, or 
improvisation is a species of composition, is a nonsensical question because both practices share 
a fundamental process called selection.  Selecting is where the agency is.  Selecting itself is 
neither composition nor improvisation.  Of course, selection by actual human agents always 
occurs in either composing or improvising, or in the continuum between them.  Consequently, to 
posit a process called selection is a theoretical construct, an abstraction. 
 The distinction between composing and improvising is one of degree.  There is a 
spectrum or continuum of actions having improvisation to one side and composition on the other.  
Whether any one action lies categorically to one side with a firm degree of confidence is yet to 
be seen. So, my view is that the composition-improvisation distinction is not hard and fast but a 
                                                         
84 Thus, the title of the Bruno Nettl and Melissa Russell volume:  In the Course of Performance. 
85 Brown, “Musical Works, Improvisation, and the Principle of Continuity,” 353. 
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continuum or spectrum.  Consequently, it is vague.  This does not mean that the metaphysics of 
the work must be vague too.  What I will do in the work section is build the theory based upon 
those actions that are on the end of the spectrum, the ones we know, or think at least more 
probable, are improvisation. 
 If both composition and improvisation involve selection as their base cognitive/motor 
constituent or process, then one may wonder why we should have two action-types.  Why not 
consider an adverbial theory of composition and improvisation.  This would involve linguistic 
revisionism, but I do not think that that is a knock-down argument against such a theory—
linguistic revision is sometimes warranted.  Artists select compositionally86 or improvisedly.  In 
this case the artist is fundamentally doing the same thing, viz., selecting, but there are two ways 
in which it may achieved.  This is similar to the analysis of many other action-types (verbs), such 
as running and running quickly.  I reject this view because the linear model is wrong, and 
because there is a disanalogy with other verbs.  Even though I could begin composing and then 
improvise, and vice versa, in performances this cannot be the case.  One has already composed 
and now it is being played, instantiated, performed.  In addition, there are enough differences 
that obtain in most cases between composing and improvising to preclude an adverbial theory. 
 
2.2 Properties 
 
When a jazz master improvises, perhaps the most impressive aspect of the performance is 
its appearance of impromptu perfection.  Although improvised, the performance has no 
mistake, false step, or deficiency.  It looks inevitable, as if it could have been done in no 
other way, as if every stage were known to the performer from the beginning. 
                                                         
86 “Composedly” already exists as an adverb with a very different meaning.  “Compositionally” 
exists, too, but sounds closer to the intended meaning here. 
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     Paradoxically, we know that if the same jazz master performed the improvisation 
again, it would be entirely different, but it would still appear as if it could have been done 
in no other way, as if it were inevitable.87 
— Francis-Noël Thomas and Mark Turner, Clear and Simple as the Truth: Writing Classic Prose 
 There are both metaphysical and evaluative issues with respect to the following 
properties:  improvised/having been improvised, improvisatory (character)/as if it was 
improvised/sounds or looks improvised.  "Improvised" can pick out a certain action-type or it 
can be used as an aesthetic property—but saying something is improvised or improvisatory as an 
aesthetic property does not necessarily entail anything about value.  Sounding or looking or 
otherwise seeming improvised is often called “improvisatory” or “as if improvised.”  I would 
like to discuss this property from a metaphysical point of view and bracket the evaluative issues.  
Since “improvised” and “composed” are genetic properties, not much discussion is required here 
because it has been addressed in the action theory section above.  Medium specificity becomes 
process/generative specificity:  certain kinds of content and/or attributes are better suited to one 
generative process rather than another.  I am studying two generative processes, composition and 
improvisation.  Performance is not a generative process because any performance will be either 
of a composition or an improvisation. 
 It is clear that there is a property of performances, and perhaps of other objects and 
events, that one may call “improvised.”  This is meant in the sense that these performances meet 
the following criterion:  if the performance was in fact improvised by the performer, then the 
performance has the property of having been improvised.  Hence, this is a genetic property:  the 
property is about the origin, or generative/productive process, of the object to which it is being 
ascribed.  A performance may be an instantiation of this property, a bearer of this property, or 
                                                         
87 Francis-Noël Thomas and Mark Turner, Clear and Simple as the Truth: Writing Classic Prose 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 37.  (This book is now in a second edition, 2011.) 
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possess this property.  In addition to performances in music, dance, and theatre, literary works 
and paintings could also be described as improvisatory.  If an artist can improvise in a particular 
art form, then there is the potential for an object in that art form to be described as improvised.  I 
will bracket the question of what kinds of thing can be bearers of such properties and just refer to 
performances and improvisations themselves, since it is clear that they are probably the best 
examples of such bearers. 
 It would seem that if this is the case with improvisation, then so it is with composition.  If 
a sound sequence (or sound occurrence) has been composed (action-type), then it has the genetic 
property of having been composed. 
 Can we make a distinction between the properties is/was improvised and sounds 
improvised?  Sounding improvised is not a necessary property of performances that are in fact 
improvised, because a performance may be improvised and not sound improvised (whatever that 
means for the moment).  On the other hand, a performance could be of a composition but still 
sound improvised.  One may want to say:  if a performance sounds improvised to the listeners, 
then it has the property of sounding improvised.  Consequently, sounding improvised is a 
perceptual property to some extent.  In other words, the perception of listeners and their 
recognition completely determines the truth-conditions of the property ascription.  This does not, 
however, entail that no background knowledge is required for ascription.  One could not properly 
ascribe a performance as sounding improvised if one has not listened to it, and if one has not 
engaged with improvised (genetic sense) and composed works in the past.  The problem for such 
an account of this property is whether consensus, or even something less than consensus, could 
ever be achieved with respect to various performances.  Perhaps this is an empirical question.  
Since the truth-conditions, on this account, not only include direct perception but recognition 
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under a description, the perceiver would also require certain background knowledge for 
ascription.  This would mean that sounding improvised would also be an artistic property.  There 
are at least two kinds of properties that are relevant to aesthetic understanding:  aesthetic 
properties and artistic properties.  Aesthetic properties are more or less perceptual, and require 
little or no background knowledge about art history and the like for successful ascription.  
Artistic properties require background knowledge, sometimes a lot of it, for ascription.88 
 Where do the conditions, contexts, and instances from which we think we can say things 
like sounds improvised, whether or not we know in fact that it was improvised, derive?  There 
must be experiences from which we derive our judgments about sounding or seeming 
improvised?  Could it simply be the set of performances to which we were exposed in our 
personal histories? 
 Consequently, there is an epistemic requirement for the successful ascription of 
improvisatory and as if improvised.  It might be too much to require that one have experiences of 
both composed and improvised works in a particular art form.  Probably, it is sufficient that one 
have experiences of improvised works in some art forms.  If one did not have some experience 
with improvisations, then it seems unlikely that one would be able to recognize the properties on 
which improvisatory supervenes.  This supposes that there are properties of improvisations that 
can be detected by audiences.  So what are these features?  What does it mean to sound 
improvised or spontaneous?  Is sounding improvised and spontaneous the same thing?  My 
hunch is that what listeners (or viewers) are tracking are various attributes that are related 
through a family resemblance structure.  So, there will be attributes of improvisations that are 
                                                         
88 The distinction between aesthetic and artistic properties is discussed in detail below in 2.3. 
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sometimes attributes of compositions, and there are no necessary attributes, those that are always 
present when a work sounds improvised. 
 A WOA may seem improvisational, even if it is scripted, if it has a feel of spontaneity to 
it.  According to Gena Rowlands (in a broadcast interview with Charlie Rose), John Cassavetes’ 
films were mostly scripted except for his first (Shadows), which was improvised.  So what most 
people are seeing in his films is the property of looking improvised not being improvised.  
Having been improvised is a factual property that picks out a genetic feature of a work.  This 
property, therefore, is contingent upon the definition of the action-type “improvising.”  Whereas 
sounding or looking improvised is a perceptual property that picks out features of a work, 
whether or not it was in fact improvised. 
 John Rockwell in the New York Times, for example, used the term as an aesthetic 
property but not a genetic one in a recent review of Yushiko Chuma’s Sundown, a music and 
dance piece.  Rockwell writes, “A lot of the performance, especially outdoors, looked a little 
inconclusive and scattershot, with an improvisatory feeling, however carefully planned.”89  In 
this context, it seems Rockwell is using it in a somewhat negative sense because “improvisatory” 
occurs in the sentence with “inconclusive” and “scattershot.”  But I can also see that 
“inconclusive” and “scattershot” may be positive attributes of WOAs, and thereby contribute to 
the WOA’s aesthetic value.  On the other hand, one may interpret this sentence to mean that the 
improvisatory feel accounts for or explains the inconclusiveness and scattershot quality, in which 
case “improvisatory” could be value-neutral.  Nonetheless, this is good example, demonstrating 
that such a property is used, and of how such a property is used, in practice, in criticism. 
                                                         
89 John Rockwell, “Improvisatory Caper Beguiles Even before Setting of the Sun,” Dance 
Review, The Arts, The New York Times (July 31, 2006): E5. 
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 Usually, an audience member will know whether the performance she is going to 
experience is a performance of a composition or an improvisation, and sometimes there is a 
mixture of these, and perhaps even in the mixture a person would not be able to tell which part 
was improvised and which not improvised.  This often happens in the case of watching 
television, theatre, or films.  Did the actor ad lib that?  Or was that written in the script?  
Answers to these questions may not be forthcoming from just direct experience of the 
performance.  Answers would require information typically outside the normal conditions an 
audience member finds herself.  Consequently, the determination of whether a particular 
sequence was composed/scripted or improvised is a matter of one’s epistemic position.  
Members of the cast and crew, presumably, would know the status of sequences.  Even in cases 
where an audience member possesses the score or script, it might be impossible to determine 
improvisation or not.  A change from the script (or a version of the script) could have been made 
during rehearsals, or at least prior to performances.  In that case, the change would not be 
improvised during the performance. 
 What could it mean to say that some set of actions or sound-occurrences sound as if it 
were improvised?  This sounds like a recognitional capacity.  As with many other recognitional 
capacities, they are knowledge-based and perceptual.  The knowledge may be technical and 
inductive.  Here one’s previous experiences of listening to improvised (genetic sense) music, 
composed music, and knowledge of genres, art and music history would be relevant.  One has 
memories of what it sounded like et cetera.  One makes inferences about what can be done and 
what cannot be done, limits to human capacities and abilities.  But there are problems.  A 
recognizes P as sounding improvised, B does not.  But this is just like any other aesthetic concept 
or property. 
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 There is no property of music that ipso facto would distinguish between sounding 
improvised or composed.  However, certain properties, such that if a musical performance or 
work possessed them to some high degree, might be able to distinguish these alleged properties.  
For example, large-scale structural features that some analyses ascribe to works may be highly 
improbable for an improviser to do simply because of human limitations.  These limitations are 
cognitive (short-term and long-term memory limitations, certain “perspectival” requirements for 
locating and planning such large-scale features) and physical (movements, perceptual).  But one 
must be very careful here not to underestimate human abilities.  It is well-known especially in 
music that many prodigies and extraordinary players have abilities that go well beyond ordinary 
capacities:  in motor skills, memory, retention, recall, perception, et cetera.  These abilities do 
increase the probability of performing some of these large-scale features, to realize them in some 
extended improvisation over a single time, or recording session or over a career. 
 The property often associated with improvisation is spontaneity, which could be 
imagined more or less immediately, a certain ephemeral quality.  Probably though the most 
important feature is the knowledge that this is an improvised performance.  This also explains 
the positive evaluations of improviser and improvisation when the improvisation sounds like 
things that the audience knows were not (are not) improvised.  The frame of reference, or 
background information, for evaluating these performances is non-improvisations.  In this way, 
improvisation draws attention to the ways in which the conditions of making or creating can be 
important in critical and casual evaluation.  For example, in a discussion of the Parry-Lord 
theory, D. Gary Miller says,  “The appropriate question then becomes:  Does improvisation-
composition before a live audience foster devices that differ from those normally found in non-
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improvised poetry, such that the two types may exhibit different formal properties?”90  He then 
goes on to see whether they in fact have different properties.  In other words, Miller does literary 
criticism with this distinction in mind. 
 Another useful distinction can be made.  Lee B. Brown suggests that in especially non-
musical improvisation, in say painting or literature, perhaps a better term is non-performing 
artistic improvisation, there is temporal indifference between the audience of the artwork and its 
creation.  That is, a painting (say) can be improvised in terms of the distinctive activity in which 
it was created, its modality, manner in which it was made, created, constructed but the audience 
does not and need not witness this.  Consequently, there can be two identical objects in terms of 
perceptual properties and even modalities, but one main difference in modality:  one was created 
improvisationally before exhibited, and the other was performed, improvised in the presence of 
an audience.  It is a form of performance art.  Do they both have the same property of improvised 
or improvisatory?  Are there any aesthetic differences?  Are we expected to imagine the 
performance conditions in the case of the temporally indifferent one?  This distinction between 
improvising in painting (say) and music dissolves once one introduces recordings of musical 
improvisations.  Is this not the same as the painting case?  Does one really have to witness the 
improvisation live or in the studio?  I do not think we want to claim that if a performance occurs 
in a studio setting, this feature itself excludes the performance being an improvisation.  That 
sounds absurd to me.  The studio improvisation still has the genetic property of being improvised 
whether any one witnesses it or not.  This is not true if one requires that improvisations are 
performances and performances must have an audience.  Why not say that the studio engineers 
                                                         
90 D. Gary Miller, 15. 
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and others in the studio count as an audience.  In some sense they are an audience of what is 
being played. 
 Stanley Cavell seems to be talking about the as if property of improvised:  a performance 
sounds as if it were or could have been improvised.  It is not clear what the antonym property 
should be to “not sounding spontaneous.”  If X is not spontaneous then what is it?  Contrived 
(but this usually not a neutral term; it is negative)?  Not fresh or planned?  How can something 
sound planned, worked out?  The answer might involve attributions of simplicity and complexity 
grounded in basic human capacities and abilities. For example, X might follow certain rules that 
only studied reflection could provide; or X is so complex and possesses such large-scale features 
that a human could only achieve this with editing, revising, and long-term activity and reflection. 
 It is not clear that sound-occurrences which are in fact improvised have the perceptual 
property that Cavell is attempting to explain.  One thing is certain, however:  given Cavell’s 
account, a composition does not necessarily have the property “as if were (or sounds) 
composed,” because compositions may have the property of being “improvisatory.”  Although 
Cavell’s main purpose is not to defend the existence of such a property, for his overall argument 
to be persuasive he only needs this account to be plausible to function as an analogy for his 
arguments about fraudulence in contemporary music and art.  When talking about 
“improvisatory,” Cavell is not talking about aleatoric methods or randomness, because those are 
the subjects (or targets) of his broader aim. 
 Within some two to three pages, Stanley Cavell in 1966 was able to broach many of the 
issues that are of philosophical and theoretical interest with regard to improvisation.  In what is 
now considered by aestheticians as a classic, Cavell’s “Music Discomposed” is a mother lode of 
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ideas, musings, and commentary, and rich in philosophical, probing discourse.  The pages that 
concern me here are roughly 200-202, where Cavell discusses improvisation. 
 Cavell introduces the concept of improvisation in order to make a broader point about 
fraudulence in modern (or contemporary) art, especially music.  Here I want to address his 
comments about improvisation for their own sake, without regard to Cavell’s larger purpose 
(even though, if his account of improvisation is wrongheaded, then it may affect his larger 
project as well). 
 Cavell’s broad understanding of improvisation as “certain qualities of music generally” is 
about how a listener might perceive some music.  I interpret this to be similar to the 
Wittgensteinian idea of, instead of “seeing as,” “hearing as ...”  Hearing as reveals that listening 
is infected with attitudes, expectations, and even fabrications.  In this case it would be (inter alia) 
hearing the music as if it were improvised (or as if it were the product of improvisation).  But 
what are these purported features of music?  If this type of listening is possible, then the person 
must have some prior concept of improvisation before she will be able to “hear the music as 
improvised...”  Otherwise, how would one know that one was listening as if the music were 
improvised as opposed to hearing the music some other way?  I take it that these general features 
of music to which Cavell is referring are in opposition to features music has when it is composed 
and does not sound as if it could have been improvised.  There are limits to what one can see or 
hear as improvised.  That seems to be Cavell’s point. 
 But the music Cavell is referring to is, by historical fact, more or less composed.  It was 
composed in the sense that there was opportunity for revision, even though parts may have had 
their source in improvisation.  So, one could at least in principle, according to Cavell, listen to 
music as if it were being improvised instead of having been composed prior to its performance, 
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namely the performance one happens to be listening to at the time.  This seems to depend upon a 
strict distinction between composing and improvising.  On the other hand, it might not 
presuppose this strict distinction because Cavell admittedly uses the concept of improvisation 
with unusual, perhaps even idiosyncratic, broadness.  That is legitimate as long as one can make 
sense of this concept in that way.  As I argued above, I do not think that this distinction is strict, 
and it is sometimes untenable in that it hinders and obfuscates generative/production conditions 
instead of illuminate them.  The way in which Cavell is asking one to listen does not consider the 
implications of the actual conditions of composition:  the composer improvising either in her 
“mind’s ear,” or on an instrument to herself, and writing it down, and then possibly revising.  So 
what Cavell must mean when he says that around the time of Beethoven this type of listening 
ceases to be imaginable, this feigned property of improvisation, is that the music no longer seems 
to be imaginable as the product of a process of performed, spontaneous composition without 
revision.  There were large and long-term plans and goals of the compositions that could have 
been completed only with large stretches of time for reflection and revision, looking back on 
what had already been composed, comparisons and juxtapositions of sections and pieces—all 
tasks that need much time and editorial sensibility.  (These are the kind of properties with which 
Schenkerian analysis is concerned.)  These large-scale properties are not normally associated 
with improvisation. 
 It is worth reproducing the whole of this brilliant passage, even though it is long: 
 
The concept of improvisation, unlike the concept of chance, is one which has established 
and familiar uses in the practice of music theorists and historians.  An ethnomusicologist 
will have a recourse to the concept as a way of accounting for the creation-cum-
performance of the music of cultures, or classes, which have no functionaries we would 
think of as composers, and no objects we would think of as embodying the intention to 
art; and within the realm of composed (written) music, improvisation is, until recent 
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times, recognized as explicitly called for at certain sharply marked incidents of a 
performance--in the awarding of cadenzas, in the opportunities of ornamentation, in the 
realization of figured bass.  In such uses, the concept has little explanatory power, but 
seems merely to name events which one knows, as matters of historical fact (that is, as 
facts independent of anything a critic would have to discover by an analysis or 
interpretation of the musical material as an aesthetic phenomenon), not to have been 
composed. 
     My use of the concept is far more general.  I mean it to refer to certain qualities of 
music generally.  Perhaps what I am getting at can be brought out this way.  In listening 
to a great deal of music, particularly to the time of Beethoven, it would, I want to suggest, 
be possible to imagine that it was being improvised.  Its mere complexity, or a certain 
kind of complexity, would be no obstacle.  (Bach, we are told, was capable of 
improvising double fugues on any given subjects.)  I do not suggest that a chorus or a 
symphony orchestra can be imagined to be improvising music; on the contrary, a group 
improvisation itself has a particular sound.  On the other hand I do not wish to restrict the 
sense of improvisation to the performance of one player either.  It may help to say:  One 
can hear, in the music in question, how the composition is related to, or could grow in 
familiar ways, from a process of improvisation; as though the parts meted out by the 
composer were re-enactments, or dramatizations, of successes his improvisations had 
discovered--given the finish and permanence the occasion deserves and the public 
demands, but containing essentially only such discoveries.  If this could be granted, a 
further suggestion becomes possible.  Somewhere in the development of Beethoven, this 
ceases to be imaginable.  (I do not include all music after Beethoven.  Chopin and Liszt 
clearly seem improvisatory, in the sense intended; so do Brahms Intermezzi, but not 
Brahms Symphonies; early Stravinsky, perhaps, but not recent Stravinsky.) 
     Why might such a phenomenon occur?  It is, obviously enough, within contexts fully 
defined by shared formulas that the possibilities of full, explicit improvisation 
traditionally exists--whether one thinks of the great epics of literature (whose “oral-
formulaic” character is established), or of ancient Chinese painting, or of Eastern music, 
or of the theatre of the Commedia dell’Arte, or jazz.  If it seems a paradox that the 
reliance on formula should follow the fullest release of spontaneity, that must have less to 
do with the relation of these phenomena than with recent revolutions in our aesthetic 
requirements.  The suggestion, however, is this.  The context in which we can hear music 
as improvisatory is one in which the language it employs, its conventions, are familiar or 
obvious enough (whether because simple or because they permit of a total mastery or 
perspicuity) that no point are we or the performer in doubt about our location or goal; 
there are solutions to every problem, permitting the exercise of familiar forms of 
resourcefulness; a mistake is clearly recognizable as such, and may even present a chance 
to be seized; and just as the general range of chances is circumscribed, so there is a 
preparation for every chance, and if not an inspired one, then a formula for one.  But in 
the late experience of Beethoven, it is as if our freedom to act no longer depends on the 
possibility of spontaneity; improvising to fit a given lack or need is no longer enough.  
The entire enterprise of action and of communication has become problematic.  The 
problem is no longer how to do what you want, but to know what would satisfy you.  We 
could also say:  Convention as a whole now looked upon not as a firm inheritance from 
the past, but as a continuing improvisation in the face of problems we no longer 
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understand.  Nothing we now have to say, no personal utterance, has its meaning 
conveyed in the convention and formulas we now share.  Ina time of slogans, sponsored 
messages, ideologies, psychological warfare, mass projects, where words have lost touch 
with their sources and objects, and in a phonographic culture where music is for 
dreaming, or for kissing, or for taking a shower, or for having your teeth drilled, our 
choices seem to be those of silence, or nihilism (the denial of the value of shared meaning 
altogether), or statements so personal as to form the possibility of communication without 
the support of convention--perhaps to become the source of new convention.  An, then, of 
course, they are most likely to fail even to seem to communicate.  Such, at any rate, are 
the choices which the modern works of art I know seem to me to have made.  I should 
say that the attempt to re-invent convention is the alternative I take Schoenberg and 
Stravinsky and Bartok to have taken; whereas in their total organization, Krenek and 
Stockhausen have chosen nihilism.91 
 
Cavell is correct in saying that there are limits to his exercise of imagination.  For example, when 
one is listening to an orchestral or choral piece, it is difficult to imagine how such a piece could 
be collectively improvised by all of the musicians.  Such a feat is imaginatively resistant.  At 
minimum, it would be highly improbable for this to happen, even though such a thing is logically 
possible.  Collective improvisations, he says interestingly, have a particular sound.  I take this to 
be some perceptual property, something irreducible, as in “I cannot say to which physical 
properties it reduces but I know when I hear it”—it is veridical and recognitional. 
 But I do take issue with some of what Cavell is suggesting.  I begin with this early (1833) 
account of Mozart’s talent for improvisation. 
 
In the art of free improvisation Mozart had no equal.  His improvisations were as well-
ordered as if he had them lying written out before him.  This led several to think that, 
when he performed an improvisation in public, he must have thought everything out, and 
practiced it, beforehand.  Albrechtsberger thought so too.  But one evening they met at a 
musical soiree; Mozart was in a good mood and demanded a theme of Albrechtsberger.  
The latter played him an old German popular song.  Mozart sat down and improvised in 
this theme for an hour in such a way as to excite general admiration and show by means 
                                                         
91 Stanley Cavell, “Music Discomposed,” in Must We Mean What We Say? 200-202. 
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of variations and fugues (in which he never departed from the theme) that he was master 
of every aspect of the musician’s art.92 
 
Albrechtsberger, if not present and recording technology were available, would not have ascribed 
sounds improvised to this Mozart performance.  One cannot underestimate the abilities of such 
geniuses. 
 Cavell suggests that there is this break in the history of music, and perhaps it can be 
broadened to other art forms, such that roughly before Beethoven (or early Beethoven as Cavell 
would have it) Western art music sounds as if it could have been improvised or derived from 
improvisations.  In fact, a large part of early music was improvised and derived from personal 
and public improvisations, especially in J. S. Bach's case.  From roughly late Beethoven and after 
Western art music sounds as if it cannot be improvised or derived from improvisations.  Why?  
Even though Cavell does not say explicitly what the source of this transition is, one can surmise 
that it is this later period's musical complexity, its large-scale structural features, its 
"juxtaposition."  One obvious criticism of this view is to say that Cavell underestimates what in 
fact can be improvised by expert, talented, skillful musicians.  One cannot be cheap about this:  
both Cavell cannot be cheap and criticisms of him cannot be cheap.  What I mean is that 
obviously a group of orchestral musicians are not going to get together for a "jam session" on 
Saturday night and by chance improvise Beethoven's Sixth Symphony.  So the point cannot just 
be about instrumentation and the complexity that is derived from it (which Cavell addresses), 
and the concomitant coordination problems that would involve.  This thought experiment is not 
impossible but improbable, just like the monkeys accidentally typing out Hamlet.  (the 
                                                         
92Abbe Stadler, 1833 autobiography quoted in Taruskin, 287. 
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symphony case is more probable than the monkeys, I should think.)  Cavell's point is about the 
sonic properties themselves, or as he says it, "certain qualities of music generally.”93 
 So a more genuine criticism of Cavell is that he presupposes an oversimplification of 
what improvisation means and has meant, and that the goals of the agents of Western art music 
(composers, performers) have changed dramatically with respect to improvisation through the 
historical periods of music and art.  One might say that there are three more or less distinct 
narratives of the meaning and goals of improvisation in Western art and music.  One is the 
Classical view, which would include the Baroque and early Classical periods of music history.  
Here the goal of improvisation was not to sound improvised, to conceal the generative practice 
that has given rise to the product of the improvisation, and to keep in line with non-improvised 
evaluative criteria.  This is what Gerald Bruns has called "rhetorical" improvisation.94  This 
period is about embellishment, working within fixed forms, et cetera.  And the history provided 
in Part I justifies this view:  figured bass, ricercar, cadenza, faburden, et cetera.  There is no 
attempt to loosen up the non-improvised structures.  Yet this is just what Cavell calls sounds as if 
improvised. 
 The Romantic view of improvisation is to have less concealment.  There is a loosening up 
of structures and allowing more freedom, this is what makes the Romantic period different from 
the Classical.  But still keeps within the evaluative criteria of non-improvised evaluative criteria.  
This period also allows sounding improvised a bit more, certainly more than classical.  Examples 
are the development of the impromptu, fantasia, the construction of many of the famous 
cadenzas to the Classical composers, etc. 
                                                         
93 Cavell, 200. 
94 Gerald Bruns, “De Improvisatione: An Essay on Kora in Hell,” in Inventions: Writing, 
Textuality, and Understanding in Literary Theory, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
1982), 145-159. 
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 While the modernist/contemporary view is to not conceal at all, want to sound 
spontaneous, not concerned with keeping up with the evaluative criteria of non-improvised, in 
fact eschewing and sometimes purposefully subverting those criteria. 
 I think that I have license to characterize a whole history here in this way to counter 
Cavell's general characterization as well; in fact Cavell's is even more ambitious than mine:  it is 
more general and far-reaching.  Furthermore, this is no different than Danto's interpretation of art 
history.95  Of course, some people think Danto's theory is false, or does not resonate well with 
the actual, detailed study of the history of art.  Nonetheless, those criticisms are internal to the 
process.  In other words, these criticisms are aimed at Danto's conception of how art history has 
progressed and the organizing principles by which one can retrospectively make sense of such.  
External criticisms would be say that the whole enterprise of attempting to characterize history 
with grand themes.  To argue against this view would take me too far from the subject at hand.  
So I shall hand wave here and simply say I do think history, besides studying the minutiae, 
which is important, would be less interesting and useful from the point of view of using history 
to learn about who we are, our past, what is possible, and where we are going.  Without such 
grand narratives, those goals and uses of history would have to be withdrawn.  Yet this is a major 
reason why we study history and take keen interest in it. 
 Now let us apply this way of viewing the historical narrative of improvisation to Cavell's 
view.  He assumes a unitary narrative of improvisation, otherwise his view would not even make 
sense.  Now I am not saying that Cavell's view is incoherent.  It is internally consistent in the 
sense that all he needs to make his claim is for people to be able to distinguish between two 
general kinds of sounding music, before and after his breakpoint.  But its basis is faulty.  One is 
                                                         
95 Arthur Danto, After the End of Art: Contemporary Art and the Pale of History, The A.W. 
Mellon Lectures in the Fine Arts, 1995, Bollingen Series 35: 44 (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1997). 
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not going to be able to suppose a static sounding as if improvised because the goals etc. of 
improvisation changed.  But does Cavell's view then make sense for just Baroque and early 
Classical going into the late Classical and Romantic period?  Is that all he needs to make his 
point.  I think not because his point is not just a historical one, but a general theoretical one (cite 
evidence of this). 
 These improvisation conventions and values were formed according to not only aesthetic 
concerns and interests but social ones too.  These were not formed in an aesthetic vacuum—to 
think so would be naïve. 
 The paradox that Cavell is exposing and taking advantage of is that the conditions that 
make improvisation possible as an option, a possible act, are exactly those of composition as 
well.  For composition to have been foregone, we need not look to improvisation, nay, it is 
contemporary music of chance and total direction that is the alternative (or enemy as some would 
have it). 
 Questions for Cavell’s use of improvisatory are as follows.  Is it plausible to say that 
people could reliably and consistently distinguish between sound occurrences that sound 
improvised or sound composed?  What assumptions must be in place for a property like 
improvisatory to be useful at all? 
 I think that Cavell’s account is confused because it assumes certain beliefs about 
compositions and improvisations that are false or questionable.  Cavell, like many others, 
underestimates what may be and what has been achieved in improvisations, and neglects a more 
accurate account of composing as involving improvising.  Furthermore, improvisations do not 
have any particular “sound.”  Anything improvised could have been composed, and anything 
composed could have been improvised (in a logically possible sense) though it is improbable that 
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would be the case.  The fact that it in many cases it is highly improbable, although not 
impossible (logically possible), that a set of orchestra musicians together improvised a sound-
occurrence corresponding to Brahms’s Fourth Symphony score is not relevant here.  Why?  Is it 
really a misunderstanding of probability, or is it that it underestimates human capacities?  It just 
takes more time and reflection to create a symphony with complex relations like Brahms’s 
Fourth than is possible for a human spontaneously creating, or creating while performing.  
Perhaps the better answer is that that is not what a set of musicians do when they get together to 
improvise.  They are not trying to create a classical symphony, that is not their goal.  
Furthermore, many famous, justly lauded improvisations have complexity on par with classical 
music features (one should think of Clifford Brown, Sonny Rollins, John Coltrane).  Now in 
some sense, but a very narrow and useless sense, one may speak of “improvisatory.”  For 
example, when some music sounds like jazz, people tend to say something like “sounds 
improvised” et cetera.  However, the problems here are 1) the music may in fact not be 
improvised; and 2) this presupposes the equation of jazz with improvisation, which is false. 
 
2.3 Works of Art 
 
Pop (or jazz) culture, in the starkest contrast to classical, has a concept of work-identity 
so fluid as to be practically indefinable.  (It is a famous unresolved problem of 
musicology, in fact.)96 
—Richard Taruskin, Text and Act: Essays on Music and Performance 
 
 I must warn at the outset that I will not provide a comprehensive theory of art works, nor 
even musical works, because I do not have one.  Nor do I need one to accomplish the goals of 
                                                         
96 Taruskin, 281. 
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this section.  (Compare this to the fact that I did not have a comprehensive account of artistic 
creation in the above section.)  However, I do provide some insights about works of art and 
musical works, and defend the thesis that improvisations are works.  Moreover, I will not be 
providing a comprehensive overview of the literature on musical works, in part because Stephen 
Davies has already done this in his masterful book Musical Works and Performances: A 
Philosophical Exploration.97 
 In addition, my theory of improvisations as works—that they are WOAs and their 
particular nature—may proceed without making an explicit connection between the action theory 
and ontology of work-products.  As I said earlier, the correct model of the action-types of 
composition and improvisation is the continuum model even though that model is troublesome 
for a stable ontology of work-products.  Therefore, what I say henceforth may be interpreted as 
the results of a generative process that clearly falls on the extreme improvisation side of the 
continuum line.  Alternatively, but more controversially, the continuum model may suggest that 
the ontology of the results of composing and improvising ought to be the same.  This is the case 
because since composing and improvising fundamentally share the same logical and cognitive 
process of selection, and most composing and improvising are mixed enterprises (the reason for 
the continuum), an account of the WOA can be uniform. One consequence of this would be that 
an account of a MW from an (SCC) case would be admitting improvisation to some degree, and 
whatever account of a MW from (SCI) would be admitting composition and all that entails to 
some degree. 
                                                         
97 Stephen Davies, Musical Works and Performances: A Philosophical Exploration (New York:  
Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press, 2001).  Davies has done this for the definition of art 
issue, see Stephen Davies, Definitions of Art (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991); and 
expression in music, Musical Meaning and Expression (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1994). 
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 There will be two sets of arguments for the conclusion that improvisations are works:  
direct and indirect.  The first set of indirect arguments will be considering the major challenges 
that have been put forward to classifying improvisations as WOAs.  I shall undermine each of 
these challenges.  Undermining those challenges is not sufficient for demonstrating that 
improvisations are WOAs (there could be other reasons); however, it does clear the way for more 
positive, direct arguments.  The second set of indirect arguments will be burden-shifting.  The 
presumption among aestheticians today is that improvisations are not WOAs (of course, there is 
an important minority).  I will remove this presumption in order to demonstrate that it is 
plausible to think that improvisations are WOAs.  I will accomplish this by showing that 
improvisations are covered by the most sophisticated, widely accepted theory of the musical 
work, which is Jerrold Levinson’s indicated structure theory.  Consequently, the burden of proof 
will be on the naysayers to show us why improvisations are not WOAs; however, it could still be 
the case that improvisations are not WOAs.  Another problem here is that although musical 
improvisations can be covered by Levinson’s theory of musical works, this theory does not 
capture all of the salient features of improvisations, which may be important or essential to the 
identity of an improvised work.  Some of these shortcomings are similar to why Levinson’s 
theory seems to have limited application in general (which he recognizes).  Moreover, non-
musical improvisations are not covered by Levinson’s theory.  The third indirect argument will 
be generated by the question:  if improvisations are not works, then what are they?  I will look at 
some of the answers given to this question, and consider other logical possibilities.  I will show 
that none of these other possibilities is a plausible account of what improvisations are.  Hence, an 
improvisation as a WOA is the best choice among alternatives.  The set of alternatives, however, 
may not be exhaustive, thus making this argument indirect. 
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 The direct argument involves providing a positive theory of improvisational works.  
Presenting a positive theory goes beyond mere burden-shifting, process of elimination (best 
among alternatives), and undermining counterarguments.  In some sense, providing a positive 
theory constitutes an “existence proof,” i.e., if one can do it, and there is no other plausible 
alternative, then it must be the case.  First, I will draw upon the indirect argument that 
improvisations do meet the conditions of some of the current theories of the work, and so are 
works under those theories (like Levinson’s).  The features of these theories that improvisations 
meet, and the salient features of improvisations that are not captured, will inspire the positive 
account I shall give.  I will show that improvisations need a more finely tuned theory of the work 
than Levinson’s.  In addition, whilst doing this, questions of individuation will be addressed.  My 
account coheres well with, and preserves, intuitions both musicians and non-musicians have 
about improvising and improvisations, and it explains improvisational practices in the various art 
forms. 
 
 
2.3.1 A General Critique of “Musical Work” and a Defense 
 
The conviction persists, though history shows it to be a hallucination, that all the 
questions that the human mind has asked are questions that can be answered in terms of 
the alternatives that the questions themselves present.  But in fact, intellectual progress 
usually occurs through sheer abandonment of questions together with both of the 
alternatives they assume, an abandonment that results from their decreasing vitalism and 
a change of urgent interest.  We do not solve them, we get over them.98 
—John Dewey 
 
                                                         
98 John Dewey, quoted in Terence Deacon, The Symbolic Species (New York: W. W. Norton, 
1997), 11. 
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 Before I begin my positive account and criticisms of other views and theories, I will 
address some meta-ontological issues.  When one is constructing an ontology, there are overt and 
covert assumptions or presuppositions lying behind the theory.  Recently, aestheticians have 
begun to discuss and investigate these explicitly as meta-ontological issues; however, there are 
moments in the history of analytic philosophy that address these issues, and certainly Kant could 
be viewed as doing this systematically in his Critiques.99  One may call these meta-ontological 
issues and considerations.  Amie Thomasson suggests that “… meta-ontology, as applied to 
issues in the ontology of art, [are] designed to examine what it is we are doing when we 
formulate theories about the ontology of art, how we can adjudicate among the competing 
theories, and what the limits of knowledge are in this area.”100  In my view, broadly considered, 
meta-ontological issues involve the investigation of assumptions and presuppositions about other 
ontological theories (usually broader theories, such as theories of abstract objects or of material 
objects); the purpose and function of ontology and metaphysics more generally; facts about the 
world; and scientific theories that may or may not be relevant to the ontological theory at 
hand.101 
 It is now commonplace that there are such things as musical works (MW) or musical 
works of art.  This was not always the case.  As Lydia Goehr has shown, our (read:  Western, 
                                                         
99 In analytic philosophy I am thinking of P. F. Strawson.  Wittgenstein is another example.  On 
meta-ontology explicitly recognized in aesthetics, see, for example, Amie L. Thomasson, “The 
Ontology of Art and Knowledge in Aesthetics,” Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 68, no. 2 
(Summer 2005): 221-229; “Ontological Innovation in Art,” Journal of Aesthetics and Art 
Criticism 68, no. 2 (2010): 119-130; and Ordinary Objects (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2007). 
100 Amie L. Thomasson, “The Ontology of Art and Knowledge in Aesthetics,” 222. 
101 For example, roughly a third (33%) of Julian Dodd’s book Works of Music: An Essay in 
Ontology (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007) is dedicated to the theory of type/token 
from a more or less purely metaphysical point of view.  This seems reasonable given that his 
theory of musical works sits within standard type/token theory. 
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European, classical, art music) concept of musical work-hood does not become static and iron-
clad until roughly 1800.102  There were, certainly, related concepts working in non-Western 
music and in antiquity.  Where and how do MWs fit into our musical practices?  How are MWs, 
if they exist, related to sounds, musical sounds, pitch, tone, melody, rhythm, meter, timbre, 
scores, notation(s), performances, arrangements, transcriptions, orchestrations, various kinds of 
recordings, recording media, digital computer technology, and improvisations?  Is it useful or 
explanatory to have MWs in an ontological theory?  Are musical performances representations 
or instantiations (in sound) of scores, or are scores representations or instantiations of something 
like sound-structures or sound-occurrences in performances?  What is the MW in jazz and other 
popular music genres?  Is there a work-concept in popular genres that resembles Western 
classical art music?  Notice that these ontological questions are in addition to questions of the 
basic, fundamental constituents of musical sound and sound. 
 In my view, the debates in the metaphysics of music have ignored some purely 
metaphysical points.  First, all types are eternal by definition—they are non-spatio-temporal, 
abstract objects.  Second, any pattern or sequence of movements, sounds, orthography, et cetera 
is an instantiation of a type.  These are very basic points, but their relevance and significance in 
WOA theories is often confused or ignored.  Whether I doodle on the piano, practice a 
Beethoven sonata, improvise a solo over the “All the Things You Are,” I am bringing into 
existence a token of a type whose existence preceded my token.  Now pure types, things like 
words, possible chess games, sets of numbers, cannot—it is often said—be identified with 
works, or works cannot be identified with pure types because pure types lack properties that we 
think works should or do possess.  Consequently, a main issue for theories of WOAs is about 
                                                         
102 Lydia Goehr, The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works: An Essay in the Philosophy of Music 
(New York: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press, 1992). 
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what those properties are and how they can be incorporated into a clear, coherent, metaphysically 
sound theory.  Should aesthetic and artistic properties be included in the identity conditions of a 
WOA?  Should authorship be included?  So, for example, pure types may be ruled out as being 
WOAs because pure types are not created by humans, they exist before humans instantiate them.  
But types may be “juiced up” to include many kinds of properties, including aesthetic and artistic 
properties.  If they are, then the issue that remains is whether one wants to include authorship 
(and all of the properties that come with it) in the identity of a WOA. 
 In philosophical aesthetics, aesthetic properties103 are a thorny issue: their nature, 
ascription or attribution conditions, appropriate bearers, epistemology, and taxonomy are all 
controversial, and have a vast literature.  Those issues, however, are beyond the scope of this 
project.  I use aesthetic properties in the way understood by Sibley et alii.104 
 There are many ways of categorizing all of the properties relevant to criticism, evaluation 
and appreciation of works of art and other objects and events that receive our aesthetic attention.  
But in general there seem to be at least these:  aesthetic (including second-order perceptual, taste, 
formal, and Gestalt properties), artistic, expressive (including emotive and reactive properties), 
representational (including exemplification, appropriation, et cetera), and semantic/meaning 
properties.  The important distinction of concern to me here is that between aesthetic and artistic 
properties.  Arthur Danto, Peter Kivy, Jerrold Levinson and others have made the distinction 
                                                         
103 I use the term “property” as more or less synonymous with attribute, quality, characteristic, 
feature, and trait.  Levinson points out that there is a difference between a property and a quality:  
being graceful versus gracefulness.  See Jerrold Levinson, “WOAs and the Future,” in Music, 
Art, and Metaphysics: Essays in Philosophical Aesthetics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1990), 179-214. 
104 Frank N. Sibley, “Aesthetic Concepts,” in Approach to Aesthetics: Collected Papers on 
Philosophical Aesthetics, eds. John Benson, Betty Redfern, and Jeremy Roxbee Cox (New York: 
Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press, 2001). 
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between aesthetic and artistic properties.105  Perhaps calling the latter “artistic” properties may be 
unfortunate, a bit misleading, and sometimes even inaccurate, but that is what we are stuck with 
for now, and I shall use that term.  Aesthetic properties are mainly perceptual; they are sensual 
and structural.  Examples include:  beauty, ugliness, garishness, unity, flamboyance, coherence, 
gracefulness, vivid, restrained, second-order perceptual properties, behavior properties, Gestalt 
properties, taste properties.  Jerrold Levinson has defined artistic properties thus:  “Artistic 
properties differ from aesthetic properties in that they do not merely depend on the WOA’s 
relation to other WOAs and the surrounding artistic background--they are not merely the 
perceivable upshot of that contextual placement—but are inherently a matter of that 
relationality.”
106
  He also says that artistic properties are “appreciatively relevant ones that are 
                                                         
105 Jerrold Levinson, “WOAs and the Future,” in Music, Art, and Metaphysics: Essays in 
Philosophical Aesthetics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), 179-214.  Levinson 
distinguishes other kinds of properties as well, such as representational and meaning 
properties—all of these make up the total aesthetic content of a work of art.  He includes 
expressive properties in the category of aesthetic properties; I would create a different category 
for these.  Also see Peter Kivy, The Corded Shell: Reflections on Musical Expression (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 1980), 115-116. 
106
 Jerrold Levinson, “WOAs and the Future,” in Music, Art, and Metaphysics: Essays in 
Philosophical Aesthetics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), 182-183.  “Examples of 
what I mean by artistic properties are originality, derivativeness, skillfulness, revolutionariness, 
typicality, influentiality, syntheticness, distinctiveness of vision” (183).  Levinson also 
distinguishes between the following kinds of properties that are part of the content of WOAs:  
aesthetic, artistic, representational, and meaning properties. 
          Examples of aesthetic properties are:  what might be called pure value properties (being 
beautiful, sublime, ugly, dreary); emotion properties (being sad, joyful, sombre, angry); formal 
qualities (balanced, tightly knit, loosely woven, graceful); behavioral properties (being bouncy,  
[dreary], daring, [bold], sluggish,); evocative qualities (being powerful, boring, amusing, 
[humorous], stirring, [intense, interesting, exciting]); representational qualities ([verisimiltude], 
being true-to-life, distorted, realistic); what might be called second-order perceptual properties 
(vivid or pure (said of colors or tones), [intense], dull, muted, [articulated, slurred]).  From Alan 
H. Goldman, “Properties, Aesthetic,” in A Companion to Aesthetics, Blackwell Companions to 
Philosophy Series, ed. David Cooper (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1992), 342.  These may 
said to supervene on non-aesthetic properties of objects and events such as shape, color, 
identification of subject matter in representation, et cetera.  From a list of aesthetic properties by 
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not directly perceivable but are inherently relations to other WOAs.”  Artistic properties require 
perception but always require more cognitive mediation than aesthetic properties.  One must 
have background knowledge (e.g., of history) and interpretative skills based upon that 
knowledge in order to ascribe artistic properties.  Examples of artistic properties are originality, 
derivativeness, skillfulness, revolutionariness, typicality, influentiality, syntheticness, 
distinctiveness of vision.107  These properties have traditionally been ascribed to works of art and 
natural phenomena.  In the case of natural phenomena, only aesthetic properties apply. 
 An example from David Best helps to make the distinction between aesthetic and artistic 
properties clear: 
 
Some years ago I was privileged to attend a performance by Ram Gopal, the great Indian 
classical dancer, and I was quite captivated by the exhilarating and exquisite quality of 
his movements.  Yet I was unable to appreciate his dance artistically since I could not 
understand it.  For instance, there is a great and varied range of subtle hand gestures in 
Indian classical dance, each with a quite precise meaning, of which I knew none.  It is 
clear that my appreciation was aesthetic, not artistic.108 
   
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Colin Lyas:  “proportion, grace, elegance, daintiness, smoothness of texture, sweetness of sound, 
vividness of colour, delicacy of line, fragrance of odour.”  Colin Lyas, “Aesthetic and Personal 
Qualities,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 72 (1971-1972): 171. 
     Other examples of artistic properties:  historically related properties (original, novel, 
innovative, new, interesting, conservative, derivative, trite, monotonic, poignant); relational 
properties related to art theories, art histories, traditions, schools, genres; technical properties 
(virtuosic, dexterous, facility, ease, efficient, accurate, sloppy, sacrificial). 
     Peter Kivy, The Corded Shell: Reflections on Musical Expression,  Princeton Essays on the 
Arts Series (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), 115-116 also makes the distinction 
between aesthetic and artistic.  But Kivy’s use of “artistic” embodies Levinson’s categories of 
artistic, representational, and meaning properties.   
107 Jerrold Levinson, “WOAs and the Future,” in Music, Art, and Metaphysics: Essays in 
Philosophical Aesthetics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), 183. 
108 David Best, Feeling and Reason in the Arts (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1985), 157. 
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 Kendall Walton writes:  “One of the most fundamental questions of musical aesthetics is 
this:  Which is of primary musical importance, musical works (symphonies, songs, sonatas, etc.) 
or performances of musical works?  Are works or performances the basic object of musical 
attention, musical appreciation, and musical judgment?”109  The motivation for recognizing or 
adding MWs to our ontology is to allow us to refer to something in our musical practices.  These 
musical practices include composing, improvising, performing, playing, practicing, interpreting, 
listening, appreciating, criticizing, evaluating, transcribing, orchestrating, arranging, et cetera.  
Our musical practices are variegated and complex.  For Walton, the assumption seems to be that 
value fundamentally motivates musical metaphysics.  Uses of terms like “importance,” 
“significance,” “focus of appreciation,” et cetera clearly imply value.  But this does not settle the 
issue because further questions arise about the nature of the value, valuing, and evaluation to 
which one is committed.  In other words:  Which meta-ontological considerations should one use 
or presuppose in constructing a metaphysical theory?  Or is it enough to call attention to the ones 
that we seem as a culture to be committed to in our musical and cultural practices? 
 Traditionally, the criteria of metaphysical theory acceptance are explanatory power and 
preservation of, or coherence with, pre-theoretical intuitions, or where relevant, consistency with 
scientific facts.  Very often, scientific facts do not play a significant role in aesthetic discussions.  
I would add a further consideration, then, especially relevant to metaphysical theories in 
aesthetics:  sociological and anthropological facts about human artistic practices, including 
artistic production and reception, and critical and evaluative practices. 
                                                         
109
Kendall L. Walton, “The Presentation and Portrayal of Sound Patterns,” in Human Agency: 
Language, Duty, and Value: Philosophical Essays in Honor of J.O. Urmson, eds. Jonathan 
Dancy, J. M .E. Moravcsik, and C. C. W. Taylor (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
1988), 237. 
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 Artistic, critical, and musical practices should play a role as meta-ontological 
considerations in constructing a musical metaphysics.  Stephen Davies says “If ontology is to be 
more than a philosopher’s game, it must reflect the ‘what’s’ and ‘why’s’ informing the esteem 
that draws us to art works.  Musical ontology should be responsive to the ways we engage with 
and discuss music and its works.”110  However, the metaphysical theory must make metaphysical 
sense, too.  By metaphysical sense, I mean that the theory should adhere to general theory 
construction desiderata, and be consistent with the best general metaphysical theories available.  
I do not mean to imply that metaphysical theories are completely settled issues; nonetheless, 
there is consensus, or at least presumption and burden of proof ascriptions, on many matters. 
 Philosophers’ imaginations are either buttressed or diminished by past and current 
technologies, among others things such as ingenuity and imaginative resistance problems.  This 
not only holds for philosophers’ thought experiments, which I take to be obvious, but other tools 
that we use, too.111  My view is that in doing ontology in aesthetics philosophers have radically 
underestimated the effects of our development (or lack thereof) of technology, scientific 
knowledge.  There exceptions to this underestimation.  Aestheticians and others generally 
recognize the importance of the development of writing, both as an idea and the technology of it, 
on literature.  One can discern it in the comparison to the primarily oral cultures that continue to 
exist.  In the metaphysics of material objects, there are now serious alternatives to traditional 
                                                         
110 Stephen Davies, Musical Works and Performances: A Philosophical Exploration (New York: 
Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press, 2001), 9. 
111 There is now a lot of good work on the nature of thought experiments both in philosophy and 
science.  See, especially, the work of Tamar Szabo Gendler.  Moreover, the locus classicus on 
the issue of imaginative resistance is Tamar Gendler, “The Puzzle of Imaginative Resistance,” 
The Journal of Philosophy 97, no. 2 (February 2000): 55-81.  This article has created a small but 
growing cottage industry, including such notable philosophers as Brian Weatherson, Richard 
Moran, Dustin Stokes, and others. 
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views that have been influenced by the explosion of knowledge in particle physics and 
theoretical physics.  Four dimensionalism attempts to construct an ontological theory that is 
partly influenced by quantum mechanics, or string theory.112  Below I will try to show how this 
is the case in the metaphysics of music.  Two important areas in which there have been 
unanalyzed assumptions informing theories are notation and the creation/discovery dichotomy. 
 
Notation, Works, and Bias 
 
 In general, philosophers of music have neglected to realize the extent to which the 
western notational system for music has influenced their theorizing and thinking about the 
metaphysics of music.  The notational system, just like the western tempered system of pitches 
themselves, is more or less arbitrary and historically contingent.  One response is that since 
philosophers have more or less paid attention only to western music, and the western tradition 
has a long, entrenched history, then it should be no surprise that notation has played strong in 
theorizing about the metaphysics of music.  But that misses the point.  I am pointing out how the 
western tempered system and its corresponding notation are contingent.  In addition, even given 
the western tempered system, there could have been many different notation systems developed.  
The contingency I am concerned with is both the “could have been otherwise” type, and the fact 
that the properties, sonic or otherwise, that western notation has captured and sought to capture is 
contingent as well.  It is difficult to determine why some properties were notated and others not.  
Clearly, in some cases it had to do with the technology available. 
                                                         
112 Probably, the best advocate of this view is Theodore Sider, Four Dimensionalism: An 
Ontology of Persistence and Time (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
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 Here is an example.  Sound structures as types or kinds play a central role in the 
metaphysics of music.  They are based more on notation than the physics of sound.  Philosophers 
have equated the sound structure to the features a score notates and can notate.  The sound 
structure’s ontological thinness is largely a by-product of the assumption that structures are 
exhausted by the representations we make of them.  Even though there can be a few ways of 
representing a sound structure, the tendency is to represent them as more or less scores, which 
indicate pitch in the tempered system, rhythm, meter, tempi, vague stylistic instructions (e.g., ad 
libitum, “freely” in a score), et cetera.  Another way of representing a sound structure is to 
indicate pitches by actual time (milliseconds) and Hertz cycles per second.  This would be 
unreadable for humans, but the purpose of a representation of a sound structure is not to put 
forward a set of instructions for performers. 
 Computing theory, digital computers, and related technology provide an alternative 
example.  Since digitally recorded sounds (or analog recordings transformed into digital 
recordings) capture perceptual properties (and sub-perceptual properties) by encoding them into 
binary code, one could use the binary encoding sequence along with specification of eight- or 
sixteen-bit, sampling rate, et cetera as a representation of a sound structure.  Certainly, a series of 
digits is an abstract object.  The encoding itself must be realized on an appropriate playback 
mechanism that is programmed to transform the binary encoding into sounds and sonic 
properties.  This is not different from the fact that notations rely on humans to understand and 
obey their conventions.  Without people capable of understanding and playing notation, a sound 
structure based on a standard score would be as dead as a compact disk113 encoded with 
microscopic spaces and laser etchings without compact disk player technology. 
                                                         
113 By “compact disc,” I mean to include any storage device capable of encoding digital 
computer machine code. 
  
243 
 
 What counts as the appropriate object for the musical work of art presents some difficulty 
to the theorist.  In human musical practices, there are scores, sketches, lead sheets, performances, 
rehearsals, productions, arrangements, transcriptions, interpretations, variations, parodies, and 
improvisations.  Currently, there are several metaphysical theories of the musical work.  Most of 
them are indexed to a particular time, culture, or genre.  This fact is evidence that different 
practices and traditions require different theories.  I believe the promise of having the theory of 
the musical work is slim to none.  Musical works as kinds (categories, or types, or other 
abstracta) are going to be plural, and different genres have different degrees of ontological 
complexity.  The motivations for theorizing about musical works are that it has intrinsic 
metaphysical interests, which are shared by other philosophical problems and issues, and it is 
important because thinking about this issue raises important questions about what is central to 
music, musical evaluation, and criticism, and even ordinary appreciation.  First, I shall comment 
on why this should be an issue at all for the aesthetics of improvisation. 
 What really hinges on the work of art status?  Does it really matter if improvisations are 
works?  What would make it matter?  We need a focus of appreciation.114  Some philosophers 
have treated the concern for a correct theory of the musical work in classical, Western art music 
as a mere puzzle to be solved without significant consequences artistic practices.  It is motivated 
by a desire to account for the relationships between scores, performances, transcriptions, 
arrangements, parodies, variations, and the like.  In the world of improvisation, which exists 
within Western art music too, most of these relationships do not obtain.  There are no scores for 
improvisations, at least before they are performed.  There is no composition/performance 
                                                         
114 I use David Davies’ phrase here from Art as Performance, New Directions in Aesthetics 
Series (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2004). 
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relation.  However, there is an instantiation of a sound structure.  The instantiation is not 
occurring in the typical composition way; however, the improviser can certainly be viewed as 
indicating a sound structure through performance, playing.  Indeed, as Kendall Walton has noted, 
another interest is in figuring out what the primary object of appreciation and evaluation is.115  I 
am not sure if this is correct, but it cannot be doubted as a conscious motive on the part of 
philosophers.  I question this because intuitively, it seems to me, the ordinary listener or 
appreciator or critic makes a distinction between a performance token of (say) Beethoven’s Third 
Symphony and the set of instructions upon which the performance token was based.  We call 
those sets of instructions scores.  Furthermore, people can primarily appreciate a particular 
instrumentalist, or orchestra, or conductor, no matter what the piece of music is.  Particular 
interpretations, even though they may be unorthodox, may be the primary object of appreciation.  
There are all sorts of things that can be appreciated and evaluated.  Now, Walton’s point is to 
single out the most important or central object.  But merely having a correct or adequate theory 
of the musical work does not entail that the “work” is the primary object.  In other words, one 
can pursue the theory of the work even if it is not the primary object; the account would still be 
useful, of philosophical interest, and help us to understand at least one of the things we 
appreciate, evaluate, and analyze.  David Davies goes against this.  He argues that the worth of 
the work concept at all is to be the focus of appreciation. 
 In addition, there now seems to be a practice among aestheticians to call the thing we pay 
attention to in an art form or genre “works.”  This makes some sense.  So what is the object we 
pay attention to in improvised art genres? 
                                                         
115 Kendall Walton, “The Presentation and Portrayal of Sound Patterns.” 
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 Aaron Ridley is skeptical about musical metaphysics.116  Ridley has challenged the need 
for musical ontology.  Why place such a premium on arguing that improvisations are works?  It 
may seem forced, especially when one considers that works really seem to be connected to 
prescription, which means repeatability, and following instructions.  One might think that if it is 
evaluation with which we are concerned, then even if improvisations are not works, they can still 
be evaluated.  Not being a work does not preclude improvisations from being evaluated. 
  Whether one likes it or not, there exists a tradition and history that recognizes and 
establishes a large framework of social practices called the “work.”  Lydia Goehr has analyzed 
that history.117  She historicizes the conception of musical works.  Works have become more or 
less entrenched in our critical and appreciative practices.  This fact gives warrant to the idea that 
works are of primary significance in evaluation, whatever they may be.  To conceive of 
improvisations as non-works would already be to reduce improvisation (and thereby 
improvising) to a lesser status than more traditional conceptions of works, viz., of Western, 
classical, art music.  Moreover, there seems to be no a priori reason to say that works cannot 
have the properties that improvisations bear.  The reasons given, as we shall see, for 
improvisations not being works are appeals to evaluative issues and evidence from supposed 
social practices.  When one says that works need to be prescriptive, it is not clear what kind of a 
claim this is.  Surely, using past practice as evidence that things in the past which have been 
called works have been for the most part prescriptive, sounds like question-begging.  Why use 
that history and tradition?  Why confine the concept in that way?  "Work-hood," I submit, should 
be defined in such a way that it allows improvisations to be works.  Why?  Is this arbitrary?  Am 
                                                         
116 Aaron Ridley, “Against Musical Ontology,” Journal of Philosophy 100, no. 4 (2003): 203-
220. 
117 Lydia Goehr, The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works: An Essay in the Philosophy of 
Music. 
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I question-begging?  I do not think so.  I want a theory of the work to do the work (no pun 
intended) and be the object of critical inquiry; I do not want to enagage in 
“humptydumptying”118 over the definition of “work-hood.” 
  On the other hand, one may claim work-hood is merely a stranglehold—perhaps, 
monopoly—of the past that is oppressive to other, often newer, genres.  One way of emphasizing 
the significant differences, aesthetic and otherwise, between Western art music and other genres, 
including many “world” musical genres, is to eliminate the work-concept.  My solution is this.  If 
the general work-concept is interpreted as “focus of appreciation,” an object of aesthetic 
judgments, then the concept will be sufficiently malleable to allow us to use it for other genres.  
This solution, then, both addresses the potential negative effect of dismissing the work-concept 
in improvisatory and other genres, and liberates these genres from the oft-viewed oppressive past 
tradition.  It does the former by preserving the work-concept; it does the latter by recognizing 
ontological plurality while still using the work-concept.  I will argue in favor of such an 
ontological plurality below. 
 Another reason to use and focus on the concept of “work” with respect to improvisations 
is that we do want improvisations to be on par with the western classical notion of musical work 
as composition.  Even the enemies of the idea that improvisations are works think this; for 
example Stephen Davies says, “… improvisers and performers can deserve no less praise for 
their creativity than composers receive.”119  This is also the reason why other terms for 
classifying improvisations would be insufficient.  For example, Paul Thom has suggested that 
                                                         
118 I learned this term from Nigel Warburton, Thinking from A to Z (New York: Routledge, 
1996), 73.  (This book is in its third edition now.) 
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improvisations may be “aesthetic objects” but not WOAs.120  And not all aesthetic objects are 
WOAs.  He grants, while falling short of asserting it, that performances and works performed 
can be aesthetic objects, but they are not WOAs.  Putting these together into argument form 
yields an invalid argument.  I accept the premise that not all aesthetic objects are WOAs 
(alternatively, some aesthetic objects are not WOAs).  But that being true does not show which 
aesthetic objects are not WOAs; it merely says at least one is not, we do not know which one (or 
set).  In this argument, to suppose that improvisations are included in the set of aesthetic objects 
that are not WOAs is petitio principii.  Nothing in this argument entails that improvisations 
cannot be aesthetic objects, performances, and WOAs. 
 Whether or not the work in a particular genre or tradition is in fact the primary object of 
appreciation, there is no doubt that work-hood has a central role in much of music appreciation, 
criticism, and musical practices.  An example of the prejudice for a singular conception of the 
musical work is given by Martha Nussbaum, although the spirit of what she says is correct:  “The 
concept of the musical artwork that organizes our practices of concert going is in fact of 
relatively recent origin, even in the West; and yet this fact is far from widely recognized.  A 
listener who brings that concept to a performance by Ravi Shankar is likely to miss many aspects 
of his creative contribution, which is that of improvisation within the limits of a classical form 
with long traditions of performance.”121  My response is that it is not the concept of MW that is 
the problem here, but the conception of the MW.  By interpreting work-hood to be the focus of 
appreciation (or one of the main foci of appreciation), we are not committed to the notion that 
there is only one kind of thing that satisfies and functions as the focus of appreciation in all 
                                                         
120 Paul Thom, For an Audience: A Philosophy of the Performing Arts, The Arts and Their 
Philosophies Series, (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1993), 62. 
121 Martha C. Nussbaum, Cultivating Humanity: A Classical Defense of Reform in Liberal 
Education (Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University Press, 1997), 120. 
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artistic contexts.  This simply means that the particular kind of thing a work is in the classical 
tradition will be different for other genres.  In other genres we want something to regard in high 
esteem, but we need a different ontological conception of work-hood.  In other words, there is no 
one size fits all theory of work-hood.  So, there will be some features of work-hood that classical 
art music possesses that will be retained in other genres and others not.  Consequently, work-
hood in different genres of music are going to be a different kinds of object—but all will be the 
focus (or foci) of appreciation.  But that also explains why it is important to retain the term 
“work” and our interest in it.  We need to show that there is something on par with classical art 
music work-hood in other traditions and genres, if they are to be valued and evaluated on equal 
grounds.  Therefore, I shall proceed by using the work-hood concept. 
  
2.3.2 General Challenges to Improvisations as Works 
 
 Many philosophers and musicologists challenge the claim that improvisations are WOAs 
and/or MWs.  From a review of the literature and an informal, unscientific poll, the presumption 
seems to be that improvisations are not WOAs.  Aestheticians such as Stephen Davies, Andrew 
Kania, Paul Thom, and Andy Hamilton argue for this thesis;122 whereas, the notable exceptions 
are Peter Kivy (to some extent) and Philip Alperson, who think that improvisations are 
                                                         
122 Stephen Davies, Musical Works and Performances: A Philosophical Exploration (New York: 
Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press, 2001); Andrew Kania, "All Play and No Work: The 
Ontology of Jazz," Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 69, no. 4 (Fall 2011): 391-403; Andy 
Hamilton, “The Aesthetics of Imperfection,” Philosophy 65 (July 1990): 323-340; Any 
Hamilton, “The Art of Improvisation and the Aesthetics of Imperfection” The British Journal of 
Aesthetics 40, no. 1 (January 2000): 168-185; Paul Thom, For An Audience. 
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WOAs.123  In a nutshell, here are the main arguments against the claim that improvisations are 
MWs. 
 
Challenge 1 (CH 1)  Improvisations are performances (i.e., necessarily), and performances are 
not, and cannot be, artworks.  This is the view of Paul Thom among others.124 
 
(CH 2)  Improvisations are not strictly compositions (in other words there are differences 
between the two action-types), and only compositions are (or give rise to) MWs.  Only the 
action-type of composing gives rise to MWs.  There are other tough cases for this argument:  are 
orchestrations, arrangements, and transcriptions separate MWs? 
 
(CH 3)  Recorded improvisations are documentations, and documentations are not WOAs or 
MWs.  On some metaphysical views, all WOAs are documentations of the actions or action-
types that created them.125  I will bracket that minority view here. 
 
I shall examine each of these views, and in so doing some aspects of my positive theory that 
improvisations are WOAs will be adumbrated. 
 Certainly, improvisations are performances, as established in 2.1.  I think (CH 1) is false.  
Consider 
  Premise 1. No WOAs are events (event-tokens). 
                                                         
123 Peter Kivy, Authenticities; Philip Alperson, “On Musical Improvisation.” The Journal of 
Aesthetics and Art Criticism 43, no. 1 (Fall 1984): 17-29. 
124 Paul Thom, For An Audience. 
125 For example, David Davies, and Gregory Currie, An Ontology of Art, Scots Philosophical 
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  Premise 2. All performances are events (event-tokens). 
  3. / No performances are WOAs. 
 
This argument is valid.  Is it sound?  Premise (1) is an odd claim to make.  The problem here is 
the assumption that WOAs in general must be the kind of entities with which one may engage 
more than once.  In other words, WOAs must be capable of being multiply instanced.  
Consequently, WOAs cannot be ephemeral, fleeting, non-static events.  But one can engage with 
fleeting things more than once depending on what one talking about.  We can engage with the 
action-type of improvising itself more than once, or (say) Sonny Rollins’ improvising over 
rhythm changes more than once.  But these observations equivocate on the object of engagement 
that concerns us in the above argument.  The sound sequence that Rollins played, which was an 
event, over rhythm changes on July 4, 1958 at the Village Vanguard no longer exists, it has been 
swept away into the dustbin of jazz history.  How could that event be a WOA or MW? 
 Although Premise 1 and its assumption (multiple engagement or instantiation) are 
plausible, they are based on confusion and a lack of charity.  The lack of charity derives from 
their ungenerous view that only works for performance exist; they ignore, at least conceptually, 
the possibility of works not for performance.126  They can be accused of this lack of charity 
because there is no a priori reason for there not being works for performance and works not for 
performance.  But a stronger objection to Premise 1 and the multiplicity assumption is that it 
conflates metaphysics and epistemology.  The paradigm examples of WOAs that Thom and 
others use are Shakespeare’s King Lear, Joyce’s Ulysses, and Beethoven’s Sixth Symphony.  I 
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can attend many performances of the play King Lear and read Ulysses many times; I can read 
King Lear and Ulysses and recommend them to others to read; I can attend many performances 
of the Sixth Symphony.  However, the reason one can do those things is because the text of King 
Lear still exists, and there are many copies of the text, and there are probably people who have 
much of it memorized such that a group could perhaps put together the text from memory.  But if 
these were not famous works to which many people for a long time have been acquainted, the 
memory extraction would not be the case.  If all of the copies of King Lear, Ulysses and the 
Sixth Symphony were destroyed, and no one remembered them, they would not be multiple.  
People could not engage with them.  Now I do not want to say that under those conditions King 
Lear or Ulysses or the Sixth Symphony does not exist.  They do exist and they would continue to 
exist as abstract objects, perhaps as types.  But there would be no tokens.  There would be no 
possibility of multiplicity—multiple engagements or instantiations.  There is conflation of 
acquaintance of what there is and what there is. 
 Another problem with Premise 1 and Premise 2 involves confusion over doing and 
making.  Performers do something, and performances involve doing not making.  Performers act, 
play, move, dance, et cetera.  Is acting, playing, and moving a doing or making or both?  WOAs, 
it is claimed, are made, created, and are not just doing.  But even in the case where performers 
are doing and not making (if that distinction makes sense), this is not the case for improvisers 
because they are making while doing.  Even if one does not view the product as a WOA, it is 
clear that improvisers make/create a sound-sequence, which instantiates an abstract sound 
structure.  Something has been made (or discovered).  The process of making something does not 
entail that the product of the making continues to exist beyond the making.  Imagine that 
someone manipulates some medium and the product of manipulation passes away immediately 
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after.  The way Thom interprets making is as though making art entails that the product of the 
making must be available only after the making.  What an (artistic) agent makes may exist only 
whilst she makes it.  There is no logical error in that.  Richard Shusterman makes a similar point 
eloquently:  “This separation of the WOA from the artist’s personality has deeply marked our 
aesthetic heritage.  …  But there is also a tradition in aesthetics that affirms a greater unity of art 
and life, of making and doing.”127  If not by traditional classical music performers, then the 
existence and historical persistence of improvisers and improvisation have demanded, and give 
justification for, that other tradition. 
 A similar argument used in favor of (CH 1) is that performers are not creative, or ought 
not to be creative.  Their role is one of fealty.  Performances are judged on their fidelity to 
WOAs, directions, production types.  But this is a limited understanding of what it is to be 
creative.  Creation and making admit of degrees.  There are different levels of creativity, which 
do give rise to different kinds of fidelity—as in fidelity to one’s self and one’s artistic integrity or 
personal style. 
 It is much easier to claim that a certain set of musical performers are creative because of 
the specific nature of their practices.  A pianist or harpsichordist who performs Bach’s keyboard 
works is attempting to perform a work and make it available to listeners.  But that is not all they 
are doing.  The performer is trying to interpret the work in a specific way, often to reveal some 
properties which the performer thinks ought to be emphasized or highlighted, or more generally, 
and perhaps more importantly, to reveal a personal understanding or “vision” of the work.  This 
is much easier to make sense of when the player (the musician) of the work is simultaneously the 
director or interpreter or producer.  This also explains why the conductor of orchestras is 
                                                         
127 Richard Shusterman, Performing Live: Aesthetic Alternatives for the Ends of Art (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 2000), 202. 
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considered creative in the sense that he or she is revealing a personal understanding of an 
orchestral work through directing the musicians of the orchestra.  But this also shows why we 
have intuitions that all of those musicians are not being creative but more robotic in following 
the explicit, precise instructions of the score, the conductor, and perhaps even their principal 
(first chair of each instrument section).  Typically, we do not think of orchestra musicians as 
creative performers, but we do attribute competence and excellence in execution and expression.  
We reserve ultimate praise for the virtuosos who perform solo and out in front of the orchestra or 
ensemble for concertos and sonatas and the like.  The difference is that the orchestra musicians 
have little, if any, opportunity for conveying a personal understanding of the work, and in fact it 
may not be their proper role.  If an orchestra musician did attempt more than this, it would 
probably be viewed negatively; whereas, the soloist does convey personal understanding of a 
work, or in Peter Kivy’s terminology “personal authenticity.”128 
 But in performing arts where there is more separation between these activities, the 
distinctions seem to get more pronounced and problematic.  Consider theatre and dance.  
Sometimes the situation seems to be similar to the orchestra case, sometimes not.  When certain 
actors perform in plays, people go to see the actor.  But here they might be interested for two 
divergent reasons.  Audiences might just want to see the actor perform whether or not the actor is 
responsible for the interpretation of the work.  Here the qualities admired might be brilliant 
execution, personal charisma and style.  Or some actors are admired because of their personal 
understandings of characters, roles, plays interpretations etc.  For example, Olivier:  he is 
admired sometimes for the interpretation of a Shakespeare play, sometimes because of the 
brilliant personal understanding or vision of a character in Shakespeare.  Examples of charisma 
                                                         
128 Peter Kivy, Authenticities. 
  
254 
and style might be some film actors, such as Jack Nicholson, Robert Mitchum, and some 
character actors.  Occasionally, these two spheres collide:  the personal understanding and 
personal style, the execution and the interpretation.  In theatre we value certain directors (in film 
this is even more obvious because of the increased role over artistic decisions that the film 
director has over what is ultimately presented to the audience) because of their skill in 
emphasizing certain features of theatre works or their strong personal understandings of works 
(think of Elia Kazan and Mike Nichols). 
 So, if multiplicity through continued physical existence is the central reason for Premise 
1, and I have shown that the assumption that makes Premise 1 plausible is false, then Premise 1 
loses its presumption.  Hence, the argument is unsound. 
 Moreover, (CH 1) supposes an oversimplified art ontology.  Performances are event-
tokens, but they can be tokens of a performance type, usually a production type.  Performance 
tokens are not just tokens of the WOA as score or script.  Each object/event has different levels 
of ontological thickness and thinness.  I proffer opera as an example.  I attended two 
performance tokens of Mozart’s Die Zauberflöte at the Santa Fe Opera in July 1998—two 
consecutive nights.  Jonathan Miller was the director and blocked the acting, designed the sets 
and costumes and lighting.  Miller decided to set the story, plot and characters in post World War 
I 1920s Vienna, in an expensive, fancy hotel.  The following things seem to exist:  the WOA Die 
Zauberflöte by Mozart, which includes his score, Emanuel Schikaneder’s libretto, and some 
surviving stage instructions; the production type, which is Miller’s interpretation of Die 
Zauberflöte; individual performance tokens.  Evaluative concerns motivate such an ontology.  
Mozart’s work is brilliant and wonderful—high aesthetic and artistic value.  In my view, the 
production type—the Miller interpretation—was a failure; it did not work (no more “magic” in 
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The Magic Flute).  Yet on the second night the performance token was excellently executed.  I 
do not fault the performers for a lousy direction and production type.  Given the production type, 
they performed well.  On the first night, the performance token failed because the power failed at 
the opera house and this threw the entire performance off.  Evaluations can be different for each 
performance token.  To make matters simple:  score and libretto receive positive evaluation, 
production type negative, first performance token negative, the second performance token 
positive.  What makes the different evaluations possible is the ontological complexity.  Opera is 
an ontologically complex art form.  What is a production type?  This is a set instructions that can 
be multiply instanced, yet it is derivative on a different type of work.  The performance tokens 
here are instances of two “types:”  Die Zauberflöte and the Miller production type.  It may be the 
case that if no one recorded these performances and Miller’s and his collaborators’ instructions, 
then there will never be another token of this production type.  The type is fleeting in one sense, 
but continues to exist as some sort of type, an abstract object, though no one will ever have 
access to it.  I want to say that the score/libretto, production type, and each performance token is 
a WOA. 
Moreover, performance tokens, either recorded or not, are important because they 
constitute an oeuvre.  We value oeuvre.  Performers who exclusively perform (not compose et 
cetera) give us performance tokens to evaluate.  Kevin Bazzana makes an analogical argument 
with the auteur theory in philosophy of film and cinema studies.  Speaking of Glenn Gould, 
Bazzana says, 
 
I would suggest, in fact, that his [Glenn Gould’s] oeuvre merits consideration by 
standards very like those of the so-called auteur theory of cinema, as propounded by 
French (and later American) film critics in the 1950s and 1960s.  According to the auteur 
theory, the personality of the director was a criterion of value, particularly where there 
was a manifest tension between that personality and the material of the work.  Moreover, 
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with a canonical director who had a particularly distinctive personal vision, the auteur 
critic was interested not only (or even especially) in evaluating the individual films but in 
appreciating the oeuvre as a whole, and so in situating the individual films within the 
overall conception of the director.  Put bluntly, the auteur critic was as interested in a 
director’s artistic failures as in his successes, where that director’s work as a whole was 
deemed important; failure illuminates the oeuvre no less than does success.  The auteur 
theory was not intended to sanitize the canonical directors, to find reasons to excuse or 
forgive their weak and unconvincing productions, but rather to acknowledge that those 
productions existed within an oeuvre that had a value greater than the sum of its 
constituent works.  Indeed, auteur critics were often more interested in the bad works of 
great directors than the exceptional successes of mediocre ones.129 
 
Certainly, improvisers fit into this category, making their individual performances and 
recordings primary objects of appreciation. 
 Next, let us consider (CH 3).  Noël Carroll gives an account of broadcast improvisations.  
Non-recorded broadcast improvisations raise difficulties because they are events.  Carroll 
characterizes and putatively solves the problem thus: 
 
... I think that our anxieties rest on the intuition that improvisations are one-of-a-kind 
events. 
 I believe that there are two ways to handle this problem.  The first is to concede 
that improvisations are singular artworks and to argue that, as in the case of single 
instance photographs, reception instances of improvisations are documentations rather 
than tokens of the works in question.  However, the second solution to this problem, and 
the one I prefer, is to deny that improvisations are, in principle, single instance artworks.  
For improvisations can be memorized and played again by the original artists or by 
someone else; they can be notated, as they are in the classical tradition, and played again; 
and in the age of mass art they can be taped and/or memorized by listeners who, in turn 
can notate them and/or reproduce them.  An improvisation continues to exist as long as 
token performances of it may be executed.  A painting ceases to exist when the “original 
is destroyed; but in this sense, there are not, strictly speaking, originals in the case of 
improvised musical or dramatic productions.  It is conceptually possible to replicate an 
improvisation, but it is not possible to replicate paintings under the standard concept of 
painting. 
 Improvisations are not, in principle, singular artworks.  Thus, the pattern 
developed to characterize film artworks can be applied to broadcast improvisations.  That 
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is, we see and/or hear token reception instances of the improvisation type through the 
mediation of a token transmission signal template.130 
 
Carroll is correct in saying that there are reception tokens of improvisation types.  However, one 
can still recognize improvisations, a certain class of them, as singular WOAs, as I shall argue 
below. 
 Several points need to be made about documentations.  What is a documentation?  It 
seems to be a metaphysical category that is distinct from WOAs, representations, instances, 
exemplifications, and reproductions.  There are theories of MWs that involve recordings as a 
primary mode of being.  Consequently, if these theories are sound (which I think they are), then 
in principle there is nothing wrong with recordings functioning as entities in an ontological 
theory.  In addition, recordings are stable, more or less static entities.  They are like scores, and if 
my point about notational bias and technology from above are correct, then recordings 
themselves may be used or may be viewed as notational devices, too.  Second, musical 
performances are works are documentations of MWs. 
 In addition, if documentations exist as a separate ontological category, then they must be 
recordings.  The method and media of recording is not important here.  If the documentation is 
sufficiently transparent, then one would see through or hear through the recording medium and 
engage the object or event that was recorded.  Hence, that a recording is a documentation does 
not entail that there is no WOA.  It is a documentation of a WOA.  Merely calling something a 
documentation does not entail that there is no WOA involved. 
 Now I consider (CH 2).  The differences and similarities between composing and 
improvising have already been discussed in the action theory section above.  Here one must find 
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a characteristic that is not only contrastive between composing and improvising but also makes a 
difference to the WOA/MW issue.  Prescription is a good candidate:  composing prescribes 
(usually through notation), and improvising does not prescribe.  Even though I do not think 
prescription is a necessary condition for composing, one may think that prescription is essential 
for work status.  Hence, one may say that the distinction between the two action-types does not 
necessarily entail anything about work status,131 unless 
 
 (CW) The only action-type that generates, gives rise to, to WOAs or MWs is composing 
 
is true.  Given that there is a distinction between the two action-types of composing and 
improvising (though not mutually exclusive on the continuum), then 
 
 (IW) The action-type of improvising does not generate WOAs or MWs 
 
would be true, too.  Are there any reasons to accept (CW)?  We shall see quickly how meta-
ontological considerations enter into this investigation.  Because I am trying to argue that 
improvisations are WOAs, I must show that (CW) is false or at least questionable.  I see no 
reason to accept this categorical claim (CW).  The only way for (CW) to be true is if one could 
show that (CW) is true a priori, by fiat, if you will.  This means that (CW) would be an analytic 
proposition—that is the only way (CW) can be a priori true.  There are two possible meanings 
here:  (1) generating works is part of the meaning of composing; or (2) part of the meaning of 
“work of art” or “musical work” is that it was the result of a compositional process, the action-
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type composing.  Consider (1) first.  Is it really part of the meaning of composition or composing 
that it generates WOAs or MWs?  Now composing must result in something, something 
produced or generated by whatever process of composition is being eventuated, but that is far 
from saying what the exact nature of the product is.  However, even if it were true that the 
generation of works is part of the meaning of composing, it would not entail that composing is 
the only generative process that gives rise to WOAs or MWs.  Instead, one might say that the 
product of the action-type composing is a composition.  That seems true but tautologous.  That 
would be analytic, and it would be illuminating for our purposes only if 
 
 (CW`) All compositions (the results of composing) are WOAs or MWs 
 
were true.  Even people who believe (CW) is true would not accept (CW`).  Not all artists’ 
doodles, sketches, notes, et cetera are WOAs even though in some sense they were composed, 
generated in the act of composition.  I am excluding the cases of day-dream-like doodling.  
Doodles of this type seem like improvisations. 
 How do we want to consider the status of compositions?  Is it merely a synonym for 
WOA or MW?  How would one argue for such conclusions?  It is not clear to me what kinds of 
arguments can be proffered here except appeals to semantic intuitions.  I must admit that my 
intuitions are neutral here.  WOAs and MWs are products of activities or accomplished in the 
course of those activities. 
 Now consider meaning (2).  Part of the meaning of “work of art” or “musical work” is 
that it was the result of composing.  This is not more plausible than (CW`).  Perhaps, the only 
way to settle this is by semantic intuitions and use.  It is more plausible to think that 
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 (CW``) The action-type composing generates, or gives rise to, WOAs or MWs. 
 
(CW``) says that when an agent legitimately composes, the result is a WOA or MW.  This claim 
is quantifying over the actions that are properly “composings” not over WOAs or MWs.  
Therefore, (CW``) does not exclude other means of generation of WOAs or MWs—in other 
words (IW) can be false.  Thus, even though “composing” may always generate WOAs/MWs, it 
can be the case that other action-types generate WOAs/MW, such as improvising. 
 Is there any reason to think (IW) is true regardless of the status of CW or CW` or CW``?  
(IW) can be dismissed for the same reasons that (CW) failed.  (IW) would have to be a priori 
true, and thus an analytic proposition.  In other words, part of the meaning of “improvise” and its 
cognates would include the idea that the result of such action-types is not a WOA; and similarly, 
part of the meaning of “work of art” or “musical work” is that the object or event to which it 
refers was not improvised.  It is absurd to think that people have such semantic intuitions without 
already having an account of WOA or MW in their background knowledge.  Perhaps, one way to 
investigate this is experimental philosophy.  This would require finding out and testing people’s 
semantic intuitions about “work of art,” “musical work,” “composing,” “improvising.”  A bit of 
armchair and anecdotal social and cognitive psychology is required in the absence of such 
experimental evidence, although I am not sure that the kinds of experiments that could be 
developed to test our semantic intuitions would be adequately robust to establish an hypothesis 
either way.  It is not clear that people have semantic intuitions about “work of art” or “musical 
work,” because although these terms are used by lay people, critics, and artists, their use of these 
terms does not seem stable and comprehensive; they are terms of art and convenience.  In 
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general people do not have fully worked out views of what they mean by “work of art” or 
“musical work.”  Furthermore, it could turn out that these terms function with stability within 
certain highly rarefied groups, such as classical musicians, jazz musicians, popular music critics, 
et cetera.  If this is the case, then it simply shows the need to do conceptual analysis, to do 
philosophy. 
 This really leaves us in our initial position here:  try to find an attribute that WOAs or 
MWs possess, but improvisations do not.  So, let us go back to the initial suggestion:  
prescription.  To prescribe here means to give instructions for doing something (e.g., playing, 
moving).  Talk of prescription usually comes along with other claims.  For example, if X is 
prescriptive, then one is primarily interested in the execution of X, or the product of the 
execution of X.  In the Standard Case of Composition (SCC) from the beginning of Part II, the 
notated score is a set of instructions for musicians to execute.  Since it is obviously wrong to 
identify the MW with the score, the score is used as an exemplar for the properties that ought to 
be included in the account or the theory of the MW.  If improvisations are not prescriptive, then 
improvisations would be excluded if  
 
 (WP) WOAs must be prescriptive 
 
is true.  If (WP) is true, and if composing is essentially prescriptive and improvisation is not, then 
we would have sufficient evidence to conclude that improvisations are not WOAs, and in general 
improvising (action-type) does not generate WOAs.  But (WP) is false.  Counterexamples are 
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paintings, sculptures, and literary works.  None of these works of art are prescriptive and they 
certainly are works.132  Perhaps (WP) needs to be modified to 
 
 (PWP) Performing arts works must be prescriptive. 
 
Or, more modestly, 
 
 (MWP) Musical works must be prescriptive. 
 
Since, (MWP) would be included within the scope of (PWP), let us consider the more modest 
claim.  (MWP) says, in other words, being prescriptive is a necessary condition for being a 
musical work (X is a MW only if X is prescriptive); prescription is essential to be a MW.  Why 
is there (or should there be) a difference between works of art in general and musical works?  
Obviously, some level of specificity has to be given in an account of WOAs for each art form, 
but there should be some general features of works of art that remain constant through all of the 
art forms.  Is that true?  Consider 
 
                                                         
132 There are some counterexamples to this claim, but they are rare.  For example, there can be a 
painting that is a set of instructions of some kind, and literary works can certainly be of set of 
instructions to do something or make something.  But these cases are few and far between and do 
not represent the central components of these art forms.  Furthermore, in this kind of case the 
actual execution of the prescription is not important—that it is a prescription is what is 
aesthetically interestingly.  However, in the standard case of MWs, the execution of the 
prescription (i.e., a performance) is the focus of appreciation, and functions (for the most part) as 
the epistemic access to the work. 
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 (Plurality WOA) Different art forms, to be determined in some suitable way, must have 
different accounts or theories of what counts as a work of art (the identity of WOAs) in that 
particular art form; and 
 
 (Unity WOA) Despite there being different art forms, genres, and other categories, there 
is only one kind of WOA. 
 
(Plurality WOA) leaves open the question that there are universal features to all WOAs in all art 
forms.  Hence, there are distinctive features to WOAs in each art form, and there may be some 
universal features that these WOAs share.  Similarly, if (Plurality WOA) sounds reasonable, then 
an ontological pluralism with respect to genres should also sound reasonable.  Different genres 
may require different theories of WOAs and MWs.  Investigating and theorizing about individual 
art forms and genres has been a recent change in analytic aesthetics.  Consider what Noël Carroll 
says: 
 
Recently, philosophers of art have wanted to alleviate the overly constricted 
configuration of the field by looking at the special theoretical problems of individual arts, 
by returning to older questions of the aesthetics of nature, and by re-situating traditional 
questions about art within broader questions about the function of symbol systems in 
general.  The present attempt at a philosophy of horror is part of this effort to widen the 
purview of philosophical aesthetics.  Not only should the special problems of artforms 
[sic] be reconsidered; but the special problems of genres that cross artforms should be re-
evaluated as well.133 
 
In addition, Peter Kivy, in what may be called a manifesto (very unusual for Kivy, it should be 
noted), has suggested that aestheticians focus on problems and questions that may be distinctive 
                                                         
133 Noël Carroll, The Philosophy of Horror or Paradoxes of the Heart (New York: Routledge, 
1990), 9. 
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in particular art forms and genres.  In fact, the title of his book reveals the project:  Philosophies 
of Arts: An Essay in Differences.  The first two chapters of this book, “How We Got Here, and 
Why” and “Where We Are,” are derived from his Presidential Address to the American Society 
for Aesthetics Annual Meeting in 1992.  Kivy says, 
 
I have been arguing that the history of aesthetic theory, from its modern beginnings in the 
eighteenth century to its present, flourishing state, has been almost a single-purpose quest 
for the “common property,” with absolute music as the perennial experimentum crucis …  
And as things presently stand, that quest remains the major activity of philosophers of art, 
with no settled-on solution in hand. 
 This not to say that differences in the arts have not, historically, been recognized 
as an object of philosophical concern.  …  However that may be, the overriding concern 
was, and continues to be, the search for sameness; and that search has blinded the 
philosophical community to a bevy of questions of more than trivial importance, 
involving the arts not in their sameness but in their particularity.  …  what I am urging, 
by both precept and example, is that the project of philosophically scrutinizing the 
individual arts—both “high” and “low”—and their distinctive differences be taken off the 
back burner and put up front.  There is no reason we cannot keep two kettles boiling at 
once.134 
 
Thus, Kivy is urging an emphasis on looking for the differences between art forms and genres, 
but not at the expense of the traditional “cross-form” questions and problems.  We would do well 
to do both.  (Also notice his inclusion of so-called high and low art, which would include popular 
art forms and genres.)  This opens the door to thinking that different art forms and genres may 
require very different treatment in terms of approach and theories.  Specifically, here this would 
mean that one cannot speak of a or the “theory of the musical work;” instead, there will be 
theories of musical works.  Different genres have different salient features, different things to 
which listeners pay attention, different concerns, and these inform understanding and evaluation 
within genres.  It makes sense to have different conceptions of MWs (or, more generally, WOAs) 
                                                         
134 Peter Kivy, Philosophies of Arts: An Essay in Differences (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1997), 52-53. 
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that reflect these differences, if we are to understand the concept of work of music as the primary 
object of appreciation. 
 As indicated above, even if (Plurality WOA) is true, it would not preclude the fact that 
there are some properties of works of art that are universal, viz., hold for works of art in all art 
forms.  To deny this would be to accept 
 
 (Sui Generis WOA) Different art forms, to be determined in some suitable way, must 
have completely different accounts or theories of what counts as a work of art in that particular 
art form, i.e., each art form is sui generis with respect to work-hood. 
 
Various reasons can be given for accepting this sui generis claim.135  But if this were true it 
would call into question some traditional, standard problems and questions in aesthetics, such as 
the definition of art, the nature of aesthetic experience, et cetera, those that Kivy mentions 
above—the quest of a common property.  These projects are supposed to range over all of the 
arts forms and sometimes are even meant to be broader, as in the aesthetics of nature and 
artificial environments (as Carroll mentions above).  No one would deny that one has different 
kinds of experiences in reading a novel, listening to music, looking at pictures; however, 
intuitions substantiate that these kinds of experiences are different from all other kinds of 
experiences.  How are they different?  They are, at least in part, aesthetic.  So, aestheticians have 
                                                         
135 For example, medium specificity theories could be committed to such a claim and to a certain 
degree support it.  But just because particular art forms (and possibly genres) are better than 
others in communicating or conveying certain contents does not mean that nothing is shared 
among art forms.  And if properties are shared among works of art in different art forms, the sui 
generis claim is false. 
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tried to figure out what that difference is, whilst still recognizing some higher-level, so to speak, 
variation with respect to engagement with the different art forms. 
 Now one may object to the above criticism of the sui generis principle by pointing out 
that (1) so much the worse for traditional aesthetic problems; and (2) my examples given above 
may require general theorizing, but work-hood issues are a different matter.  But it is difficult to 
imagine that general things can be said about the definition of art but nothing general can be said 
about work-hood status in all art forms.  Even if there are, roughly, things that can be said about 
what counts as art in general and what counts as an aesthetic experience, some of these 
similarities must enter into theories of work-hood.  Therefore, because of the long tradition of 
aestheticians having something to say about properties ranging over all of the art forms, and that 
work-hood theories will to some extent be parasitic on these other aesthetic issues, (Sui Generis 
WOA) is false. 
 I implied above that the disjunction between (Plurality WOA) and (Sui Generis WOA) is 
mutually exhaustive, though not mutually exclusive.  If these alternatives were not exhaustive, 
then I would be guilty of the false dilemma fallacy.  However, both could be true and both could 
be false.  The plan was that if one thinks that (Plurality WOA) is false, then one is committed to 
either (Sui Generis WOA) or (Unity WOA).  But I have shown that there are good reasons to 
think that (Sui Generis WOA) and (Unity WOA) are false.  Therefore, (Plurality WOA) is 
presumptively true.  (Plurality WOA) is borne out in our artistic and appreciative practices.  
Given (Plurality WOA) then, in some art forms or genres WOAs are prescriptive, and in other art 
forms or genres they are not prescriptive. 
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 But I also want to argue that improvisations can be prescriptive, and there is a sense in 
which all improvisations are prescriptive.  I will argue for this below.  Let us then focus on a 
single art form. 
 Within music, ontological plurality may be true.  Thus, 
 
 (Plurality MWP) There are different kinds of musical works. 
 
This view is a kind of Ontological Pluralism because it states that there is more than one kind of 
MW.  The use of the term “musical work” already implies that there are different kinds of WOAs 
because there are different art forms, but it is still possible to have one account or theory of the 
WOA.  Thus, on this view, it might even be nonsensical to speak of “musical works;” there is no 
singular, unique thing to which one may refer.  Different theories of MWs might correlate to 
musical genres, and this supposes that one could give a suitable account of genre and genre 
differences.  Or different theories of MWs might correlate to different action-types or musical 
practices.  Differences between practices and genres do not necessarily mean that some have 
work status while others do not have work status.  One might have to decide about work status 
on case-by-case basis.  First, let us address the claim itself.  How can one defend (Plurality 
MWP)? 
 (Plurality MWP) can be defended on appreciative and evaluative grounds.  One considers 
what aesthetic understanding consists of in a particular genre or musical practice.  Some degree 
of musical understanding is necessary for the proper appreciation and evaluation of the products 
of these genres and practices.  In fact, these are inter-defined and dependent:  proper appreciation 
is determined by understanding, and understanding is motivated by wanting to properly 
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appreciate, and thereby evaluate, the products of genres and practices.  Understanding resides in 
part in explaining (or having explanations of) features of the artistic products (foci of 
appreciation).  Sometimes the explanations will be obvious, and other times one will have to rely 
on the constructed intentions of the artists.  One begins to obtain answers to why-questions by 
determining the distinguishing characteristics of each genre and practice.  Salient features of 
genres and practices will be determined.  Proper appreciation should include these salient 
features, and the evaluation of the products will be based, perhaps in large part, on these salient 
features.  Evaluation without consideration of these salient features is a form of missing the 
point.  If a particular theory of WOAs or MWs does not capture these salient features, then the 
theory will not be about the object or focus of appreciation.  As indicated in 2.3.1, a fundamental 
intuition that we have about the existence of WOAs in general is that they account for, and are 
the embodiment of, the object of appreciation—what it is we think we are evaluating.  Thus, if 
the salient features of different genres and practices are not shared, then this will require different 
theories of the MW in each case.  In other words, the theory of the MW in each genre should 
capture the salient features of the main object or objects of appreciation in that respective genre. 
 Consider what Stephen Toulmin says here.  He makes the point well: 
 
Not so long ago, in the days before it became intellectually respectable, jazz used to be 
contrasted with ‘good music.’  Of course (the critics granted) it was not all equally 
debased:  there could be better jazz and worse jazz.  For that matter, not all ‘good music’ 
was equally good--nor even ‘good’:  Grieg, for instance, was a splendid composer of his 
kind, and yet remained suspect, as not being wholly ‘good.’  Still, in judging music (it 
was presumed) one had to consider both whether a piece or composer was a good 
example of a particular type, and whether that type was a ‘good’ type.  Different genres 
of music were thus placed in a hierarchy, some being subordinated to others. 
     Looking back, we may doubt whether these cross-type comparisons were fair, or even 
legitimate.  Yet the fact is that they were made.  ...  Just as the question ‘Is this music 
good of its kind?’ is distinct from the question ‘Is it “good” music?,’ so we find scientists 
asking both ‘Is this event a natural and self-explanatory one of its kind?’ and also ‘Is this 
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an example of the most natural and self-explanatory sort?’  Explanatory ideals and 
paradigms thus have two parts to play.  Within a given science, such as dynamics, one 
kind of motion (say) will be accepted as the standard of intelligibility.  ...  But, when we 
compare happenings of different kinds, we find different sciences being subordinated to 
one another, and so setting standards for one another, in the same way as genres of 
music.  Phenomena may, as a result, be explained either by comparing them with other, 
more self-explanatory happenings of the same kind or by relating them to happenings of 
some other sort, which are thought to be intrinsically more natural, acceptable, and self-
explanatory.136 
 
Recognizing different art forms and genres do not entail their relations are hierarchical.  Of 
course, there is a grand history in aesthetics of philosophers attempting to create such 
hierarchies.  Among the most infamous are Plato, Kant, Hegel, and Schopenhauer.  All attempts 
were failures, often because of the implausibility of the more general metaphysical theories on 
which they grounded. 
 The justification just provided for (MWP) involves meta-ontological issues.  The 
ontology of human artifacts,137 and perhaps other social phenomena, should be treated differently 
than the ontology of the natural world and perhaps some abstract objects such as numbers and 
geometric objects.  In the latter case, realism would require that truth conditions will be tied to a 
set of considerations that are independent of human interests, though perhaps not human 
intervention.138  In the case of human artifacts our interests are relevant and may be used to settle 
metaphysical issues.  To be specific in the case that concerns us here:  there would be no other 
reasons to contrive a theory of the MW if it were not for our interests in appreciation and 
evaluation.  We are still interested in the truth, of course, but the truth conditions are more 
                                                         
136 Stephen Toulmin, Foresight and Understanding: An Enquiry into the Aims of Science, Harper 
Torchbooks, The Science Library Series (Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 1961; 
reprint edition, New York: Harper and Row, 1963), 62-63. 
137 For an excellent account of the concept of “artifact,” see Randall Dipert, Artifacts, Artworks, 
and Agency. 
138 See, for example, Ian Hacking, Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural 
Science (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983). 
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directly influenced by, even generated by, human-centered concerns.139  There will be the 
question of exactly what constitutes a social phenomenon from a non-social one, and it is easy to 
think of the hard cases; however, when it comes to art, justifiably there is not much debate.  Art, 
though perhaps not aesthetics broadly construed, is artifactual.140 
 If prescription does not prohibit improvisations from being classified as WOAs or MWs, 
then multiple realization or instantiation may be the barrier to prevent improvisations from being 
WOAs or MWs. 
 Consider 
 
 (MI) Musical works must be capable of being multiply instanced. 
 
What does “multiply instanced” mean?  Multiply instanced is sometimes called repeatability.  
The way in which musical works are multiply instanced is mainly through performances and/or 
reception tokens.  The latter covers the sound reproduction of a musical recording.  If (MI) is 
true of works for performance (not performed works), then (MWP) must be true, for otherwise 
how would one instance a Wi without a set of instructions?  But there is no reason to think 
(MWP) is true.  If one includes reception tokens as instances of a work, then (MWP) does not 
have to be true for (MI) to be true.  However, even a recording can be prescriptive.  Instead of a 
                                                         
139 For a brilliant analysis of these meta-ontological issues, see Amie Thomasson’s articles cited 
above. 
140 I think this is the case even if the “art” was created by primates.  Primates have intentional 
psychologies, and it is possible that primates could be working under an art concept.  There have 
been some studies on bird song.  A few aestheticians have been addressing this issue (e.g., Sheila 
Lintott, Aaron Meskin).  In addition, the artifactuality condition has been a standard necessary 
condition in definitions of art.  George Dickie’s institutional definition is one example.  Dickie 
(and also Noël Carroll) also has responses to the putative driftwood and natural event 
counterexamples.  They count as artifacts when they are “framed” or exemplified by humans. 
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score, one might use a recording to give others instructions on how to instantiate or realize a 
work.  Consider avant-garde works in which pictures, drawings, and the like serve as scores.  
Hence, if one’s ontology is going to include certain kinds of recordings as works, then (MI) is 
acceptable because either recording can be prescriptive, or reception tokens count as instances.  
The problem still holds for non-recorded improvisations.  Are non-recorded improvisations 
capable of being multiply instanced?  Ideally, non-recorded improvisations can be repeated 
because improvisations do instantiate sound structures.  If someone memorized a non-recorded 
improvisation’s sound structure, then it could be multiply instanced.  Is (MI) true 
unconditionally?  In order for (MI) be true, it would depend upon the following stronger, modal 
claim: 
 
 (MMI) Essentially, necessarily, music is a multiply instanced art form. 
 
Improvisation is an entrenched, traditional musical practice, even in the Western classical art 
music tradition.  Now suppose that it is true that improvisations are not necessarily multiply 
instanced—improvisations cannot be multiply instanced (although, as I argue below, there are 
ways in which they can be and are multiply instanced).  Hence, (MMI) is false and (MI) is false.  
In other words, because a major musical practice with a long history is not multiply instanced, it 
cannot be the case that music is necessarily multiply instanced.  (MMI) does not capture a proper 
description of musical practices.  But some may not be satisfied with this quick move.  The 
referent of the term “music” in the proposition of (MMI) must be fixed to a factual description of 
the art form, which can be suitably determined through history, social sciences, and simple 
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reflection.  That improvisation is an entrenched musical (and artistic) practice is a fact.141  Thus, 
(MMI) does not cohere with the facts.  However, the modal operator in (MMI) may be doing the 
work.  What is the strength of the modal operator?  Does it mean on any conception of music in 
any possible world?  Or does it mean given a particular definition of music captured by our 
current practices music is necessarily (in all possible worlds) multiply instanced?  I do not think 
the first suggestion makes sense.  How would one begin to construct other conceptions of music 
different from the one we have?  Would it make sense to say that an alternative conception of 
music is that it is (exclusively) a tactile art form and not sonic?  Obviously, that is a silly 
semantic game.  To determine whether X exists in some or all possible worlds, X must mean 
and/or refer to something.  Consequently, the definition of music must be fixed, and the best way 
to make it rigid is to address our historical and current musical practices.142 
 Even though I believe the above argument is strong, there is another argument to be made 
with respect to (MMI).  Improvisations can be multiply instanced.  There are two cases to 
consider:  fleeting, ephemeral performance tokens that are improvised, and recorded or 
documented improvisations.  No one doubts that improvisations (in music) are at least in part 
sound structures.  What else could they be?  Sound structures are abstract objects and they exist 
independently of human action or thought.   When one happens to play the sound sequence that 
matches a particular sound structure, one is instantiating, and thus the sound-structure itself may 
be multiply instanced through and in both temporal and spatial coordinates.  Without claiming 
that sound-structures exhaust the identity conditions of improvisations (whether WOAs or not), 
there is here at least one aspect of improvisations that are multiply instanced.  That seems to be 
enough to satisfy MMI, or even MI.  The problem in the background here is prescription once 
                                                         
141 Part I may be interpreted as providing a plethora of evidence for this claim. 
142 The argument here would also hold of the more general concept of “art.” 
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again.  Although recorded improvisations have documentations, namely, the recording, on 
whatever medium is used, and its properties.  The reproduction, or playback instance, of a 
documentation would be a reception token, and if reception tokens are included as instantiations, 
then documented improvisations would be multiply instanced.  Furthermore, if I am correct that 
recorded improvisations are a special kind of MW (to be argued for below), then the work would 
have instantiations through playbacks (reception tokens).  What of playbacks through use of 
sound reproduction equipment when there are no listeners, so putatively there is no reception?  
One can invoke ideal reception, that is, counterfactually there could be someone present to hear 
the playback.  Hence, it should count as a reception token.  But MMI is just one of the general 
criticisms of improvisations as WOAs, viz., that performances or performance tokens cannot be 
WOAs.  This has already been refuted above, so (MMI) is either trivially true, or (MMI) is non-
trivially false. 
 Compare (MMI) to film or photography.  It seems that nothing about photography hinges 
on the fact that there may be many prints of a single image taken by a camera.  Consider the 
following example.  Ansel Adams generates a negative and prints it in his dark room.  The 
negative is destroyed.  Consequently, there is only one print of the image in existence.  Now, of 
course, counterfactually there could have been more prints.  But the fact that there is actually 
only one print, and add to the thought experiment that negatives are destroyed after printing them 
once, then if photography were necessarily multiply instanced, then in a world in which the 
capturing of still images worked this way there would be no such thing as photography.  This 
seems very implausible.  My intuitions are that photography would still exist, would flourish, 
and would be a distinctive art form.  It would be a slightly different art form than it is presently, 
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nonetheless it would still be an art form whose defining feature is the use of mechanical 
reproduction for the production, generation, and capturing of images.143 
 So, the question becomes, is being multiply instanced ever necessary to be a particular art 
form?  Wood cuts, print making?  The fact that we do distinguish between art forms in this way 
does not entail that this feature reveals something essential to a particular art form.  Instead, what 
it does is give us a property by which we can distinguish between and categorize art forms as 
they presently exist.  A property P upon which we sort things does not entail that P is essential to 
any of the sorting categories. 
 Furthermore, (Plurality MWP) says that there is nothing intrinsic to the concept of music 
itself that as an art form its WOAs must be multiply instanced.  Some genres of music have 
MWs that are multiply instanced, other do not.144 
 I conclude that (CH 2) is false or questionable.  This is the case because its assumptions 
and presuppositions conflict with any reasonable conception of music history and practices, and 
there are sound semantic intuitions that preclude improvising give rise to WOAs and MWs. 
 
 
2.3.3  Burden-Shifting:  Levinson’s Theory and Improvisations 
 
 The purpose of this section is to take a standard account of musical works, in fact the 
locus classicus on musical works, and determine whether improvisations would be covered by 
                                                         
143 Noël Carroll discusses a similar issue in A Philosophy of Mass Art (New York: Oxford 
University Press, Clarendon Press, 1998), 215. 
144 I will just note that on theories that take action-types instead of their products to be the 
primary objects of appreciation, all art forms are multiply instanced, including painting.  Currie 
claims that all art forms are multiply instanced.  This view is compatible with my theory, 
although I am not committed to such a claim. 
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this standard account.  Jerrold Levinson’s theory of the musical work is justifiably the locus 
classicus, because it is comprehensive with respect to a genre, explicit, economical, and the most 
influential account of musical works.  Even though Levinson explicitly recognizes the limits of 
what his theory is meant to apply to, one can still test the theory to see if it applies to other cases.  
For example, Levinson was not addressing popular music, nor many contemporary avant-garde 
pieces.  The data for his theory is the very limited case of Western, art, classical music from 
roughly Bach to Brahms (approximately 1700 to 1900, with exceptions before, during, and after 
this period).  I will show that improvisations would be covered by Levinson’s theory of the 
musical work.  In doing this, I am not arguing that Levinson’s theory is the correct theory of the 
metaphysical status of improvisations; instead, this demonstrates that there is some presumption 
in favor of improvisations being works of art (WOA) and/or musical works (MW).  In addition, 
this section will serve as good base for understanding the some of the issues and problems in the 
ontology of music. 
 Levinson first specifies three desiderata that a theory of the musical work should satisfy.  
The “creatability” desideratum is “(Cre) Musical works must be such that they do not exist prior 
to the composer’s compositional activity, but are brought into existence by that activity.”145  Fine 
individuation is “(Ind) Musical works must be such that composers composing in different 
musico-historical contexts who determine identical sound structures invariably compose distinct 
musical works.”146  Performance means:  “(Per) Musical works must be such that specific means 
of performance or sound production are integral to them.”147  Levinson claims his theory 
                                                         
145 Levinson, “What a Musical Work Is,” in Music, Art, and Metaphysics:  Essays in 
Philosophical Aesthetics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), 68. 
146 Ibid., 73. 
147 Ibid., 78. 
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satisfies all three desiderata.  A musical work (MW) is an abstract entity he calls an initiated 
type.  The particular initiated type that constitutes the musical work is the conjunction of the 
sound structure and performing-means structure, as indicated by some particular person 
(composer) at a specific time.  The compositional act consequently introduces to the world a new 
object: 
 
MW = S/PM structure-as-indicated-by-X-at-t. 
 I should note that since 1980, when Levinson’s article was first published, he has made 
one major change to the theory.  In response to criticisms by Gregory Currie,148 Levinson 
amended the account of MW: 
 
MW+ = S/PM structure-as-indicated-by-X-at-t-in-musico-historical-context-C 
 
As Levinson states, this new account makes creative context, composer, date of composition, and 
musical structure necessary conditions for the identity of a musical work (in most of Western, 
art, classical music).  It may be the case that the indexing of time t is redundant with the 
inclusion of musico-historical contexts, but it seems to be needed to thwart off certain bizarre 
thought experiment cases, which Currie concocts.  For example, Currie queries whether 
Beethoven’s Hammerklavier Sonata149 would be the same work if the preceding music history 
                                                         
148 Jerrold Levinson, “Art as Action,” in The Pleasure of Aesthetics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1996), 146. 
149 Ludwig van Beethoven, Piano Sonata No. 29 in B-flat Major, Opus 106, “Grosser Sonate für 
das Hammerklavier.” 
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were different.150  Suppose that Beethoven’s Sonata was the first piece music written in Europe 
since the time of Purcell—it seems that the Hammerklavier would not be the work we identify as 
Beethoven’s Hammerklavier Sonata.  This counterfactual history would eliminate and add 
various artistic properties to the work, even though it was still composed by Ludwig van 
Beethoven in 1817-1818 and dedicated to Archduke Rudolf.  Since Levinson thinks that the 
musico-historical context is a function of the time of composition and the person/agent doing the 
composing and the preceding and following musical/artistic history, as long as the composers are 
different persons, then the works created are different even when the S/PM structures are 
identical.  This is the case because Levinson thinks that relevant properties of the work are 
determined at least in part by what a composer has done prior to the particular composition in 
question.  For example, these artistic properties include, or would be derived from, the various 
psychological properties of composers, such as being influenced by this or that theory or person, 
what the composer studied and when, with whom they studied and when, and the composer’s 
prior artistic achievements and failures.  Many philosophers and musicians believe that artistic 
properties are part of the identity of MWs.  Pure sound structures do not possess artistic 
properties, although they possess many, if not most, of the aesthetic properties we deem as 
significant for the identity of a WOA. 
Since Levinson recognizes and accepts that abstract objects cannot be “created” by 
humans—they exist eternally or a-temporally—but (he claims) (Cre) is a strong intuition we 
have, a new entity that encapsulates both is required.  Levinson thus “invents” (discovers?)151 
initiated types. 
                                                         
150 Currie, Ontology of Art, 58-60; and Levinson, “Art as Action,” 145-146. 
151 The problem of what term to use here is exactly the same as the problem Levinson tries to 
solve by introducing this new type of entity—initiated types.  Did Levinson construct, invent, or 
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Levinson describes the following ontological classification.  There are indicated 
structures and pure structures.  Both kinds of structures are types.  One may infer that both are 
abstract objects, since types are abstract.  Moreover, Levinson says, there are two kinds of types:  
implicit types and initiated types.  Implicit types are the standard, abstract, non-temporal kind, 
which include things like “geometrical figures, family relationships, strings of words, series of 
moves in chess, ways of placing five balls in three bins.”152  Initiated types come into being; they 
are not eternal.  They are brought into existence through a process of intentional human action 
(e.g., composition).  Levinson claims that the Ford Thunderbird, the Lincoln penny, and the 
hedgehog are examples of initiated types.  These are historically contingent structures.  Thus, a 
coin of the same design as the Lincoln penny during the ancient Roman Empire would share the 
structure of the Lincoln penny but would not be the Lincoln penny.  The Lincoln penny can exist 
as the Lincoln penny only after the historical person Lincoln existed.  Consequently, Levinson 
solves the problem he set out for himself:  capture the abstract nature of musical works but allow 
them to be created and individuated in a way that preserves (or conserves) their artistic 
properties. 
 Levinson distinguishes between (1) instances of W {I(W)}, (2) instances of the sound 
structure of W {I(Wss)}, (3) instances of the S/PM structure of W {I(Ws/pm)}, and (4) 
performances of W {P(W)}.  An instance of a work W is a sound event (an actualized sound 
sequence) that conforms completely to the S/PM structure of W.  A performance of a work W is a 
sound event that is intended to instantiate W:  it represents an attempt to exemplify W’s S/PM in 
accordance with the composer’s indication of it and “succeeds to a reasonable degree.”  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
make initiated types/indicated structures, or did he discover them?  This distinction and debate, 
as I have suggested, is probably fruitless. 
152 Levinson, “What a Musical Work Is,” 80. 
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Therefore, a correct P(W) is an I(W), and an incorrect P(W) is not an I(W).  Incorrect 
performances are still performances of something.  These distinctions allow Levinson to avoid 
Nelson Goodman’s counterintuitive conclusion that a performance of a work with one, even 
minor, error is not a performance of the work.  Furthermore, transcriptions of musical works 
count as new, different musical works, even though a transcription would be an I(Wss) though 
not an I(Ws/pm).  Now we can derive the following “theorems:”153 
 
T1:  All I(W) = I(Wss) 
T2:  All I(W) = I(Ws/pm) 
T3:  Some I(Ws/pm) are not I(W) 
T4:  Some I(Wss) are not I(W) 
T5:  All P(W) = I(W) 
T6:  Some I(W) are not P(W) 
T7:  A particular P(W) is a member of the set of all performances of W {P(W)1, ..., P(W)n} 
T8:  {I(W)} is a subset of {P(W)} 
 
The fact that Levinson’s theory gives rise to these distinctions and entities has advantages, many 
of which provide plausible metaphysical grounds for understanding musical practices.  For 
example, I would not want to classify Wendy Carlos’s synthesizer renditions of Bach and 
Beethoven keyboard compositions as performances of their works, nor would I classify them as 
proper transcriptions.  But they are instances of the sound-structure of their works.  I limit my 
example to keyboard compositions because the synthesizer is a keyboard instrument (in fact, a 
                                                         
153 These are my derivations based on Levinson’s definitions and comments presented in his 
article. 
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synthesizer can produce any keyboard timbre, e.g. pianoforte, organ, clavichord, and 
harpsichord).  In other words, the pure sound structure of a keyboard is realizable on a keyboard 
instrument.  An orchestral composition’s sound structure could be realized by dubbing and multi-
tracking in recording sessions.  In other words, each orchestral part would be a played on the 
synthesizer and recorded as tracks.  In addition, a performance of a work ought to be susceptible 
to errors.  There may be vagueness with respect to the quantity and quality of errors that would 
qualify a sound sequence as not being a performance of a work; however, most performances of 
works do contain minor errors and still seem to qualify as performances of the work.  If not, then 
one would be stipulating that performances of works are impossible, which I think is an 
undesirable view.  Therefore, one could construct a continuum representing the quantity and 
quality of errors.  Those sound sequences with a few insubstantial (itself a vague term) errors 
would be closer to the ideal performance of a MW, and those with many significant errors would 
be closer to not being a performance of the MW. 
 This ontological classification is helpful with respect to many thorny issues in 
performance practice, but it would not eliminate completely the controversies that exist about 
particular cases (e.g., some of Glenn Gould’s live performances and recordings of Bach and 
Brahms, and Keith Jarrett’s recordings of Mozart and Haydn, and the authentic instrument 
movement of performance practice).  However, this classification opens up new possibilities.  
For example, if a performer ignores certain features of a score, then the executed sound sequence 
(whether live or recorded or both) may qualify as an instance of the sound structure but not an 
instance of the work. 
 Now let us determine whether improvisations can be MW+ = S/PM structure-as-
indicated-by-X-at-t-in-musico-historical-context-C.  First, improvisations are certainly sound 
  
281 
structures.  Improvisations (in music) are sound sequences or occurrences, and these sound 
sequences instantiate or realize a pure sound structure simpliciter.  This point will be important 
for my positive account given below.  Analogously, an improvised literary text instantiates an 
abstract structure, which includes letters, spaces and punctuation. 
Now it might be said that by improvising, an improviser does not select, fix, determine a 
PM structure.  I have two responses to this putative objection.  First, one may construe the actual 
means used in improvising as the performance means.  This interpretation is more plausible in 
light of the (MusPen) and (NotDev) cases.  Second, the performance means structure is not a 
necessary condition for being a MW+.  Levinson includes performance means structures in order 
to address the typical works of the classical canon, which often specify instrumentation in some 
way.  However, many classical works do not specify instrumentation, but still are works (e.g., 
many of J.S. Bach’s compositions, such as Art of the Fugue).  So, for Levinson, if a work has 
performance-means specified, then it must be included in the identity of the work; whereas, if 
there is no performance-means specified, then it cannot be specified and there will not be 
I(Ws/pm), just I(Wss) and I(W). 
 The same ambiguities that arise with some scores also arise with improvisation.  In that 
sense, improvisations would be no different than a score which did not include certain features 
such as instrumentation, dynamics, tempi, et cetera, or contain such instructions to a limited 
degree.  Levinson uses several phrases that are vague, perhaps deliberately vague:  
“compositional act,” “indicated.”  There is one attempt by Levinson to make indicate more 
precise when he includes, parenthetically, the terms “(fixes, determines, selects).”  The full 
quotation is needed:  “For the paradigmatic pieces we are concerned with, the composer typically 
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indicates (fixes, determines, selects) an S/PM structure by creating a score.”154  In addition, a 
concept such as “compositional act” will refer to different activities if only because of 
technological changes that allow for different ways to notate and produce, select, and determine 
sounds, or otherwise give artistic and production instructions.  There is no reason to deny 
improvising as a compositional act in the way that Levinson describes it here—an activity by 
which a person (as improviser, as composer) selects, determines, fixes an S/PM structure or 
sound structure simpliciter.  This is, however, an empirical matter; it ought not to be decided by 
a priori argument.  How people compose is a matter of how they actually do it.  Later in the 
article Levinson describes it more specifically:  “The other class of types, initiated types, are so 
called because they begin to exist only when they are initiated by an intentional human act of 
some kind.  All those of interest can, I think, be construed as arising from an operation, like 
indication, performed upon a pure structure.  Typically, this indication is effected by producing 
an exemplar of the structure involved, or a blueprint of it.  In so indicating (or determining) the 
structure, the exemplar or blueprint inaugurates the type that is the indicated structure, the 
structure-as-indicated-by-x-at-t.  All indicated structures are, perforce, initiated types.”155  First, 
improvising is certainly an intentional human act.  Improvising may be viewed as an operation 
performed upon a pure structure (we have already shown that improvisations are in part sound 
structures simpliciter, just like any sequence of sounds or sound-occurrence is).  Second, the next 
sentence contains an important word:  “typically.”  Levinson is correct in saying that in the 
classical canon “typically” a composer composed by producing, creating, making a score.  The 
score served as an exemplar or blueprint, and indicated the pure sound structure (s-s simpliciter).  
                                                         
154 Levinson, “What a Musical Work Is,” 79. 
155 Ibid., 81. 
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But this does not entail that compositions must be produced through exemplars or blueprints.
156
  
In improvisations a (say) player indicates while performing the piece simultaneously.  The 
indication is achieved during the performance.  There is no a priori reason for thinking that 
indicating cannot be achieved while playing, or that playing/performing is a way or form of 
indicating.  Of course, a score could be produced simultaneously as in the (MusPen) or (NotDev) 
cases discussed above.  Incidentally, this is how a musically illiterate person could produce a 
notated score or chart.  Or the improvised sound sequence could be notated afterwards.  These 
seem like accidental features of improvisations. 
In addition, indicating does not necessarily entail anything about replication
157
 or re-
identification, although improvisations (I shall argue) are subject to both.  Furthermore, if my 
previous arguments are correct about improvising and composing—that they are fundamentally 
based on the same process of selection—then it would surely follow that improvisations would 
satisfy the indication of  a S/PM structure criterion.  Indicating is selecting, or a way of selecting.  
There is nothing in Levinson’s theory to preclude improvisations as musical works.  Levinson 
says:  “The other class of types, initiated types, are [sic] so called because they begin to exist 
                                                         
156
 In fact, James C. Anderson (“Musical Kinds,” The British Journal of Aesthetics 25, no. 1 
(Winter 1983): 44) confirms the vagueness that I find in Levinson’s theory on indication:  “For 
what is it for a kind to be ‘indicated-by-P-at-t’?  While we all understand, with Levinson, that 
typically this is done by creating a score, no general account of ‘kind-indication’ is to be found in 
Levinson’s paper, nor in my amended version of his theory.” 
157
 These are difficult words to get right—if there is correctness already established about them.  
Samuel R. Levin (Shades of Meaning: Reflections on the Use, Misuse, and Abuse of English 
(Boulder, CO: Westview, 1998), 77-78) distinguishes between duplication and replication:  “a 
distinction may be drawn between these two words on the basis that replicate is derived from 
replica, whose meaning properly connotes ‘a copy—of a concrete object or of an objective 
representation,’ whereas duplicate conveys a more general sense of ‘to produce again’ or ‘to 
reproduce;’ in other words, duplication may be regarded as an activity because one duplicates 
something, but replication is a process in which something is replicated.”  I find this to be 
unhelpful because I still want to know what it is to duplicate X and replicate X.  Here is a stab at 
analysis:  To replicate could mean to generate a copy in some way or an objective presentation of 
X, whereas to duplicate X is to create another exact copy. 
  
284 
only when they are initiated by an intentional human act of some kind.”158  Improvising is an 
intentional human act that brings into existence a particular sound structure.  Simply, 
improvisations are indications of musical works while the composer/improviser simultaneously 
performs them.  A recording or notational device could serve as the documentation of the 
musical work; however, nothing in Levinson’s theory requires documentation or a notated score 
to be produced.  Therefore, I conclude that improvisations meet all of the conditions of 
Levinson’s definition of a musical work, MW+.  Hence, improvisations are musical works on 
this account. 
 There are five groups of challenges, objections, and criticisms of Levinson’s theory of 
musical works. 
 
(1)  Limited application.  As Levinson himself notes his theory is to account only for Western 
Classical art music roughly from 1700 to 1900.  Should one seek a more comprehensive theory, 
and try to incorporate other kinds of music, genres, and historical periods?  Since I argued for 
(Plurality WOA and MWP), I believe the limited application is acceptable.  However, a problem 
arises with respect to the boundaries of applicability.  Classical music from roughly 1700 to 1900 
is very vague.  But this is not a devastating criticism. 
 
(2)  Structures.  There is a significant question as to whether structures can be indexed in the way 
Levinson requires.  S/PM structures are indexed according to person, place, time, and context.  
Should we accept Levinson’s distinction between pure/implicit types and initiated types? 
 
                                                         
158 Levinson, “What a Musical Work Is,” 81. 
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(3)  Abstract objects.  Obviously, Levinson’s theory relies upon the existence of abstract objects, 
and in fact introduces a new abstract object, MW or MW+.  Consequently, the theory is subject to 
all of the general criticisms of abstract objects, and especially criticisms of WOAs as abstract 
objects.  I will not pursue this objection further. 
 
(4)  Desiderata.  The intuitions that give rise to his three desiderata may be questioned or denied. 
 
(5)  Notational exemplars.  First, there is a parsimony problem, which is not devastating for 
Levinson’s theory and is easily corrected.159  Levinson assumes the score is the notational 
exemplar for the abstract type of the S/PM structure.  But if the score contains timbre notations, 
either indirectly or directly, then the PM structure is not needed.  For example, most scores of 
this period of western classical music do not just indicate a c’ pitch/tone but a clarinet playing c’.  
In other words, instrumentation is included, as Levinson recognizes.  So, my point here is that 
pure sound structures can incorporate timbre properties, and since instrumentation, or PM 
structure as Levinson call it, is wholly reducible to timbre, then pure sound structures simpliciter 
are sufficient.  PM structures are redundant. 
I shall discuss (5) first.  Can a non-specified, non-intended instrument or devices produce 
the same timbres as real, traditional instruments?  If yes, then PM structures are not redundant.  
But not all individual instruments of an instrument category have exactly the same harmonic 
content, attack-delay envelope and vibrato, although they must be sufficiently similar to be a 
successful member of the kind.  Many of the differences are barely measurable, thus 
imperceptible.  It may be the same for synthesized sounds.  Differences may occur if the 
                                                         
159 I have never confirmed whether Levinson would be willing to accept such a correction. 
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fingering and embouchure (when relevant) of the instrument produces expressive or timbral 
differences.  If that is the case, then specific instrument playing is sui generis.  Suppose there is a 
solo clarinet composition that is performed twice.  One is performed by a musician on a standard 
clarinet.  The other is performed by a person playing a special synthesizer keyboard.  They both 
produce exactly the same sound sequence.  Does the synthesized case not count as performance 
of the PM structure because it was not played on a clarinet?  The score specified a clarinet.  Do 
composers intend the actual instrument or just the timbre of the instrument they specify?  One 
cannot answer this question by historical inquiry because before such technology was available 
or conceivable, there was no reason to say “clarinet timbre or clarinet-like timbre.”  Clarinets 
were the only things capable of producing such timbres or clarinet sounds.  Considerations of 
counterfactual histories also probably will not yield an answer to these questions.  It does not 
take thought experiments to generate such problems.  Consider the authenticity movement of 
performance practice for Renaissance and Baroque music.  Should Vivaldi and Bach only be 
properly performed on instruments of the period?  Suppose a contemporary instrument maker 
could duplicate a violin or viola designed and constructed in the 1740s.  Would that be an 
authentic instrument or a period instrument?  Here one might simply appeal to the perceptible 
properties produced by such instruments.  If the duplicates had the same “feel” and sonic 
properties indicative of actual period instruments, then it might make sense to say that they 
should count as authentic.  Of course, I have thus far omitted an important element:  the agents 
playing either the original period instrument or the duplicates.  Not only the instrument itself, but 
the way it is played, should be included in so called authentic music practice.  The way people 
played these instruments in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is hopelessly lost to us.  
This has not stopped music historians, critics, and experts from making inferences about such 
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playing.  Nonetheless, that element cannot be reproduced accurately because there are no 
artifacts available to provide evidence of the way musicians played several hundred years ago. 
It is interesting to imagine a case in which all hitherto specifiable timbres could be 
produced on a special keyboard instrument like a synthesizer.  People could then learn any 
instrument on this keyboard instrument.  There could be an orchestra of keyboards and keyboard 
players.  What would this mean for musical practices?  All learning of playing an instrument 
would be reducible to learning how to play keyboard.  I do not say piano because such an 
instrument would require additional skills to produce the timbres, such as synthesizers do today.  
In the future, we may have to work such questions. 
Second, there are questions about using scores as notational exemplars as I demonstrated 
above.  The contingencies of notation in any culture, and the limits that are constitutive of a 
notation system cause unwarranted bias in doing sound metaphysics.  If there were different 
technologies available to Bach and Beethoven, it is possible that the properties they would 
choose to specify in their instructions would be ontologically thicker or thinner than standard 
scores.  Furthermore, the properties may be very different from what we think of scorable 
properties given our history. 
 Challenge (1) is not problematic given that (Plurality MW) is correct.  We need 
ontological plurality because of the meta-ontological concerns, and the defense of (Plurality 
MW), discussed above.  Consequently, the objections to Levinson’s theory of MWs that remain 
most prescient are the soundness of our intuitions with respect to the three desiderata, using 
notation as the standard to construct abstract objects, and the problem of whether initiated types 
and indicated structures exist. 
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 Challenge (4).  Does Levinson give us any reasons for accepting his quite hefty 
assumptions?  In one way, perhaps yes.  Levinson presupposes that there are entities in the world 
called musical works, and his concern is to figure out what those things are.  Levinson’s 
argument is not going to get very far at all if one just denies that such entities exist.  So, it seems 
that Levinson really needs to convince us of two things:  not only what these entities are (the 
criteria for being one of those objects he identified as MWs), but that there are such things in the 
first place.  Levinson does a good job of developing the criteria given the desiderata he 
formulates, but it is questionable whether he motivates the project itself—namely, that there are 
or should be such things as musical works.  Being charitable, one might want to interpret some 
of the things Levinson says as being entrenched intuitions or beliefs that we have given our 
culture and history, etc. as taking it as quite obvious that there needs to be such things as musical 
works. 
 As Lydia Goehr has pointed out,160 Levinson’s account of musical works depend upon 
the appeal to a set of allegedly non-negotiable intuitions (Levinson does not say as much, but it is 
implicit in how he argues) and theoretical arguments.  By non-negotiable, I think Goehr means 
that Levinson presents his case as if these are the intuitions “we” have, where the “we” is 
assumed to be most or all educated, sophisticated listeners of music.  It is unclear whether these 
intuitions are intended to be the ones “we” ought to have or the ones we do in fact have.  This 
kind of problem in analytic philosophical methodology is almost never made explicit or clear.  
Now, the theoretical arguments Levinson uses are Gedankenexperiment or Gedankenexperiment-
like arguments.  So, since ultimately these thought experiment conclusions rely upon an appeal 
to some set of more fundamental intuitions, Levinson’s argument fundamentally rests on 
                                                         
160 Lydia Goehr, The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works, 51-57. 
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intuitions (we do have or ought to have given a certain set of interests, practices, goals, values, et 
cetera).  It might be clear that the best line of attack against Levinson’s theory of musical works 
is to challenge these intuitions.  How does one do that?  There are at least two ways.  First, one 
can just deny that these are “our” intuitions.  This can be, and traditionally has been, attempted 
by the counterexample approach, which demonstrates that the intuitions are not as clear as first 
presented, or not comprehensive enough for the purposes at hand.  Another way is to show that 
an individual may have conflicting intuitions over a particular relevant case, or that significant 
groups of individuals would have conflicting intuitions over a case.  If no further appeal can be 
made to something outside of these intuitions, then there seems to be no way to adjudicate 
between these intuitions.  We are left in a morass.  Second, one can try to show that the intuitions 
are irrelevant to what counts, or what is significant in theorizing about the subject matter.  This 
latter approach does not try to deny that we have these intuitions, in fact one might concede that 
we do have these intuitions, but rather gives something like a “so what” response to them. 
 Therefore, a comprehensive attack on Levinson’s theory would undermine or refute both 
his alleged non-negotiable intuitions and his theoretical arguments by challenging the intuitions.  
Of course, one still has the entire usual arsenal of refutation by attacking the inferences, and the 
argument structure (validity, soundness).  Attacking Levinson’s theory is a tricky task for several 
reasons.  First, whenever one is dealing with intuitions and intuition-pumping, it is risky and 
difficult.  Second, because Levinson is arguing for the existence of a new kind of entity or 
ontological category, one cannot easily undermine his account by showing that the entity really 
does not meet the standard requirements without question begging. 
 What are the kinds of intuitions that Levinson appeals to make his arguments for his 
theory of musical works?  Some of the intuitions are metaphysical, and mainly those of us with a 
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philosophical bent.  But most are supposed to be aesthetic, hence evaluative.  These are about 
what we find important in music.  In short, why we value music, what we find valuable in our 
experience of music. 
 Challenge (2).  Traditional metaphysical accounts of structures define them as sets of 
relations.161  They are different from sets because in sets the order of the members (or elements) 
does not individuate the set, whereas structures are individuated by the order of their members 
(as in a set of ordered n-tuples).  This puts obvious restrictions on the kinds of thing that may be 
a structure.  Levinson says that the pure sound structure simpliciter includes all “standardly” 
specified audible features.  This is questionable.  But what is a standardly specified audible 
feature (property)?  What do scores represent?  In order to include these features, the structure 
would have to be based upon the notational exemplar, and would be, therefore, more like a 
linguistic type than a pure sound structure.  In fact, this is similar to Anderson’s view.  Anderson 
thinks of the musical work as a descriptive-kind defined by the score.  The linguistic type of 
“cat” is the sequence {<c> <a> <t>} or {<c, a, t>}.  Levinson says he does not mean for the 
structure to be reductive in any sense.  Do initiated types admit of the type-token distinction?  
What would count as a token of the initiated type?  A performance?  A particular printing of the 
score?  The initiated type is still an abstract entity in the sense that it is not identical to the score 
or a performance, even if that performance is a perfect (lacks any errors) compliance-class of the 
score. 
 In one sense there really are not different kinds of structures.  A structure is a structure; it 
does not matter what it is a structure of, namely the content of the ordered sequence.  The content 
                                                         
161 For example, D. M. Armstrong, Universals: An Opinionated Introduction, Focus Series 
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989); Reinhardt Grossman, The Existence of the World: An 
Introduction to Ontology, The Problems of Philosophy: Their Past and Present Series (New 
York: Routledge, 1992); J. P. Moreland, Universals, Central Problems of Philosophy Series 
(Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2001). 
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of abstract objects like sets and structures are always representations.  Think of the set of natural 
numbers, an infinite set.  The content of the set are numbers, which are already abstract objects; 
however, when I physically inscribe a representation of the set of natural numbers {1, 2, 3, ...} I 
use numerals, which are representations in notational form of the numbers.  So what is the 
content of a sound structure?  There are many ways of representing sounds and the properties of 
sounds.  There are many ways of representing numbers too, but we have adopted the convention 
of Arabic numerals.  I could have written the set of natural numbers as {I, II, III, ...}.  So, one 
might use Western musical notation as a way of representing sounds and their properties.  If I do, 
then whatever limitations this notation has, my structure has as well.  But if I do not use 
notational exemplar as my representational system, then I may not be subject to these limitations 
or different ones.  If there is a representational system which could capture (or represent) all 
sounds and sonic properties, then the structure itself would be complete.  Perhaps recordings 
should be considered a representational system, even a new notational system creating notational 
exemplars.  Recordings capture sounds, certainly all audible sounds, and sonic properties.  
Whether or not recordings capture all audible sounds and sonic properties is the problem of 
transparency of recordings, but that need not concern us here. 
 My defense of the separation between metaphysics and epistemology should be expected.  
Consider Levinson’s theory of initiated types or indicated structures.  A consequence of his 
theory is that even if there are neither recordings nor remaining scores of a musical work, it 
would still continue to exist because MW+ is not dependent upon physical objects or events for 
its continued existence.  MW+’s coming to be is dependent (according to Levinson) upon 
physical events obtaining, but once brought into existence it is eternal like other abstracta.  
Therefore, even if there is no way of re-identifying the improvisation because there is no 
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physical record or document of it, and even if no one remembers it, it was brought into existence 
and continues to exist as a musical work.  This would mean that a person could putatively bring 
into existence a musical work by playing or writing, and for all we know it is novel, but not be 
the agent’s work because it had already been brought into existence by someone else.  The same 
problem exists for Levinson’s theory. 
 What salient features of improvisations are not captured by Levinson’s theory of the 
MW?  Levinson’s theory of the MW is not sufficiently ontologically thick.  Our interest in 
improvisations is in how they sound.  How sounds sound is a vague enterprise when trying to 
describe this phenomenon.  This holds for all of sensory modalities.  Probably, we do not possess 
a rich enough vocabulary, and we do not have the reflective capacity of our own experiences in 
an introspectively sufficient manner, to articulate what we hear.  But we know we do hear these 
rich sonic properties, and we know when we have these experiences:  our experiences of 
performance token events and recordings.  Levinson’s theory of MW+ captures the fact that 
sonic improvisations instantiate a sound structure, have timbre properties, and have artistic 
properties that are based on the performer and historical context of the improvisation.  
Levinson’s theory does not capture.  Many improvisations are not solo performances.  Consider 
Keith Jarrett’s Köln Concert.  It is a recording.  How much ontologically thicker is the recording 
than Levinson’s MW+?  Digital recordings quantify the sonic information into a computational 
code that is realized for playback on music reproduction machines (amplifiers, pre-amplifiers, 
compact disc players, et cetera).  For example, the binary encoding by lasers on a disc is an 
abstract object.  But now we have the bias generated by the technology—the particular way in 
which humans have devised to encode and capture information (light, sound).  Now of course in 
some sense even traditional sound structures are based on a bias—a scientific one—because of 
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the tempered system of the west, and the way we have devised of measuring and representing.  Is 
a sound a set of cycles?  Sounds are vibrating airwaves.  But we choose a system to measure and 
represent the vibrations.  (Perhaps even the concept of vibration is contingent?)  We radically 
underestimate the way in which our technological practices and inventions influence our 
metaphysical musings.  These practices become entrenched:  we take them for granted and forget 
their contingent origins.  The information and practices could have been a different way.  We 
could measure and represent sonic properties differently. 
 Here I have shown that improvisations are MWs according to Levinson’s theory of the 
MW, although Levinson did not explicitly address improvisations in his theory.  Improvisations 
meet the criteria Levinson puts forward for something to be classified as a MW.  This, however, 
does not mean that Levinson’s account is the best theory for improvisations.  There are salient 
features of improvisations and improvisational practice that are not captured by Levinson’s 
theory.  Furthermore, Levinson’s theory of MWs has shortcomings.  Consequently, the 
accomplishment here is limited:  there is presumption for improvisations being WOAs (at least in 
the case of music).  But now a better fitting theory needs to be constructed for the work-hood of 
improvisations:  a theory that does not have such shortcomings and captures all of the salient 
properties of improvisations. 
 
2.3.4  The Proper Theory for Improvisations as WOAs 
 
Our preserved theories and the world fit together so snugly less because we have found 
out how the world is than because we have tailored each to the other.162 
—Ian Hacking, Representing and Intervening 
  
                                                         
162 Ian Hacking, Representing and Intervening, 31. 
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 The work-concept as employed in many popular musics and jazz is different from that of 
Western, classical, art music.  One kind of difference resides in variegated goals.  The classical 
musician seeks notational accuracy and sometimes interpretive accuracy; whereas, in jazz (say), 
often there is no notational script or score against which one could be accurate and the goal is to 
be creative at the time of performance, create a new version or interpretation of the work which 
does not include notational accuracy even if there is a scored manuscript.  The work-concept 
here is problematic because of the fact that there are often no scores, and more importantly the 
absence of rules, tacit or not, of how melodies and even harmonies are to be played.  In fact, 
often a goal is to obscure it as much as possible while giving an audience enough structure to 
recognize it.  Since a major goal of improvising and jazz practice is to be original, creative, and 
spontaneous, the role the work plays is that of evaluative background in the sense that the 
performance of the work is to be judged as a performance of the work in order to evaluate the 
performance’s creativity.  This needs some form of recognition.  In addition, improvisational 
practices often produce singular (non-recorded) events.  This also needs to be recognized in a 
theory. 
 First let us be clear about the practices and products that are of first order concern for the 
metaphysics of improvisation.  I shall the history, including contemporary history, of jazz as the 
paradigm. 
 
(1) There are individual events consisting of ensemble or solo “live” performance tokens without 
recording or documentation. 
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(2) There are individual events consisting of ensemble or solo “live” performance tokens with 
recording or documentation.  Following Theodore (Ted) Gracyk,163 these are called veridical 
recordings. 
(3) There are recordings, which typically occur in recording studios.  Some recordings are 
similar to recordings of live performances that usually occur in performance venues (as in (2) 
above).  Some recordings are “constructed”164 in the sense that the recording does not consist 
simply of a documentation of a wholly separable event, viz., the performance in the studio.  
Constructed recordings involve such technologies as dubbing, recording separate tracks, a single 
musician playing several tracks, editing different recorded sound sequences together, multiple 
signal processing editing.  In other words, the recording is “sculpted,” or constructed onto the 
medium of recording (e.g., tape, disks, digital media, analog media).  Many non-veridical jazz 
recordings are a combination of “live” studio performances, which mimic a performance to an 
audience in a venue, and constructed practices.  Of course, it is possible to use many constructed 
recording practices on veridical recordings.  Consequently, the distinction between veridical and 
constructed recordings is vague.  We have access to, i.e., hear, recordings through playback on 
suitable reproduction means.  Each playback is a reception token. 
(4) There are songs, tunes, lead sheets and charts, arrangements, transcriptions. 
 
 Because of the complexity of the practices and objects that exist in jazz and other 
improvisational genres and art forms, we need an ontological theory that takes account of this 
complexity and plurality and has some explanatory power.  Consequently, the ontology I offer 
                                                         
163 Theodore Gracyk, Rhythm and Noise: An Aesthetics of Rock (Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 1996). 
164 The term “constructed recording” also comes from Gracyk. 
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will be plural.  I do not think that there is one kind of work involved in improvisational, artistic 
practices.  The two basic claims are that we need to recognize recordings and sound structures. 
My first point is that recordings165, which are ontologically thick and robust, should be a 
significant entity in an ontological theory of improvisation and performing art forms that include 
improvisational practices in their histories.  The advent of sound recording technology and 
reproduction permitted music to be recorded and listened to repeatedly.  In the case of dance and 
theatre, moving picture recording played a similar role, though historically less significantly than 
in music.  No longer ephemeral, improvisations could now be studied in depth:  over long 
periods of time, with as many pauses and repeats as the listener desired.  Manipulation of 
playback makes possible transcription by musicians and theorists.  In addition, the 
improvisations were now available to anyone with access to sound reproduction equipment; one 
need not be in attendance.  This, to a significant degree, introduces the idea of an improvised 
work in yet another sense.  When improvisations are recorded, either live or in a studio, the 
action-type of improvising generates two objects:  a sound structure MW, and a recording MW. 
There are many reasons in favor of this ontological claim.  First, the history of jazz is 
largely documented through recordings and is primarily conveyed to people through recordings.  
Obviously, recordings do not play an exclusive role here, but recordings are primary.  This is the 
case in part because of the historically contingent fact that jazz as a genre developed roughly 
simultaneously with the invention and development of various kinds of recording technologies.  
In jazz history and appreciation courses, recordings are emphasized because they provide 
examples, are a primary object of study for the subject, and give access to musicians and styles 
that no longer exist and would be difficult if not impossible to duplicate.  Even though there are 
                                                         
165 I mean to include video/audio, and audio tout court recordings. 
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lead sheets and charts that can be and are studied (at least for those with musical knowledge), 
they are insufficient for the study of jazz.  Much of jazz was not and is not notated.  Admittedly, 
most performances that have occurred are also not available for study.  They were neither 
notated nor recorded.  Nonetheless, there are a significant number of recordings available.  Some 
of the strengths of the history of these recordings are that most of these recordings are publicly 
available in some format, and the recordings are diverse with respect to time periods (obviously 
contingent on the availability of the technology), styles, artists, locations, and are both veridical 
and constructed. 
A similar claim has been made with respect to rock music and other popular music genres 
by Gracyk and John Fisher.166  I will argue that jazz, for example, is akin to rock music with 
respect to the proper, primary objects of appreciation.  I will use and apply what I call the 
Gracyk-Fisher theory of the ontology of rock and other popular music to improvisation.  The fact 
that rock music includes a lot of improvisation supports this analogy and application to jazz and 
other improvisational genres (assuming the Gracyk-Fisher is correct). 
 Although one listens to recordings in the study of western classical music, this is an 
adjunct to the primary study of theory and scores.  Some theorists say that coming to know a 
classical work can only be achieved by listening to it, either a live performance or a recording.  
Some would even say several performances or recordings from different artists (musicians, 
conductors, orchestras, et cetera).  The historical contingency of recording technology, as I have 
pointed out, could have changed the nature of our appreciative, academic, and musical practices 
of classical music.  And perhaps that is occurring now.  Appreciators and educators are focusing 
                                                         
166 Gracyk, Rhythm and Noise; John Andrew Fisher, “Rock ’n’ Recording: The Ontological 
Complexity of Rock Music,” in Musical Worlds: New Directions in the Philosophy of Music, ed. 
Philip Alperson (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998), 109-123. 
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more on recordings of classical works, and different recordings makes the study of varying 
interpretations convenient.  Live performances were the only option before this.  But this 
counterfactual proposition and possible future change is not a problem for my account.  I accept 
the ontological plurality and complexity of classical music as well.  When I say that performance 
tokens, whether recorded or not, are WOAs and/or MWs, I include classical music.  I find no 
reason for rejecting the idea that when Arturo Benedetti Michelangeli performs and/or records a 
Scarlatti sonata, there are two MWs involved:  one is generated by the performance, the other 
pre-exists the performance.  Therefore, if one, for example, accepts Levinson’s theory of the 
MW for classical music, there is the MW+ entity and the recorded or unrecorded performance.  
Are all performances WOAs/MWs?  Yes, they are works.  The profligacy objection to including 
all performances is not cogent.  This objection makes accusations of a “bloated” ontology with 
the assumption that an ontology should be subject to Occam’s razor.  But parsimony governs in 
cases of unnecessary entities.  I believe that sometimes the parsimony principle is abused.  
Applying parsimony does not mean specifying a particular number of entities, or establishing 
absolute boundaries for the number of entities.  In the philosophy of science, its main purpose is 
as a criterion in deciding among empirically equivalent theories and explanations.  Imagine the 
scenario J. S. Mill feared in the quotation I used above.  Given certain parameters most or all of 
the possible combinations of pitches and their ordered durations have been exhausted by human 
invention and industriousness.  For the moment, let us use Levinson’s theory of the work.  
Consequently, there would be an extremely large number of MW+s.  Would that constitute a 
bloated ontology?  I think not; frankly, it sounds silly.  To put it “tautologously:”  an ontology 
ought to have as many entities as there are.  Performances in the descriptive sense count as 
WOAs and MWs. 
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I might be accused equivocation with respect to the proper level of entities to which 
parsimony ought to be applied.  To describe this objection I shall use an analogous case to the 
idea that all performances are WOAs or MWs.  A similar objection can be made against the view 
that all improvisations, however insignificant or amateur, are musical works.  This view would 
have the untoward consequence of significantly bloating our musical/artistic ontology.  The 
concern about profligate ontological theories, it might be said, is about the theory part of an 
ontology, i.e., the quantity of the kinds of entities, not the quantity of members in the set of any 
particular kind entity.  If this were not the case, then this criticism could be used against any of 
the accounts of musical works because their members (individual compositions) are continually 
expanding.  In other words, parsimony applies to (say) kinds of thing, not the individual things 
that constitute the kind or members of the set the kind term describes.  But the other 
counterargument against parsimony objections is that it seems irrelevant, especially with respect 
to certain kinds of abstract objects.  Could there be too many possible chess games?  Are there 
too many numbers?  Since sound structures play a role in my account and in many other theories 
of the musical work (especially if they are type-token theories), then there are either an indefinite 
number of possible musical works, or an enormous number of possible musical works.  Granted I 
am now talking about possibilia, it could be the case that an enormous number of sound 
structures are instantiated through human action.  The quantity of sound structures is already 
specified given a set of defined parameters (e.g., length of time, a cap on possible pitches) 
because sound structures are abstract and exist non-spatio-temporally—all of them exist 
eternally.  If one does not define parameters, then there are an infinite number of sound 
structures and as a result there are an infinite number of possible musical works that might be 
instantiated by either action-type.  And if sound structures are finite because of parameters we set 
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(obviously could still be a very large number), then the number of potential musical works is 
fixed and finite, even though a thousand generations of humans would never be able to 
instantiate that number.  The infinite, indefinite, or large number of sound structures seems 
irrelevant to the merit of a theory that uses such entities. 
 Second, jazz musicians primarily study jazz and improvisation via recordings.  They 
transcribe improvised solos, often learn tunes and improvisation by ear from recordings, they 
become familiar with the language of the history of jazz by listening to recordings.  Jazz 
transcriptions require transcribing (notating) improvised solos and improvised interpretations of 
tunes from recordings.  Again, there are other modes of study, such as attending live jazz 
performances, participating in jam sessions, ensemble practicing, exercise and “how-to” 
textbooks and manuals, and private or group lessons.  I am not diminishing the value of these 
modes of engagement by emphasizing recordings.  However, the primary way someone learns to 
play like Bird (Charlie Parker) is not by listening to a live person play like Bird, or by studying 
transcriptions of his solos.  In addition, transcriptions, like classical scores, only capture limited 
features of the sound sequence.  They cannot, at least not yet, capture subtleties of rhythm, and 
most importantly, the non-reductive, elusive property of a musician’s “sound” on his or her 
instrument.  One must have direct epistemic access to the sound.  Recordings, even when they 
are of poor quality, provide that access and mediated direct engagement. 
My second point is that an entity like a sound structure must be included in the ontology 
of improvisation.  In the case of other art forms, there needs to be an appropriate structure, akin 
to a pure sound structure.  The fact that musicians can and do use other musicians’ unrecorded 
improvisations directly, as in quotation, or indirectly, entails that there is at least a mental or 
conceptual object used as a basis for (say) the musical quotation.  Usually, quotations require 
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transposition.  For example, Parker played an E-flat alto saxophone and if I am playing a piano 
(C instrument) or tenor saxophone (B-flat) I need to transpose that actual pitches Parker recorded 
or played to transposed pitches in the relevant key of my instrument.  In addition, transcriptions 
and arrangements can only be accounted for by abstract sound structures.  Consider the example 
of big band arrangements of tunes constructed from Charlie Parker’s improvised solos.  These 
tunes are constructed from Charlie Parker’s solos.  Others have also composed tunes from 
Parker’s improvised solos.  Notice that this practice is not different from what Bach and 
Beethoven did from their own improvisations.  These examples are also illustrative of another 
feature of improvisations that support their status as works.  There are many improvised solos 
preserved on recordings that possess a level of fame and adoration accorded to typical, western 
classical works (where the work-hood is not in question).  Most of Charlie Parker’s recorded 
solos, John Coltrane’s solo on “Giant Steps,” Coleman Hawkins’ solo on “Body and Soul,” 
many of Miles Davis’s solos from the late 1940s, 1950s, and early 1960s have this status.  Not 
just connoisseurs but ordinary enthusiasts can whistle or hum these sound structures.  When one 
sings or whistles a Bird solo, one does not reproduce the exact sound of what Bird played.  
Obviously, there are differences in timbre, key, and other properties of the sounds.  This is 
possible because one uses the sound structure of what Bird played, not the actual sound sequence 
Bird performed, as on a recording.  We listen to the recordings of these solos as we would listen 
to a late Beethoven string quartet.  We often repeat playback of the solo itself, just as we repeat 
playback of a particular movement of a symphony.  Our listening and appreciative practices treat 
these solos as ontologically thick (the recording itself) and thin (sound structure simpliciter) 
objects.  Our generative and appreciative practices with respect to improvisation are constitutive 
of the work-hood of improvisations, in particular the ontological complexity and plurality I am 
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suggesting.  By this I mean that these practices logically support my ontological account of 
improvisation, and that my ontological account makes possible these appreciative practices.167 
 The substance of my theory is the following.  A person’s improvising simultaneously 
brings into existence, or instantiates, two entities:  (1) an abstract structure of some kind, and (2) 
either a recorded performance event token or an unrecorded performance event token.  (1) 
requires that there be sound structures, movement structures, movement and word structures, et 
cetera.  (2) means that in the case of constructive recordings [the distinction between constructed 
and veridical recordings is not important in jazz but may have significance in other genres, 
although even in jazz it can be important as in some fusion, electronic jazz music], the artwork is 
the sound recording, in a way defended (amended Fisher theory), and in the case of live 
performances, the performance event itself is the artwork (along with the structure it realizes as 
indicated by S at t).  What needs to be done:  a precise definition of these ontological entities, 
such as the structures, an argument that performances can be WOAs, a theory of how sound 
recordings and perhaps other recording/documentations can be WOAs and the primary WOAs of 
a genre.  The structure is what is replicable, reproducible.  The recording/documentation 
although multiply instanced has definitive versions.  Show that improvised genres are more like 
rock and film than classical music (although even some classical music recently is like rock--for 
example Glenn Gould or anyone for that matter recordings which many are constructive, but 
even if not then recording documents a performance which is a particular interpretation of a 
musical work, and if performances can be works, then the recording is a work itself along with 
the WOA).   The fact that performances, many of them in the past, and many of the present and 
future will never be experienced again is not a reason to discount performances as WOAs. 
                                                         
167 Charitably, one might say that this is a “transcendental argument.” 
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 My theory recognizes both the ontologically thin and thick elements of improvisations 
and improvisational and artistic practices in various art forms.  The recordings and performances 
are ontologically thick; the sound structure is ontologically thin. 
 When there is no constructive recording, the performance event will be the WOA and/or 
MW.  There are several reasons why recordings should be considered the MW for many 
improvisations.  The history of one of the most significant genres of music to arise with 
improvisational practices is for the most part a history of recordings.  Jazz musicians learn their 
trade through the study of recordings.  They learn by ear the solos and styles of past masters.  
They transcribe solo improvisations as well as renderings of melodies and standards including 
the harmonic elements by the rhythm section (piano, guitar, even drum parts).  In some cases 
solo improvisations are “quoted” in new recordings or live performances.  These practices reveal 
the strong role of recordings have played in the history and development of jazz and rock music. 
 Recordings and performance token events are the most robust entities.  They contain all 
of the sonic perceptual and sub-perceptual properties.  I include sub-perceptual properties 
because there may be aesthetic properties, which are perceivable, that supervene on them.  In 
addition, these entities possess all of the relevant artistic properties that ought to be part of the 
identity of a WOA and MW for improvisations.  Recordings and performance tokens are indexed 
to the time and location of their eventuating, which entails that all properties dependent upon 
music-historical/art-historical context are part of their identity.  Recordings and performance 
tokens, or their constituent parts and properties, can be original, derivative, Bill Evans-
influenced, novel, traditional, free jazz-influenced, modal jazz-influenced, et cetera.  Pure sound 
structures cannot possess these properties because they are non-spatio-temporal, abstract objects.  
Recordings and performance tokens instantiate pure sound structures.  Furthermore, for those 
  
304 
whose intuitions cohere with Levinson’s (Cre) desideratum, and accept the creation/discover 
distinction, recordings and performance tokens meet that criterion. 
 Perhaps one of the most important advantages of recordings and performance tokens (and 
their veridical recordings) is that they capture all  the improvising that occurs in many artistic 
contexts, most notably jazz.  In the (SCI) case above, I pointed out that the naïve view of 
improvisation is that there is one person improvising at a time, or that only solos are improvised 
or should count as improvisation.  Recordings and performance tokens include all of the 
ensemble’s playing, including all of the improvisation that occurs from the interaction between 
musicians, and the improvising of the rhythm section.  To think that these are not of aesthetic 
interest or value is to misunderstand jazz and jazz practices. I am not sure how one could argue 
for this claim without question-begging.  But as George Dickie notes in his defense of the 
institutional theory of art, there is circular reasoning (a form of question-begging) and there is 
viciously circular reasoning.  The institutional theory may be circular but it is not viciously so.  I 
will adopt that argument here. 
 Recordings, especially, permit one to investigate the many complex features that exist in 
typical jazz ensemble performance.  One can listen to a recording of a tune or performance many 
times and concentrate one’s attention on various aspects.  For example, when I listen to the 
1960s quintet of Miles Davis, I like many others often concentrate on Miles Davis’ playing, 
soloing, and how he interprets and re-interprets standards, and his own quintet’s tunes (such as 
Wayne Shorter’s brilliant, innovative  tunes).  Other times I concentrate on Tony Williams’ 
drumming or Herbie Hancock’s accompaniment, much of which is improvised.  Listening to a 
series of live, veridical recordings, such as the quintet’s The Complete Live at the Plugged Nickel 
1965, one can compare and contrast the performances of the same tune and discern the very 
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varied way in which the rhythm section plays the same tune in different sets and on different 
days. 
 Performance event tokens are physical, space-time events whose spatial and temporal 
boundaries are determined by the phenomenological experience of the audience and the actions 
and intentions of the performers.  Audience members’ experiences of the event in addition to the 
conventions of performance will provide the grounds for the beginning and cessation of a 
performance event.  These events are brought about by the relevant artistic agents’ bodily 
movements, manipulation of sound producing devices (including vocalizations), and the sounds 
these devices produce.  An ontology of sound is well beyond the scope of this project;168 
however, here I will assume a reductive, physicalist ontology of sounds as vibrations of air.  
Causes and effects must be the same for two events to be identical.  By the “same,” I mean that 
the space-time properties are identical.  Hence, on this account, it is impossible to re-perform an 
action exactly (perhaps time travel would defeat this claim).  Requiring events to be individuated 
by their spatial-temporal properties makes possible performance types and tokens.  For example, 
John’s playing a middle C on a particular piano for three seconds on Tuesday at location L is a 
different event token from his playing a middle C for three seconds on the same piano on 
Wednesday at L.  However, both performance events are of the same performance type, viz., 
John’s playing a middle C for three seconds on this particular piano at L.  In an ontological 
theory of performing arts, it is desirable to distinguish performance token events from 
performance types because of spatial and temporal context dependent properties that often make 
a difference to critical assessments. 
                                                         
168 For the ontology of sound, a fairly recent area of metaphysics, see Casey O’Callaghan, 
Sounds (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
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 What is a recording?  The idea that recordings can be the primary objects of appreciation 
in particular genres, and thus be fundamental ontological entities, comes from Theodore 
Gracyk’s aesthetics of rock music.169  Although, as Gracyk notes, he was just giving 
philosophical justification for something critics, connoisseurs, and enthusiasts knew tacitly and 
un-philosophically.  Gracyk’s theory was revised by John Fisher.  Here are some quotations from 
Gracyk’s book Rhythm and Noise: An Aesthetics of Rock that give a good foundation for 
understanding the theory and its motivation:170 
1. “recordings are the primary link between the rock artist and the audience” (18).   
2. Recordings are “the primary object of critical attention” (18). 
3. “Records, not simply songs or performances, are the relevant object of critical attention” (13). 
4. Alternatively, recordings are the “primary texts” of rock music (21). 
5. “listeners immersed in the rock tradition regard the sound of rock recordings as highly relevant 
to their impact and meaning” (17-18). 
6. “the musical works do not exist apart from the recording process itself” (13). 
7. “Rock music is both composed and received in light of musical qualities that are subject to 
mechanical reproduction but not notational specification” (1). 
8. “In rock the musical work is less typically a song than an arrangement of recorded sounds” 
(1). 
Gracyk also points out the collaborative nature of the recording, which is the value of the 
production of the recording (by a separate producer(s) or the musicians themselves).  How 
recordings are produced, and the effect of that process, can only be accessed through the 
                                                         
169 Theodore Gracyk, Rhythm and Noise: An Aesthetics of Rock (Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 1996). 
170 Page numbers in parentheses below refer to Gracyk, Rhythm and Noise: An Aesthetics of Rock 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1996). 
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reproduction of the recording.  Production consists of microphone placement, tracking, choice of 
recording equipment, mixing tracks, dubbing, signal processing (e.g., echo, reverberation, 
frequency equalization, noise reduction, octave effects, distortion, flangellation).  As music 
aficionados know, some producers became famous, as famous as musicians and artists.  This 
ontology is what also explains the introduction of the term “recording artist,” which was first and 
aptly attributed to the Beatles. 
 The recording work (MWR) is the master “tape”171 recorded and produced at a particular 
time and place.  The master tape should be considered complete when the artists and other 
collaborators deem it is ready for reproduction and distribution to the public.  A constructed 
recording is not a performance of work; it is the work.  There are reproductions of the master 
tape on different media:  compact discs, tapes, vinyl records, et cetera.  All copies of the master 
tape in whatever medium (digital files such as MP3, cassette tapes, vinyl records, compact disks) 
must be causally related to the master tape in the right way in order to be authentic and give 
listeners proper epistemic access to the MWR.  We hear and have access to MWRs through 
playback.  Playback conditions are normative.  One must use a suitable reproduction machine in 
suitable listening conditions in order to experience the MWR.  Consequently, not all playback 
events give access to the MWR.  Here there will be tough aesthetic issues to consider:  what 
listening conditions are suitable?  Are there general rules that can be adopted?  Or are rules 
specific to individual cases or genres?  Some argue that some artists construct their recordings 
for “Ipod” like listening, viz., headphones, and environment in which the listening occurs is 
unimportant.  Gracyk and Fisher make the case that many (most?) rock recordings have standard, 
normative conditions for appropriate playback and listening.  Fisher says that most rock 
                                                         
171 Before digital recording and playback technology, the masters were reel-to-reel tapes.  
Nowadays, typically the master is a digital file encoded and stored on an appropriate medium. 
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recordings of roughly the 1960s and 1970s should be listened to in conditions that mimic 
professional studio playback, because those are the conditions under which the recording was 
made and “sculpted.”172 
 Fisher argues that veridical recordings have less support as MWs in rock music.  
Although I disagree with Fisher, I will not contest his claim here.  I think it is different for jazz 
and perhaps other musical genres wherein improvisation is central.  Problem is that veridical 
recordings seem to be documentations of the performance token event, and if one thinks that 
performance tokens are WOAs, then this makes the case for veridical recordings being works 
themselves even more difficult.  I do not want to deny that veridical recordings are 
documentations.  Since there are important features of improvisations occurring in real time 
(unlike what often happens in constructed recordings), as I said above, often there is not much 
difference between a constructed and veridical recording.  A studio performance is like a “live” 
performance without an audience.  One might think that in constructed recordings, musicians are 
performing for a recording, whereas in veridical recordings performers are performing for an 
audience.  But ultimately this distinction dissolves because musicians know that there is 
an“audience” who will be listening to their recordings at a later time.  In addition, however the 
audience’s presence changes musicians’ performances, there are other ways in which it causes 
more opacity to what is of utmost aesthetic importance.  For example, the justly famous and 
valuable Bill Evans’ Sunday at the Village Vanguard sessions173 recording has a lot of ambient 
noise.  Sometimes I think that the clinking of glasses, the light, whispering conversation, and the 
sounds of the movement of the club’s staff add a sentimental touch to these recordings.  But most 
                                                         
172 Fisher, “Rock ‘n’ Recording,” 112-113. 
173 Bill Evans Trio, The Complete Village Vanguard Recordings, 1961, three CDs, Riverside 
Records 3RCD-4443-2).  This is a live recording of the Bill Evan Trio at the Village Vanguard, 
New York, on June 25, 1961. 
  
309 
of the time I am annoyed because it creates an albeit not totally cumbersome barrier to hearing 
and concentrating on Evans’ piano, Paul Motian’s drums, and Scott La Faro’s bass.  Many jazz 
musicians treat the studio as if it were a live performance (minus the distractions of the 
audience174), and they believe that artistic integrity requires improvisers especially to record in 
this way.  These musicians would never dub, splice, or paste sound sequences, although almost 
everyone executes several “takes” of a performance in a studio setting.  The selection of which 
performance to publish is also available in the veridical case.  Usually, producers will record 
many more live performances than what is intended to be released, and the musicians and other 
collaborators choose which to include on the master tape.  These performances may be culled 
from several different venues and appearances.  Historically, this has not occurred in jazz as 
much as in rock and popular music.  And this fact is revealing.  There is a strong documentation 
sensibility in jazz and improvisational practices.  Many “takes” are often released, veridical 
recordings are unified (one time and place), critics and enthusiasts demand release of all sessions 
and material recorded.175  There are two kinds of immediacy involved in improvisation.  First, 
the fact that ideas, movements, sounds, et cetera are being invented at the time of recording, or 
playing, or performing—invention is occurring immediately (more or less as I have established 
already).  Revision and editing are impossible, and there are significant temporal constraints.  
Second, there is the twofold immediacy of improvisation in live performance:  real time 
invention (the first) and phenomenological immediacy, or uniqueness of initial experience.  I am 
not suggesting that the initial experience one has in listening is not valuable.  I am suggesting 
                                                         
174 Some jazz musicians love the audience; they feed off of them and it fuels their creative 
inspiration.  Other jazz musicians loathe audiences, even when they are well behaved (the Glenn 
Gould view). 
175 This phenomenon exists in rock music appreciation, too.  One recent example is the enormous 
amount of material being released by Jimi Hendrix’s executors. 
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that it may not be the most valuable because it does permit understanding and appreciation of 
properties of improvisations that require study and contemplation—the kind of study and 
contemplation one affords to a late Beethoven string quartet, or Mahler symphony, or a work of 
Schönberg.   In addition, experiences of sound recordings involve mostly hearing.  Experiences 
of live performance involve more than one sensory modality.  Recent studies have shown that the 
visual component of the live experience (the same is true of video recordings of live, musical 
performances) affects our understanding and appreciation, if not evaluation, of a performance.176  
People that experience simultaneous visual and auditory inputs detect expressive qualities more 
accurately than when confronted with auditory inputs alone.  This immediacy has caused 
confusion about evaluation, however.  Some philosophers have thought that a kind of acousmatic 
concatenationism is the correct model of understanding and appreciation of improvisation 
because of these kinds of immediacy.  In other words, improvisation’s most salient features are 
detectable in (or even require attendance at live performances177) immediate experience because 
they are immediate phenomena.  This view is erroneous.  There are qualities to detect and 
appreciate that come from non-immediate repeated experience, reflection, and introspection, the 
first kind of immediacy is present in repeated experiences of live performances or recordings.  
But this is erroneous.  Documentation and recording technology have permitted deep 
concentration.  Here is Keith Jarrett commenting on his own, recent solo recording: 
 
                                                         
176 See Dom McIver Lopes and Vincent Bergeron, “Hearing and Seeing Musical Expression,” 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (2009): 1-16, and my commentary on their 
article. 
177 Lee Brown seems to hold this view. See “Phonography,” in Aesthetics: Reader in Philosophy 
of the Arts, eds. David Goldblatt and Lee B. Brown (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 
1997), 252-257; and “‘Feeling My Way’:  Jazz Improvisation and Its Vicissitudes—A Plea for 
Imperfection,” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 58, no. 2 (Spring 2000):  113-124. 
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Months before I went to Japan, I had the idea that, since my career had had a lot to do 
with transforming energy into something new each time, this time I wanted the 
transformation to include the actual format itself.  Most listeners of my past solo concerts 
will be momentarily (at least) shocked at the initial absence of melodic—or even 
motivic—content, the material seemingly un-motivated by any concept at all.  This is not 
an accident (or it was a planned one).  I didn’t want any premature resolutions.  How we 
arrive at profound thoughts has a lot to do with what we aren’t thinking beforehand, and I 
had in mind letting some of the music happen to me without sitting there deep in thought.  
I wanted my hands (especially the left hand) to tell me things.  This is part of the process 
I wished to experiment with.  Transformative moments are very rare, or they seem so due 
to our inattention.  It takes so many processes to coincide just so for us to arrive at a 
transformative moment (if we’re watching).  But maybe this is wrong, and they happen 
constantly, though we are absent.  The listener has to bear with me here.  The whole thing 
is risky, but I’ve taken you places before and I’m not aiming to disappoint. 
 
 … I was slightly shocked to notice that the concert had arranged itself into a 
musical structure despite my every effort to be oblivious to the overall outcome.  I should 
not have felt this way, however, for the subconscious musical choices of sequence were 
made out of the personal need for the next thing.  This is what one should keep in mind 
while listening.  We are all players and we are all being played. 
 
… Everything on these discs is completely improvised.178 
 
In the second paragraph, one learns that even performers, improvisers, need to listen and engage 
again to discover all of the valuable properties present in an improvised performance.  The fact 
these features were not intended by the improviser is not relevant.  One finds valuable, 
unintended properties in non-improvised works of music, literature, painting, et cetera. 
 In addition, veridical recordings give us better access to improvisational artistic failures.  
A primary object of evaluation, as pointed above, is the oeuvre of an improviser.  Critics and 
enthusiasts want to hear many takes, alternatives, determine artistic growth or decline.  
Acquaintance with artistic failures is important, and veridical recordings provide more evidence 
of these failures.  Of course, constructed recordings can be failures as well.  One needs evidence 
                                                         
178 Keith Jarrett, “Some Words about the Music,” liner notes to Radiance, 2 CDs, EMC 1960/61, 
2005.  This is live (concert) recording of Jarrett performing in Osaka, Japan on October 27, 2002, 
and in Tokyo, Japan on October 30, 2002. 
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from both constructed and veridical recordings to make comprehensive judgments about 
improvisers. 
 Because there is a continuum of the degree differences between constructed and veridical 
recordings, and in the history of improvised jazz music this distinction is less stark than in rock 
music, and the role documentation plays in almost all improvisational genres, veridical 
recordings should count as MWRs. 
 Jazz “composers” compose tunes that are for the most part exactly like classical 
compositions.  The works of Duke Ellington, Antonio Carlos Jobim, Thelonious Monk, and 
Wayne Shorter are examples of brilliant jazz composers.  The action-type in these cases is 
(SCC).  They are notated in scores, charts, and lead sheets.  The specificity of the instructions 
provided through the notation will underdetermine the exact nature of the performance, and this 
specificity differs in the same it does in classical music.  For example, much of Duke Ellington’s 
oeuvre has a high level of specificity (much like late nineteenth century scores), although there 
are other compositions that are more like lead sheets wherein the instructions are deliberately 
vague.  In the latter cases, under-determination is the goal.  Basic melodic and harmonic 
structures are indicated leaving room for interpretation.  They become vehicles for 
improvisation.  Vehicles for improvising—particular tempos, rhythms, harmonic structures, 
melodies, vamps, et cetera—are aesthetically appreciated for their fecundity.  For aesthetic 
evaluation, the “aesthetic strength” of a jazz tune, say a Jobim or Ellington tune, is actually 
demonstrated by the number of recorded and unrecorded performances, the diversity of those 
performances and interpretations, and it malleability and flexibility for interpretation.  Where the 
work comes in to play in evaluating is to help us determine the strength of certain 
critical/aesthetic predicates that are important for jazz appreciation, criticism, and evaluation.  
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The recording or set of recordings of the composition form the base upon which one determines 
both the aesthetic strength of the pure sound structure that the composition instantiates, and the 
interpretation performance token itself, which on my account is a MW, too.  Ontological 
plurality accounts for our appreciative practices, and explains the generative practices of the 
artists. 
 Duke Ellington himself recorded some of his more robust compositions as lead sheets 
(e.g., Duke Ellington and John Coltrane album, Money Jungle album with Ellington in a trio 
setting with Charles Mingus and Max Roach179) demonstrating the flexibility that exists in jazz 
and in genres where improvisation, innovation, and novelty are premiums.  If Levinson’s theory 
could be salvaged from its problems, then it would be a satisfactory theory of the “thicker” 
scores.  These more robustly scored works possess artistic properties not captured by pure sound 
structures.  There is no doubt that these artistic properties are important in the understanding and 
appreciation of these works.  However, since most of the compositions contained improvised 
sections, and the composers often recorded their own compositions with their own bands and 
ensembles, my ontology of recordings and pure sound structures are sufficient.  We have access 
to recordings that these composers made of their tunes.  To account for the various 
interpretations in recorded and unrecorded performances by other artists, there are pure sound 
structures.  In cases like “Take the A Train,” there is a score, which is robust in specific 
instructions like a classical score, and lead sheet notations.  The lead sheet notations are minimal 
with respect to melodic and harmonic notation and give rise to the significant improvisational 
practice of interpreting tunes (basic melodic and harmonic structures).  This is the process that 
was used in most of jazz history.  Standards are lead sheets extracted from ontologically thicker 
                                                         
179 Duke Ellington, Money Jungle, Blue Note Records CDP 7 46398 2, 1987; originally, United 
Artists Records UAJ-14017. 
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Tin Pan Alley scores, and musical show “books,” that are constitutive of the practice of 
generating versions, interpretations of these compositions.  Original instrumentation is almost 
always changed, and the point of performing them is to render an interesting interpretation.  Not 
only melodic and harmonic elements are ornamented and changed, and tempi changed, but 
sometimes the entire style or sub-genre of a tune is changed from its original score and/or 
performances.  For example, suppose a samba is changed to a march, a ballad becomes an up-
tempo tune, a major, expressively happy tune is changed to minor.  Some versions have become 
appreciated and entrenched.  For example, Charlie Parker’s famous introduction to “All the 
Things You Are,”180 which was partly improvised and partly planned, is now often considered 
part of the tune.  When performed in jam sessions, this introduction is often included.  Many 
younger musicians, who do not study the original Tin Pan Alley and musical show history, 
believe that it was part of the original tune! 
 What of other genres of music in which improvisation is essential, such as gamelan?  
Recordings have not played an important role in the history and development of gamelan.  
Historically, gamelan music is much older than jazz.  Second, recording technology and practices 
were late in introduction and never took hold because the live performance tradition, especially 
the “cutting sessions,” is central to gamelan practices.  Gamelan orchestras generate collective, 
collaborative improvisations based on constraints.  Since gamelan performances are the central 
objects of appreciation, and the sound structures instantiated during performances have no 
                                                         
180 One example of this introduction is on the recording Charlie Parker, Live at Massey Hall, 
May, 1953, Savoy Records.  Scott DeVeaux reports that this famous introduction can be traced 
back to a tune titled “Good Jelly Blues, recorded by Billy Eckstine and the DeLuxe All-Stars on 
April 13, 1944, and probably notated by Dizzy Gillespie.  In addition, DeVeaux claims that this 
introduction is a “hip caricature” of the opening to Rachmaninoff’s Prelude in C-Sharp Minor.  
Scott DeVeaux, The Birth of Bebop: A Social and Musical History (Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, 1997), 342-343. 
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effective ossifying mechanism, we must accept the performance tokens and the sound structures 
they instantiate.  Having neither a notational record, nor sound recording, and given the immense 
harmonic, melodic, and rhythmic complexity of gamelan performances, it is improbable that 
these sound structures will have much practical value.  People will not be able to remember in 
sufficient detail the sound structure features of the performance.  Nonetheless, those sound 
structures do exist and are instantiated during those performances.  In the cases where the 
performances are recorded, the recording will be the primary MW. 
How would one decide what ontology to use?  Genre determinations and the like must 
proceed on a case-by-case basis and ought to be argued about and decided by critics, 
connoisseurs, and the public.  Over time, certain views become entrenched.  These attributions 
must be empirically decided (by the experts) by the conditions present at the time of production.  
Because it is empirical, there can be epistemic problems.  For example, a case in which an 
improvisation occurs as a performance token event and initially it is believed that there was no 
recording of the event will be deficient until the recording is discovered.  At some later time, one 
discovers a live, veridical recording of the performance token.  Perhaps, it was clandestinely 
recorded by an audience member.  This kind of case has existed.  There are Charlie Parker 
recordings of live performances that were unknown until a few decades after the performances.  
In addition, because of the limits of our empirical knowledge one must be open to changes in our 
ontological attribution of particular cases.  Most cases, however, will be clear:  there is a 
recording, which is constructed or veridical, a performance token event occurs, the performance 
was recorded or not. 
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ENVOI 
 
 
 
 
 
to float the orb or suggest the orb is floating:  and, with the 
mind thereto attached, to float free:  the orb floats, a bluegreen 
wonder:  so to touch the structures as to free them into rafts 
 
that reveal the tide:  many rafts to ride and the tides make a 
place to go:  let’s go and regard the structures, the six-starred 
easter lily, the beans feeling up the stakes:  we’re gliding:  we 
 
are gliding:  ask the astronomer, if you don’t believe it:  but 
motion as a summary of time and space is gliding us:  for a while, 
we may ride such forces:  then, we must get off:  but now this 
 
beats any amusement park by the shore:  our Ferris wheel, what a 
wheel:  our roller coaster, what mathematics of stoop and climb:  sew 
my name on my cap:  we’re clear:  we’re ourselves:  we’re sailing. 
 
—A. R. Ammons, section 155 (conclusion) of Sphere: The Form of a Motion 
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